Related provisions for SUP 10C.12.10
201 - 220 of 1033 items.
It is likely to be misleading for a firm that is not authorised by the FCA or PRA to state or imply that it is so authorised. It is also likely to be misleading for a firm to state or imply that a client will have recourse to the Financial Ombudsman Service or the FSCS where this is not the case.2(3) [deleted]44
4As well as potentially breaching the requirements in this section, misleading statements by a firm may involve a breach of Principle 7 (Communications with clients) or section Part 7 (Offences relating to financial services) of the Financial Services Act 2012, as well as giving rise to private law actions for misrepresentation.
(1) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.6.2G(1)]3(2) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.6.2G(2)]3(3) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.1.6G(3)]3(4) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.6.2G(4)]3
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FCA's3 view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.33(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the market abuse. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the market abuse:(a) the conduct of the individual in
(1) If the FCA3 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the market abuse, or others, from committing further or similar abuse then the FCA3 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA3 may do this include:333(a) where the FCA3 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the market abuse to meet its objective of credible deterrence;3(b) where previous FCA3 action in respect of similar
The FCA3 and the individual on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA3 and the individual concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step
1A CASS medium firm and a CASS large firm must allocate to a single6director or senior manager of sufficient skill and authority6 the function of:(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that firm’s systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS;(2) reporting to the firm’sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CMAR to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.14.[Note: article 7, first paragraph of the MiFID Delegated
(1) (a) This paragraph CASS 1A.3.1BG describes how CASS 1A.3.1AR applies to SMCR firms.8343(b) The8 function in CASS 1A.3.1AR is not a separate controlled function and performing that function does not require approval as an approved person.837(c) 7However, nothing in paragraphs (1A) to (4) affects the requirement for the function in CASS 1A.3.1AR to be allocated to a single director or senior manager of sufficient skill and authority in accordance with CASS 1A.3.1AR and CASS
(1) 1The following provisions of the MiFI Regulations regulate the establishment, application and resetting of position limits:
(a) Regulation 16(1) imposes an obligation on the FCA to establish position limits in respect of commodity derivatives traded on trading venues in the United Kingdom and economically equivalent OTC contracts;
(b) Regulation 16(2) imposes an obligation on the FCA to establish position limits on the basis of all positions held by a person in the contract
(1) 1A person must comply at all times with commodity derivative position limits established by the FCA, published at www.fca.org.uk. (2) A direction made under (1) applies where a commodity derivative is traded on a trading venue in the United Kingdom.2(3) Position limits established under (1) shall apply to the positions held by a person together with those held on its behalf at an aggregate group level (subject to the non-financial entity exemption in regulation 17(1) of the
(1) 1Regulation 17 of the MiFI Regulations regulates the position limit exemption applicable to positions in a commodity derivative held by or on behalf of a non-financial entity which are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity of that non-financial entity, and which is approved by the FCA in accordance with the relevant criteria and procedures. Regulation 17(1) imposes an obligation on the FCA to disregard such positions, when calculating
This guidance is issued under section 139A of Act (Guidance). It is designed to throw light on particular aspects of regulatory requirements, not to be an exhaustive description of a person's obligations. If a person acts in line with the guidance in the circumstances contemplated by it, then the FCA will proceed on the footing that the person has complied with aspects of the requirement to which the guidance relates.
