Related provisions for CREDS 2.2.17
1 - 20 of 87 items.
Under section 4(1) of, and Schedule 1 to, the Credit Unions Act 1979 or article 8(1) of, and Schedule 1 to, the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 1985, as appropriate1, a credit union is required to have a committee of management, managers or other officers, or a board of directors (a governing body)5. This body 5should be competent to control the affairs of a credit union, and have an appropriate range of skills and experience relevant to the activities carried on by the
In accordance with rule SC 2 in COCON 2.2.1R5, it is the responsibility of each individual member of the governing body5 who is a senior conduct rules staff member5to understand, and ensure that the credit union complies with, the requirements of all the relevant Acts, secondary legislation and rules.
(1) The 5credit union'sgoverning body5has responsibility for ensuring that the credit union complies with the requirements of SYSC 4.1.1 R (see CREDS 2.2.1 G and CREDS 2.2.2 G). So, the governing body5 has overall responsibility for:(a) establishing objectives and formulating a business plan;(b) monitoring the financial position of the credit union;(c) determining and documenting policies and procedures;(d) directing and coordinating the work of all employees and volunteers, and
CREDS 2.2.8 R requires a credit union's system of control to be fully documented. The documentation helps the governing body5 to assess if systems are maintained and controls are operating effectively. It also helps those reviewing the systems to verify that the controls in place are those that have been authorised, and that they are adequate for their purpose.
(1) The governing body5 should decide what form this documentation should take, but the governing body5 should have in mind the following points.(a) Documents should be comprehensive: they should cover all material aspects of the operations of the credit union.(b) Documents should be integrated: separate elements of the system should be cross-referred so that the system can be viewed as a whole.(c) Documents should identify risks and the controls established to manage those risks.
Documentation should not be restricted to "lower level" controls applied in processing transactions, but should also cover "high level" controls including:(1) identifying those powers to be exercised only by the governing body5, and the powers delegated to others;(2) the purpose, composition and reporting lines of sub-committees, and senior managers to whom responsibilities are delegated;(3) the specific roles and responsibilities of individual officers;(4) the timing, form and
The main reasons why a credit union should maintain adequate accounting and other records are:(1) to provide the governing body5 with adequate financial and other information to enable it to conduct its business in a prudent manner on a day-to-day basis;(2) to safeguard the assets of the credit union and the interests of members and persons too young to be members; (3) to assist officers of the credit union to fulfil their regulatory and statutory duties in relation to the preparation
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a credit union to have a separate compliance function.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a compliance function should be documented.(3) A compliance function should be staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent to perform their duties objectively. It should be adequately resourced and should have unrestricted access to the credit union's
5The governing body must be satisfied that: (1) the information available is sufficiently comprehensive for the proper assessment of the potential risks for the credit union, and in order to determine its need for capital and liquidity; (2) the information available is sufficiently comprehensive to provide a clear statement of the performance and financial position of the credit union; (3) management information reports are prepared with sufficient frequency;(4) sufficient attention
In forming a view on whether the management information system is sufficiently comprehensive, the governing body should consider whether, where relevant, the substance of reports provides a clear statement of loans, conditional sale agreements and hire-purchase agreements,8 arrears and provisions. These matters should be compared against limits, ratios and other parameters set by the governing body, as well as regulatory requirements.
The purposes of an internal audit are:(1) to ensure that the policies and procedures of the credit union are followed;(2) to provide the governing body5 with a continuous appraisal of the overall effectiveness of the control systems, including proposed changes;(3) to recommend improvements where desirable or necessary;(4) to determine whether the internal controls established by the governing body5 are being maintained properly and operated as laid down in the policy, and comply
The internal audit work programme should include items such as:(1) verification of cash (counting and reconciliation) without prior notification;(2) bank reconciliation (checking records against bank statements);(3) verification of passbooks or account statements;(4) checking for compliance with policies and procedures;(5) checking for compliance with relevant Acts, secondary legislation and rules;(6) checking minutes and reports of the governing body5 and other sub-committees
The key elements of a satisfactory system of internal audit include the following:(1) Terms of reference. These should be specified with precision and include, amongst other things, scope and objectives of the audit committee and the internal audit function (see CREDS 2.2.11G), access to records, powers to obtain information and explanations for officers, and reporting requirements. These should be approved by the governing body5. (2) Risk analysis. Key risks in each area of the
The governing body5 should be satisfied that the internal audit function (see CREDS 2.2.11 G) is being properly carried out. In order to review the overall effectiveness of the internal audit function it should consider the following:(1) the adequacy and scope of planning;(2) the adequacy and scope of work performed in relation to the plans and programmes;(3) the regularity and level of reporting on matters arising from the inspections;(4) the disposal of points and recommendations
The governing body5should consider the range of possible outcomes in relation to various risks. These risks are increased when a credit union provides ancillary services such as issuing and administering means of payment and money transmission, which result, in particular, in higher liquidity and operational risks.
