Related provisions for PERG 8.3.4
141 - 160 of 958 items.
The activity in article 25(1) is carried on only if the arrangements bring about, or would bring about, the transaction to which the arrangement relates. This is because of the exclusion in article 26 of the Regulated Activities Order (Arrangements not causing a deal). Article 26 excludes from article 25(1) arrangements which do not bring about or would not bring about the transaction to which the arrangements relate. In the FCA's view, a person would bring about a contract of
Article 25(2) may, for instance, include activities of persons who help potential policyholders fill in or check application forms in the context of ongoing arrangements between these persons and insurance undertakings. A further example of this activity would be a person introducing customers to an intermediary either for advice or to help arrange an insurance policy. The introduction might be oral or written. By contrast, the FCA considers that a mere passive display of literature
In the FCA's view, 'incidental' in this context means that the activity must arise out of, be complementary to or otherwise be sufficiently closely connected with the profession or business. In other words, there must be an inherent link between the activity and the firm's main business. For example, introducing dental insurance may be incidental to a dentist's activities; introducing pet insurance would not be incidental to his activities. In addition, to be considered 'incidental',
This exclusion applies to a person whose profession or business does not otherwise consist of regulated activities. In the FCA's view, the fact that a person may carry on regulated activities in the course of the carrying on of a profession or business does not, of itself, mean that the profession or business consists of regulated activities. This is provided that the main focus of the profession or business does not involve regulated activities and that the regulated activities
In the FCA's view, the crucial element of the exclusion in article 27 is the inclusion of the word 'merely'. When a publisher, broadcaster or internet website operator goes beyond what is necessary for him1 to provide its1 service of publishing, broadcasting or otherwise facilitating the issue of promotions, it may well bring itself1 within the scope of article 25(2). Further detailed guidance relating to the scope of the exclusion in article 27 is contained in PERG 2.8.6G (2)
The restriction in the scope of article 28 raises an issue where there is a trust with co-trustees, where each trustee will be a policyholder with equal rights and obligations. If the activities of one of the trustees include arranging in respect of contracts of insurance, that trustee could be viewed as arranging on behalf of his co-trustees who will also be policyholders. Similar issues also arise in respect of trustees assisting in the administration and performance of a contract
The effect of PERG 5.6.17G (4) is that some persons who, in making introductions, are making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments under article 25(2) of the Regulated Activities Order, cannot use the introducing exclusion. This is usually the case if1 the arrangements for making introductions relate to contracts of insurance (PERG 5.6.19 G has further guidance on when arrangements for introductions may be regarded as relating to contracts of insurance). However,
Where a person is making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments by way of making introductions, and he is not completely indifferent to whether or not transactions may result, it may still be the case that the exclusion in article 33 will apply. In the FCA's view, this is where:(1) the introduction is for independent advice on investments generally; and(2) the introducer is indifferent as to whether or not a contract of insurance may ultimately be bought (or
1Section 301A(1) of chapter3 1A of Part XVIII of the Act places an obligation on a person who decides to acquire or increase control (see sections 301D and 301E of the Act) over a UK RIE3to notify the FCA5, before making the acquisition3. Furthermore, those persons are required to obtain the FCA's5 approval before acquiring control 3or increasing the level of control held.3353533
The FCA5 will approve an acquisition or an increase in 3control if it is satisfied that the acquisition by the person seeking approval does not pose a threat to the sound and prudent management of any financial market operated by the UK RIE (see section 301F(4) of the Act). The reference to any financial market is to be read as including a reference to any auction platform as a result of the RAP regulations.76353334
The FCA will not relieve or refund a PSR fee if after the start of that fee year:42(1) 4a payment system ceases to be a regulated payment system; or4(2) 4an IFR card payment system ceases to be subject to the IFR;4 or(3) 4a person4 ceases to be a direct payment service provider of a regulated payment system or an IFR card payment system4.
If a PSR fee payer8 does not pay the total amount of its PSR fees before the end of the date on which it is due, it must pay to the FCA2: 24(1) an administrative fee of £250; plus(2) interest on any unpaid part of the fee at an annual rate of 5% above the Official Bank Rate from time to time in force, accruing daily from the date on which the amount concerned became due.
