Related provisions for EG 12.3.3
381 - 400 of 1029 items.
A parent undertaking which wishes to make use of the exemption in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market must without delay, notify the following to the FCA:1(1) a list of the names of those management companies, investment firms or other entities, indicating the competent authorities that supervise them, but with no reference to the issuers concerned; and(2) a statement that, in the case of each such management company
Where the parent undertaking intends to benefit from the exemptions only in relation to the financial instruments4 referred to in DTR 5.3.1R6, it must4 notify to the FCA only the list referred to in paragraph (1) of DTR 5.4.4 R.[Note: article 10(3) of the TD implementing Directiveand article 13 of theTD6]
A parent undertaking of a management company or of an investment firm must in relation to issuers subject to this chapter whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that:1(1) the organisational structures of the parent undertaking and the management company or investment firm are such that the voting rights are exercised independently of the parent undertaking;(2) the persons who decide how the voting rights are exercised
A parent undertaking of a third country6 undertaking must comply with the notification requirements in DTR 5.4.4 R (1) and DTR 5.4.5 R and in addition: (1) must make a statement that in respect of each management company or investment firm concerned, the parent undertaking complies with the conditions of independence set down in DTR 5.4.10 R; and (2) must1 be able to demonstrate to the FCA on request that the requirements of DTR 5.4.6 R are respected.[Note: article 23 of the TD
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
(1) The Chief Risk Officer should be accountable to a firm'sgoverning body.(2) The FCA9 recognises that in addition to the Chief Risk Officers primary accountability to the governing body, an executive reporting line will be necessary for operational purposes. Accordingly, to the extent necessary for effective operational management, the Chief Risk Officer should report into a very senior executive level in the firm. In practice, the FCA9 expects this will be to the chief executive,
(1) The FCA9 considers that, while the firm'sgoverning body is ultimately responsible for risk governance throughout the business, firms should consider establishing a governing body risk committee to provide focused support and advice on risk governance.(2) Where a firm has established a governing body risk committee, its responsibilities will typically include:(a) providing advice to the firm'sgoverning body on risk strategy, including the oversight of current risk exposures
3The FCA is the single statutory regulator for all financial business in the UK. Its strategic objective under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the 2000 Act) is to ensure that the relevant markets function well. The FCA's operational objectives are: securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers;protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system; andpromoting effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets.(Note: The 2000
3Under the 2000 Act the FCA has powers to investigate concerns including: • regulatory concerns about authorised firms and individuals employed by them;suspected contraventions of the Market Abuse Regulation or any supplementary market abuse legislation (as defined in Part 8 of the Act)5252• suspected misleading statements and practices under s.397 of the 2000 Act and Part 7 of the Financial Services Act 2012;• suspected insiderdealing under of Part V of the Criminal Justice
3The FCA has the power to take the following enforcement action: • discipline authorised firms under Part XIV of the 2000 Act and approved persons and other individuals1under s.66 of the 2000 Act;• impose penalties on persons that perform controlled functions4without approval under s.63A of the 2000 Act;• impose civil penalties2under s.123 of the 2000 Act;5• 2temporarily prohibit an individual from exercising management functions in MiFID investment firms or from dealing in
The FCA will not grant an investment firm consolidation waiver unless:(1) the UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3 meets the conditions for being a CAD Article 22 group;(2) the FCA is satisfied that each BIPRU firm in the UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3 will be able to meet its capital requirements using the calculation of capital resources in GENPRU 2 Annex 6R (Capital resources table for a BIPRU 2firm with a waiver from consolidated supervision); and(3) the
Compliance with the capital requirements set out in BIPRU 8.4.11 R is a condition under the Capital Adequacy Directive for the exemption from capital requirements as it applies in accordance with article 95(2) of the UK CRR3. Thus if they are breached the FCA is likely to revoke the investment firm consolidation waiver.
If a firm has an investment firm consolidation waiver, it must:(1) ensure that each CAD investment firm in the UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3 which is a firm3has in place systems to monitor and control the sources of capital and funding of all the members in the UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3;(2) notify the FCA of any serious risk that could undermine the financial stability of the UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3, as soon as the firm becomes
Although an investment firm consolidation waiver switches off most of this chapter, a firm should still carry out the capital adequacy calculations in BIPRU 8.3 to BIPRU 8.8 as if those parts of this chapter still applied to the UK consolidation group or non-UK sub-group3 and report these to the FCA. It should also still monitor large exposure risk on a consolidated basis.