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(1) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 26.3.2R(1)]5(2) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 26.3.2R(2)]5(3) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 26.3.2R(3)]5(4) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 26.3.3R]5(5) [deleted]5(6) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 26.4.3R]5(7) [deleted
The approach taken in BIPRU 12.3 is to set out:(1) overarching systems and controls provisions in relation to a firm's management of its liquidity risk;(2) provisions outlining the responsibilities of that firm'sgoverning body and senior managers for the oversight of liquidity risk;(3) more detailed provisions covering a number of specific areas, including:(a) pricing liquidity risk;(b) intra-day management of liquidity;(c) management of collateral;(d) management of liquidity
The strategies, policies, processes and systems referred to in BIPRU 12.3.4 R must be proportionate to the complexity, risk profile and scope of operation of the firm, and the liquidity risk tolerance set by the firm'sgoverning body in accordance with BIPRU 12.3.8 R6.2[Note: article 86(2) (part) of the CRD]42
(1) 2[deleted]2(2) 2[deleted]2(3) A firm should ensure that its strategies, policies, processes and systems in relation to liquidity risk enable it to identify, measure, manage and monitor its liquidity risk positions for:(a) all sources of contingent liquidity demand (including those arising from off-balance sheet activities);(b) all currencies in which that firm is active; and(c) correspondent, custody and settlement activities.(4) 2[deleted]2(5) A firm should ensure that it
A firm must ensure that:(1) its governing body establishes that firm'sliquidity risk tolerance and that this is appropriately documented;2(2) its liquidity risk tolerance is appropriate for its business strategy and reflects its financial condition and funding capacity; and2(3) its liquidity risk tolerance is communicated to all relevant business lines.2[Note: article 86(2) of the CRD]425
As part of the SLRP, the appropriate regulator will assess the appropriateness of the liquidity risk tolerance adopted by an ILAS BIPRU firm to ensure that this risk tolerance is consistent with maintenance by the firm of adequate liquidity resources for the purpose of the overall liquidity adequacy rule. The appropriate regulator will expect a firm to provide it with an adequately reasoned explanation for the level of liquidity risk which that firm'sgoverning body has decided
A firm must ensure that its senior managers:(1) continuously review that firm's liquidity position, including its compliance with the overall liquidity adequacy rule; and(2) report to its governing body on a regular basis adequate information as to that firm's liquidity position and its compliance with the overall liquidity adequacy rule and with BIPRU 12.3.4R.
Although a firm'ssenior managers are likely to develop strategies, policies and practices for the management of that firm'sliquidity risk, it is the responsibility of a firm'sgoverning body to approve those strategies, policies and practices as adequate. In determining the adequacy of those strategies, policies and practices, a firm'sgoverning body should have regard to that firm'sliquidity risk tolerance established in accordance with BIPRU 12.3.8R.
[deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 24.2.6R]6
(1) Unless a firm cannot reasonably compare a maturity payment with a calculated asset share, it must:(a) set a target range for the maturity payments that it will make on:(i) all of its with-profits policies; or(ii) each group of its with-profits policies;(b) ensure that each target range:(i) is expressed as a percentage of unsmoothed asset share; and(ii) includes 100% of unsmoothed asset share; and(c) manage its with-profits business, and the business of each with-profit fund,
At least once a year (or, in the case of a non-directive friendly society, at least once in every three years) and whenever a firm is seeking to make a reattribution of its inherited estate,2 a firm'sgoverning body must determine whether the firm'swith-profits fund, or any of the firm'swith-profits fund, has an excess surplus.