(1) 2The FCA may recover a PSR fee as a debt owed to it under paragraph 23 (8) of Schedule 1ZA of the Act.(2) The FCA will consider taking action for the recovery (including interest) through the civil courts.(3) In addition, the FCA or PSR may be entitled to take regulatory action in relation to the non-payment of PSR fees. What action, if any, that is taken by the FCA or PSR will be decided upon given the particular circumstances of the case.8
3The FCA does not have a set of enforcement priorities that are distinct from the priorities of the FCA as a whole. Rather, the FCA consciously uses the enforcement tool to deliver its overall strategic priorities. The areas and issues which the FCA as an organisation regards as priorities at any particular time are therefore key in determining at a strategic level how enforcement resource should be allocated. FCA priorities will influence the use of resources in its supervisory
3One way in which the FCA focuses on priority areas is through its thematic work. This work involves the FCA looking at a particular issue or set of issues across a sample of firms. Themes are, in general, selected to enable the FCA to improve its understanding of particular industry areas or to assess the validity of concerns the FCA has about risks those areas may present to the statutory objectives. Thematic work does not start with the presumption that it will ultimately lead
3This does not mean that the FCA will only take enforcement action in priority strategic areas. There will always be particularly serious cases where enforcement action is necessary, ad hoc cases of particular significance in a markets, consumer protection or financial crime context, or cases that the FCA thinks are necessary to achieve effective deterrence.
3The combination of the priority given to certain types of misconduct over others and the FCA's risk-based approach to enforcement means that certain cases will be subject to enforcement action and others not, even where they may be similar in nature or impact. The FCA's choice as to the use of the enforcement tool is therefore a question of how the FCA uses its resources effectively and efficiently and how it ensures that it is an effective regulator.
In all cases, before 4it proceeds with an investigation, the FCA will satisfy itself that there are grounds to investigate under the statutory provisions that give the FCA powers to appoint investigators. Another consideration will be whether the FCA has any agreements in place regarding taking5 action on behalf of, or otherwise providing5 assistance to, other authorities5. EG 2.5.14discusses the position where other authorities may have an interest in a case. If the statutory
4The FCA’s referral criteria are published on the Enforcement section of the FCA’s website: http://www.fca.org.uk/about/enforcement/referral-criteria. In considering whether an enforcement investigation is likely to further the FCA’s aims and objectives, the FCA will consider factors that address the following issues:(1) any available supporting evidence and the proportionality and impact of opening an investigation;(2) what purpose or goal would be served if the FCA were to end
Where an ROIE1 includes in its report made under section 295(1) of the Act (Notification: overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses) a statement in compliance with section 295(2)(a) of the Act that an event has occurred in the period covered by that report which is likely to affect the FCA's1 assessment of whether it is satisfied as to the requirements set out in section 292(3) (Overseas investment exchanges and overseas clearing houses), it must include particulars
An ROIE1 must include in the first report submitted under section 295(1) of the Act after the recognition order in relation to that ROIE1 is made: 11(1) particulars of any events of the kind described in section 295(2) of the Act which occurred; (2) particulars of any change specified in REC 6.7.4 R (1) or disciplinary action specified in REC 6.7.4 R (2) which occurred; and(3) any annual report and accounts which covered a period ending; after the application for recognition
Where an ROIE1 proposes to change: (1) its address in the United Kingdom for the service of notices or other documents required or authorised to be served on it under the Act; or(2) the address of its head office;it must give notice to the FCA1 and inform it of the new address at least 14 days before the change is effected.1
Where an ROIE1 has notice that any licence, permission or authorisation which it requires to conduct any regulated activity in its home territory has been or is about to be:1(1) revoked; or(2) modified in any way which would materially restrict the ROIE1 in performing any regulated activity in its home territory or in the United Kingdom;1it must immediately notify the FCA1 of that fact and must give the FCA1 the information specified for the purposes of this rule in REC 6.7.9
618(1) Unless (2) applies, twice a year a firm must provide the FCA with a complete report concerning complaints received from eligible complainants.10618(2) If a firm:13(a) has permission to carry on only credit-related regulated activities or operating an electronic system in relation to lending and has revenue arising from those activities that is less than or equal to £5,000,000 a year; or13(b) has permission to carry on only:1413(i) 14regulated claims management activities;
