Related provisions for SUP 3.8.5

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SUP 3.5.1GRP
If an auditor is to carry out his duties properly, he needs to be independent of the firm he is auditing, so that he is not subject to conflicts of interest. Many firms are also subject to requirements under the Companies Act 1989, or the Companies Act 2006,1 the Building Societies Act 1986 or the Friendly Societies Act 1992 on auditor's independence.
SUP 3.5.2RRP
A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that the auditor which it appoints is independent of the firm.
SUP 3.5.3RRP
If a firm becomes aware at any time that its auditor is not independent of the firm, it must take reasonable steps to ensure that it has an auditor independent of the firm. The firm must notify the FCA and the PRA (if it is a PRA-authorisedfirm) or the FCA (in all other cases) if independence is not achieved within a reasonable time.
SUP 3.5.4GRP
The appropriate regulator will regard an auditor as independent if his appointment or retention does not breach the ethical guidance in current issue from the auditor's recognised supervisory body on the appointment of an auditor in circumstances which could give rise to conflicts of interest.
SUP 3.8.7GRP
SUP 3.5.4 G explains that an auditor whose appointment does not breach the ethical guidance in current issue from the auditor's recognised supervisory body will be regarded as independent by the appropriate regulator.
COLL 7.7.10RRP
(1) The authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme that is a merging UCITS or a receiving UCITS in a proposed UCITS merger must ensure that a document containing appropriate and accurate information on the merger is provided to the unitholders of that scheme so as to enable them to:(a) make an informed judgment about the impact of the proposal on their investment;(b) exercise their rights under regulation 12 (Right of redemption) of the UCITS Regulations 2011; and(c) where applicable,
COLL 7.7.13RRP
(1) The6 information document that the 6 authorised fund manager of a merging UCITS6 must provide to its unitholders under COLL 7.7.10 R (3)(b) must also include:(a) details of any differences in the rights of unitholders of the merging UCITS before and after the proposed UCITS merger takes effect;(b) if the key investor information of the merging UCITS and the receiving UCITS show synthetic risk and reward indicators in different categories, or identify different material risks
REC 2.3.12GRP
4For the purposes of REC 2.3, "net capital" should be in the form of equity. For this purpose, the FCA5 considers that common stock, retained earnings, disclosed reserves and other instruments classified as common equity tier one capital or additional tier one capital constitute equity. The FCA5 considers that, when calculating its net capital, a UK recognised body:55(1) should deduct holdings of its own securities, or those of any undertaking in the same group as the UK recognised
BIPRU 5.6.19RRP
(1) A firm must be able to satisfy the appropriate regulator that the firm's risk management system for managing the risks arising on the transactions covered by the master netting agreement is conceptually sound and implemented with integrity and that, in particular, the minimum qualitative standards in (2) – (11) are met.(2) The internal risk-measurement model used for calculation of potential price volatility for the transactions is closely integrated into the daily risk-management
SYSC 5.1.11GRP
Where a firm10 outsources its internal audit function, it should take reasonable steps to ensure that every individual involved in the performance of this service is independent from the individuals who perform its external audit. This should not prevent services from being undertaken by a firm's external auditors provided that:(1) the work is carried out under the supervision and management of the firm's own internal staff; and(2) potential conflicts of interest between the provision
COLL 8.4.5RRP
(1) 714Subject to (2) and (3) (where applicable), a qualified investor scheme may invest in units in a scheme (a ‘second scheme’) only if the second scheme is:7(a) a regulated collective investment scheme; or7(b) a scheme not within (a) where the authorised fund manager has taken reasonable care to determine that:7(i) it is the subject of an independent annual audit conducted in accordance with international standards on auditing;7(ii) the calculation of the net asset value of
COLL 5.7.9RRP
(1) A non-UCITS retail scheme operating as a FAIF must not invest in units in schemes in COLL 5.7.7R(2)(a) to (2)(c)7 (‘second schemes’) unless the authorised fund manager has carried out appropriate due diligence on each of the second schemes and:(a) is satisfied, on reasonable grounds and after making all reasonable enquiries, that each of the second schemes complies with relevant legal and regulatory requirements;(b) has taken reasonable care to determine that:(i) the property
SYSC 4.4.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person13?

8

Yes. They13 will be performing the limited scope function13.

However, the limited scope function does not apply to an EEA SMCR firm (except claims management and funeral plan 16firms) or an authorised professional firm that is a core SMCR firm.1313

171717178

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The FCA13 considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm'schief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals may nevertheless require approval under section 59 (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FCA13 would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas SMCR firm13 which is not an EEA SMCR firm13?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1 2.15R13).

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm'sUK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

13(3) SYSC 4.4 does not apply to such a firm if it does not have a branch in the United Kingdom.

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an EEA SMCR firm other than a claims management or funeral plan 16firm13?

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). 15

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm'sgroup under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2).

(4) SYSC 4.4 does not apply to an EEA PTV firm if it does not have a branch in the United Kingdom15.

See also Question 1.15

1313

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FCA13 envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of independent,9 non-executive directors to be responsible (among other things) for overseeing the effectiveness9 of the audit process and the objectivity and independence of the external auditor9. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval under section 59 in relation to that function (see Question 1).

5

15

[deleted]15

13
SYSC 4.7.7RRP

[deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 24.2.6R]6

CASS 7.15.18RRP
(1) Before using a non-standard method of internal client money reconciliation, a firm must:(a) establish and document in writing its reasons for concluding that the method of internal client money reconciliation it proposes to use will:(i) (for the normal approach to segregating client money) check whether the amount of client money recorded in the firm's records as being segregated in client bank accounts meets the firm's obligation to its clients under the client money rules
CASS 7.13.58RRP
(1) In addition to the requirement under CASS 7.13.57 R, before adopting the alternative approach, a firm must send a written report to the FCA prepared by an independent auditor of the firm in line with a reasonable assurance engagement, stating the matters set out in (2).(2) The written report in (1) must state whether, in the auditor's opinion:(a) the firm's systems and controls are suitably designed to enable it to comply with CASS 7.13.62 R to CASS 7.13.65 R; and(b) the firm's
BIPRU 4.10.51RRP
GA as calculated under BIPRU 5.8.11 R is then taken as the value of the protection for the purposes of calculating the effects of unfunded credit protection under the IRB approach.[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 4 point 8 (part)]