A mutual may pay compensation or redress due to a policyholder, or formerpolicyholder, from a with-profits fund, but may only pay from assets that would otherwise be attributable to asset shares if, in the reasonable opinion of the firm'sgoverning body, the compensation or redress cannot be paid from any other assets in the with-profits fund. 1
A firm must not effect new contracts of insurance in an existing with-profits fund unless:22(1) the firm'sgoverning body is satisfied, so far as it reasonably can be, and can demonstrate, having regard to the analysis in (2), that the terms on which each type of contract is to be effected are likely to have no adverse effect on the interests of the with-profits policyholders whose policies are written into that fund; and2(2) the firm has:(a) carried out or obtained appropriate
A firm, other than a Solvency II firm,5 must not:2(1) use with-profits assets to finance the purchase of a strategic investment, directly or by or through a connected person; or2(2) retain an investment referred to in (1);2unless its governing body is satisfied, so far as it reasonably can be, and can demonstrate, that the purchase or retention is likely to have no adverse effect on the interests of its with-profits policyholders whose policies are written into the relevant f
(1) 2In order for a firm to comply with COBS 20.2.36 R, a firm'sgoverning body should consider:(a) the size of the investment in relation to the with-profits fund;(b) the expected rate of return on the investment;(c) the risks associated with the investment, including, but not limited to, liquidity risk, the capital needs of the acquired business or investment and the difficulty of establishing fair value (if any);(d) any costs that would result from divestment;(e) whether the
A firm will be taken to have ceased to effect new contracts of insurance in a with-profits fund:(1) when any decision by the governing body to cease to effect new contracts of insurance takes effect; or(2) where no such decision is made, when the firm is no longer:(a) actively seeking to effect new contracts of insurance in that fund; or(b) effecting new contracts of insurance in that fund, except by increment; or2(3) if the firm:2(a) (i) is no longer effecting a material volume
In order to ensure compliance with the overall liquidity adequacy rule and with BIPRU 12.3.4R and BIPRU 12.4.-1 R, a firm must:(1) conduct on a regular basis appropriate stress tests so as to:(a) identify sources of potential liquidity strain;(b) ensure that current liquidity exposures continue to conform to the liquidity risk tolerance established by that firm'sgoverning body; and(c) identify the effects on that firm's assumptions about pricing; and(2) analyse the separate and
Consistent with BIPRU 12.3.5R, the expects that the extent and frequency of such testing, as well as the degree of regularity of governing body review under BIPRU 12.4.2R, should be proportionate to the nature scale and complexity of a firm's activities, as well as to the size of its liquidity risk exposures. Consistent with the appropriate regulator's statutory objectives under the Act, in assessing the adequacy of a firm's stress testing arrangements (including their frequency
(1) A firm should ensure that the results of its stress tests are:(a) reviewed by its senior managers;(b) reported to that firm'sgoverning body, specifically highlighting any vulnerabilities identified and proposing appropriate remedial action;(c) reflected in the processes, strategies and systems established in accordance with BIPRU 12.3.4R;(d) used to develop effective contingency funding plans;(e) integrated into that firm's business planning process and day-to-day risk management;
A4firm must have in place liquidity recovery4plans setting out adequate strategies and proper implementation measures in order to address possible liquidity shortfalls6. Those plans must be tested at least annually,4 updated on the basis of the outcome of the alternative scenarios set out in BIPRU 12.4.-1 R, and be reported to and approved by the firm'sgoverning body, so that internal policies and processes can be adjusted accordingly.2 A firm must take the necessary operational
A firm must ensure that its contingency funding plan:(1) outlines strategies, policies and plans to manage a range of stresses;(2) establishes a clear allocation of roles and clear lines of management responsibility;(3) is formally documented;(4) includes clear invocation and escalation procedures;(5) is regularly tested and updated to ensure that it remains operationally robust;(6) outlines how that firm will meet time-critical payments on an intra-day basis in circumstances
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
(1) The Chief Risk Officer should be accountable to a firm'sgoverning body.(2) The FCA9 recognises that in addition to the Chief Risk Officers primary accountability to the governing body, an executive reporting line will be necessary for operational purposes. Accordingly, to the extent necessary for effective operational management, the Chief Risk Officer should report into a very senior executive level in the firm. In practice, the FCA9 expects this will be to the chief executive,
(1) The FCA9 considers that, while the firm'sgoverning body is ultimately responsible for risk governance throughout the business, firms should consider establishing a governing body risk committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.(2) Where a firm has established a governing body risk committee, its responsibilities will typically include:(a) providing advice to the firm'sgoverning body on risk strategy, including the oversight of current risk exposures