A firm with only a limited permission to whom DISP 1.10.1R(1) and (2) do not apply is required to submit information to the FCA about the number of complaints it has received in relation to credit-related activities under the reporting requirements in SUP 16.12 (see, in particular, data item CCR007 in SUP 16.12.29CR). A firm with limited permission to whom DISP 1.10.1R (1) and (2) do not apply is also subject to the complaints data publication rules in DISP 1.10A.10618
Firms that are part of a group may submit a joint report to the FCA. The joint report must contain the information required from all firms concerned and clearly indicate the firms on whose behalf the report is submitted. The requirement to provide a report, and the responsibility for the report, remains with each firm in the group.101
(1) Twice a year a firm must provide the FCA with a complete report concerning complaints received from eligible complainants about matters relating to activities carried out by its employees when acting as retail investment advisers. The report must be set out in the format in DISP 1 Annex 1C R.104777(2) DISP 1 Annex 1C R requires (for the relevant reporting period) information about:10(a) the total number of complaints received by the firm about matters relating to activities
(1) 5If a firm does not submit a complete report by the date on which it is due, in accordance with DISP 1.10.5 R, the firm must pay an administrative fee of £250.10(2) The administrative fee in (1) does not apply if the firm has notified the
FCA
of a systems failure in accordance with DISP 1.10.6 R.10
For the purpose of inclusion in the public record maintained by the FCA, a firm must:10(1) provide the FCA, at the time of its authorisation, with details of a single contact point within the firm for complainants; and10(2) notify the
FCA
of any subsequent change in those details when convenient and, at the latest, in the firm's next report under the complaints reporting rules.10
In the FCA's view, the matters identified in PERG 8.10.2 G mean that:(1) for a communication to be real time it must be made in course of an interactive dialogue; but that(2) if the interactive dialogue takes place by means of the exchange of letters or e-mails or in a publication, the communication will be deemed to be non-real time. In this case, publications include newspapers, journals, magazines or other periodical publications, websites or similar systems for the electronic
The words ‘personal visit, telephone conversation or other interactive dialogue’ clearly imply that the first two are types of the third. In the FCA's view, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which a personal visit or telephone conversation would not be interactive. The very fact of a conversation taking place would mean two or more persons were interacting with each other. A telephone call is not the same thing as a conversation. It may be made to, or even by, an intelligent
In the FCA's view, the fact that scope for interaction is essential if a financial promotion is to be real time leads to the following conclusions.(1) Most communications made in written or pictorial form will not offer scope for interaction. The most likely exception to this is where persons are expected to respond immediately. This situation may arise, for example, where the equivalent of a telephone conversation is conducted by e-mail. This is the basis of the exemption in
In the FCA's view, a communication which may exist in enduring form will be a non-real time communication. Examples of this include videos, audio cassettes, bulletin boards, websites and recorded telephone messages. Messages placed on Internet chat-rooms will also be non-real time. Radio or television programmes or teletext services may contain communications that involve an interactive dialogue. For example, a communication made by the broadcaster and addressed to an interviewee
PERG 8.6.9 G explains that article 6 of the Financial Promotion Order has the broad effect that a communication is made to another person where it is addressed to a particular person or persons. It also states that a ‘recipient’ of a communication is the person or persons to who it is made (that is to whom it is addressed). This takes on importance where certain exemptions which apply to real time financial promotions made to a person are concerned. It appears to the FCA that,
In the FCA's view, persons who may be engaging in investment activity or engaging in claims management activity1 jointly include:(1) a married couple;(2) two or more persons, who will invest jointly in a product (for example, a cohabiting couple who are not married or members of a family);(3) the directors of a company or partners in a firm;(4) members of a group of companies;(5) the participants in a joint commercial enterprise;(6) the members of an investment club; and(7) the
In the FCA's view, the mere fact of a person accepting an invitation to attend a meeting does not automatically mean that he has initiated any dialogue which may take place during the meeting and which may amount to a financial promotion. This will depend on the facts of each case and such matters as the manner in which the invitations are made, the arrangements for acceptance and how the meeting is conducted. For example, the fact that investments or investment services will
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
- (1)
In the FCA's view:
- (a)
- (b)
a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;
- (c)
the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;
- (d)
firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;
1 - (e)
firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and
- (f)
a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.
[Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/remuneration
.]
- (2)
High-level category
Suggested business lines
Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Fixed income
Foreign exchange
Commodities
Securitisation
Sales areas
Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)
Commercial banking
Equities
Structured finance
Lending quality
Trading areas
Research
Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile
Credit/market/operational risk
Legal
Treasury controls
Human resources
Compliance
Internal audit
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
In the FCA's view, the circumstances in which a person is giving advice on the borrower varying the terms of a regulated mortgage contract so as to vary his obligations under the contract include (but are not limited to) where the advice is about:(1) the borrower obtaining a further advance secured on the same land as the original loan; or(2) a rate switch or a product switch (that is, where the borrower does not change lender but changes the terms for repayment from, say, a variable
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may7 take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:7(1) a person may provide information on a selected, rather than balanced7, basis that would tend to influence the decision of the borrower; and7(2) a person, as a result of going through the sales process, may discuss7 the merits of one regulated mortgage contract over another, resulting in advice to
(1) There are two aspects of the definition of advising on regulated mortgage contracts that are particularly relevant to whether pre-sale questioning involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts:7(a) the fact that advice must relate to a particular regulated mortgage contract (see PERG 4.6.5G); and (b) the distinction between information and advice (see PERG 4.6.13G). (2) Whether or not pre-sale7 questioning in any particular case is advising on regulated mortgage contracts
7The first type involves identifying regulated mortgage contracts based on7 factual matters. For example, the purpose may be to identify7 whether a borrower wishes to pay a fixed or variable rate of interest or the size of deposit available.7 There are various possible scenarios, including the following:(1) the questioner may go on to identify several particular7regulated mortgage contracts which match features identified by the pre-sale7 questioning; provided these are presented
When the scripted pre-sale questioning identifies particular regulated mortgage contracts (see7PERG 4.6.23G(3) and PERG 4.6.24G(2)), the FCA considers that it is necessary to look at the process and outcome of the pre-sale questioning as a whole7 in deciding whether the process involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts. Factors that may be relevant7 include:1111(1) any representations made by the questioner at the start of the questioning relating to the service they are7
2Further examples of what is and is not regulated advice
This table belongs to PERG 4.6.33 G.
Example of what the firm3 says and does 3 |
Regulated or not? |
(1) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, including fixed and variable rates. Here are some leaflets which set out the main features.” |
No. Leaflets that just explain the terms and conditions of a lender’s products are not advice (see PERG 4.6.15G (1)). Even if the leaflet contains promotional material, merely handing over the leaflet does not mean that the firm is giving advice. |
(2) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, our best rates are two-year fixed rates, you might want to look at those.” |
Yes. The firm has identified specific products that it offers and is drawing the customer’s attention7 to those products. Identifying which products have the lowest rates is not advice on its own, only facts. However, “best” involves a value judgement7, particularly when a comparison is made with other products that have different periods for which interest is fixed or that have variable interest rates. |
(3) The firm says “In order to provide you with an illustration, I need to know how much you want to borrow, the term and the property value. Which product or products would you like an illustration for?” |
No. The firm is collecting factual information to provide the customer with an illustration of costs. |
(4) The firm says “Based on what you’ve told me I think you would be best to look at two-year fixed rates. Here is some information about our products.” |
Yes. The firm has made a judgment on what type of product is best for the customer and has identified specific products of that type that it offers. |
(5) The firm says “Our fixed rates start at 4.99% for two years with a £900 fee. Our variable rates start at 4.50% with a £800 fee. Depending on how much you want to borrow and your circumstances, this may affect the rate available to you.” |
No. The firm is comparing two products without recommending either, nor is the firm recommending7 one over the other. |
(6) A lender with just one mortgage product advises a customer to take out that mortgage. The lender makes it clear that it does not give advice about products other than its own. |
