Related provisions for SYSC 22.3.6
261 - 280 of 345 items.
1The FCA has investigation and sanctioning powers in relation to both criminal and civil breaches of the Payment Services Regulations. The Payment Services Regulations impose requirements including, amongst other things, obligations on payment service providers to provide users with a range of information and various provisions regulating the rights and obligations of payment service users and providers.
1The FCA recognises that preliminary findings letters serve a very useful purpose in focussing decision making on the contentious issues in the case. This in turn makes for better quality and more efficient decision making. However, there are exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may decide it is not appropriate to send out a preliminary findings letter. This includes: (1) where the subject consents to not receiving a preliminary findings letter; or (2) where it is not practicable
713If a complaint relates to the sale of a payment protection contract, knowledge by the complainant that there was a problem with the sale of the payment protection contract generally (for example where there has been a rejection of a claim on the grounds of ineligibility or exclusion, or the complainant has received a customer contact letter explaining that they may have been mis-sold) would not in itself ordinarily be sufficient to establish for the purposes of the three-year
A firm need not provide an ESIS:(1) in relation to a direct deal; (2) if the consumer refuses to disclose key information (for example, in a telephone conversation, his name or a communication address) or where the consumer is not interested in pursuing the enquiry; or(3) if the firm does not wish to do business with the consumer.
4Firms are reminded of:(1) the guidance in CONC 3.3.10G(6) to (8) in relation to debt solutions; and(2) the rule in CONC 8.2.4R which requires firms to notify the customer that free debt counselling, debt adjusting and providing of credit information services is available and that the customer can find out more by contacting MoneyHelper7.
(1) The purposes of this chapter are to2:(a) set out the requirements on firms in relation to the adoption, and communication to UK-based employees, of appropriate internal procedures for handling reportable concerns made by whistleblowers as part of an effective risk management system (SYSC 18.3);2(b) set out the role of the whistleblowers’ champion (SYSC 18.4);2(c) require firms to ensure that settlement agreements expressly state that workers may make protected disclosures
1Where a transferable security, which has been admitted to trading on a regulated market, is also traded on an MTF without the consent of the issuer, the firm operating the MTF must not make the issuer subject to any obligation relating to initial, ongoing or ad hoc financial disclosure with regard to that MTF.[Note: article 18(8)4 of MiFID]
If a contract with an appointed representative is terminated, or if it is amended in a way which gives rise to a requirement to notify under SUP 12.8.1R, a firm must take all reasonable steps to ensure that:(1) if the termination is by the firm, the appointed representative is notified in writing before, or if not possible, immediately on, the termination of the contract and informed that it will no longer be an exempt person for the purpose of the Act because of the contract
(1) When a firm enters into a current account agreement where:(a) there is a possibility that the account-holder may be allowed to overdraw on the current account without a pre-arranged overdraft or exceed a pre-arranged overdraft limit; and (b) if the account-holder did so, this would be a regulated credit agreement;the current account agreement must contain the information in (2) and (3).[Note: section 74A(1) of CCA](2) The information required by (1) is:(a) the rate of interest
(1) Where a financial instrument of an issuer is admitted to trading on one SME growth market, the financial instrument must not be traded on another SME growth market unless the issuer has been informed and has not objected. (2) In the case of (1), the issuer shall not be subject to any obligation relating to corporate governance or initial, ongoing or ad hoc disclosure with regard to the latter SME growth market.[Note: article 33(7) of MiFID]
(1) A firm must make available:(a) the information on the employers’ liability register either:(i) on the firm's website at the address notified to the FCA in ICOBS 8.4.6R (1); or(ii) by arranging for a tracing office which meets the conditions in ICOBS 8.4.9 R to make the information available on the tracing office’s website; and(b) the latest director's certificate prepared in accordance with SUP 16.23A.5R(1)5 and the latest report prepared by an auditor for the purposes of
(1) 7In SUP 6 the "relevant regulator" is the regulator to which a firm with a Part 4A permission has made or can make (in accordance with SUP 6) an application to vary or cancel its Part 4A permission or to have imposed on it a new requirement or to vary or cancel any existing requirement (see SUP 6.2.3A G to SUP 6.2.3E G).(2) Where the PRA can only determine an application with the consent of the FCA, the FCA may request further information as if it were the relevant regulator.(3)
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FCA11 ) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. Compliance by another person to whom the Principles apply with Principles 3, 4 and 11 can also be affected by the activities of other persons who are members of their group.14 This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems
(1) 1The FCA's3 approach to determining penalties described in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5C is intended to ensure that financial penalties are proportionate to the breach. The FCA3 recognises that penalties may affect persons differently, and that the FCA3 should consider whether a reduction in the proposed penalty is appropriate if the penalty would cause the subject of enforcement action serious financial hardship.333(2) Where an individual or firm claims that payment of the penalty