Related provisions for BIPRU 2.3.11
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(1) A firm'sgoverning body is likely to delegate many functions and tasks for the purpose of carrying out its business. When functions or tasks are delegated, either to employees or to appointed representatives or, where applicable, its tied agents8, appropriate safeguards should be put in place.(2) When there is delegation, a firm should assess whether the recipient is suitable to carry out the delegated function or task, taking into account the degree of responsibility involved.(3)
(1) The guidance relevant to delegation within the firm is also relevant to external delegation ('outsourcing'). A firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations. So, for example, under Principle 3 a firm should take reasonable care to supervise the discharge of outsourced functions by its contractor.(2) A firm should take steps to obtain sufficient information from its contractor to enable it to assess the impact of outsourcing on its systems and controls.
(1) (a) If a depositary performs part of its functions through a branch in an 4EEA State, this is not a delegation by the depositary of its functions to a third party.(b) This is because ‘third party’ in COLL 6.6B.22R means any party that is not part of the same legal entity as the depositary.(2) [deleted]4(3) (a) A depositary that performs part of its functions through a branch in an EEA State 4 should ensure that those arrangements do not impede the depositary’s ability to meet
A depositary may delegate the functions in COLL 6.6B.18R and COLL 6.6B.19R to one or more third parties if:(1) the tasks are not delegated with the intention of avoiding the requirements of the UCITS Directive, as implemented in this chapter4;(2) the depositary can demonstrate that there is an objective reason for the delegation;(3) the depositary:(a) has exercised all due skill, care and diligence in the selection and appointment of any third party to whom it intends to delegate
In considering whether to grant (or consent to, as the case may be)27 a firm's application to vary its Part 4A permission or impose or vary a requirement, the regulator concerned will also have regard, under section 55R(1)27 of the Act (Persons connected with an applicant), to any person6 appearing to be, or likely to be, in a relationship with the firm which is relevant. The Financial Groups Directive Regulations make special consultation provisions where the regulator is exercising
(1) The FCA may request a firm to include specific responsibility for a regulatory outcome in the statement of responsibilities of the relevant SMF managers. (2) For example, where the FCA asks a firm to take remediation action following an internal or supervisory review or a report under section 166 of the Act (Reports by skilled persons) and considers it appropriate for an SMF manager to take responsibility for that action, it may ask the firm to add an additional, customised,
If the transferee is not (and will not be) authorised and will not be7 a Swiss general insurance company, then the appropriate regulator8 will need to consult the transferee's8 insurance supervisor in the place where the business is to be transferred. The appropriate regulator8 will need confirmation from this supervisor that the transferee will meet his solvency margin requirements there (if any) after the transfer.888
Before a firm appoints a person as an appointed representative (other than an introducer appointed representative) and on a continuing basis, it must establish on reasonable grounds that:11(1) the appointment does not prevent the firm from satisfying and continuing to satisfy the threshold conditions;(2) the person:(a) is solvent;(b) is otherwise 1suitable to act for the firm in that capacity;and1(c) has no close links which would be likely to prevent the effective supervision
The appropriate regulator will review the results of a firm'sILAA, including the results of the stress tests required by BIPRU 12.5.6R, as part of its Supervisory Liquidity Review Process (SLRP). The appropriate regulator's review of the stress test results will assist it assessing the adequacy of a firm's liquidity resources relative to other ILAS BIPRU firms and, consequently, in calibrating the individual liquidity guidance that it gives to that firm. BIPRU 12.9.2G sets out
10Although PRIN does not apply to a firm in relation to its carrying on of auction regulation bidding, the FCA35expects to be given notice of events that are material to the FCA's35supervision of that business and so firms carrying on that business should have regard to the guidance in SUP 15.3.8 G to SUP 15.3.10 G.3535
Compliance with Principle 11 includes, but is not limited to, giving the FCA11 notice of:3535(1) any proposed restructuring, reorganisation or business expansion which could have a significant impact on the firm's risk profile or resources, including, but not limited to:(a) setting up a new undertaking within a firm'sgroup, or a new branch (whether in the United Kingdom or overseas); or (b) commencing the provision of cross border services into a new territory; or(c) commencing
A firm's continuing to hold capital in accordance with its individual capital guidance and its ability to carry on doing so is a fundamental part of the appropriate regulator's supervision of that firm. Therefore if a firm'scapital resources have fallen, or are expected to fall, below the level advised in individual capital guidance, then, consistent with Principle 11 (Relations with regulators), a firm should inform the appropriate regulator of this fact as soon as practicable,
4Following discussions with the firm on the items listed in BIPRU 2.2.23AG (1) to BIPRU 2.2.23AG (3), the appropriate regulator may put in place additional reporting arrangements to monitor the firm's use of its capital planning buffer in accordance with the plan referred to in BIPRU 2.2.23AG (3). The appropriate regulator may also identify specific trigger points as the capital planning buffer is being used up by the firm, which could lead to additional supervisory actions.