Yes. The lender may argue that this is not regulated advice because it is not recommending one product over another as it only has one product itself and does not give advice about the products of other lenders. However, in the FCA's view this is still regulated advice. For advice to be regulated it must be advice on the merits of entering into a particular regulated mortgage contract (or varying one). It is possible to give advice about the merits of a product without comparing that product with another. |
Note: Unless otherwise specified, the firm might be the lender or an advisory or intermediary firm. |
|
1The FCA has power to apply to the court for a restitution order under section 382 of the Act and (in the case of market abuse) under section 383 of the Act. It also has an administrative power to require restitution under section 384 of the Act. When deciding whether to exercise these powers, the FCA will consider whether this would be the best use of the FCA's limited resources taking into account, for example, the likely amount of any recovery and the costs of achieving and
1The FCA's power to conduct investigations to assist overseas authorities is contained in section 169 of the Act. The section provides that at the request of an overseas regulator, the FCA may use its power under section 165 to require the production of documents or the provision of information under section 165 or to appoint a person to investigate any matter.
1When it considers whether to use its investigative power, and whether section 169(4) applies, the FCA will first consider whether it is able to assist without using its formal powers, for example by obtaining the information voluntarily. Where that is not possible, the FCA may take into account all of the factors in section 169(4), but may give particular weight to the seriousness of the case and its importance to persons in the United Kingdom, and to the public interest.
1When considering whether to cancel a sponsor's approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the sponsor;
(2) the adequacy of the sponsor's systems and controls;
(3) the sponsor's history of compliance with the listing rules;
(4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected failure of the sponsor to meet (at
1When considering whether to cancel a primary information provider’s approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the primary information provider; (2) the adequacy of the primary information provider’s systems and controls;
(3) the primary information provider’s history of compliance with DTR 8; (4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected
1DEPP 7 applies when the FCA3:3(1) has appointed an investigator at
the request of an overseas regulator,
under section 169(1)(b) (Assistance to overseas regulators)4under
section 131FA2 of the Act;
and(2) has directed, or is considering
directing, the investigator, under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act,
to permit a representative of the overseas
regulator4 to attend, and take part in, any interview conducted for the
purposes of the investigation.2
The purpose of DEPP 7 is to set out the FCA's3 statement of policy on the conduct of interviews to which a direction
under section 169(7) or
section 131FA2 has been given or the FCA3 is considering giving. The FCA3 is required to prepare and publish this statement of policy by
section 169(9) and (11) and
section 131FA2 of the Act.
As required by section 169(10) and
section 131FA2 of the Act, the Treasury has approved
the statement of policy.333
1The following are examples of situations where the FCA may consider it appropriate to seek a court order under section 258 (in the case of an AUT) or section 261Y (in the case of an ACS) to remove the authorised fund
manager or depositary:
(1) Where there are grounds for concern over the behaviour of the authorised fund
manager or depositary in respect of the management of the scheme or of its assets. (2) Where an authorised
1The FCA recognises that participants in an AUT or ACS have a direct financial interest in the scheme
property. It follows that in cases where it considers it appropriate to use its section 254 power (in the case of an AUT) or its section 261U power (in the case of an ACS) to revoke an authorisation order, the FCA will generally first require the authorised fund
manager or depositary to wind up the AUT or ACS (or seek a court order for the
1The FCA's power to conduct investigations to assist overseas regulators2 in respect of the short selling regulation is contained in section 131FA of the Act. The section provides that at the request of an overseas regulator2 or ESMA, the FCA may either use its power under section 131E to require the production of information, or appoint a person to investigate any matter.
1The CCA Order does not require the FCA to publish procedures about its approach towards applications to the court for an injunction or restitution order. However, the FCA will normally follow its equivalent decision-making procedures for similar decisions under the Act as set out in EG 10 and EG 11.