Related provisions for SYSC 19D.3.28
41 - 60 of 240 items.
The calculation of expected loss amounts in accordance with BIPRU 4.3.6 R must be based on the same input figures of PD, LGD and the exposure value for each exposure as being used for the calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts in accordance with BIPRU 4. For defaultedexposures,where a firm uses its own estimate of LGDs, EL must be the firm's best estimate of expected loss (ELBE), for the defaultedexposure in accordance with BIPRU 4.3.122 R.[Note:BCD Article 88(2)]
A firm's documentation relating to data should include clear identification of responsibility for data quality. A firm should set standards for data quality and aim to improve them over time. A firm should measure its performance against those standards. A firm should ensure that its data is of high enough quality to support its risk management processes and the calculation of its capital requirements.
(1) This paragraph contains guidance on BIPRU 4.3.43 R and more general guidance about the governance of rating systems.(2) In determining the assignment referred to in BIPRU 4.3.43 R, a firm should have regard to the sensitivity of the rating to movements in fundamental risk drivers.(3) A firm should, for any rating system, be able to demonstrate that it acts appropriately or has an appropriate policy, as applicable, with respect to:(a) any deficiencies caused by its not being
The following provisions also apply with respect to the definition of default:(1) for overdrafts, days past due commence once an obligor has breached an advised limit, has been advised a limit smaller than current outstandings, or has drawn credit without authorisation and the underlying amount is material;(2) an advised limit means a limit which has been brought to the knowledge of the obligor;(3) days past due for credit cards commence on the minimum payment due date;(4) in
(1) This paragraph contains guidance on the definition of default.(2) If:(a) a firm ordinarily assigns exposures in the sovereign, institution and corporate IRB exposure class to a member of a group substantially on the basis of membership of that group and a common group rating; and(b) the firm does so in the case of a particular group;(3) the firm should consider whether members of that group should be treated as a single obligor for the purpose of the definition of default.(4)
To the extent that LGD estimates take into account the existence of collateral, a firm must establish internal requirements for collateral management, legal certainty and risk management that are generally consistent with those set out in BIPRU 5 (Credit risk mitigation) as modified by BIPRU 4.10.[Note:BCD Annex VII Part 4 point 78]
(1) A firm must be able to satisfy the appropriate regulator that the firm's risk management system for managing the risks arising on the transactions covered by the master netting agreement is conceptually sound and implemented with integrity and that, in particular, the minimum qualitative standards in (2) – (11) are met.(2) The internal risk-measurement model used for calculation of potential price volatility for the transactions is closely integrated into the daily risk-management
The fully adjusted exposure value (E*) for a firm using the master netting agreement internal models approach must be calculated according to the following formula:E* = max {0, [(∑E -∑C) + (VaR output of the internal models)]}where(1) (where risk weighted exposure amounts are calculated under the standardised approach) E is the exposure value for each separate exposure under the agreement that would apply in the absence of the credit protection;(2) C is the value of the securities
(1) A firm must under the standardised approach calculate risk weighted exposure amounts for repurchase transactions and/or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions and/or other capital market-driven transactions covered by master netting agreements under this rule.(2) E* as calculated under BIPRU 5.6.5 R to BIPRU 5.6.25 R must be taken as the exposure value of the exposure to the counterparty arising from the transactions subject to the master netting agreement
(1) This rule applies to a firm that is unable to comply with the Remuneration Code because of an obligation it owes to a Remuneration Code staffmember under a provision of an agreement made on or before 29 July 2010 (the "provision").(2) A firm must take reasonable steps to amend or terminate the provision referred to in (1) in a way that enables it to comply with the Remuneration Code at the earliest opportunity.(3) Until the provision referred to in (1) ceases to prevent the
(1) The aim of the Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the 3CRD which relate to remuneration. 7In applying the Remuneration Code, firms should comply with the EBA “Guidelines on sound remuneration policies
(1) 7In addition to the notification requirements in the Remuneration Code7 general circumstances in which the FCA7 expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities of other members
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should in particular note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices to be
The criteria which the appropriate regulator must apply when assessing ECAIs for recognition for exposurerisk weighting purposes are set out in Regulation 22 and Schedule 1 to the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006. In making an assessment against those criteria and in carrying out the mapping process described in BIPRU 3.3.7 G to BIPRU 3.3.9 G the appropriate regulator will have regard to the approach set out in the Committee of European Banking Supervisors' "Guidelines on
Under Regulation 22(3) of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006 the appropriate regulator is obliged to determine, taking into account the requirements set out in Schedule 2 to the Capital Requirements Regulations 2006, with which of the credit quality steps set out in Part 1 of Annex VI of the Banking Consolidation Directive the relevant credit assessments of an eligible ECAI are to be associated. Those determinations should be objective and consistent.
