Related provisions for APER 4.6.3

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APER 4.5.1AGRP
The Statement of Principle 5 (see APER 2.1A.3R3) is in the following terms: "An approved person performing an accountable higher management function3 must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the APER employer8 for which they are3 responsible in their3accountable function is organised so that it can be controlled effectively." 39
APER 4.5.5GRP
3Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.4 G includes, but is not limited to:(1) implementing confusing or uncertain reporting lines (see APER 4.5.12 G);(2) implementing confusing or uncertain authorisation levels (see APER 4.5.13 G);(3) implementing confusing or uncertain job descriptions and responsibilities (see APER 4.5.13 G).
APER 4.5.7GRP
34(1) 9(2) [deleted]7
APER 4.5.8GRP
3Failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that suitable individuals are responsible for those aspects of the business under the control of the individual performing an accountable higher management function falls within APER 4.5.2G (see APER 4.5.14 G).
APER 4.5.9GRP
3Behaviour of the type referred to in APER 4.5.8 G4 includes, but is not limited to:(1) failing to review the competence, knowledge, skills and performance of staff to assess their suitability to fulfil their duties, despite evidence that their performance is unacceptable (see APER 4.5.14 G);(2) giving undue weight to financial performance when considering the suitability or continuing suitability of an individual for a particular role (see APER 4.5.14 G);(3) allowing managerial
APER 4.5.12GRP
The organisation of the business and the responsibilities of those within it should be clearly defined (see APER 4.5.5 G (1)3). Reporting lines should be clear to staff. Where staff have dual reporting lines there is a greater need to ensure that the responsibility and accountability of each individual line manager is clearly set out and understood.3
APER 4.5.14GRP
If an individual's performance is unsatisfactory, then the appropriate approved person (if any) performing an accountable higher management function3 should review carefully whether to allow that individual to continue in position. In particular, if they are3 aware of concerns relating to the compliance with requirements and standards of the regulatory system (or internal controls) of the individual concerned, or of staff reporting to that individual, the approved person performing
MAR 10.1.1GRP
(1) 1The purpose of this chapter is to implement articles 57 and 58 of MiFID by setting out the necessary directions, rules and guidance.(2) In particular, this chapter sets out the FCA’s requirements in respect of provisions derived from2:(a) articles 57(1) and 57(6) of MiFID, which require it2 to establish limits, on the basis of a methodology determined by ESMA, on the size of a net position which a person can hold, together with those held on the person’s behalf at an aggregate
MAR 10.1.2GRP
(1) The scope of this chapter is as follows: In respect of position limit requirements in MAR 10.2, a commodity derivative position limit established by the FCA in accordance with MAR 10.2.2D(1) applies regardless of the location of the person at the time of entering into the position and the location of execution. [Note: article 57(14)(a) of MiFID](2) In respect of position management controls requirements:(a) the requirements contained or referred to in MAR 10.3 apply to persons
MAR 10.1.3GRP
This chapter is structured as follows:(1) MAR 10.1 sets out an introduction to MAR 10, a description of the application of MAR 10 to different categories of person, an explanation of the approach taken to the UK transposition of articles 57 and 58 of MiFID, the scope and territoriality of this chapter, and the structure of this chapter. (2) MAR 10.2 sets out the position limit requirements. (3) MAR 10.3 sets out the position management controls requirements. (4) MAR 10.4 sets
MAR 10.3.2GRP
A UK market operator operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives must apply position management controls on that trading venue, in accordance with paragraph 7BA of the Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, as inserted by the MiFI Regulations. [Note: article 57(8) to 57(10) of MiFID]
MAR 10.3.3RRP
(1) This rule applies to a UK firm operating a multilateral trading facility or an OTF and a UK branch of a third country investment firm operating a multilateral trading facility or an OTF.(2) A firm must apply position management controls which enable an MTF or OTF at least to: (a) monitor the open interest positions of persons;(b) access information, including all relevant documentation, from persons about: (i) the size and purpose of a position or exposure entered into;(ii)
MAR 10.3.4GRP
An operator of a trading venue referred to in MAR 10.3.1G may include provisions in its rulebook which impose appropriate obligations on its members or participants as part of compliance with its position management controls obligations.
APER 4.6.6GRP
1Failing to take reasonable step to maintain an appropriate level of understanding about an issue or part of the business that they have delegated to an individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) falls within APER 4.6.2G (see APER 4.6.14G).
APER 4.6.8GRP
1Failing to supervise and monitor adequately the individual or individuals (whether in-house or outside contractors) to whom responsibility for dealing with an issue or authority for dealing with a part of the business has been delegated falls within APER 4.6.2G.
PRIN 1.1.5GRP
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FCA11 ) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. Compliance by another person to whom the Principles apply with Principles 3, 4 and 11 can also be affected by the activities of other persons who are members of their group.14 This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems
PRIN 1.1.6GRP
As set out in PRIN 3.3 (Where?), Principles 1 (Integrity), 2 (Skill, care and diligence) and 3 (Management and control) apply to world-wide activities in a prudential context. Principle 5 (Market conduct) applies to world-wide activities which might have a negative effect on confidence in the UK financial system8. In considering whether to take regulatory action under these Principles in relation to activities carried on outside the United Kingdom, the FCA11 will take into account
PRIN 1.1.7GRP
Breaching a Principle makes a firm or other person to whom the Principles apply14 liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a Principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Principle in question. Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the FCA11 to show that a firm or other person14 has been at fault in some way. What constitutes "fault" varies between different Principles. Under Principle 1 (Integrity),
PRIN 4.1.2GRP
Under PRIN 3.3.1 R, the territorial application of a number of Principles and PRIN 2A8 to a UK MiFID investment firm is extended to the extent that another applicable rule or onshored regulation7 which is relevant to an activity has a wider territorial scope. 7633
PRIN 4.1.4GRP
(1) Certain requirements derived from7MiFID are disapplied for:(a) eligible counterparty business;(b) transactions concluded under the rules governing a multilateral trading facility between its members or participants or between the multilateral trading facility and its members or participants in relation to the use of the multilateral trading facility;(c) transactions concluded on a regulated market between its members or participants.(2) Under PRIN 3.1.6 R, these disapplications
REC 2.7A.1UKRP