Rights conferred on third parties cannot be affected by guidance given by the FCA. This guidance represents the FCA's view, and does not bind the courts, for example, in relation to an action for damages brought by a private person for breach of a rule (see section 138D of the Act (Action for damages)), or in relation to the enforceability of a contract where there has been a breach of the general prohibition on carrying on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom without authorisation
A firm is required to provide the FCA2 with a wide range of information to enable the FCA2 to meet its responsibilities for monitoring the firm's compliance with requirements imposed by or under the Act. Some of this information is provided through regular reports, including those set out in SUP 16 (Reporting requirements) and SUP 17 (Transaction reporting). In addition, other chapters in the Handbook set out specific notification and reporting requirements. Principle 11 includes
7Payment service providers are required to provide the FCA with such information as the FCA may direct in respect of their provision of payment services or compliance with the requirements imposed by or under Parts 2 to 7 or regulation 105 of the Payment Services Regulations. The purpose of SUP 15.8 is to request information from full credit institutions where they provide (or propose to provide) account information services or payment initiation services. In addition to this
3SUP 15.11 (Notification of COCON breaches and disciplinary action) provides rules and guidance on notifications to the FCA by an SMCR firm where the SMCR firm8 takes disciplinary action in relation to any conduct rules staff and the reason for taking that action is a reason specified in rules made by the FCA. This is a requirement imposed4 under section4 64C of the Act.4
In assessing compliance with, or a breach of, a rule in COCON, the FCA will have regard to the context in which a course of conduct was undertaken, including: (1) the precise circumstances of the individual case; (2) the characteristics of the particular function performed by the individual in question; and (3) the behaviour expected in that function.
In determining whether or not the particular conduct of a person complies with the rules in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include: (1) whether that conduct relates to activities that are subject to other provisions of the Handbook; (2) whether that conduct is consistent with the requirements and standards of the regulatory system relevant to the person'sfirm.
In determining whether or not the conduct of a senior conduct rules staff member complies with rules SC1 to SC4 in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include:(1) whether they exercised reasonable care when considering the information available to them;(2) whether they reached a reasonable conclusion upon which to act;(3) the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business;(4) their role and responsibility as determined by reference to the relevant statement
UK domestic firms with a premium listing1 are subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code, whose internal control Provisions1 are explained in the publication entitled ‘Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting (September 2014)’1 issued by the Financial Reporting Council. Therefore, firms in this category will be subject to that code, as well as to the rules in COCON. In forming an opinion as to whether a senior conduct rules staff
Some of these tools, for example
the use of public statements to deliver messages to firms or consumers1, do not involve
the FCA in direct oversight
of the business of firms. In
contrast, other tools do involve a direct relationship with firms.
The FCA also has powers to
act on its own initiative to impose or vary individual requirements on
a firm (see SUP 7) and to ban or impose requirements in relation to
specific financial promotions1. The FCA may
also use its general rule-making
The FCA uses
a variety of tools to monitor whether a firm,
once authorised, remains in compliance
with regulatory requirements. These tools include (but are not limited to):(1) desk-based reviews;(2) liaison with other agencies or
regulators;(3) meetings with management and other
representatives of a firm;(4) on-site inspections;(5) reviews and analysis of periodic
returns and notifications;(6) reviews of past business;(7) transaction monitoring;(8) use of auditors; and(9) use
The FCA also
uses a variety of tools to address specific risks identified in firms. These tools include:(1) making recommendations for preventative
or remedial action;(2) giving other individual guidance to a firm;(3) imposing individual requirements; and(4) varying a firm'spermission in another way.
