Related provisions for BIPRU 2.3.6
121 - 140 of 412 items.
The Regulated Activities Order does not define a reinsurance contract. The essential elements of the common law description of a contract of insurance are also the essential elements of a reinsurance contract. Whilst the terms derived from the IDD3 address4 insurance and reinsurance separately, throughout this guidance the term 'contract of insurance' (italicised or otherwise) also applies to contracts of reinsurance.
Subject to CASS 11.1.6 R, only the rules and guidance in the debt management client money chapter listed in the table below apply to CASS small debt management firms.
Reference |
Rule |
Application |
|
Firm classification |
|
Responsibility for CASS operational oversight |
|
Definition of client money and discharge of fiduciary duty |
|
Organisational requirements |
|
Statutory trust |
|
Selecting an approved bank at which to hold client money |
|
Client bank account acknowledgement letters |
|
Segregation and the operation of client money accounts |
|
Payments to creditors |
|
CASS 11.11.1 R to CASS 11.11.12 R , CASS 11.11.30 R and CASS 11.11.32 G |
Records, accounts and reconciliations |
CASS 11 resolution pack |
|
Client money distribution in the event of a failure of a firm or approved bank |
The rules and guidance in this section1 are intended to promote confidence in the market at Lloyd's, and to protect certain consumers of services provided by the Society in carrying on, or in connection with or for the purposes of, its regulated activities. They do this by ensuring that the Society appropriately and effectively regulates the capacity transfer market so that it operates in a fair and transparent manner.1
The byelaws referred to in INSPRU 8.4.3 R should:(1) ensure that adequate and effective arrangements are in place to enable members and persons applying to be admitted as members to enter into transactions to transfer syndicate capacity and settle these transactions in a timely manner;(2) give clear and comprehensive guidance about the dissemination of information that is, or may be, relevant to the price of syndicate capacity and the transparency of the capacity transfer market;
Article 53(1)3 does not apply to advice given on any of the following:(1) deposit or other bank or building society accounts (but note the exceptions and points in PERG 8.25.3G)4;(2) interests under the trusts of an occupational pension scheme (but rights under an occupational pension scheme that is a stakeholder pension scheme will be securities);(3) mortgages or other loans (but note that advising on regulated mortgage contracts is a separate regulated activity under article
(1) 4There are some circumstances in which giving advice about a deposit is a regulated activity.(2) Providing basic advice on a stakeholder product is a separate regulated activity under article 52A of the Regulated Activities Order. A stakeholder product includes a stakeholder deposit account. See the guidance in PERG 2.7.14AG (Providing basic advice on stakeholder products) for more about this.(3) Article 53(1) does apply to advice on structured deposits.
Any specific rule or piece of guidance in CONC is without prejudice to the application of PRIN, any other rules in the Handbooks, the CCA and secondary legislation made and things done under it, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, the Consumer Rights Act 20152, Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 and any other applicable consumer protection legislation.
1The guidance in COND 2.7 should be read as applying to both paragraph 2F of Schedule 6 to the Act and, as far as relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions under the Act in respect of firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, paragraph 3E of Schedule 6 of the Act.
1Firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, should note that the PRA states in its Approach Documents that analysis of such firms' business models will form an important part of the PRA's supervisory approach. For the avoidance of doubt, this guidance does not apply to the PRA's own assessment of the firms' business models.
(1) The guidance relevant to delegation within the firm is also relevant to external delegation ('outsourcing'). A firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations. So, for example, under Principle 3 a firm should take reasonable care to supervise the discharge of outsourced functions by its contractor.(2) A firm should take steps to obtain sufficient information from its contractor to enable it to assess the impact of outsourcing on its systems and controls.
