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  1. Point in time
    2024-12-18

Preamble

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 20(3) thereof,

Whereas:

  1. (1)

    Harmonised standards on the investment recommendations or other information recommending or suggesting an investment strategy (hereinafter "recommendations") are necessary for the objective, clear and accurate presentation of such information and for the disclosure of interests and conflicts of interest. They should be complied with by persons producing or disseminating recommendations. In particular, in order to ensure high standards of fairness, probity and transparency in the market, recommendations should be presented objectively and in a way that does not mislead market participants or the public.

  2. (2)

    All persons who produce or disseminate recommendations should have in place arrangements to ensure that information is objectively presented and interests or conflicts of interest are effectively disclosed. Moreover, additional arrangements should be made for those categories of persons who, by virtue of their nature and their activities, generally pose greater risks to market integrity and investor protection. That group would include independent analysts, investment firms, credit institutions, any person whose main business is to produce or disseminate recommendations, and the natural persons working for them under a contract of employment or otherwise, as well as other persons proposing investment decisions in respect of financial instruments who present themselves as having financial experience or expertise, or are perceived as such by market participants (hereinafter "experts"). Non-exhaustive indicators to be considered in relation to the identification of such experts include the frequency with which they produce recommendations; the number of followers they have when they propose recommendations; their personal work's history, including whether they have been professionally producing recommendations in the past; and whether their previous recommendations are or have been relayed by third parties, such as the media.

  3. (3)

    The identity of the persons producing recommendations, their competent authority, if any, and the dates and times when the recommendations were completed and then disseminated should be disclosed, since they may be valuable information for investors in relation to their investment decisions.

  4. (4)

    Disclosure of valuations and methodologies is useful information in order to understand recommendations, as well as to gauge the extent to which the persons producing them are consistent in the valuations and methodologies they adopt. Recommendations produced by the same person and related to companies that belong to the same industry or to the same country should aim at consistently exhibiting some consistent common factors. For those reasons, independent analysts, investment firms, credit institutions, persons whose main business is to produce recommendations, and the natural persons working for them under a contract of employment or otherwise, as well as experts, should explain in the recommendations any change in the valuations and methodologies they use.

  5. (5)

    The interests of persons producing recommendations, and the conflicts that those interests could entail, may influence the opinion that those persons express in their recommendations. In order to ensure that the objectivity and reliability of the information can be evaluated, it should be appropriate to disclose of any relationship and circumstance that may reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the information, including interests or conflicts of interest of the person producing the recommendation, or of a person belonging to the same group, concerning the financial instrument or the issuer to whom the recommendation, directly or indirectly, relates.

  6. (6)

    Disclosures of interests or conflicts of interest should be specific enough as to enable the recipient of the recommendation to take an informed view of the degree and nature of the interest or conflict of interest. Independent analysts, investment firms, credit institutions, persons whose main business is to produce recommendations, and the natural persons working for them under a contract of employment or otherwise, as well as experts, should also disclose whether they own a net long or short position above a predetermined threshold in the issued share capital of the issuer to which the recommendation relates. In that context, they should calculate the net long or short position in accordance with the methodology for calculating positions under Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

  7. (7)

    In the interest of proportionality, persons producing recommendations should be allowed to adapt their arrangements for objective presentation and for disclosure of interest or conflicts of interest within the limits set out in this Regulation, including when they produce non-written recommendations that are made using modalities such as meetings, road shows or audio or video conferences as well as radio, TV or website interviews.

  8. (8)

    Recommendations may be disseminated in an unaltered, altered or summarised form by a person other than the person producing them. The way in which persons who disseminate recommendations handle those recommendations may have an important impact on the evaluation of those by investors. In particular, the knowledge of the identity of the person disseminating the recommendation and the extent of alteration of the source recommendation can be a valuable piece of information for investors when considering their investment decisions.

  9. (9)

    Where the persons disseminating recommendations extrapolate only some elements of a source recommendation, this could amount to a substantial alteration of the content of the source recommendation. A change in the direction of the source recommendation (e.g. by changing a "buy" recommendation into a "hold" or "sell" recommendation, or vice versa, or by changing the price target) should always be considered a substantial alteration.

  10. (10)

    The processing of personal data in the context of this Regulation should be conducted in compliance with the national laws, regulations or administrative provisions transposing Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.

  11. (11)

    This Regulation is based on the draft regulatory technical standards submitted by the European Securities and Markets Authority to the Commission.

  12. (12)

    The European Securities and Markets Authority has conducted open public consultations on the draft regulatory technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the opinion of the Securities Markets Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

  13. (13)

    In order to ensure the smooth functioning of the financial markets, it is necessary that this Regulation enters into force as a matter of urgency and that the provisions laid down in this Regulation apply from the same date as those laid down in Regulation (EU) No 596/2014,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: