Related provisions for IPRU-INV 5.10.1
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If an originator or sponsor fails to comply with BIPRU 9.6.1 R or BIPRU 9.6.1A R1 in respect of a securitisation, it must:(1) hold capital against all of the securitised exposures associated with the securitisation transaction as if they had not been securitised; and(2) disclose publicly:(a) that it has provided non-contractual support;1 and(b) the regulatory capital impact of doing so.[Note: BCD Article 101(2)]
(1) The support described in BIPRU 9.6.5 G (1) is permitted by BIPRU 9.6.1 R.(2) The support described in BIPRU 9.6.5 G (3) is not permitted by BIPRU 9.6.1 R.(3) The support described in BIPRU 9.6.5 G (2) may be permitted by BIPRU 9.6.1 R under the following conditions:(a) the fact that the firm may give it is expressly set out in the contractual and marketing documents for the securitisation;(b) the nature of the support that the firm may give is precisely described in the documentation;(c)
To assess its expected capital requirements over the economic and business cycles, a firm may wish to project forward its financial position taking account of its business strategy and expected growth according to a range of assumptions as to the state of the economic or business environment which it faces. For example, an ICAAP should include an analysis of the impact that the actions of a firm's competitors might have on its performance, in order to see what changes in its environment
If a firm's current available capital resources are less than the capital resources requirement indicated by the stress test that need not be a breach of BIPRU 2.2.41 R. The firm may wish to set out any countervailing effects and off-setting actions that can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the appropriate regulator as being likely to reduce the difference referred to in the first sentence. The appropriate regulator is only likely to consider a demonstration of such actions
A firm may decide to hold additional capital to mitigate any weaknesses in its overall control environment. These weaknesses might be indicated by the following:(1) a failure by a firm to complete an assessment of its systems and controls to establish whether they comply with SYSC; or(2) a failure by a firm's senior management to approve its financial results; or(3) a failure by a firm to consider an analysis of relevant internal and external information on its business and control
(1) A firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities must establish a remuneration committee. (2) The remuneration committee must be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity. (3) The chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members
This Remuneration Principle underlines the link between a firm's variable remuneration costs and the need to manage its capital base, including forward-looking capital planning measures. Where a firm needs to strengthen its capital base, its variable remuneration arrangements should be sufficiently flexible to allow it to direct the necessary resources towards capital building.
The Principles
1 Integrity |
A firm must conduct its business with integrity. |
2 Skill, care and diligence |
A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence. |
3 Management and control |
A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems. |
4 Financial prudence |
A firm must maintain adequate financial resources. |
5 Market conduct |
A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct. |
6 Customers' interests |
A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. |
7 Communications with clients |
A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading. |
8 Conflicts of interest |
A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another client. |
9 Customers: relationships of trust |
A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its judgment. |
10 Clients' assets |
A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients' assets when it is responsible for them. |
11 Relations with regulators |
A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and cooperative way, and must disclose to the FCA1 appropriately anything relating to the firm of which that regulator would reasonably expect notice. |
(1) 1The FCA expects to have an open, cooperative and constructive relationship with data reporting services providers to enable it to understand and evaluate data reporting services providers’ activities and their ability to meet the requirements in the DRS Regulations. As part of that relationship the FCA expects a data reporting services provider to provide it with information about any proposed restructuring, reorganisation or business expansion which could have a significant
If a defined term does not appear in the IPRU(INV) glossary below, the definition appearing in the main HandbookGlossary applies.
