Related provisions for PERG 9.7.1
21 - 40 of 127 items.
Regulations 17(2)(d) (requirements on issuer relating to the asset pool) and 23(2) (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) require the issuer of a regulated covered bond and the owner of the relevant asset pool to make arrangements so that the asset pool is of sufficient quality to give investors confidence that in the event of the failure of the issuer there will be a low risk of default in the timely payment by the owner of claims attaching to a regulated covered
The FCA expects the issuer to demonstrate, as part of showing that Regulations 17 (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 24 (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations will be complied with, that there are provisions in the covered bond or programme which enable the views and interests of investors in the regulated covered bond to be taken account of in an appropriate and timely way by a suitably qualified, adequately resourced,
(1) The FCA expects legal advice to deal adequately with at least the following matters in relation to the actual or proposed arrangements:(a) whether the transfer of the assets to the owner would be upheld in the event of liquidation or administration, or similar collective insolvency proceedings, of the issuer or the transferor (if different from the issuer);(b) the risk of the transfer of an asset to the owner being re-characterised as the creation of a security interest;(c)
The activity of arranging (bringing about) deals in investments is aimed at arrangements that would have the direct effect that a particular transaction is concluded (that is, arrangements that bring it about). The activity of making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments is concerned with arrangements of an ongoing nature whose purpose is to facilitate the entering into of transactions by other parties. This activity has a potentially broad scope and typically
8It is of note, however, that the regulated activity of making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments is not limited to arrangements that are participated in by investors. It is also not necessary that both the buyer and the seller under the transaction that is being arranged should participate in the arrangements. So, arrangements may come within the activity if they are participated in only by product companies with a view to their issuing investments. A person
8It is also the FCA's view that certain arrangements may come within the activity even though the parties may have already committed to the transaction using other arrangements. This would typically apply to a clearing house whose clearing and settlement facilities may be seen to be made with a view to the members of the clearing house, as participants in its arrangements, entering into transactions (usually through an investment exchange) which must be cleared through the clearing
The advice must also be given to someone who holds specified investments or is a prospective investor (including trustees, nominees or discretionary fund managers). This requirement excludes advice given to a person who receives it in another capacity. An example of this might be a tax professional to whom advice is given to inform the practice of his profession or advice given to an employer for the purposes of setting up a group personal pension scheme. Further guidance on the
6An AIFM must take all reasonable steps to identify conflicts of interest that arise, in the course of managing AIFs, between:(1) the AIFM, including its managers, employees or any person directly or indirectly linked to the AIFM by control, and an AIF managed by the AIFM or the investors in that AIF; or(2) an AIF or the investors in that AIF, and another AIF or the investors in that AIF; or(3) an AIF or the investors in that AIF, and another client of the AIFM; or(4) an AIF or
6An AIFM must take all reasonable steps to avoid conflicts of interest and, when they cannot be avoided, manage, monitor and (where applicable) disclose those conflicts of interest in order to prevent them from adversely affecting the interests of the AIFs and their investors, and to ensure that the AIFs it manages are fairly treated.[Note: article 12(1)d of AIFMD]
6An AIFM must:(1) maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements, with a view to taking all reasonable steps designed to identify, prevent, manage and monitor conflicts of interest in order to prevent them from adversely affecting the interests of the AIFs and their investors;(2) segregate, within its own operating environment, tasks and responsibilities which may be regarded as incompatible with each other or which may potentially generate systematic
6If the organisational arrangements made by the AIFM to identify, prevent, manage and monitor conflicts of interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that risks of damage to investors' interests will be prevented, the AIFM must:(1) clearly disclose the general nature or sources of conflicts of interest to the investors before undertaking business on their behalf; and(2) develop appropriate policies and procedures.[Note: article 14(2) of AIFMD]
Activities which are purely profile raising and which do not identify and promote particular investments or investment services or services which constitute a controlled claims management activity8 may not amount to either an invitation or inducement of any kind. Examples of this include where listed companies sponsor sporting events or simply put their name or logo on the side of a bus or on an umbrella. This is usually done with a view, among other things, to putting their names
A person ('A') may enquire:(1) whether another person is certified as a high net worth individual or a sophisticated investor so that A may determine whether an exemption applies; or(2) whether a person has received material sent to him; or(3) how a person might propose to react to a take-over offer. or8(4) whether a person has been involved in an accident.8Enquiries of this or a similar kind will not amount to inducements to engage in investment activity or to engage in claims
The person who responds to the request for the material in the circumstances in PERG 8.4.29 G may make a financial promotion in the form of a covering letter or oral communication ('C'). This will not mean that the material accompanying C must itself be treated as an inducement. This will depend on the circumstances. The material itself would only become an inducement if it is turned into part of the financial promotion in C. For example, C may refer to the contents or part of
Things such as help-lines for persons who wish to make an investment will not usually involve invitations or inducements to engage in investment activity. This is where their purpose is merely to explain or offer guidance on how to invest or to accept an offer. In such cases, the investor will already have decided to invest and there will be no element of persuasion on the part of the person giving the explanation or guidance.
