Related provisions for LR 10.5.3

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DEPP 6A.3A.2GRP
1The following factors may be relevant when determining the period of limitation: (1) whether the FCA may be minded to reapprove the approved person in the future, for example if the approved person takes action specified by the FCA during the period of limitation;(2) the approved person's expected lost earnings if the FCA imposes a short period of limitation; (3) whether imposing a short period of limitation would cause the approved person serious financial hardship.
EG 2.5.1RP
1Action before or following an investigation may include, for example, referring some issues or information to other authorities for consideration, including where another authority appears to be better placed to take action. For example, when considering whether to use its powers to conduct formal investigations into market misconduct, the FCA will take into account whether another regulatory authority is in a position to investigate and deal with the matters of concern (as far
EG 19.1.2RP
1Where conduct may amount to a breach of more than one enactment, the FCA may need to consider which enforcement powers to use and whether to use powers from one or more of the Acts. Which power or powers are appropriate will vary according to the circumstances of the case. However, where appropriate, we have tried to adopt procedures in respect of our use of powers under legislation other than the Act which are akin to those used under the Act. We expect, for example, to provide
EG 4.2.1RP
1The Act does not always require the FCA to give written notice of the appointment of investigators, for example, where investigators are appointed as a result of section 168(1) or (4) of the Act and the FCA believes that the provision of notice would be likely to result in the investigation being frustrated, or where investigators are appointed as a result of section 168(2) of the Act.
EG 3.1.2RP
2Information may also be provided to the FCA voluntarily. For example, firms may at times commission an internal investigation or a report from an external law firm or other professional adviser and decide to pass a copy of this report to the FCA. Such reports can be very helpful for the FCA in circumstances where enforcement action is anticipated or underway. The FCA's approach to using firm-commissioned reports in an enforcement context is set out at the end of this chapter.
EG 5.3.1RP
As set out in DEPP 5, special decision-making arrangements apply in relation to settlement. The person concerned may agree all relevant issues with the FCA (in which case the settlement decision makers will give all relevant statutory notices). Alternatively, a focused resolution agreement may be agreed (in which case the settlement decision makers are responsible for giving the warning notice and the RDC for giving any decision notice).2 The FCA would expect to hold any settlement
EG 10.3.2RP
1The FCA may request the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases, for example, where it has evidence showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that a person will contravene a requirement of the Act and that the contravention will result in the dissipation of assets belonging to investors.
EG 2.12.1RP
1An important consideration before an enforcement investigation and/or enforcement action is taken forward is the nature of a firm’s overall relationship with the FCA and whether, against that background, the use of enforcement tools is likely to further the FCA's aims and objectives. So, for any similar set of facts, using enforcement tools will be less likely if a firm has built up over time a strong track record of taking its senior management responsibilities seriously and
DTR 1.4.4GRP
Examples of when the FCA may require the suspension of trading of a financial instrument include:(1) if an issuer fails to make an2 announcement as required by the Market Abuse Regulation2 within the applicable time-limits which the FCA considers could affect the interests of investors or affect the smooth operation of the market; or(2) if there is or there may be a leak of inside information and the issuer is unwilling or unable to issue an appropriate2 announcement required
EG 3.4.2RP
1In some cases involving both general and specific concerns, the FCA may consider it appropriate to appoint investigators under both section 167 and section 168 at the outset. Also, where, for example, it has appointed investigators under section 167, it may subsequently decide that it is appropriate to extend the appointment to cover matters under section 168 as well.
EG 16.4.2RP
1A disapplication order in relation to exempt regulated activities made against a member will be relevant should that member subsequently apply for authorisation under the Act. Whether or not such an application for authorisation is successful will depend on many factors, including the FCA's grounds for making the disapplication order. For example, if the order for disapplication of the exemption was made on the grounds of a breach of rules made under section 332(1) of the Act,
LR 6.13.2GRP
1In considering whether an applicant has satisfied LR 6.13.1R, the FCA will consider, among other things, whether the board of the applicant consists solely of non-executive directors and whether significant elements of the strategic decision-making of or planning for the applicant take place outside the applicant’s group, for example with an external management company.
SYSC 19A.2.2GRP
(1) [deleted]2(2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements.2(3) As with other aspects of a firm's systems and controls, in accordance with SYSC 4.1.2 Rremuneration policies, procedures and practices must be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the common
SYSC 19C.2.2GRP
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
DISP 1.3.2AGRP
416These procedures should, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the respondent's business, ensure that lessons learned as a result of determinations by the Ombudsman are effectively applied in future complaint handling, for example by:(1) relaying a determination by the Ombudsman to the individuals in the respondent who handled the complaint and using it in their training and development;(2) analysing any patterns in determinations by the Ombudsman concerning
MCOB 6.9.11RRP
The SRB agreement provider must keep a record of the written pre-offer document at Stage One and the written offer document for signing at Stage Two for a period of:(1) one year after the end of the fixed term of the tenancy under the regulated sale and rent back agreement; or(2) five years from the date of the disclosures and warnings, written offer documents and cooling-off period notices;whichever is the longer.
DEPP 6A.4.3GRP
The FCA1 may depart from the approach set out in DEPP 6A.4.2 G. For example, the FCA1 may at the outset consider that a financial penalty is the only appropriate sanction for a breach but, having determined the appropriate level of financial penalty, may consider it appropriate to reduce the amount of the financial penalty for serious financial hardship reasons. In such a situation, the FCA1 may consider it appropriate to impose a suspension, restriction, condition,3 limitation