In seeking to comply with its obligation to carry out checks on its internal records and accounts, a CASS small debt management firm may choose to follow the steps specifically required of CASS large debt management firms in undertaking a CASS large debt management firm internal client money reconciliation and CASS large debt management firm external client money reconciliation. A CASS small debt management firm which follows that procedure is likely to be regarded by the FCA
A CASS debt management firm must inform the FCA in writing without delay if:(1) its internal records and accounts of client money are materially out of date or materially inaccurate so that the firm is no longer able to comply with the requirements in CASS 11.11.1 R to CASS 11.11.4 R; or(2) it becomes aware that, at any time in the preceding 12 months, the amount of client money segregated in its client bank accounts materially differed from the total aggregate amount of client
A CASS large debt management firm must inform the FCA in writing without delay if:(1) after having carried out a CASS large debt management firm internal client money reconciliation in accordance with CASS 11.11.13 R it will be unable to, or materially fails to, pay any shortfall into (or withdraw any excess from) a client bank account so that the firm is unable to comply with CASS 11.11.23 R;(2) after having carried out a CASS large debt management firm external client money
2Normally, where the outcome is potentially a financial penalty, suspension, restriction, condition or disciplinary prohibition,3 the FCA will send a letter at an early point in the enforcement process to the subject of the investigation. This is what the FCA refers to as a stage 1 letter. The FCA will aim to give 28 days’ notice of the beginning of stage 1 to allow the parties involved to make administrative arrangements, e.g. ensuring that key staff can be available to participate
2There is no set form for a stage 1 letter though it will always explain the nature of the misconduct, the FCA's view on the sanction3, and the period within which the FCA expects any settlement discussions to be concluded. In some cases, a draft statutory notice setting out the alleged rule breaches and the proposed sanction3 may form part of the letter, to convey the substance of the case team’s concerns and reasons for arriving at a particular level of sanction3. The FCA will
2The timing of the stage 1 letter will vary from case to case. Sufficient investigative work must have taken place for the FCA to be able to satisfy itself that the settlement is the right regulatory outcome. In many cases, the FCA can send out the stage 1 letter substantially before the person concerned is provided with the FCA's preliminary investigation report (see paragraphs 4.13.1 to 4.13.4). The latest point the FCA will send a stage 1 letter is when the person is provided
2The FCA considers that 28 days following a stage 1 letter will normally be the ‘reasonable opportunity to reach agreement as to the amount of penalty’ before the expiry of stage 1 contemplated by DEPP 6.7.3G3. Extensions to this period will be granted in exceptional circumstances only, and factors that will be taken into account in considering an application will include the extent to which factors outside the firm’s or individual’s control will have a material impact on their
A credit union must provide the FCA, once a year, with a report in the format set out in CREDS 9 Annex 1 R (Credit Union complaints return) which contains (for the relevant reporting period) information about:(1) the total number of complaints received by the credit union;(2) (for the product/service groupings within section 5)3 the number of complaints closed by the credit union:(a) within eight weeks of receipt; and(b) more than eight weeks after receipt;(2A) (for other lending
A report under this section must be given or addressed, and delivered, in the way set out in SUP 16.3.6 R to SUP 16.3.16 G (General provisions on reporting), except that, instead of the credit union's usual supervisory contact, the report must be given to or addressed for the attention of the Central Reporting team at the FCA.22
1The FCA may impose, under sections 55J or 55L of the Act,3 a variation of permission3 or a requirement3 so that it takes effect immediately or on a specified date if it reasonably considers it necessary for the variation or requirement to take effect immediately (or on the date specified), having regard to the ground on which it is exercising its own-initiative powers.
1The FCA will consider exercising its own-initiative power2where: (1) the information available to it indicates serious concerns about the firm or its business that need to be addressed immediately; and (2) circumstances indicate that it is appropriate to use statutory powers immediately to require and/or prohibit certain actions by the firm in order to ensure the firm addresses these concerns.