34In most cases where there is a loss, the endowment policy will be surrendered and put towards the cost of setting up a suitable repayment mortgage. Where this is the case, that part of the surrender value relating to the windfall augmentation should be paid as a cash lump sum to the investor or to the investor's order as part of the redress package. Only that part of the surrender value which does not relate to the windfall augmentation should be put towards the cost of setting
34Firms are entitled to mitigate losses by making use of the Traded Endowment Policy (TEP) market (see DISP App 1.3.8 G to DISP App 1.3.10 G). This allows firms to sell policies on the TEP market to meet the costs of redress, rather than using the surrender value. Where this method is adopted, firms should pay to the investor, as part of the redress package, a cash lump sum representing that proportion of the policy realised which would have related to the windfall augmentati
(1) When deciding whether to take enforcement
action under Part 7 of the RCB Regulations,
and what form that enforcement action should take, the FCA will consider all relevant factors,
including:(a) the relevant factors on decisions to take action set out in DEPP 6.2.1 G;(b) whether any contractual or other arrangements agreed between the
parties can be used effectively to address any perceived failure under the RCB Regulations; and(c) the interests of investors in the relevant
When considering whether to impose
a financial penalty, the amount of penalty, and whether to impose the penalty
on the issuer or the owner, the FCA will have regard, where relevant,1 to:(1) the statement on determining the appropriate level of a financial
penalty set out 1in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5D1;(2) the particular arrangements between the issuer and
the owner; (3) the likely impact of the penalty on the interests of investors
in a regulated covered bond;
and(4) the conduct
Under article 53(1)1 of the Regulated Activities Order, for anyone except a person in PERG 8.24.1AG,4advising on investments (except P2P agreements)1 covers advice which:(1) is given to a person in his capacity as an investor or potential investor, or in his capacity as agent for an investor or a potential investor; and(2) is advice on the merits of his (whether as principal or agent):42(a) 4buying, selling, subscribing for, exchanging, redeeming, holding4 or underwriting a particular
For advice to be covered by4PERG 8.24.1 G:4(1) it must relate to an investment which is a security, structured deposit2 or a relevant investment;(2) that investment must be a particular investment;(3) it must be given to persons in their capacity as investors or potential investors;(4) it must be advice (that is, not just information); and(5) it must relate to the merits of investors or potential investors (or their agents) buying, selling, subscribing for or underwriting (or
(1) The authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme that is a merging UCITS or a receiving UCITS in a proposed UCITS merger must ensure that a document containing appropriate and accurate information on the merger is provided to the unitholders of that scheme so as to enable them to:(a) make an informed judgment about the impact of the proposal on their investment;(b) exercise their rights under regulation 12 (Right of redemption) of the UCITS Regulations 2011; and(c) where applicable,
(1) The information document that must be provided to unitholders under COLL 7.7.10 R (Information to be given to unitholders) by the authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme must be written in a concise manner and in non-technical language.(2) [deleted]6(3) The information to be provided to the unitholders of the merging UCITS must meet the needs of investors who have no prior knowledge of the features of the receiving UCITS or of the manner of its operation, drawing their attention
6The TD Major Holdings Regulation provides that:Recital 4The disclosure regime for financial instruments that have a similar economic effect to shares should be clear. Requirements to provide exhaustive details of the structure of corporate ownership should be proportionate to the need for adequate transparency in major holdings, the administrative burdens those requirements place on holders of voting rights and the flexibility in the composition of a basket of shares or an index.
