Related provisions for REC 6A.2.3
121 - 140 of 490 items.
(1) 1This section deals with the circumstances and manner in which an ACS is to be wound up or a sub-fund of a co-ownership scheme is to be terminated otherwise than by the court as an unregistered company under the Insolvency Act 1986 or the Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (further rules regarding schemes of arrangement are found in COLL 7.6 (Schemes of arrangement)).(2) An ACS may be wound up under this section only if it is solvent. Under section 261W of the Act (Requests
This table belongs to COLL 7.4A.1G (5) (Explanation of COLL 7.4A)
Summary of the main steps in winding up an ACS or terminating a sub-fund of a co-ownership scheme under FCArules Notes: N = Notice to be given to the FCA under section 261Q of the Act in a section 261Q case. R = Request to wind up the scheme under section 261W of the Act in a section 261W case. E = commencement of winding up or termination W/U = winding up FAP = final accounting period |
|||
Step number |
Explanation |
When |
|
1 |
Commence preparation of solvency statement |
7.4A.5R(2) |
|
2 |
Send audited solvency statement to the FCA with copy to depositary. |
7.4A.5R(4) and (5) |
|
3 |
In a section 261Q case: - the authorised contractual scheme manager receiving FCA approval; - or one month having passed after submitting the requisite notice under section 261Q of the Act without the authorised contractual scheme manager or depositary having received from the FCA a warning notice under section 261R in respect of the proposal. In a section 261W case, the authorised contractual scheme manager or depositary receives an indication from the FCA that, subject to there being no change in any relevant factor, on the conclusion of the winding up of the ACS, the FCA will agree to the request to wind up the ACS. |
Section 261Q of the Act (in a section 261Q case) 7.4A.4R(3)(c) to (e) (in a section 261W case) |
|
4 |
Normal business ceases; notify unitholders |
E |
7.4A.4R |
5 |
Depositary to realise and distribute proceeds |
ASAP after E |
7.4A.6R(1)-(5) |
6 |
Send annual long report of authorised contractual scheme manager, depositary and auditor to the FCA |
Within 4 months of FAP |
7.4A.9R(7) |
7 |
Request FCA to revoke relevant authorisation order |
On completion of W/U |
7.4A.6R(6) |
(1) Upon the happening of any of the matters or dates referred to in (3), and subject to the requirement of (4) being satisfied, and not otherwise:(a) COLL 6.2 (Dealing), COLL 6.3(Valuation and pricing), COLL 6.6.20R to COLL 6.6.24G (Assessment of value)3 and COLL 5 (Investment and borrowing powers) cease to apply to the ACS or to the units and scheme property in the case of a sub-fund of a co-ownership scheme; (b) the depositary must cease to issue and cancelunits, except in
(1) Either before notice is given under section 261Q of the Act or before a request is made under section 261W of the Act in relation to the proposals referred to in COLL 7.4A.4R (4), the authorised contractual scheme manager must make a full inquiry into the ACS's (or, in the case of the termination of a sub-fund of a co-ownership scheme, the sub-fund's) affairs, business and property to establish whether the ACS or the sub-fund will be able to meet all its liabilities.(2) The
A firm is required to provide the FCA2 with a wide range of information to enable the FCA2 to meet its responsibilities for monitoring the firm's compliance with requirements imposed by or under the Act. Some of this information is provided through regular reports, including those set out in SUP 16 (Reporting requirements) and SUP 17 (Transaction reporting). In addition, other chapters in the Handbook set out specific notification and reporting requirements. Principle 11 includes
3SUP 15.11 (Notification of COCON breaches and disciplinary action) provides rules and guidance on notifications to the FCA by an SMCR firm where the SMCR firm8 takes disciplinary action in relation to any conduct rules staff and the reason for taking that action is a reason specified in rules made by the FCA. This is a requirement imposed4 under section4 64C of the Act.4
Section 236(3) of the Act states clearly that the investment condition must be met 'in relation to BC'. In the FCA's view, this means that the investment condition should not be applied rigidly in relation to specific events such as particular issues of shares or securities or in relation to particular points in time. The requirements of the investment condition must be satisfied in relation to the overall impression of the body corporate itself, having regard to all the circ
The FCA's views on the following three elements of the investment condition are explained separately:(1) the 'reasonable investor' (see PERG 9.7 (The investment condition: the 'reasonable investor'));(2) the 'expectation' test (see PERG 9.8 (The investment condition: the 'expectation test' (section 236(3)(a) of the Act))); and(3) the 'satisfaction' test (see PERG 9.9 (The investment condition: the 'satisfaction test' (section 236(3)(b) of the Act)).
