Related provisions for GENPRU 2.2.168

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CONC 7.13.8GRP
SYSC 8.1 includes rules and guidance on outsourcing with which firms must or should comply as appropriate.
INSPRU 7.1.9AGRP
2This section sets out in greater detail the approach to be taken by a firm when carrying out the assessment of capital described in the preceding paragraph. This is the assessment referred to as an individual capital assessment. 3GENPRU 1.2.42 R is a general requirement for a firm to carry out stress tests and scenario analyses taking into account an appropriate range of adverse circumstances and events relevant to the firm's business and risk profile and to estimate the financial
IFPRU 6.1.2GRP
This chapter:(1) implements article 101 of CRD; (2) contains the rule that exercises the discretion afforded to the FCA as competent authority under article 327(2) of the UK CRR1; and(3) contains the guidance for market risk.
COLL 4.3.2GRP
(1) The diagram in COLL 4.3.3 G explains how an authorised fund manager should treat changes it is proposing to a scheme and provides an overview of the rules and guidance in this section.(2) Regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations (The Authority's approval for certain changes in respect of a company), section 261Q of the Act (Alteration of contractual schemes and changes of operator or depositary)5 and section 251 of the Act (Alteration of schemes and changes of manager or trustee)
GEN 4.5.5GRP
[deleted]2
MAR 5A.3.8GRP
Matched principal trading does not exclude the possibility of settlement risk, and, accordingly, firms should take appropriate steps to minimise this risk. For guidance relating to the treatment of matched principal trading for the purposes of IFPRU prudential categorisation, see PERG 13 Q61 and Q64.
SYSC 19A.1.8GRP
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should in particular note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices to be
PERG 5.12.13GRP
[deleted]65455451
MCOB 5.1.4GRP
The table in MCOB 5.1.5 G shows how the relevant rules and guidance in MCOB 5.6 apply to certain types of regulated mortgage contracts.
IFPRU 2.1.4GRP
This section has rules requiring a firm to identify and assess risks to its ability to meet its liabilities as they fall due, how it intends to deal with those risks, and the amount and nature of financial resources that the firm considers necessary. IFPRU 2.2.43 R (Documentation of risk assessment) provides that a firm should document that assessment. The FCA will review that assessment as part of its own assessment of the adequacy of a firm's capital under its supervisory review
SUP 16.5.3GRP
The purposes of the rules and guidance in this section are:(1) to ensure that, in addition to such notifications, the appropriate regulator11 receives regular and comprehensive information about the identities of all persons with whom a firm has close links, which is relevant to a firm's continuing to satisfy the effective supervision threshold conditions11 and to the protection of consumers; and1111(2) to implement certain requirements relating to the provision of information
DEPP 6.5C.3GRP
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the market abuse. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the market abuse:(a) the conduct of the individual in
CREDS 7.1.3GRP
The rules and guidance in this chapter are in addition to the provisions of (in relation to Great Britain credit unions)2section 11 of the Credit Unions Act 1979 and (in relation to Northern Ireland credit unions) article 28 of the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 19852 in relation to loans made by credit unions. Under these provisions (1) a Great Britain credit union may make a loan only to:22(a) a member of the credit union who is an individual; and(b) a corporate member
BIPRU 12.3.2GRP
BIPRU 12.4 contains further rules and guidance on stress testing and contingency funding plans. These are both extensions of the overarching systems and controls provisions in BIPRU 12.3. In formulating the rules and guidance in these two sections, the appropriate regulator has taken account of the Principles for Sound Liquidity Management and Supervision dated September 2008 issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It is intended that the content of BIPRU 12.3 and
SYSC 4.4.6GRP

Frequently asked questions about allocation of functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R

Question

Answer

1

Does an individual to whom a function is allocated under SYSC 4.4.5 R need to be an approved person13?

8

Yes. They13 will be performing the limited scope function13.

However, the limited scope function does not apply to an EEA SMCR firm (except claims management firms) or an authorised professional firm that is a core SMCR firm.1313

171717178

2

If the allocation is to more than one individual, can they perform the functions, or aspects of the functions, separately?

If the functions are allocated to joint chief executives under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, they are expected to act jointly. If the functions are allocated to an individual under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2, in addition to individuals under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, the former may normally be expected to perform a leading role in relation to the functions that reflects his position. Otherwise, yes.

3

What is meant by "appropriately allocate" in this context?

The allocation of functions should be compatible with delivering compliance with Principle 3, SYSC 4.4.3 R and SYSC 4.1.1 R. The FCA13 considers that allocation to one or two individuals is likely to be appropriate for most firms.

4

If a committee of management governs a firm or group, can the functions be allocated to every member of that committee?

Yes, as long as the allocation remains appropriate (see Question 3). If the firm also has an individual as chief executive, then the functions must be allocated to that individual as well under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see Question 7).

5

Does the definition of chief executive include the possessor of equivalent responsibilities with another title, such as a managing director or managing partner?

Yes.

