Related provisions for BIPRU 4.10.8

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To access the FCA Handbook Archive choose a date between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004 (From field only).

SUP 15.9.4RRP
A firm does not have to give notice to the FCA2 under SUP 15.9.1 R if it or another member of the consolidation group has already given notice of the relevant fact to:55(1) the FCA2 or55(2) (if another competent authority is co-ordinator of the financial conglomerate ) that competent authority; or(3) (in the case of a financial conglomerate that does not yet have a co-ordinator ) the competent authority who would be co-ordinator under Regulation 1(2) of the Financial Groups
SUP 4.2.5GRP
Actuaries3 act as a valuable source of information to the appropriate regulator4 in carrying out its functions. For example, in determining whether a firm satisfies the threshold conditions, the appropriate regulator4 has regard to whether the firm has appointed an actuary3 (or some other person with responsibility for the actuarial function required by rule 6 of the PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business)4 with sufficient experience in the areas of business
SYSC 13.7.9GRP
Operating processes and systems at separate geographic locations may alter a firm's operational risk profile (including by allowing alternative sites for the continuity of operations). A firm should understand the effect of any differences in processes and systems at each of its locations, particularly if they are in different countries, having regard to:(1) the business operating environment of each country (for example, the likelihood and impact of political disruptions or
DTR 5.4.4RRP
A parent undertaking which wishes to make use of the exemption in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market must without delay, notify the following to the FCA:1(1) a list of the names of those management companies, investment firms or other entities, indicating the competent authorities that supervise them, but with no reference to the issuers concerned; and(2) a statement that, in the case of each such management company
SYSC 21.1.2GRP
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
EG App 3.1.1RP
3The FCA is the single statutory regulator for all financial business in the UK. Its strategic objective under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the 2000 Act) is to ensure that the relevant markets function well. The FCA's operational objectives are: securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers;protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system; andpromoting effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets.(Note: The 2000
REC 6A.2.2GRP
A requirement is relevant if it is imposed:(1) by the operator's Home State regulator in the implementation of MiFID or any EU2 legislation made under MiFID;2(2) by provision implementing MiFID, or any EU2 legislation made under it, in the operator's Home State; or2(3) by any directly applicable EU2 regulation made under MiFID.2
CASS 11.11.32GRP
CASS debt management firms are also reminded of their obligation to notify the appropriate regulator of a significant breach of a rule under SUP 15.3.11 R.
SUP 16.8.10RRP
1Life policies falling within SUP 16.8.8 R, which were sold subject to the conduct of business rules of a previous regulator, need to be reported only if they were required to be reported on by the rules of the previous regulator of the firm submitting the report.
CONC 2.10.20GRP
Where a firm understands, or reasonably suspects, a customer has or may have a mental capacity limitation the firm should take particular care that the customer is not provided with credit which the firm knows, or reasonably believes, to be unsuitable to the customer's needs, even where the credit would be affordable.[Note: paragraph 4.43 of MCG]
EG 11.3.2RP
1However, there may be circumstances in which the FCA will choose to use the powers under section 382 or section 383 of the Act to apply to the court for an order for restitution against a firm. Those circumstances may include, for example, where: (1) the FCA wishes to combine an application for an order for restitution with other court action against the firm, for example, where it wishes to apply to the court for an injunction to prevent the firm breaching a relevant requirement11;
MAR 10.5.2GRP
1The following provisions of the MiFI Regulations regulate the power of the FCA to intervene in respect of position limits: (1) Regulation 28 provides that the FCA may, if it considers necessary, limit the ability of any person to enter into a contract for a commodity derivative, restrict the size of positions a person may hold in such a contract, or require any person to reduce the size of a position held, notwithstanding that the restriction or reduction would be more restrictive
REC 2.4.5GRP
In assessing whether its connection with any person could affect whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to:4(1) the reputation and standing of that other person, including his standing with any relevant UK or overseas regulator;(2) breaches of any law or regulation by that other person; (3) the roles of any of the UK recognised body's key individuals who have a position within organisations under the control or influence of that other
EG 19.10.4RP
1The FCA has powers under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act both as a “designated enforcer” in relation to domestic and Schedule 132 infringements and as a “Schedule 132 enforcer” which gives the FCA and other Schedule 132 enforcers additional powers in relation to Schedule 132 infringements under the CRA2.
EG App 3.3.2RP
1Under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 the Director of the SFO may investigate any suspected offence which appears on reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex fraud and may also conduct, or take over the conduct of, the prosecution of any such offence. The SFO may investigate in conjunction with any other person with whom the Director thinks it is proper to do so; that includes a police force (or the FCA or any other regulator). The criteria used by the SFO for deciding
DEPP 1.1.1GRP
1This manual (DEPP) is relevant to firms, approved persons and other persons, whether or not they are regulated by the FCA.5 It sets out:5(1) the FCA's5 decision-making procedure for giving statutory notices. These are warning notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5);5(1A) the FCA's decision-making procedure in cases where the PRA is required to seek the FCA's consent before approving an application (a) for Part 4A permission; (b) for the variation
SYSC 4.4.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person13?

8

Yes. They13 will be performing the limited scope function13.

However, the limited scope function does not apply to an EEA SMCR firm (except claims management and funeral plan 16firms) or an authorised professional firm that is a core SMCR firm.1313

171717178

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The FCA13 considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm'schief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals may nevertheless require approval under section 59 (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FCA13 would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas SMCR firm13 which is not an EEA SMCR firm13?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1 2.15R13).

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm'sUK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

13(3) SYSC 4.4 does not apply to such a firm if it does not have a branch in the United Kingdom.

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an EEA SMCR firm other than a claims management or funeral plan 16firm13?

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). 15

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm'sgroup under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2).

(4) SYSC 4.4 does not apply to an EEA PTV firm if it does not have a branch in the United Kingdom15.

See also Question 1.15

1313

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FCA13 envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of independent,9 non-executive directors to be responsible (among other things) for overseeing the effectiveness9 of the audit process and the objectivity and independence of the external auditor9. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval under section 59 in relation to that function (see Question 1).

5

15

[deleted]15

 13
MAR 5.7.1BGRP
[deleted]64
COLL 11.2.2RRP
(1) An application for approval of an investment in a master UCITS under section 283A of the Act must be accompanied by the following documents:(a) the instrument constituting the fund1 of the feeder UCITS and of the master UCITS;1(b) the prospectus and the key investor information referred to in COLL 4.7.2 R (Key investor information) of the feeder UCITS and of the master UCITS;(c) the master-feeder agreement or the internal conduct of business rules in accordance with COLL 11.3.2R