1The FCA will consider cancelling a firm'sPart 4A permission using its own-initiative powers contained in sections 55J and 55Q respectively of the Act in two main circumstances: (1) where the FCA has very serious concerns about a firm, or the way its business is or has been conducted; (2) where the firm'sregulated activities have come to an end and it has not applied for cancellation of its Part 4A permission.
1The grounds on which the FCA may exercise its power to cancel an authorised person's
permission under section 55J of the Act are the same as the grounds for variation and for imposition of requirements. They are set out in section 55J(1) and section 55L(2) and described in EG 8.1.1. Examples of the types of circumstances in which the FCA may cancel a firm'sPart 4A permission include: (1) non-compliance with a Financial Ombudsman Service award against the
1However, where the FCA has cancelled a firm'sPart 4A permission, it is required by section 33 of the Act to go on to give a direction withdrawing the firm'sauthorisation. Accordingly, the FCA may decide to keep a firm'sPart 4A permission in force to maintain the firm's status as an authorised person and enable it (the FCA) to monitor the firm's activities. An example is where the FCA needs to supervise an orderly winding down of the firm's regulated business (see SUP 6.4.22 (When
1The FCA has certain functions in relation to what are described as “registrant-only” mutual societies including registered societies or registered friendly societies.2 These societies are not regulated or supervised under the Act. Instead, they are subject to the provisions of2 FSA74, FSA92, CCBSA14 and CCBSA(NI)693 which require them to register with the FCA and fulfil certain other obligations, such as the requirement to submit annual returns.
2
1The FCA's enforcement activities in respect of registrant-only societies focus on prosecuting societies that fail to submit annual returns. As registrant-only societies are not subject to the rules imposed by the Act and by the FCA
Handbook, the requirement that they submit annual returns provides an important check that the interests and investments of members, potential members, creditors and other interested parties are being safeguarded. The power to prosecute
1The decision whether to initiate criminal and other proceedings under these Acts will be taken in accordance with the procedure described in EG 12.1.7. Under these Acts,3 a society may appeal certain decisions of the FCA relating to the refusal, cancellation or suspension of a society’s registration to the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session. 3Distinguishing features of the procedure for giving statutory notices under the FSA92, including available rights of reference
Firms are reminded that section 398 of the Act (Misleading the FCA or PRA:9 residual cases) makes it an offence for a firm knowingly or recklessly to provide the FCA3 with information which is false or misleading in a material particular in purported compliance with the FCA's3rules or any other requirement imposed by or under the Act. An offence by a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association may be attributed to an officer or certain other persons (section 400
The FCA will
adopt a pre-emptive approach which will be based on making forward-looking
judgments about firms' business
models, product strategy and how they run their businesses, to enable the FCA to identify and intervene earlier to
prevent problems crystallising. The FCA's approach
to supervising firms will contribute
to its delivery against its objective to protect and enhance the integrity
of the UK financial system (as
set out in the Act). Where the FCA has responsibilities
While respecting each regulator's
different statutory objectives and
mandates, in undertaking its supervisory activity the FCA will
co-ordinate and co-operate with the PRA as
required and necessary in the interests of the effective and efficient supervision
of regulated firms and individuals.
Both regulators will coordinate with each other as required under the Act, including on the exchange of information
relevant to each regulator's individual objectives. However, the FCA and
An issuer4 that seeks admission of debt securities referred to in article 1(2)(b) and (d) of the Prospectus Regulation5 must submit to the FCA in final form a completed Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List.Note: The Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List form can be found on the Primary Markets6 section of the FCA's website.1
In cases against individuals, including market abuse cases, the FCA3 may make a prohibition order under section 56 of the Act or withdraw an individual’s approval under section 63 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 reflects the FCA's3 assessment of the individual’s fitness to perform regulated activity or suitability for a particular role, and does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach.