In complying with the contractual duty in SUP 5.5.1 R (1) the FCA3 expects that a skilled person appointed by a firm4 under section 166 (Reports by skilled persons) or section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act4 will cooperate with the FCA3 by, amongst other things, providing information or documentation about the planning and progress of the report and its findings and conclusions, if requested to do so. A firm should therefore
1As the provision of credit data on companies is not a regulated activity under the Act, the Regulations create a separate monitoring and enforcement regime but apply, or make provision corresponding to, certain aspects of the Act. The FCA's approach to taking enforcement action under the Regulations will reflect its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate and responsive
The customer function does not extend to an individual who is performing the functions in SUP 10A.10.7R (1) to SUP 10A.10.7R (2) or SUP 10A.10.7R (5) to (7) and who is based overseas and who, in a 12-month period, spends no more than 30 days in the United Kingdom to the extent that he is appropriately supervised by a person approved for this function.
2Private warnings are a non-statutory tool. Fundamentally they are no different to any other FCA communication which criticises or expresses concern about a person’s conduct. But private warnings are a more serious form of reprimand than would usually be made in the course of ongoing supervisory correspondence. A private warning requires that the FCA identifies and explains its concerns about a person's conduct and/or procedures, and tells the subject of the warning that the FCA
For the purpose of BIPRU 3.2.25 R (1)(c) it is the risk management functions of the group that should be integrated, rather than the group's operational management. A firm should ensure that if risk management functions are integrated in this way it should be possible for the appropriate regulator to undertake qualitative supervision of the management of the integrated risk management function.
Once a financial conglomerate has become a financial conglomerate and subject to supervision in accordance with this chapter10, the figures in the financial conglomerate definition decision tree are altered as follows:(1) the figure of 40% in the box titled Threshold Test 1 is replaced by 35%;(2) the figure of 10% in the box titled Threshold Test 2 is replaced by 8%; and(3) the figure of six billion Euro in the box titled Threshold Test 3 is replaced by five billion Euro.
The FCA5 may also use its own-initiative powers5 for
enforcement purposes. EG 82 sets out in detail the FCA's5 powers under sections 55J and 55L of the Act5 and
the circumstances under which the FCA5 may use its own-initiative powers5 in this way, whether for enforcement purposes or as part of its
day to day supervision of firms.
This chapter provides additional guidance on when the FCA5 will use these powers for supervision purposes.55255555
(1) References to a market maker are to a market maker which:(a) (subject to (3) below) is authorised by the FCA or the PRA under the United Kingdom provisions which implemented MiFID11;(b) does not intervene in the management of the issuer concerned; and (c) does not exert any influence on the issuer to buy such shares or back the share price.[Note: articles 9(5) and 9(6) of the TD](2) A market maker relying upon the exemption for shares or financial instruments within DTR 5.3.1R(1)10