In carrying out their risk governance responsibilities, a firm'sgoverning body and governing body risk committee should have regard to any relevant advice from its audit committee or internal audit function concerning the effectiveness of its current control framework. In addition, they should remain alert to the possible need for expert advice and support on any risk issue, taking action to ensure that they receive such advice and support as may be necessary to meet their responsibilities
1A firm must, in relation to each with-profits fund it operates:(1) appoint:(a) a with-profits committee; or(b) a with-profits advisory arrangement (referred to in this section as an ‘advisory arrangement’), but only if appropriate, in the opinion of the firm'sgoverning body, having regard to the size, nature and complexity of the fund in question;(2) ensure that the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement operates in accordance with its terms of reference; and(3) make
(1) Ultimate responsibility for managing a with-profits fund rests with the firm through its governing body. The role of the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement is, in part, to act in an advisory capacity to inform the decision-making of a firm'sgoverning body. The with-profits committee or advisory arrangement also acts as a means by which the interests of with-profits policyholders are appropriately considered within a firm's governance structures. The with-profits
A firm must ensure that the terms of reference contain, as a minimum, terms having the following effect:(1) the role of the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement is, as relevant, to assess, report on, and provide clear advice and, where appropriate, recommendations to the firm'sgoverning body on:(a) the way in which each with-profits fund is managed by the firm and, if a PPFM is required, whether this is properly reflected in the PPFM;(b) if applicable, whether the firm
A firm must: (1) ensure that its governing body, in the context of its consideration of issues referred to in COBS 20.5.3R (1)(a) to (d) and (2)(b)(i) to (x):(a) obtains, as relevant, assessments, reports, advice and/or recommendations of the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement, if the governing body, the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement considers that significant issues concerning the interests of with-profits policyholders need to be considered by the
(1) COBS 20.5.5R (2) requires that a firm provides a with-profits committee or advisory arrangement with sufficient resources. A with-profits committee or advisory arrangement should be able to obtain external professional, including actuarial, advice, at the expense of the firm, if the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement considers the advice to be necessary to perform its role effectively. In a proprietary firm the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement should
(1) The FCA expects the governing body of the firm to decide whether a member of the with-profits committee or a person (other than a non-executive director) carrying out the advisory arrangement is independent. The FCA expects a firm'sgoverning body to adopt the following approach and have regard to the following factors when making this assessment:(a) the governing body should determine whether the person is independent in character and judgment and whether there are relationships
A firm (Firm A) must establish an IGC, unless:3(1) Firm A has established a governance advisory arrangement in accordance with COBS 19.5.3R; or3(2) another firm in Firm A’s group has already established an IGC under this section, and Firm A has made arrangements with that IGC to cover a relevant scheme operated by Firm A or a pathway investment offered by Firm A.3
(1) If a firm considers it appropriate, it may establish a governance advisory arrangement instead of an IGC, having regard to:3(a) for a relevant scheme operator, the size, complexity and nature of the relevant scheme it operates; or3(b) for a pathway firm, the size of the take up, or expected size of the take up, complexity and nature of the pathway investment.3(2) If a firm has decided to establish a governance advisory arrangement rather than an IGC, this section (other than
(1) Firms with large or complex relevant schemes should establish an IGC. For the purposes of this section, a firm may determine whether it has large relevant schemes by reference to:(a) the number of relevant policyholders in relevant schemes; (b) the funds under management in relevant schemes; and(c) the number of employers contributing to relevant schemes.(2) Examples of features that might indicate complex schemes include: (a) schemes that are operated on multiple information
A firm must include, as a minimum, the following requirements in its terms of reference for an IGC:(1) the IGC will act solely in the interests of:3(a) relevant policyholders and any other members or clients a firm asks the IGC to consider; or3(b) pathway investors;3(2) the IGC will assess the ongoing value for money for relevant policyholders delivered by a relevant scheme particularly, though not exclusively, through assessing the three factors in (a) to (c) below, taking into
(1) An IGC is expected to act in the interests of relevant policyholders or pathway investors3 both individually and collectively. Where there is the potential for conflict between individual and collective interests, the IGC should manage this conflict effectively. An IGC is not expected to deal directly with complaints from individual policyholders or pathway investors3. (2) The primary focus of an IGC should be the interests of relevant policyholders or pathway investors in