(1) Each EEA State, including the United Kingdom, is required to implement article 14 of the UCITS Directive by drawing up rules of conduct which management companies authorised in that State must observe at all times, except as explained in (3).(2) UK UCITS management companies operating an EEA UCITS scheme under the freedom to provide cross border services (otherwise than by establishing a branch in that State) are advised that, as provided for elsewhere in the Handbook, they
(1) 6This guidance is relevant to an SMCR firm8 required to
establish and maintain an internal audit function under article 24 of the MiFID Org Regulation7.(2) Taking account of the nature, scale and complexity of its activities,
the firm should have appropriate procedures to ensure that the
removal or any other disciplinary sanctioning of the head of the
internal audit function does not undermine the independence of the
internal audit function.(3) In the FCA's view, it will be
(1) This section applies in relation to dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way2 that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities (the dual-regulated firms remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1)
(1) A firm should be able to demonstrate that its decisions are consistent with an assessment of its financial condition and future prospects. In particular, practices by which remuneration is paid for potential future revenues whose timing and likelihood remain uncertain should be evaluated carefully and the governing body or remuneration committee (or both) should work closely with the firm's risk function in evaluating the incentives created by its remuneration system. (2)
A firm must:(1) set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback; and(2) ensure that the criteria for the application of malus and clawback in particular cover situations where the employee:(a) participated in, or was responsible for, conduct which resulted in significant losses to the firm; or(b) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety.[Note: article 94(1)(n) of the CRD and Standards 6 and 9 of the FSB Compensation Standards][Note: The FSA
A person seeking to make a financial promotion to another person may wish to make enquiries of that person to establish whether they are16 certified. Unless another exemption applies or the financial promotion is approved by an authorised person, such enquiries will not be possible if the enquiry communication is an inducement or invitation to engage in investment activity. In the FCA's8 view, a communication which is merely an enquiry seeking to establish that a person holds
9Article 72F exempts any financial promotion which is made to an employee by or on behalf of a person in relation to an exempt staff loan. An exempt staff loan is defined as a credit agreement which is:(1) offered by a lender to a borrower as an incident of employment with the lender, or with an undertaking in the same group as the lender11; and(2) an exempt agreement under a provision of article 60G (exempt agreements: exemptions relating to the total charge for credit) of the
6The exemptions described in PERG 8.14.40A G to PERG 8.14.40AEA G9 should enable employers (and their contracted service providers) to promote employee benefits packages that include any pension schemes, work-related insurance schemes,9staff mortgages and certain staff loans9 to employees without undue concern that they may be breaching the restriction in section 21 of the Act. PERG 8.14.34 G (Communications by employers and contracted service providers to employees) has further
The FCA4 will consider the full circumstances of each case when determining whether or not to take action for a financial penalty or public censure. Set out below is a list of factors that may be relevant for this purpose. The list is not exhaustive: not all of these factors may be applicable in a particular case, and there may be other factors, not listed, that are relevant.4(1) The nature, seriousness and impact of the suspected breach, including:(a) whether the breach was deliberate
The FCA's4 rules on systems and controls against money laundering are set out in SYSC 3.2 and SYSC 6.3. The FCA4, when considering whether to take action for a financial penalty or censure in respect of a breach of those rules, will have regard to whether a firm has followed relevant provisions in the Guidance for the UK financial sector issued by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group.44
9When determining under section 66A(5)(d) of the Act whether or not an SMF manager has taken such steps as a person in their position could reasonably be expected to take to avoid the contravention of a relevant requirement by the firm occurring (or continuing), additional considerations to which the FCA would expect to have regard include, but are not limited to:(1) the role and responsibilities of the SMF manager (for example, such steps as an SMF manager in a non-executive
SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements) contains rules and guidance on matters that should be notified to the FCA. Such matters include, but are not limited to, any circumstance that the depositary becomes aware of whilst undertaking its functions or duties in COLL 6.6.4 R (1) (General duties of the depositary) and (where applicable) COLL 6.6.4BR (Specific duties of a depositary: oversight of the liquidity management of a FIIA),18 that the FCA would reasonably view as
(1) Directors of an ICVC, authorised fund managers and depositaries should also have regard to SYSC 8 (Outsourcing).66SYSC 8.1.6 R4 states that a firm remains fully responsible for discharging 6all of its obligations under the regulatory system6 if it outsources crucial or important operational functions4 or any relevant services and activities.6646644(2) SUP 15.8.6 R (Delegation by UCITS management companies) requires the 8authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme to inform the