Related provisions for DTR 2.7.1
1 - 6 of 6 items.
3Issuers should be aware that ESMA has issued guidelines under article 17(11) of the Market Abuse Regulation which contain a non-exhaustive indicative list of the legitimate interests of issuers to delay disclosure of inside information and situations in which delayed disclosure is likely to mislead the public: see the ESMA MAR delayed disclosure guidelines4.
An issuer should
not be obliged to disclose impending developments that could be jeopardised
by premature disclosure. Whether or not an issuer has
a legitimate interest which would be prejudiced by the disclosure of certain inside information is an assessment which
must be made by the issuer in
the first instance. 321
(1) [deleted]1(2) If an issuer is
faced with an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable
if it is necessary to clarify the situation. In such situations a holding
announcement should be used where an issuer believes
that there is a danger of inside information leaking
before the facts and their impact can be confirmed. The holding announcement
should:(a) detail as much of the subject matter
as possible;(b) set out the reasons why a fuller
announcement
The FCA is aware that many issuers provide unpublished information to
third parties such as analysts, employees, credit rating agencies, finance
providers and major shareholders, often in response to queries from such parties.
The fact that information is unpublished does not in itself make it inside information. However, unpublished
information which amounts to inside information is
only permitted to be disclosed in accordance with the requirements of the Market Abuse Regula
If an issuer is
relying on article 17(4) or 17(5) of the Market Abuse Regulation1 to delay the disclosure of inside
information it should prepare a holding announcement to be disclosed
in the event of an actual or likely breach of confidence. Such a holding announcement
should include the details set out in DTR 2.2.9 G (2).
The knowledge that press speculation
or market rumour is false may not1 amount to inside
information. If1 it does amount to inside
information, the FCA expects that there may be cases where1 an issuer would be able
to delay disclosure1 in accordance with article 17(4) or 17(5) of the Market Abuse Regulation1.
Examples of when the FCA may require the suspension of trading of a financial instrument include:(1) if an issuer fails to make an2 announcement as required by the Market Abuse Regulation2 within the applicable time-limits which the FCA considers could affect the interests of investors or affect the smooth operation of the market; or(2) if there is or there may be a leak of inside information and the issuer is unwilling or unable to issue an appropriate2 announcement required
(1) [deleted]65(2) 5An
individual may be a "senior executive", as defined in article 3(1)(25)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation,6 irrespective of the
nature of any contractual arrangements between the individual and the issuer and notwithstanding the absence of
a contractual arrangement between the individual and the issuer,
provided the individual has regular access to inside information relating,
directly or indirectly, to the issuer and
has power to make managerial decisions