6

Is it possible for a firm to have more than one individual as its chief executive?

Although unusual, some firms may wish the responsibility of a chief executive to be held jointly by more than one individual. In that case, each of them will be a chief executive and the functions must be allocated to all of them under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2 (see also Questions 2 and 7).

7

If a firm has an individual as chief executive, must the functions be allocated to that individual?

Normally, yes, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

But if the firm is a body corporate and a member of a group, the functions may, instead of being allocated to the firm'schief executive, be allocated to a director or senior manager from the group responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division, so long as this is appropriate (see Question 3). Such individuals may nevertheless require approval under section 59 (see Question 1).

If the firm chooses to allocate the functions to a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of a relevant group division, the FCA13 would expect that individual to be of a seniority equivalent to or greater than a chief executive of the firm for the allocation to be appropriate.

See also Question 14.

8

If a firm has a chief executive, can the functions be allocated to other individuals in addition to the chief executive?

Yes. SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3, permits a firm to allocate the functions, additionally, to the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers as long as this is appropriate (see Question 3).

9

What if a firm does not have a chief executive?

Normally, the functions must be allocated to one or more individuals selected from the firm's (or where applicable the group's) directors and senior managers under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 3.

But if the firm:

(1) is a body corporate and a member of a group; and

(2) the group has a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group or of a relevant group division;

then the functions must be allocated to that individual (together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate) under SYSC 4.4.5 R, column 2.

10

What do you mean by "group division within which some or all of the firm's regulated activities fall"?

A "division" in this context should be interpreted by reference to geographical operations, product lines or any other method by which the group's business is divided.

If the firm's regulated activities fall within more than one division and the firm does not wish to allocate the functions to its chief executive, the allocation must, under SYSC 4.4.5 R, be to:

(1) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of the group; or (2) a director or senior manager responsible for the overall management of one of those divisions;

together, optionally, with individuals from column 3 if appropriate. (See also Questions 7 and 9.)

11

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an overseas SMCR firm13 which is not an EEA SMCR firm13?

The firm must appropriately allocate those functions to one or more individuals, in accordance with SYSC 4.4.5 R, but:

(1) The responsibilities that must be apportioned and the systems and controls that must be overseen are those relating to activities carried on from a UK establishment with certain exceptions (see SYSC 1 Annex 1 2.15R13).

(2) The chief executive of an overseas firm is the person responsible for the conduct of the firm's business within the United Kingdom (see the definition of "chief executive"). This might, for example, be the manager of the firm'sUK establishment, or it might be the chief executive of the firm as a whole, if he has that responsibility.

13(3) SYSC 4.4 does not apply to such a firm if it does not have a branch in the United Kingdom.

12

How does the requirement to allocate the functions in SYSC 4.4.5 R apply to an EEA SMCR firm other than a claims management firm13?

(1) Such a firm is not required to allocate the function of dealing with apportionment in SYSC 4.4.5R (1).

(2) Such a firm is required to allocate the function of oversight in SYSC 4.4.5R (2). 15

(3) Such a firm need not allocate the function of oversight to its chief executive; it must allocate it to one or more directors and senior managers of the firm or the firm'sgroup under SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (2).

(4) SYSC 4.4 does not apply to an EEA PTV firm if it does not have a branch in the United Kingdom15.

See also Question 1.15

1313

13

What about a firm that is a partnership or a limited liability partnership?

The FCA13 envisages that most if not all partners or members will be either directors or senior managers, but this will depend on the constitution of the partnership (particularly in the case of a limited partnership) or limited liability partnership. A partnership or limited liability partnership may also have a chief executive (see Question 5). A limited liability partnership is a body corporate and, if a member of a group, will fall within SYSC 4.4.5 R, row (1) or (2).

14

What if generally accepted principles of good corporate governance recommend that the chief executive should not be involved in an aspect of corporate governance?

The Note to SYSC 4.4.5 R provides that the chief executive or other executive director or senior manager need not be involved in such circumstances. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code5 recommends that the board of a listed company should establish an audit committee of independent,9 non-executive directors to be responsible (among other things) for overseeing the effectiveness9 of the audit process and the objectivity and independence of the external auditor9. That aspect of the oversight function may therefore be allocated to the members of such a committee without involving the chief executive. Such individuals may require approval under section 59 in relation to that function (see Question 1).

5

15

[deleted]15

 13
FEES 4.1.3GRP
Most of the detail of the periodic fees that are payable by firms is set out in FEES 4 Annexes 1A to 11BR11. FEES 4 Annex 12 G194 and 13FEES 4 Annex 13G provide10 guidance on the calculation of certain tariffs.5 Most of the provisions of the Annexes will vary from one fee year19 to another. Accordingly fresh FEES 4 Annexes will come into force, following consultation, for each fee year19.411191019199
SUP 3.8.1GRP
The auditor of a firm has various rights and duties to obtain information from the firm and both to enable and to require him to pass information to the appropriate regulator in specified circumstances. This section imposes or gives guidance on those rights and duties.