1Paragraph 7BA – Position management

(1)

A [UK RIE] operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives must apply position management controls on that venue, which must at least enable the [UK RIE] to -

(a)

monitor the open interest positions of persons;

(b)

access information, including all relevant documentation, from persons about-

(i)

the size and purpose of a position or exposure entered into;

(ii)

any beneficial or underlying owners;

(iii)

any concert arrangements; and

(iv)

any related assets or liabilities in the underlying market;

(c)

require a person to terminate or reduce a position on a temporary or permanent basis as the specific case may require and to unilaterally take appropriate action to ensure the termination or reduction if the person does not comply; and

(d)

where appropriate, require a person to provide liquidity back into the market at an agreed price and volume on a temporary basis with the express intent of mitigating the effects of a large or dominant position.

(2)

The position management controls must take account of the nature and composition of market participants and of the use they make of the contracts submitted to trading and must-

(a)

be transparent;

(b)

be non-discriminatory; and

(c)

specify how they apply to persons.

(3)

A [UK RIE] must inform the FCA of the details of the position management controls in relation to each trading venue it operates.

Paragraph 7BB – Position reporting

(1)

This paragraph applies to a [UK RIE] operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives, emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives.

(2)

The [UK RIE] must -

(a)

where it meets the minimum threshold, as specified in article 83 (position reporting) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of 25 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive2, make public a weekly report with the aggregate positions held by the different categories of persons for the different commodity derivatives, emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives traded on the trading venue specifying -

(i)

the number of long and short positions by such categories;

(ii)

changes of those positions since the previous report;

(iii)

the percentage of the total open interest represented by each category; and

(iv)

the number of persons holding a position in each category; and

(b)

provide the FCA with a complete breakdown of the positions held by all persons, including the members and participants and their clients, on the trading venue on a daily basis, or more frequently if that is required by the FCA.

(3)

For the weekly report mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(a) the [UK RIE] must -

(a)

categorise persons in accordance with the classifications required under sub-paragraph (4); and

(b)

differentiate between positions identified as-

(i)

positions which in an objectively measurable way reduce risks directly relating to commercial activities; or

(ii)

other positions.

(4)

The [UK RIE] must classify persons holding positions in commodity derivatives, emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives according to the nature of their main business, taking account of any applicable authorisation or registration, as -

(a)

an investment firm or qualifying2 credit institution;

(b)

an investment fund, either as an undertaking for collective investment in transferrable securities within the meaning of section 236A of the Act, an AIF or an AIFM within the meaning of regulations 3 and 4 respectively of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1773)2;

(c)

another financial institution, including an insurance undertaking within the meaning of section 417 of the Act, a reinsurance undertaking within the meaning of section 417 of the Act, and an occupational pension scheme within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;2

(d)

a commercial undertaking; or

(e)

in the case of emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives, an operator with compliance obligations under Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community.

[Note: 1993 c.48. Section 1 was amended by section 239 of the Pension Schemes Act 2004 (c. 35) and S.I. 2007/3014.]2

(5)

The [UK RIE] must communicate the weekly report mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(a) to the FCA2.