(1)7 |
The rules of the [UK RIE] must provide that the [UK RIE] must not exercise its power to suspend or remove from trading on a trading venue operated by it any financial instrument which no longer complies with its rules, where such step would be likely to cause significant damage to the interests of investors or the orderly functioning of the financial markets. |
7(2) |
Where the [UK RIE] suspends or removes any financial instrument from trading on a trading venue it operates it must also suspend or remove from trading on that venue any derivative that relates to or is referenced to that financial instrument where that is required to support the objectives of the suspension or removal of trading of that financial instrument. |
7(3) |
Where the [UK RIE] suspends or removes any financial instrument from trading on a trading venue it operates, including any derivative in accordance with sub-paragraph (2), it must make that decision public and notify the FCA. |
7(4) |
Where following a decision made under sub-paragraph (2) the [UK RIE] lifts a suspension or re-admits any financial instrument to trading on a trading venue it operates, including any derivative suspended or removed from trading in accordance with that sub-paragraph , it must make that decision public and notify the FCA. |
[Note: MiFID RTS 18 contains requirements on the suspension and removal of financial instruments from trading]7 |
|
2In determining whether:(1) business conducted by means of a UK RIE'sfacilities is conducted so;5(2) [deleted]55as to afford proper protection to investors, the FCA5 may, in addition to the matters dealt with in REC 2.7 to REC 2.12, have regard to all the arrangements made by the UK recognised body concerning the operation of its facilities.5
2The FCA5 may also have regard to the extent to which the UK recognised body's rules, procedures and the arrangements for monitoring and overseeing the use of its facilities:5(1) include appropriate measures to prevent the use of its facilities for abusive or improper purposes;(2) provide appropriate safeguards for investors against fraud or misconduct, recklessness, negligence or incompetence by users of its facilities;(3) provide appropriate information to enable users of its
2In determining whether a UK RIE is ensuring that business conducted by means of its facilities is conducted in an orderly manner (and so as to afford proper protection to investors), the FCA5 may have regard to the extent to which the UK RIE's rules and procedures:5(1) are consistent with the Market Abuse Regulation6;6(2) prohibit abusive trading practices or the deliberate reporting or publication of false information about trades; and(3) prohibit or prevent:(a) trades in which
2In determining whether a UK RIE is ensuring that business conducted by means of its facilities is conducted in an orderly manner (and so as to afford proper protection to investors), the FCA5 may have regard to whether the UK RIE's arrangements and practices: 5(1) enable members and clients for whom they act to obtain the best price available at the time for their size and type of trade;(2) demonstrate that the UK RIE is able to satisfy:7(a) either or both of the following:7(i)
The Act does not provide a mechanism for appeals to the FCA2 from decisions by recognised bodies in relation to complaints. However, the FCA2 is required by section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) to have arrangements to investigate complaints (called relevant complaints in the Act) which it considers relevant to the question of whether a recognised body should remain recognised as such. This section describes aspects of the FCA's2 arrangements for investigating
Where the FCA2 receives a complaint about a recognised body, it will, in the first instance, seek to establish whether the complainant has approached the recognised body. Where this is not the case, the FCA2 will ask the complainant to complain to the recognised body. Where the complainant is dissatisfied with the handling of the complaint, but has not exhausted the recognised body's own internal complaints procedures (in the case of a complaint against a UK recognised body, including
When it is considering a relevant complaint, the FCA2 will make its own enquiries as appropriate with the recognised body, the complainant and other persons. It will usually ask the recognised body and the complainant to comment upon any preliminary or draft conclusions of its review and to confirm any matters of fact at that stage.2
(1) 1Unless (1A) applies to the firm, where,27 in accordance with DISP 1.10.1 R, a firm submits a report to the
FCA
reporting 500 or more complaints, it must publish a summary of the complaints data contained in that report (the complaints data summary).27(1A) (a) This paragraph applies to a firm which:(i) has permission to carry on only credit-related regulated activities or to operate an electronic system in relation to lending3; and(ii) has revenue arising from those activities3
A firm must immediately confirm to the
FCA
, in an email submitted to
complaintsdatasummary@fca.org.uk ,
that the complaints data summary or total number of complaints (as appropriate)27 accurately reflects the report submitted to the
FCA
, that the summary or total number of complaints (as appropriate)27 has been published and where it has been published.
Firms may choose how they publish the complaints data summary or total number of complaints (as appropriate)27. However, the summary or total number of complaints (as appropriate)27 should be readily available. For this reason, the
FCA
recommends that firms should publish the summary or total number of complaints (as appropriate)27 on their websites.