6The TD Major Holdings Regulation provides that:Recital 6
Financial instruments which provide exclusively for a cash settlement should be accounted for on a delta–adjusted basis, with cash position having delta 1 in the case of financial instruments having a linear, symmetric pay-off profile in line with the underlying share and using a generally accepted standard pricing model in the case of financial instruments which do not have a linear, symmetric pay-off profile in line with
The risks arising from securitisation transactions in relation to which a firm is investor,3originator or sponsor, including reputational risks,3 must be evaluated and addressed through appropriate policies and procedures, to ensure in particular that the economic substance of the transaction is fully reflected in risk assessment and management decisions.[Note:BCD Annex V point 8]3
BIPRU 9 deals with:(1) requirements for investors,3originators and sponsors of securitisations of non-trading bookexposures;3(2) the calculation of risk weighted exposure amount for securitisation positions for the purposes of calculating either the credit risk capital component or the counterparty risk capital component; and3(3) the requirements that investors, originators and sponsors of securitisations in the trading book will have to meet (BIPRU 9.3.1AR, BIPRU 9.3.15R to BIPRU
Where, in relation to an offer in the United Kingdom, no prospectus is required under the Act, the issuer and offeror must ensure that material information they provide to qualified investors or special categories of investors, including information disclosed in the context of meetings relating to offers, is disclosed to all qualified investors or special categories of investors to whom the offer is exclusively addressed. [Note: article 15.5 PD]
Where there is a clean-up call option, the following conditions must be satisfied:(1) the clean-up call option is exercisable at the discretion of the originator;(2) the clean-up call option may only be exercised when 10% or less of the original value of the exposuressecuritised remains unamortised; and(3) the clean-up call option is not structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancement positions or other positions held by investors and is not otherwise structured to
The securitisation documentation must not contain clauses that:(1) other than in the case of early amortisation provisions, require positions in the securitisation to be improved by the originator including but not limited to altering the underlying credit exposures or increasing the yield payable to investors in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the securitised exposures; or(2) increase the yield payable to holders of positions in the securitisation in response
An issuer may wish to take account of the following factors when considering whether the information in question would be likely to be used by a reasonable investor as part of the basis of his investment decisions:1(1) 1the significance
of the information in question will vary widely from issuer to issuer, depending on a variety of factors
such as the issuer's size, recent
developments and the market sentiment about the issuer and
the sector in which it operates; and(2) the likelihood1
It is not possible to prescribe
how the reasonable investor test will apply in all possible situations. Any
assessment may need to1 take into consideration the anticipated impact of the information
in light of the totality of the issuer's activities,
the reliability of the source of the information and other market variables
likely to affect the relevant financial instrument in
the given circumstances. However, information which is likely to be considered
relevant to a reasonable
(1) 1In general terms, simply giving information without making any comment or value judgment1 on its relevance to decisions which an investor may make is not advice.(2) 1The provision of purely factual information does not become regulated advice merely because it feeds into the customer’s own decision-making process and is taken into account by them.(3) 1Regulated advice includes any communication with the customer which, in the particular context in which it is given, goes
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:(1) a person may offer to provide information on directors’ dealings on the basis that, in his opinion, were directors to buy or sell investors would do well to follow suit;(2) a person may offer to tell a client when certain shares reach a certain value (which would be advice if the person providing the
(1) The instrument constituting the fund5 may provide for different classes of unit to be issued in an authorised fund and, for a scheme which is an umbrella, provide that classes of units may be issued for each sub-fund.5(2) In order to be satisfied that COLL 3.2.2 R (Relationship between the Instrument constituting the fund5and the rules) is complied with, the FCA will take into account the principles in (a) to (c) when considering proposals for unit classes:5(a) a unit class
(1) 1Before undertaking a class hedging transaction for a class of units, the authorised fund manager should:2(a) ensure that the relevant prospectus clearly:(i) states that such a transaction may be undertaken for the relevant class of units2; and(ii) explains the nature of the risks that such a transaction may pose to investors in all classes;(b) consult the depositary about the adequacy of the systems and controls it uses to ensure compliance with COLL 3.3.5A R (Hedging of
The Companies Act 1989: section 166