1It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of the situations that will give rise to such serious concerns, but they are likely to include one or more of the following characteristics: (1) information indicating significant loss, risk of loss or other adverse effects for consumers, where action is necessary to protect their interests; (2) information indicating that a firm's conduct has put it at risk of being used for the purposes of financial crime, or of being otherwise
1The FCA will consider the full circumstances of each case when it decides whether a2 variation of Part 4A permission under section 55J of the Act3 or an imposition of a requirement under section 55L of the Act3 is appropriate. The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors the FCA may consider. (1) The extent of any loss, or risk of loss, or other adverse effect on consumers. The more serious the loss or potential loss or other adverse effect, the more likely it is that the
Once every calendar year, a CASS debt management firm must notify the FCA, in writing, of the information in (1), (2) or (3), as applicable, and the information in (4), in each case no later than the day specified in (1) to (4):(1) if it held client money in the previous calendar year, the highest total amount of client money held during the previous calendar year, notification of which must be made no later than the fifteenth business day of January; or (2) if it did not hold
(1) Notwithstanding CASS 11.2.3 R, provided that the conditions in (2) are satisfied, a CASS debt management firm that would otherwise be classified as a CASS small debt management firm under the limits provided for in CASS 11.2.3 R may elect to be treated as a CASS large debt management firm.(2) The conditions to which (1) refers are that in either case: (a) the election is notified to the FCA in writing;(b) the notification in accordance with (a) is made at least one week before
A firm's 'CASS debt management firm type' and any change to it takes effect:(1) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 11.2.4 R (1) or CASS 11.2.4 R (2), on 1 February following the notification; or(2) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 11.2.4 R (3), on the day it begins to hold client money; or(3) if the firm makes an election under CASS 11.2.7 R and provided the conditions in CASS 11.2.7 R (2) are satisfied, on the day the notification made under
Section 333T of the Act (Funding of action against illegal money lending) requires the Treasury to notify the FCA of the amount of the Treasury’s illegal money lending costs. The FCA must make rules requiring authorised persons, or any specified class of authorised person, to pay to the FCA the specified amounts or amounts calculated in a specified way, with a view to recovering the amounts notified to it by the Treasury.
2The FCA3 will seek to deprive an individual of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA3 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit. Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breaching FCA3rules or other requirements of the regulatory system and the individual’s breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA3
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of an individual’s “relevant income”. “Relevant income” will be the gross amount of all benefits received by the individual from the employment in connection with which the breach occurred (the “relevant employment”), and for the period of the breach. In determining an individual’s relevant income, “benefits” includes, but is not limited to, salary, bonus, pension contributions, share options and share schemes;
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the individual in bringing (or
(1) If the FCA3 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA3 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA3 may do this include:333(a) where the FCA3 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;3(b) where previous FCA3 action in respect of similar breaches
The FCA3 and the individual on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA3 and the individual concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step
The FOS ADR levy is
calculated as follows:(1) Determine the number of hours, or part of an
hour, taken by the FCA, in performing functions
under the ADR Regulations.(2) Using the table at FEES 3 Annex 9R(11),
determine the relevant pay grades of those employed by the
FCA to perform the functions under the
ADR Regulations.(3) Next, multiply the applicable rate in the table
at FEES 3 Annex 9R(11) by the number of hours or part hours obtained under
(1).(4) Then add any fees and disbursements
The FCA understands that in complying with condition 2(g) of the Part 30 exemption order, a firm is representing that it will not:(1) make use of the opt-out arrangements in CASS 7.10.9G2 to CASS 7.10.13G2; or(2) conduct business to which the client money rules do not apply because of the exemption for CRD credit institutions and approved banks in CASS 7.10.16R2 to CASS 7.10.24R2; or(3) enter into any TTCA under CASS 7.113;2in relation to business conducted pursuant to the Part
For firms with exemptive relief under the Part 30 exemption order, the CFTC has issued certain no-action letters which, on the FCA's understanding, would allow such firms to use an LME bond arrangement as an alternative to complying with condition 2(g) of the Part 30 exemption order. Under an LME bond arrangement, a firm may arrange for a binding letter of credit to be issued to cover the 'secured amount' (as defined by section 30.7 of the General Regulations under the US Commodity
1Subject to SYSC 12.1.2 R to SYSC 12.1.4 R, this section applies to each of the following which is a member of a group:(1) a firm that falls into any one or more of the following categories:(a) an investment firm that is not a designated investment firm18;15(b) [deleted]88(c) an insurer;(ca) a UK ISPV;16(d) [deleted]18(e) a UK parent entity of an investment firm group that is subject to prudential consolidation under MIFIDPRU 2.5 or to the group capital test under MIFIDPRU 2.6;
SYSC 12.1.8R (1) deals with the systems and controls that a firm should have in respect of the exposure it has to the rest of the group. On the other hand, the purpose of SYSC 12.1.8R (2) and the rules in this section that amplify it is to require groups to have adequate systems and controls. However a group is not a single legal entity on which obligations can be imposed. Therefore the obligations have to be placed on individual firms. The purpose of imposing the obligations
A company2 must forward to the FCA, for publication, by uploading to the national storage mechanism, a copy13 of:2(1) all circulars, notices, reports or other documents to which the listingrules apply, at the same time as any such documents are issued; and(2) all resolutions passed by the company other than resolutions concerning ordinary business at an annual general meeting, as soon as possible after the relevant general meeting.