2The FCA3 may withdraw a firm’s authorisation under section 33 of the Act, as well as impose a financial penalty. Such action by the FCA3 does not affect the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate financial penalty in relation to a breach. However, the fact that the FCA3 has withdrawn a firm’s authorisation, as a result of which the firm may have less earning potential, may be relevant in assessing whether the penalty will cause the firm serious financial hardship.3333
1This means that there will be situations in which the FCA has powers to investigate and take action under both the Act and the Money Laundering Regulations. The FCA will consider all the circumstances of the case when deciding what action to take and, if it is appropriate to notify the subject about the investigation, will in doing so inform them about the basis upon which the investigation is being conducted and what powers it is using. The FCA will adopt the approach outlined
1However, the Money Laundering Regulations say little about the way in which investigation and sanctioning powers should be used, so the FCA has decided to adopt enforcement and decision making procedures which are broadly akin to those under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described in EG 19.152.
An example of a rule20 being interpreted as cut back by GEN 2.2.23R is SYSC 6.1.1R, which requires a firm to maintain adequate policies and procedures to ensure compliance with its obligations under the regulatory system; SYSC 6.1.1R should be interpreted as applied by the FCA in respect of a PRA-authorised person’s compliance with regulatory obligations that are the responsibility of the FCA (for example, in respect of a bank maintaining policies and procedures to ensure compliance
1The rights and duties of auditors are set out in SUP 3.8 (Rights and duties of all auditors) and SUP 3.10 (Duties of auditors: notification and report on client assets). SUP 3.8.10 G also refers to the auditor's statutory duty to report certain matters to the FCA imposed by regulations made by the Treasury under sections 342(5) and 343(5) of the Act (information given by auditor or actuary to a regulator). An auditor should bear these rights and duties in mind when carrying out
An important part of the conclusion in PERG 6.7.5 G was that, although the provider assumed a risk at the outset of the contract, looking at the contract as a whole and interpreting the common law in the context of the FCA objectives (see PERG 6.5.2 G and PERG 6.5.3 G) there was no relevant assumption of risk.(1) The presence or absence of an assumption of risk is an important part of the statutory rationale for the prudential regulation of insurance.(2) In Medical Defence Union
1Where a person who is a shareholder has contravened one or more relevant transparency provisions (as defined in section 89NA(11) of the Act) in respect of shares in a company admitted to trading on a regulated market and the FCA considers the breach to be serious, the FCA may apply to the Court for an order suspending that person’s voting rights as set out in section 89NA of the Act.
1The FCA will notify the subject of the investigation that it has appointed investigators to carry out an investigation under the Payment Services Regulations and the reasons for the appointment, unless notification is likely to prejudice the investigation or otherwise result in it being frustrated. The FCA expects to carry out a scoping visit early on in the enforcement process in most cases. The FCA's
policy in civil investigations under the Payment Services
Information is needed to support the FCA's1 risk based approach to the supervision of all regulated entities. Risk based supervision is intended to ensure that the allocation of supervisory resources and the supervisory process are compatible with the regulatory objectives and the FCA's1 general duties under the Act. The central element of the process of risk based supervision is a systematic assessment by the FCA1 (a risk assessment) of the main supervisory risks and concerns
For each UK recognised body, the FCA1 will conduct a periodic risk assessment. This assessment will take into account relevant considerations including the special position of recognised bodies under the Act, the nature of the UK recognised body's members, the position of other users of its facilities and the business environment more generally.1
Section 234 of the Act (Industry Funding) enables the FCA to require the payment to it or to FOS Ltd, by firms or any class of firm, of specified amounts (or amounts calculated in a specified way) to cover the costs of: (1) the establishment of 1the Financial Ombudsman Service; and (2) its operation in relation to the Compulsory Jurisdiction.