The following parties may be recognised as eligible providers of unfunded credit protection:(1) central governments and central banks;(2) regional governments or local authorities;(3) multilateral development banks;(4) international organisationsexposures which are assigned a 0% risk weight under the standardised approach;(5) public sector entities, claims on which are treated as claims on institutions or central governments under the standardised approach;(6) institutions;(7)
A firm must be able to satisfy the appropriate regulator that it has systems in place to manage potential concentration of risk arising from the firm's use of guarantees and credit derivatives. The firm must be able to demonstrate how its strategy in respect of its use of credit derivatives and guarantees interacts with its management of its overall risk profile.[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 2 point 15]
Where an exposure is protected by a guarantee which is counter-guaranteed by a central government or central bank, a regional government or local authority or a public sector entity claims on which are treated as claims on the central government in whose jurisdiction they are established under the standardised approach, a multilateral development bank or an international organisation,1to which a 0% risk weight is assigned under or by virtue of the standardised approach, or a public
Where a firm transfers a part of the risk of a loan in one or more tranches, BIPRU 9 applies. Materiality thresholds on payments below which no payment shall be made in the event of loss are considered to be equivalent to retained first loss positions and to give rise to a tranched transfer of risk.[Note: BCD Annex VIII Part 3 point 86]
An AIFM must establish, implement and maintain remuneration policies and practices for AIFM Remuneration Code staff that are consistent with, and promote, sound and effective risk management and do not encourage risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk profile of the instrument constituting the fund of the AIFs it manages.[Note: article 13(1) of AIFMD]
An AIFM must ensure that its remuneration policy is consistent with, and promotes, sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk profiles of the instrument constituting the fund of the AIFs it manages.[Note: paragraph 1(a) of Annex II of AIFMD]
(1) An AIFM that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices, and the incentives created for managing risk.(3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the governing
An AIFM must ensure the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee, or, if such a committee has not been established, by the governing body in its supervisory function.[Note: paragraph 1(f) of Annex II of AIFMD]
An AIFM must ensure that the assessment of performance is set in a multi-year framework appropriate to the life-cycle of the AIFs managed by the AIFM to ensure that:(1) the assessment process is based on longer term performance; and(2) the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the redemption policy of the AIFs it manages and their investment risks.[Note: paragraph 1(h) of Annex II of AIFMD]
A full-scope UK
AIFM should: (1) cover the professional liability risks set out in article 12 of the AIFMD level 2 regulation (professional liability risks) (as replicated in IPRU-INV 11.3.12UK1) by either:(a) maintaining an amount of own funds in line with article 14 of the AIFMD level 2 regulation (additional own funds) (as replicated in IPRU-INV 11.3.14UK) (the professional negligence capital requirement); or (b) holding professional indemnity insurance and
(1) 1The professional liability risks to be covered pursuant to the UK legislation that implemented1 Article 9(7) of Directive 2011/61/EU shall be risks of loss or damage caused by a relevant person through the negligent performance of activities for which the AIFM has legal responsibility.(2) Professional liability risks as defined in paragraph 1 shall include, without being limited to, risks of:(a)
loss of documents evidencing title of assets
(1) An AIFM shall implement effective internal operational risk management policies and procedures in order to identify, measure, manage and monitor appropriately operational risks including professional liability risks to which the AIFM is or could be reasonably exposed. The operational risk management activities shall be performed independently as part of the risk management policy.(2) An AIFM shall set up a historical loss database, in which any operational failures,
(1) 1This Article shall apply to AIFMs that choose to cover professional liability risks through additional own funds.(2) The AIFM shall provide additional own funds for covering liability risks arising from professional negligence at least equal to 0,01 % of the value of the portfolios of AIFs managed. The value of the portfolios of AIFs managed shall be the sum of the absolute value of all assets of all AIFs managed by the AIFM, including assets acquired through use of leverage,
(1) 1This Article shall apply to AIFMs that choose to cover professional liability risks through professional indemnity insurance. (2) The AIFM shall take out and maintain at all times professional indemnity insurance that: (a) shall have an initial term of no less than one year; (b) shall have a notice period for cancellation of at least 90 days;(c) shall cover professional liability risks as defined in Article 12(1) and (2); (d) is taken out from an EU or non-EU undertaking
(1) This Article shall apply to AIFMs that choose to cover professional liability risks through professional indemnity insurance. (2) The AIFM shall take out and maintain at all times professional indemnity insurance that: (a) shall have an initial term of no less than one year; (b) shall have a notice period for cancellation of at least 90 days;
(c) shall cover professional liability risks as defined in Article 12(1) and (2); (d) is taken out
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
(1) The FCA9 considers that, while the firm'sgoverning body is ultimately responsible for risk governance throughout the business, firms should consider establishing a governing body risk committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.(2) Where a firm has established a governing body risk committee, its responsibilities will typically include:(a) providing advice to the firm'sgoverning body on risk strategy, including the oversight of current risk exposures