A company2 must ensure that the FCA is provided with up to date contact details of appropriate persons nominated by it to act as the first point of contact with the FCA in relation to the company's compliance with the listing rules and the disclosure requirements6 and transparency rules, as applicable.22
3Behaviour
of the type referred to in APER 4.1.3G includes, but is not limited to, deliberately:(1) falsifying documents;(2) misleading
a client about the risks of
an investment;(3) misleading
a client about the charges or
surrender penalties of investment products;(4) misleading
a client about the likely performance
of investment products by providing
inappropriate projections of
future investment returns;(5) misleading
a client by informing him that
products require only a single
3Deliberately
failing to inform, without reasonable cause:(1) a customer; or(2) his APER employer5 (or its auditors or an actuary appointed
by his APER employer5 under SUP 4 (Actuaries)1); or1(3) the FCA or
the PRA;66of the fact that their understanding
of a material issue is incorrect, despite being aware of their misunderstanding,
falls within APER 4.1.2G.
Pursuant to the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 (Short Selling) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/2554), the FCA will direct how notifications to use
the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption shall
be made. Such directions will be published on the FCA website and listed in FINMAR 2 Annex 1
G.
(1) If the FCA considers that a natural or legal
person ('P') who has notified the FCA of his intention to use either
the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption does
not satisfy the criteria to use the market
maker exemption or the authorised
primary dealer exemption, the FCA will send a letter to P setting
out the reasons why it is minded to prohibit P from using the market maker exemption or the authorised primary dealer exemption.(2) P will be given
If P is not satisfied with the FCA's decision to prohibit P's use of
the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption,
P may seek a review of the decision. This will be conducted by a group of
at least three senior FCA staff. None of the group conducting
the review will have been connected with the earlier decision taken in respect
of P's use of the market maker exemption or
the authorised primary dealer exemption.
The review may take place after the expiry
This chapter sets out the FCA's3 approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: 3(1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FCA's3approach to the exercise of its powers under:3(a) (for RIEs)2section 296 of the Act (Appropriate regulator's3 power to give directions) 4or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations5 to give directions
The FCA's3 general approach to supervision is intended to ensure that:3(1) the FCA3 has sufficient assurance that recognised bodies continue at all times to satisfy the recognised body requirements; and2132(2) the FCA's3 supervisory resources are allocated, and supervisory effort is applied, in ways which reflect the actual risks to the regulatory objectives. 3
23Firms proposing to offer arrangements involving some form of minimum underpinning or 'guarantee' should discuss their proposals with the FCA and1 HM Revenue and Customs1 at the earliest possible opportunity (see DISP App 1.5.8 G). The FCA will need to be satisfied that these proposals provide complainants with redress which is at least commensurate with the standard approaches contained in this appendix.
23One of the reasons for introducing the guidance in this appendix is to seek a reduction in the number of complaints which are referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. If a firm writes to the complainant proposing terms for settlement which are in accordance with this appendix, the letter may include a statement that the calculation of loss and redress accords with the FCAguidance, but should not imply that this extends to the assessment of whether or not the complaint should
23'Relevant benefits' are those benefits that fall outside what is required in order that policyholders' reasonable expectations at that point of sale can be fulfilled. (The phrase 'policyholders' reasonable expectations' has technically been superseded. However, the concept now resides within the obligations imposed upon firms by FCA Principle 6 ('...a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly....') Additionally, most of these benefits would
3Where an issuer or person is required to file regulated information under DTR 6.2.2R, the issuer or person must, at the same time, notify the following to the FCA: (1) the legal entity identifier (LEI) of the issuer concerned; and(2) the classifications relevant to the regulated information using the classes and sub-classes in DTR 6 Annex 1R.