financial resources |
a firm’s1 financial resources as calculated in accordance with IPRU(INV) 12.3 (Calculation of financial resources). |
financial resources requirement1 |
an amount of financial resources1 that a firm must hold as set out in IPRU(INV) 12.2 (Financial resources requirements1). |
1For unfunded credit protection:(1) to be eligible for recognition:(a) the party giving the undertaking must be sufficiently reliable; and(b) the protection agreement must be legally effective and enforceable in the relevant jurisdictions, to provide appropriate certainty as to the credit protection achieved, having regard to the approach used to calculate risk weighted exposure amounts and to the degree of recognition allowed; and(2) protection must be provided by central governments
(1) This paragraph provides guidance on BIPRU 4.2.2 R and in particular BIPRU 4.2.2 R (1).(2) The information that a firm produces or uses for the purpose of the IRB approach should be reliable and take proper account of the different users of the information produced (customers, shareholders, regulators and other market participants).(3) A firm should establish quantified and documented targets and standards, against which it should test the accuracy of data used in its rating
(1) This rule sets out what must be treated as being non-significant business or immaterial for the purposes of BIPRU 4.2.26 R (4), for exposures that do not fall within the equity exposureIRB exposure class.(2) A firm may elect permanently to exclude exposures from the IRB approach and apply the standardised approach. However a firm may only make use of this exemption to the extent that:(a) the consolidated credit risk requirement (adjusted under (6)) so far as it is attributable
Some important compliance issues include:(1) insurance against fraud and dishonesty;(2) arrangements for the prevention, detection and reporting of money laundering;(3) establishing and maintaining a satisfactory system of control;(4) keeping proper books of account;(5) computation and application of profits;(6) investment of surplus funds;(7) capital requirements; (8) liquidity requirements;(9) limits on shares and loans;(10) maintenance of membership records;(11) submission
5The governing body must be satisfied that: (1) the information available is sufficiently comprehensive for the proper assessment of the potential risks for the credit union, and in order to determine its need for capital and liquidity; (2) the information available is sufficiently comprehensive to provide a clear statement of the performance and financial position of the credit union; (3) management information reports are prepared with sufficient frequency;(4) sufficient attention
(1) A significant firm2 must establish a remuneration committee .(2) A firm in (1) must ensure that:(a) the remuneration committee is constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgement on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity;(b) the chairman and the members of the remuneration committee must be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the firm;(c)
A firm must ensure that any approval by its shareholders or owners or members, for the purposes of SYSC 19D.3.49R, is carried out in accordance with the following procedure: (1) the firm must give reasonable notice to all its shareholders or owners or members of its intention to seek approval of the proposed higher ratio;(2) the firm must make a detailed recommendation to all its shareholders or owners or members that includes:(a) the reasons for, and the scope of, the approval
If,5 with respect to a firm and a financial conglomerate of which it is a member, this rule applies under GENPRU 3.1.29A R5 to the firm with respect to that financial conglomerate as described in GENPRU 3.1.30 R, the firm must at all times have capital resources of an amount and type that ensures that the conglomerate capital resources of that financial conglomerate at all times equal or exceed its conglomerate capital resources requirement.5
Even if a firm has an advanced prudential calculation approach permission that allows it to use an advanced prudential calculation approach for the purposes of this chapter, the firm may not use the requirements of another state or territory to the extent they provide for that advanced prudential calculation approach. 4222
Where a firm considers that the capital resources requirements of GENPRU 2.1 require the holding of more capital than is needed for the firm to comply with GENPRU 1.2.26 R then the firm may apply to the appropriate regulator for a waiver of the requirements in GENPRU 2.1 under sections 138A and 138B of the Act. In addition to the statutory tests under sections 138A and 138B in deciding whether to grant a waiver and, if granted, its terms, the appropriate regulator will consider
The financial resource requirements of the Financial Services Act regulators permitted certain types of borrowings or facilities to be treated as part of a firm's capital resources. The most common example is that of a subordinated loan which met the relevant conditions. The following provisions permit firms to continue to use these borrowings or facilities in the same way as under the relevant previous regulator's rules, provided that certain conditions are met.
A subordinated loan/debt must not form part of the financial resources1 of the firm unless it meets the following conditions: (1) it has an original maturity of: (a) at least five years; or (b) it is subject to five years’ notice of repayment;
(2) the claims of the subordinated creditors must rank behind those of all unsubordinated creditors; (3) the only events of default must be non-payment of any interest or principal under the debt agreement