(1) A firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity. (3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members
(1) A firm should be able to demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of its financial condition and future prospects. In particular, practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain should be evaluated carefully and the governing body or remuneration committee (or both) should work closely with the firm's risk function in evaluating the incentives created by its remuneration system. (2)
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
(1) A firm must have in place contingency funding plans setting out adequate strategies and proper implementation measures in order to address potential liquidity shortfalls. (2) The contingency funding plans must be: (a) in writing;(b) approved by the firm'sgoverning body;(c) regularly tested; and(d) updated on the basis of the outcome of the stress tests, testing alternative scenarios set out in MIPRU 4.2D.8 R.
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[deleted] Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.1.5R]3
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(1) A CASS small debt management firm, other than a not-for-profit debt advice body, must allocate to a director or senior manager1 responsibility for:1(a) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS 11;1(b) reporting to the firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and1(c) completing and submitting a CCR005 return in accordance with SUP 16.12.29CR.1(2) [deleted]431
A CASS small debt management firm that is a not-for-profit debt advice body must allocate to a director or senior manager:(1) oversight of the firm's operational compliance with CASS 11; (2) reporting to the firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return in accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R.
A CASS large debt management firm must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of: (1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that CASS debt management firm's systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS 11; (2) reporting to the CASS debt management firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R.
An AIFM must ensure the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note: paragraph 1(d) of Annex II of AIFMD]
(1) An AIFM that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices, and the incentives created for managing risk.(3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the governing
An AIFM must ensure the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee, or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note: paragraph 1(f) of Annex II of AIFMD]
1A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that an actuary who is to be, or has been, appointed under PRA rules made under section 340 of the Act, or for the purposes of PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business, 69:8(1) does not perform the function of chairman or chief executive of the firm, or does not, if he is to perform the with-profits actuary function, become a member of the firm's governing body; and(2) does not perform any other function on behalf
1Both the actuarial function and the with-profits actuary function may be performed by employees of the firm or by external consultants, and performing other functions on behalf of the firm will not necessarily give rise to a significant conflict of interest. However, being a director, or a senior manager responsible, say, for sales or marketing in a firm (or for finance in a proprietary firm), is likely to give rise to a significant conflict of interest for an actuary performing
An actuary appointed to perform the actuarial function must, in respect of those classes of the firm's long-term insurance business which are covered by his appointment1:1(1) advise the firm's management, at the level of seniority that is reasonably appropriate, on1 the risks the firm runs in1 so far as they may have a material impact on the firm's ability to meet liabilities to policyholders in respect of long-term insurance contracts as they fall due and on the capital needed
1An actuary appointed to perform the with-profits actuary function must:(1) advise the firm's management, at the level of seniority that is reasonably appropriate, on key aspects of the discretion to be exercised affecting those classes of the with-profits business of the firm in respect of which he has been appointed;(2) [deleted]88(2A) where the firm is a Solvency II firm, advise the firm'sgoverning body as to whether the assumptions used to calculate the future discretionary
A firm must require and allow any actuary appointed to perform the with-profits actuary function1 to perform his duties and must1:11(1) keep him informed of the firm's business and other plans (including, where relevant, those of any related firm, to the extent it is aware of these);(2) provide him with sufficient resources (including his own time and access to the time of others);(3) hold such data and establish such systems as he reasonably requires;(4) request his advice about
(1) A firm'sgoverning body is likely to delegate many functions and tasks for the purpose of carrying out its business. When functions or tasks are delegated, either to employees or to appointed representatives or, where applicable, its tied agents8, appropriate safeguards should be put in place.(2) When there is delegation, a firm should assess whether the recipient is suitable to carry out the delegated function or task, taking into account the degree of responsibility involved.(3)