(1) 4To improve consumer awareness and to help firms compare their performance against their peers, the FCA publishes:(a) complaints data about the financial services industry as a whole; and(b) firm-level complaints data for those firms that are required to publish a complaints data summary or the total number of complaints (as appropriate) under DISP 1.10A.1R.(2) The FCA also publishes firm-level information giving context to the complaints data reported to it for those firms
4For firms reporting 500 or more complaints under DISP 1.10.1R(1) or 1000 or more complaints under DISP 1.10.1R(2) in the relevant reporting period, the FCA will publish the firm-level complaints data and information providing context to the complaints data reported to it either:(1) after the firm provides the appropriate consent in the complaints data report and confirms that the reported data accurately reflects the data which it will publish under DISP1.10A.1R; or(2) after
4For firms with only a limited permission that report complaints to the FCA under the reporting requirements in SUP 16.12, the FCA will publish the firm-level complaints data reported to it after the FCA receives an email from the firm under DISP 1.10A.4R. That email should confirm that the total number of complaints accurately reflects the report submitted to the FCA under SUP 16.12, that the total number of complaints has been published and where the information has been pu
The Society must, as soon as it is practical to do so, notify the FCA2of its intention to make any amendment which may alter the meaning or effect of any byelaw, including:2(1) any Lloyd's trust deed;(2) any standard form letter of credit prescribed by the Society from time to time; or(3) any standard form guarantee agreement prescribed by the Society from time to time.
The information provided to the 2FCA2by the Society under INSPRU 8.2.25 R must include:(1) a statement of the purpose of any proposed amendment or new Lloyd's trust deed and the expected impact, if any, on policyholders, managing agents, members, and potential members; and(2) a description of the consultation undertaken under INSPRU 8.2.26 R including a summary of any significant responses to that consultation.
The Act (section
1L) requires the FCA to "maintain
arrangements for supervising authorised persons". Section 1K of the Act also requires the FCA to
provide general guidance about
how it intends to advance its operational objectives in discharging its general
functions in relation to different categories of authorised
person or regulated activity.
One purpose of this guidance is
to discharge the duties of the FCA set
out in sections 1L and 1K of the Act.
The FCA's approach to
The design of these arrangements
is shaped by the FCA'sstatutory objectives in relation to the
conduct supervision of2firms as
well as the prudential supervision of firms not
supervised by the PRA. These
objectives are set out in Chapter 1 of the Act.
The FCA has one strategic objective: ensuring that the relevant
markets function well. In discharging its general functions, the FCA must, so far as is reasonably possible,
act in a way which is compatible with its strategic
objective
(1) In designing its approach to supervision,
the FCA has regard to the regulatory
principles set out in section 3B of the Act.
In particular, the FCA's regulatory
approach aims to focus and reinforce the responsibility of the senior management
of each firm (section 3B(1)(d)
of the Act) to ensure that it
takes reasonable care to organise and control the affairs of the firm responsibly and effectively, and develops
and maintains adequate risk management systems. It is the responsibility
(1) Notwithstanding CASS 1A.2.2 R, provided that the conditions in (2) are satisfied a firm may elect to be treated:(a) as a CASS medium firm, in the case of a firm that is classed by the application of the limits in CASS 1A.2.7 R as a CASS small firm; and (b) as a CASS large firm, in the case of a firm that is classed by the application of the limits in CASS 1A.2.7 R as a CASS medium firm.(2) The conditions to which (1) refers are that in either case:(a) the election is notified4
Once every calendar year a firm must notify to the FCA in writing the information specified in (1), (2) or (3) as applicable, and the information specified in (4), in each case no later than the day specified in (1) to (4):44(1) if it held client money or safe custody assets in the previous calendar year, the highest total amount of client money and the highest total value of safe custody assets held during the previous calendar year, notification of which must be made no later
4A firm's 'CASS firm type' and any change to it takes effect:(1) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 1A.2.9 R (1) or CASS 1A.2.9 R (2), on 1 February following the notification; or(2) if the firm notifies the FCA in accordance with CASS 1A.2.9 R (3), on the day it begins to hold client money or safe custody assets; or(3) if the firm makes an election under CASS 1A.2.5 R (1), and provided the conditions in CASS 1A.2.5 R (2) are satisfied, on the day the notification