In carrying out their risk governance responsibilities, a firm'sgoverning body and governing body risk committee should have regard to any relevant advice from its audit committee or internal audit function concerning the effectiveness of its current control framework. In addition, they should remain alert to the possible need for expert advice and support on any risk issue, taking action to ensure that they receive such advice and support as may be necessary to meet their responsibilities
(1) [deleted]2(2) The Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements.2(3) As with other aspects of a firm's systems and controls, in accordance with SYSC 4.1.2 Rremuneration policies, procedures and practices must be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the common
(1) [deleted]2(2) [deleted]2(3) The FCA2 would also expect firms to apply, on a firm-wide basis,2 at least the principles relating to: (a) risk management and risk tolerance (Remuneration Principle 1);2(b) supporting business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the firm (Remuneration Principle 2);2(c) conflicts of interest (Remuneration Principle 3);2(d) governance (Remuneration Principle 4);2(e) risk adjustment (Remuneration Principle 8);2(f) pension policy
(1) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme 2 must establish and maintain a permanent risk management function.(2) The function referred to in (1) must be hierarchically and functionally independent from operating units, except where such independence would not be appropriate and proportionate in view of the nature, scale and complexity of the authorised fund manager’s 2 business and of each scheme it manages.(3) The authorised fund manager 2 must be able to demonstrate that:(a)
Where the risk management function required under COLL 6.11.2 R (1) is not hierarchically and functionally independent, the authorised fund manager 2 should nevertheless be able to demonstrate that its risk management process satisfies the requirements of COLL 6.12.3 R (Risk management process) and that, in particular, the appropriate safeguards have been adopted.[Note: article 12(2) third paragraph and recital (12) of the UCITS implementing Directive]
(1) The permanent risk management function must:(a) implement the risk management policy and procedures;(b) ensure compliance with the risk limit system, including statutory limits concerning global exposure and counterparty risk, as required by COLL 5.2 (General investment powers and limits for UCITS schemes) and COLL 5.3 (Derivative exposure)2;(c) provide advice to the governing body, as regards the identification of the risk profile of each scheme it manages;(d) provide regular
To demonstrate that the issuer and the proposed owner will comply with Regulation 17, and Regulations 23 and 24 of the RCB Regulations (capability of the asset pool to cover claims), the issuer should set out what it considers to be the risks of the regulation not being complied with and show how those risks have been adequately mitigated by reference to the tests and provisions set out in the covered bond or programme documentation.
Regulations 17(2)(d) (requirements on issuer relating to the asset pool) and 23(2) (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) require the issuer of a regulated covered bond and the owner of the relevant asset pool to make arrangements so that the asset pool is of sufficient quality to give investors confidence that in the event of the failure of the issuer there will be a low risk of default in the timely payment by the owner of claims attaching to a regulated covered
The FCA will:(1) expect the issuer to demonstrate that it has in place appropriate systems, controls, procedures and policies, including in relation to risk management, underwriting, arrears and valuation; (2) expect the issuer to demonstrate that the cash-flows generated by the assets would be sufficient to meet the payments due in a timely manner including under conditions of economic stress and in the event of the failure of the issuer;(3) take account of any over collateralisation
The risk factors which the FCA will take into account in assessing the issuer's and owner's compliance with Regulations 17(2)(d) (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 23(2) (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) will include credit risk of the assets, concentration risk, market risk and counterparty risk.
Concentration risk is the risk of loss from exposures being limited in number or variety. The relevant factors the FCA may consider include:(1) the level of granularity of the asset pool (i.e. what is the number and size distribution of assets in the pool); (2) whether the borrowers or collateral is unduly concentrated in a particular industry, sector, or geographical region.
In respect of a securitisation position in respect of which a 1250% risk weight is assigned, a firm may, as an alternative to including the position in its calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts, deduct from its capital resources the exposure value of the position. For these purposes, the calculation of the exposure value may reflect eligible funded protection in a manner consistent with BIPRU 9.14.[Note:BCD Annex IX Part 4 points 35, 74 and 75(b)]
Where a firm applies BIPRU 9.10.2 R, 12.5 times the amount deducted in accordance with that paragraph must, for the purposes of BIPRU 9.11.5 R and BIPRU 9.12.8 R, be subtracted from the amount specified in whichever of those rules applies as the maximum risk weighted exposure amount to be calculated by a firm to which one of those rules applies.[Note:BCD Annex IX Part 4 point 36 and point 76]
SYSC 4.1.1 R requires every firm, including a credit union, to have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, and internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures and effective control and safeguard arrangements for information processing
(1) The governing body5 should decide what form this documentation should take, but the governing body5 should have in mind the following points.(a) Documents should be comprehensive: they should cover all material aspects of the operations of the credit union.(b) Documents should be integrated: separate elements of the system should be cross-referred so that the system can be viewed as a whole.(c) Documents should identify risks and the controls established to manage those risks.