5A firm should ensure that the systems and controls include:(1) appropriate training for its employees in relation to money laundering;(2) appropriate provision of information to its governing body and senior management, including a report at least annually by that firm'smoney laundering reporting officer (MLRO) on the operation and effectiveness of those systems and controls;(3) appropriate documentation of its risk management policies and risk profile in relation to money laundering,
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate compliance function. The organisation and responsibilities of a compliance function should be documented. A compliance function should be staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent to perform their duties objectively. It should be adequately resourced and should have unrestricted access to the firm's relevant records as
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
(1) 24A firm's arrangements should be such as to furnish its governing body with the information it needs to play its part in identifying, measuring, managing and controlling risks of regulatory concern. Three factors will be the relevance, reliability and timeliness of that information.(2) Risks of regulatory concern are those risks which relate to the fair treatment of the firm'scustomers, to the protection of consumers, to effective competition and to the integrity of the UK
(1) If an appointed representative8 is a body corporate (other than a limited liability partnership), the director function is also the function of acting in the capacity of a person:(a) who is a director, partner, officer, member (if the parent undertaking or holding company is a limited liability partnership), senior manager, or employee of a parent undertaking or holding company of the appointed representative8; and(b) whose decisions or actions are regularly taken into account
(1) If an appointed representative8 is a body corporate, the non-executive director function is also the function of acting in the capacity of a person:(a) who is a non-executive director of a parent undertaking or holding company; and(b) whose decisions or actions are regularly taken into account by the governing body of the appointed representative8.(2) However, (1) does not apply if that parent undertaking or holding company has a Part 4A permission or is regulated by an EEA
This function is having the responsibility, alone or jointly with one or more others, under the immediate authority of the governing body:(1) for the conduct of the whole of the business (or relevant activities); or(2) in the case of a branch8 in the United Kingdom of a non-UKappointed representative8, for the conduct of all of the activities subject to the UKregulatory system.
A person performing the chief executive function may be a member of the governing body but need not be. If the chairman of the governing body is also the chief executive, he will be discharging this function. If the responsibility is divided between more than one person but not shared, there is no person exercising the chief executive function. But if that responsibility is discharged jointly by more than one person, each of those persons will be performing the chief executive
(1) Members of the management body4 include the persons who, under the operational or managerial arrangements of the UK recognised body, are appointed to manage the departments responsible for carrying out its relevant functions, whether or not they are members of its governing body. A person appointed to carry out specific tasks, such as to conduct a particular investigation into a specific set of facts, would not usually be a member of the management body4.(2) A member of the
Where the governing body of a UK recognised body delegates any of its functions (which relate to that UK recognised body'srelevant functions) to a standing committee, or appoints a standing committee to manage or oversee the carrying out of any of that UK recognised body'srelevant functions, that UK recognised body must immediately notify the FCA3 of that event and give the FCA3 the following information:33(1) the names of the members of that standing committee; and(2) the terms
(1) Standing committees include permanent committees with executive, supervisory, policy-making or rule-making responsibilities. Committees appointed for particular tasks or committees established for purely consultative or advisory purposes would not usually be considered to be standing committees.(2) Committees which include persons who are not members of the governing body can be standing committees.
(1) A CASS small firm must allocate to a single6director3 or senior manager3 of sufficient skill and authority6 responsibility for:3(a) oversight of the firm’s operational compliance with CASS; and3(b) reporting to the firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight.3(2) [deleted]873[Note: article 7, first paragraph of the MiFID Delegated Directive]61
1A CASS medium firm and a CASS large firm must allocate to a single6director or senior manager of sufficient skill and authority6 the function of:(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that firm’s systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS;(2) reporting to the firm’sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CMAR to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.14.[Note: article 7, first paragraph of the MiFID Delegated