REC 2.7A.2GRP
The recognition requirements in respect of position management and position reporting set out in REC 2.7A.1UK apply to a UK RIE operating a trading venue. An investment firm operating a trading venue which trades:(1) commodity derivatives must apply position management controls on that venue in accordance with MAR 10.3.(2) commodity derivatives or emission allowances must provide position reports in accordance with MAR 10.4.
SYSC 19D.3.15RRP
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions:(1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and(3) are remunerated:(a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced employees; and(b) in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.[Note: article 92(2)(e) of CRD and Standard 2 of the FSB Compensation Standards]
SYSC 19D.3.16ERP
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
SYSC 19D.3.18GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these could arise, they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management
SYSC 19C.3.2GRP
The effect of SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) and SYSC 12.1.15 R is that the firm is required to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3 of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis.
SYSC 19C.3.14RRP
A firm must ensure that employees engaged in control functions: (1) are independent from the business units they oversee;(2) have appropriate authority; and (3) are remunerated: (a) adequately to attract qualified and experienced staff; and(b) in line with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control.
SYSC 19C.3.15ERP
(1) A firm's risk management and compliance functions should have appropriate input into setting the remuneration policy for other business areas. The procedures for setting remuneration should allow risk and compliance functions to have significant input into the setting of individual remuneration awards where those functions have concerns about the behaviour of the individuals concerned or the riskiness of the business undertaken.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
SYSC 13.2.2GRP
Operational risk is a concept that can have a different application for different firms. A firm should assess the appropriateness of the guidance in this chapter in the light of the scale, nature and complexity of its activities as well as its obligations as set out in Principle 3, to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively.
EG 15.1.1RP
1Auditors and actuaries fulfil a vital role in the management and conduct of firms, AUTs and ACSs. Provisions of the Act, rules made under the Act and the OEIC Regulations 2000 impose various duties on auditors and actuaries. These duties and the FCA's power to disqualify auditors and actuaries if they breach them assist the FCA in pursuing its statutory objectives. The FCA's power to disqualify auditors in breach of duties imposed by trust
COCON 2.2.1RRP
SC1: You must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which you are responsible is controlled effectively.
SYSC 1.2.1GRP
The purposes of SYSC are:(1) to encourage firms' directors and senior managers to take appropriate practical responsibility for their firms' arrangements on matters likely to be of interest to the FCA3 because they impinge on the FCA’s3 functions under the Act;(2) to increase certainty by amplifying Principle 3, under which a firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems;1(3) to encourage
PRIN 2.1.1RRP

The Principles

1 Integrity

A firm must conduct its business with integrity.

2 Skill, care and diligence

A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence.

3 Management and control

A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems.

4 Financial prudence

A firm must maintain adequate financial resources.

5 Market conduct

A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct.

6 Customers' interests

A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.

7 Communications with clients

A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading.

8 Conflicts of interest

A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client.

9 Customers: relationships of trust

A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment.

10 Clients' assets

A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients' assets when it is responsible for them.

11 Relations with regulators

A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the FCA1 appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect notice.

212 Consumer Duty

A firm must act to deliver good outcomes for retail customers.

CREDS 2.2.33ARRP
5A credit union must maintain information systems to enable the governing body to direct and control the credit union's business effectively, and to provide the information required by the FCA.
CREDS 2.2.46GRP
The key elements of a satisfactory system of internal audit include the following:(1) Terms of reference. These should be specified with precision and include, amongst other things, scope and objectives of the audit committee and the internal audit function (see CREDS 2.2.11G), access to records, powers to obtain information and explanations for officers, and reporting requirements. These should be approved by the governing body5. (2) Risk analysis. Key risks in each area of the
COLL 6.2.11RRP
(1) Where the authorised fund manager has not complied with COLL 6.2.8 R (1) (Controls over the issue and cancellation of units), it must correct the error as soon as possible and must reimburse the authorised fund any costs it may have incurred in correcting the position.(2) The authorised fund manager need not reimburse the authorised fund when:(a) the amount under (1) is not, in the depositary's opinion, material to the authorised fund;(b) the authorised fund manager can demonstrate
COLL 6.2.12GRP

Explanatory table: This table belongs to COLL 6.2.2 G (4) (Purpose).

Correction of box management errors

1

Controls by authorised fund managers

An authorised fund manager needs to be able to demonstrate that it has effective controls over:

(1)

its calculations of what units are owned by it (its 'box'); and

(2)

compliance with COLL 6.2.8 R which is intended to prevent a negative box.

2

Controls by depositaries

(1)

Under COLL 6.6.4 (General duties of the depositary), a depositary should take reasonable care to ensure that a scheme2 is managed in accordance with COLL 6.2 (Dealing) and COLL 6.3 (Pricing and valuation).

(2)

A depositary should therefore make a regular assessment of the authorised fund manager's box management procedures (including supporting systems) and controls. This should include reviewing the authorised fund manager's controls and procedures when the depositary assumes office, on any significant change and on a regular basis, to ensure that a series of otherwise minor changes do not have a cumulative and a significant effect on the accuracy of the controls and procedures.

3

Recording and reporting of box management errors

(1)

An authorised fund manager should record all errors which result in a breach of COLL 6.2.8 R (Controls over the issue and cancellation of units) and as soon as an error is discovered, the authorised fund manager should report the fact to the depositary, together with details of the action taken, or to be taken, to avoid repetition of the error.

(2)

A depositary should report material box management errors to the FCA immediately. Materiality should be determined by taking into account a number of factors including:

  • the implications of the error for the sufficiency of controls put into place by the authorised fund manager;
  • the significance of any breakdown in the authorised fund manager's management controls or other checking procedures;
  • the significance of any failure of systems or back-up arrangements;
  • the duration of an error; and
  • the level of compensation due to the scheme, and an authorised fund manager's ability (or otherwise) to meet claims for compensation in full.

(3)

A depositary should also make a return to the FCA (in the manner prescribed by SUP 16.6.8 R) on a quarterly basis.