The governing body5should consider the range of possible outcomes in relation to various risks. These risks are increased when a credit union provides ancillary services such as issuing and administering means of payment and money transmission, which result, in particular, in higher liquidity and operational risks.
The policy and procedures manual should cover all aspects of the credit union's operations, including matters such as:(1) cash handling and disbursements;(2) collection procedures;(3) lending, (see CREDS 7.1 to CREDS 7.2)5;(4) arrears management (see CREDS 7.2.9 G to CREDS 7.2.10 G);(5) provisioning5;(6) liquidity management5;(7) financial risk management5;(8) money laundering prevention (see SYSC 6.3);(9) internal audit (see CREDS 2.2.40 G to CREDS 2.2.50 G);(10) information
A firm must introduce adequate organisational arrangements to minimise the risk of the loss or diminution of client money, or of rights in connection with client money, as a result of misuse of client money, fraud, poor administration, inadequate record-keeping or negligence. [Note: article 2(1)(f)1 of the MiFID Delegated Directive1]
The risk of loss or diminution of rights in connection with client money can arise where a firm's organisational arrangements give rise to the possibility that client money held by the firm may be paid for the account of a client whose money is yet to be received by the firm. Consistent with the requirement to hold client money as trustee (see CASS 7.17.5 G), a firm should ensure its organisational arrangements are adequate to minimise such a risk. This may include, for example,
1(1) Unless otherwise stated,8GENPRU 3.1 applies to every firm that is a member of a financial conglomerate other than:(a) [deleted]10(b) [deleted]10(c) [deleted]10(d) an ICVC;8(e) a bank;8(f) a designated investment firm; and8(g) an insurer.8(1A) GENPRU 3.1 (except GENPRU 3.1.5R to GENPRU 3.1.12G10) applies to each of the following firms that is a member of a financial conglomerate:8(a) a bank;8(b) a designated investment firm; and8(c) an insurer that is a “UK Solvency II firm”
GENPRU 3.1.35 R implements requirements that correspond to10 Article 7(4) and Article 8(4) of the Financial Groups Directive10 that where a financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company, the sectoral rules regarding risk concentration and intra-group transactions of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate, if any, shall apply to that sector as a whole, including the mixed financial holding company.
Subject to GENPRU 3.1.35AR, a 11firm must ensure that the sectoral rules regarding risk concentration and intra-group transactions of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate referred to in GENPRU 3.1.34 R are complied with with respect to that financial sector as a whole, including the mixed financial holding company. The sectoral rules for these purposes are those identified in the table in GENPRU 3.1.36 R.4
For the corporate exposure class there is a separate sub-class of specialised lending exposure. A firm may calculate risk weights for these exposures, where it is able to do so, in the same way as it does for the rest of its corporate exposure class, i.e. using the foundation IRB approach or the advanced IRB approach. Where a firm is not able to use this approach it may calculate risk weights for specialised lending exposures by slotting them into predetermined risk weights.
(1) The appropriate regulator will only grant an IRB permission if it is satisfied that the firm's systems for the management and rating of credit risk exposures are sound and implemented with integrity and, in particular, that they meet the standards in BIPRU 4.2.2 R in accordance with the minimum IRB standards.(2) Under BIPRU 4.2.11 R, a firm applying for an IRB permission is required to demonstrate that it has been using for the IRB exposure classes in question rating systems
By modifying GENPRU 2.1.51 R to allow the firm to use the IRB approach to calculate all or part of its risk weighted exposure amounts, the appropriate regulator is treating it like an application rule. The modification means that the provisions of BIPRU relating to the IRB approach supersede the rules relating to the standardised approach for exposures coming within the scope of the IRB permission.
The management report required by DTR 4.1.8 R must also give an indication of:(1) any important events that have occurred since the end of the financial year unless those events are:4(a) 4reflected in the issuer’s profit and loss account or balance sheet; or(b) 4disclosed in the notes to the issuer’s audited financial statements;(2) the issuer's likely future development;(3) activities in the field of research and development;(4) the information concerning acquisitions of own
(1) Responsibility statements must be made by the persons responsible within the issuer.(2) The name and function of any person who makes a responsibility statement must be clearly indicated in the responsibility statement.(3) For each person making a responsibility statement, the statement must set out that to the best of his or her knowledge:(a) the financial statements, prepared in accordance with the applicable set of accounting standards, give a true and fair view of the