Related provisions for DEPP 4.1.6

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SYSC 18.4.1GRP
(1) A UK SMCR banking firm4 is required under SYSC 24.2.1R4 to allocate the FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility for acting as the firm’swhistleblowers’ champion. 242(2) SYSC 18.4.2R requires the appointment by an insurer of a director or senior manager as its whistleblowers’ champion. (3) This section sets out the role of the whistleblowers’ champion.(4) The FCA expects that a firm will appoint a non-executive director as its whistleblowers’ champion. A firm that does
SUP 10C.5.6GRP
[deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SUP 10C.5A.1G]6
SUP 10C.1.8GRP
(1) SUP 10A (FCA Approved Persons in Appointed Representatives) deals7 with the approved persons regime for appointed representatives of SMCR firms5. (2) In general this chapter does not apply to appointed representatives of SMCR firms5. SUP 10A applies instead.(3) In theory, a person employed by an appointed representative of an SMCR firm5 could come within one of the controlled functions in this chapter. If so, that person will be performing a senior management function and
REC 2.4A.1UKRP

1Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, paragraph 2A

(1)

The composition of the management body of a [UK RIE] must reflect an adequately broad range of experience.

(2)

The management body must possess adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience in order to understand the [UK RIE’s] activities and main risks.

(3)

Members of the management body must -

(a)

commit sufficient time to perform their functions on the management body;

(b)

act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind; and

(c)

effectively -

(i)

assess and challenge, where necessary, the decisions of the senior management; and

(ii)

oversee and monitor decision making.

(4)

The management body must -

(a)

define and oversee the implementation of governance arrangements that ensure the effective and prudent management of the [UK RIE] in a manner which promotes the integrity of the market, which at least must include the -

(i)

the segregation of duties in the organisation; and

(ii)

the prevention of conflicts of interest;

(b)

monitor and periodically assess the effectiveness of the [UK RIE’s] governance arrangements; and

(c)

take appropriate steps to address any deficiencies found as a result of the monitoring under paragraph (b).

(5)

A [UK RIE] must -

(a)

devote adequate human and financial resources to the induction and training of members of the management body;

(b)

ensure that the management body has access to the information and documents it requires to oversee and monitor management decision-making; and

(c)

notify the FCA of the identity of all the members of its management body.

(6)

A [UK RIE] and, if it has a nomination committee, its nomination committee must engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting persons to the management body, and for that purpose have a policy promoting diversity on the management body.

(7)

The number of directorships a member of the management body can hold at the same time must take into account individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of the [UK RIE’s] activities.

EG 8.8.1RP
1The Bank Recovery and Resolution Order 2016 amended the Act by adding sections 71B to 71I. The FCA has powers to remove directors and senior executives and to appoint temporary managers of relevant firms or parent undertakings, as defined by section 71I of the Act. Where a temporary manager has been appointed, the FCA also has powers to require the directors not to exercise specified functions during the period of appointment and to consult the temporary manager, or obtain the
EG 7.8.1RP
1The FCA's normal practice is to follow a "minded-to" procedure before deciding whether to give a private warning. This means that it will notify in writing the intended recipient of the warning that it has concerns about their conduct and inform them that the FCA proposes to give a private warning. The recipient will then have an opportunity to comment on our understanding of the circumstances giving rise to the FCA's concerns and whether a private warning is appropriate. The
SUP 3.2.5GRP
4It is the responsibility of an insurance intermediary's senior management to determine, on a continuing basis, whether the insurance intermediary is an exempt insurance intermediary and to appoint an auditor if management determines the firm is no longer exempt. SUP 3.7 (amplified by SUP 15) sets out what a firm should consider when deciding whether it should notify the FCA of matters raised by its auditor.6
COND 2.2.3GRP
Neither the UCITS Directive6, MiFID,3 the IDD7, AIFMD6 nor the Act define what is meant by a firm's 'head office'. This is not necessarily the firm's place of incorporation or the place where its business is wholly or mainly carried on. Although the FCA5 will judge each application on a case-by-case basis, the key issue in identifying the head office of a firm is the location of its central management and control, that is, the location of: 16(1) the directors and other senior
PERG 4.8.6GRP
If an unauthorised administrator makes arrangements for a mortgage administrator to administer its regulated mortgage contracts, the exclusion may cease to be available because the mortgage administrator ceases to have the required permission, or because the arrangement is terminated. The exclusion gives the unauthorised administrator a one-month grace period during which it may administer the contracts itself. If the period of administration exceeds one month, the unauthorised