The FCA1 may issue a "positive" direction (to take action) under section 166(2)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: 1 |
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Where in any case a [UK RIE] has not taken action under its default rules- if it appears to [the FCA] that it could take action, [the FCA may direct it to do so,1 1 |
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but under section 166(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Before giving such a direction the [FCA] shall consult the [UK RIE] in question; and [the FCA] shall not give a direction unless [the FCA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that failure to take action would involve undue risk to investors or other participants in the market, or that the direction is necessary having regard to the public interest in the financial stability of the United Kingdom, or that the direction is necessary to facilitate a proposed or possible use of a power under Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 or in connection with a particular exercise of a power under that Part.1 1 |
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The FCA1 may issue a "negative" direction (not to take action) under section 166(2)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: 1 |
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Where in any case a [UK RIE] has not taken action under its default rules - if it appears to the [FCA] that it is proposing to take or may take action, [the FCA] may direct it not to do so.1 1 |
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but under section 166(3)(b) of the Companies Act 1989: |
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Before giving such a direction the [FCA] shall consult the [UK RIE] in question; and the [FCA] shall not give a direction unless [the FCA] is satisfied, in the light of that consultation that the taking of action would be premature or otherwise undesirable in the interests of investors or other participants in the market, or that the direction is necessary having regard to the public interest in the financial stability of the United Kingdom, or that the direction is necessary to facilitate a proposed or possible use of a power under Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 or in connection with a particular exercise of a power under that Part.1 1 |
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Under section 166(7) of the Companies Act 1989, where a UK RIE has taken action either of its own accord or in response to a direction, the FCA may direct it to do or not to do specific things subject to these being within the powers of the UK RIE under its default rules. However,11(1) 1where the UK RIE is acting in accordance with a direction given by the FCA to take action under section 166(2)(a) of the Act on the basis that failure to take action would involve undue risk to
Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, Paragraph 4(2)(a)
2Without prejudice to the generality of sub-paragraph [4(1)], the [UK RIE] must ensure that - |
access to the [UK RIE's] facilities is subject to criteria designed to protect the orderly functioning of the market and the interests of investors and is in accordance with paragraph 7B; |
In assessing whether access to a UK recognised body's facilities is subject to criteria designed to protect the orderly functioning of the market, or of those facilities, and the interests of investors, the FCA3 may have regard to whether: 3(1) the UK recognised body limits access as a member to persons:(a) over whom it can with reasonable certainty enforce its rules contractually;(b) who have sufficient technical competence to use its facilities;(c) whom it is appropriate to
(1) (a) 3This section deals with matters relating to the register of unitholders of units in an AUT or ACS including its establishment and contents.(b) 3The authorised fund manager or depositary may be responsible for the register.(c) 3In any event, the person responsible for the register must be stated in the trust deed or contractual scheme deed and this section details what his duties are.(d) 3The provisions relating to documents evidencing title to units3are dependent on the
(1) 1Where transfer of units in an ACS is allowed by its contractual scheme deed and prospectus in accordance with the conditions specified by FCArules, the authorised contractual scheme manager of the ACS must take reasonable care to ensure that units are only transferred if the conditions specified by the FCA under (2) are met.(2) The FCA specifies that for the purposes of (1), and for the purposes of COLL 3.2.6 R(27G) (ACSs: UCITS and NURS transfer of units) and COLL 4.2.5
(1) The FCA may, at any time, require an issuer to publish such information in such form and within such time limits as it considers appropriate to protect investors or to ensure the smooth operation of the market.(2) If an issuer fails to comply with a requirement under paragraph (1) the FCA may itself publish the information (after giving the issuer an opportunity to make representations as to why it should not be published).
1A firm must:
(1) not exercise any power under its rules to suspend or remove from trading any financial instrument which no longer complies with its rules, where such a step would be likely to cause significant damage to the interest of investors or the orderly functioning of the trading venue;
(2) where it does suspend or remove from trading a financial instrument, also suspend or remove derivatives that relate or are referenced to that financial instrument, where necessary