The FCA uses mystery shopping to help it protect consumers. This may be by seeking information about a particular practice across a range of firms (SUP 2.4.3 G (1)) or the practices of a particular firm (SUP 2.4.3 G (2)). One of the risks consumers face is that they may be sold products or services3 which are inappropriate to them. A problem in protecting consumers from this risk is that it is very difficult to establish after the event what a firm has said to a 'genuine' consumer
The FCA may carry out mystery shopping:(1) together with a programme of visits to obtain information about a particular practice, looking at a particular issue across a range of firms, when the FCA may advise the firms of the issues beforehand; the practice being scrutinised may be that of firms or a class of firms in carrying on regulated activities or ancillary activities or in communicating or approving financial promotions; (2) together with focused visits (concentrating on
2The FCA's standard practice is generally to use statutory powers to require the production of documents, the provision of information or the answering of questions in interview. This is for reasons of fairness, transparency and efficiency. It will sometimes be appropriate to depart from this standard practice, for example: (1) For suspects or possible suspects in criminal or market abuse investigations, the FCA may prefer to question that person on a voluntary basis, possibly
Firms, approved persons and conduct rules staff1 have an obligation to be open and co-operative with the FCA (as a result of Principle 11 for Businesses,1 Statement of Principle 4 for Approved Persons and Rule 3 of COCON 2.11). The FCA will make it clear to the person concerned whether it requires them to produce information or answer questions under the Act or whether the provision of answers is purely voluntary. The fact that the person concerned may be a regulated person does
2The FCA will not bring disciplinary proceedings against a person for failing to be open and co-operative with the FCA1 simply because, during an investigation, they choose not to attend or answer questions at a purely voluntary interview. However, there may be circumstances in which an adverse inference may be drawn from the reluctance of a person (whether or not they are a firm or individual1) to participate in a voluntary interview. If a person provides the FCA with misleading
Article 25(1) applies only where the arrangements bring about or would bring about the particular transaction in question. This is because of the exclusion in article 26. In the FCA's view, a person brings about or would bring about a transaction only if his involvement in the chain of events leading to the transaction is of enough importance that without that involvement it would not take place. The second limb (article 25(2)) is potentially much wider as it does not require
The ordinary business of a publisher or broadcaster can involve him in publishing or broadcasting financial promotions (for example, advertisements) on behalf of authorised or exempt persons. Journalists who write about investments or financial services may promote the services of an authorised or exempt person. In the FCA's opinion, such persons would not normally be regarded as making arrangements under article 25(2). This is the case even if any arrangements they may have made
The Regulated Activities Order contains an exclusion (article 27: Enabling parties to communicate) to bring a degree of certainty to this area. This applies to arrangements which might otherwise fall within article 25(2) merely because they provide the means by which one party to a transaction (or potential transaction) is able to communicate with other parties. In the FCA's view, the crucial element of the exclusion is the inclusion of the word ‘merely’. So that, where a publisher,
For example, in the FCA's view a publisher or broadcaster would be likely to be making arrangements within the meaning of article 25(2) and be unable to make use of the exclusion in article 27 if:(1) he enters into an agreement with a provider of investment services such as a broker or product provider for the purpose of carrying their financial promotion; and(2) as part of the arrangements, the publisher or broadcaster does one or more of the following:(a) brands the investment
Other persons who may benefit from the exclusion in article 27 include persons who provide the means for someone to route an order to another person. A person providing such order routing services would not, in the FCA's view, be merely facilitating communication (of the orders) if he provides added value. This added value could be in the form, for example, of such things as formatted screens, audit trails, checking completeness of orders or matching orders or reconciling tra