Related provisions for PERG 6.7.2

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DEPP 1.2.2GRP

Table: Summary of statutory and related notices

Notice

Description

Act reference

Further information

Warning notice

Gives the recipient details about action that the FCA2 proposes to take and about the right to make representations.

2

Section 387

DEPP 2.2

Decision notice

Gives the recipient details about action that the FCA2 has decided to take. The FCA2 may also give a further decision notice if the recipient of the original decision notice consents.

22

Section 388

DEPP 2.3

Notice of discontinuance

Identifies proceedings set out in a warning notice or decision notice and which are not being taken or are being discontinued.

Section 389

DEPP 1.2.4 G and DEPP 3.2.26 G

Final notice

Sets out the terms of the action that the FCA2 is taking.

2

Section 390

DEPP 1.2.4 G

Supervisory notice

Gives the recipient details about action that the FCA2 has taken or proposes to take, for example to vary a Part 4A permission.2

22

Section 395(13)

DEPP 2.2 and DEPP 2.3

EG 19.23.11RP
1Certain FCA decisions (for example the cancellation of an authorisation or the imposition of a financial penalty) may be referred to the Tribunal by an aggrieved party.
LR 5.6.7GRP
Examples of where the FCA will consider that a reverse takeover is in contemplation include situations where:(1) the shell company6 has approached the target's board;(2) the shell company6 has entered into an exclusivity period with a target; or(3) the shell company6 has been given access to begin due diligence work (whether or not on a limited basis).
EG 19.30.7RP
1For example, the FCA will notify the subject of the investigation that it has appointed investigators to carry out an investigation under the MCDO and the reasons for the appointment, unless notification is likely to result in the investigation being frustrated. In most cases, the FCA expects to carry out a scoping visit early on in the enforcement process. The FCA's policy in regulatory investigations under the MCDO is to use powers to compel information, in the same way as
EG App 2.1.9RP
2The following are indicators of whether action by the FCA or one of the other agencies is more appropriate. They are not listed in any particular order or ranked according to priority. No single feature of the case should be considered in isolation, but rather the whole case should be considered in the round.(a) 2 Tending towards action by the FCAWhere the suspected conduct in question gives rise to concerns regarding market confidence or protection of consumers of services regulated
EG App 2.1.13RP
2The agencies will consider, as necessary, and keep under review whether an investigation has reached the point where it is appropriate to commence proceedings. Where agencies are deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings, they will have regard to the usual codes or guidance relevant to that decision. For example, agencies other than the PPS or COPFS will have regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Note: Different guidance applies to the PPS and COPFS. All criminal
EG 10.4.2RP
1When, in relation to firms, the FCA applies the broad test outlined in paragraph 10.2.2, it will consider the relative effectiveness of the other powers available to it, compared with injunctive relief. For example, where the FCA has concerns about whether a firm will comply with restrictions that the FCA could impose by exercising its own-initiative powers, it may decide it would be more appropriate to seek an injunction. This is because breaching any requirement imposed by
SYSC 4.6.17GRP
(1) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.6.2G(1)]3(2) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.6.2G(2)]3(3) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.1.6G(3)]3(4) [deleted] [Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25.6.2G(4)]3
PRIN 1.1.5GRP
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FCA11 ) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. Compliance by another person to whom the Principles apply with Principles 3, 4 and 11 can also be affected by the activities of other persons who are members of their group.14 This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems
PRIN 1.1.7GRP
Breaching a Principle makes a firm or other person to whom the Principles apply14 liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a Principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Principle in question. Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the FCA11 to show that a firm or other person14 has been at fault in some way. What constitutes "fault" varies between different Principles. Under Principle 1 (Integrity),
DEPP 6.7.1GRP
Persons subject to enforcement action may be prepared to agree the amount of any financial penalty, or the length of any period of suspension, restriction, condition,5 limitation or disciplinary prohibition5 (see DEPP 6A)4, and other conditions which the FCA seeks to impose by way of such action. These4 conditions might include, for example, the amount or mechanism for the payment of compensation to consumers. The FCA recognises the benefits of such agreements, as4 they offer
DEPP 6.7.4GRP
(1) Any settlement agreement6 between the FCA3 and the person concerned will therefore need to include a statement as to the appropriate penalty discount in accordance with this procedure.3(2) In certain circumstances the person concerned may consider that it would have been possible to reach a settlement at an earlier stage in the action, and argue that it should be entitled to a greater percentage reduction in penalty than is suggested by the table at DEPP 6.7.3G (3). It may
EG 2.9.2RP
1Guidance is not binding on those to whom the FCA'srules apply. Nor are the variety of materials (such as case studies showing good or bad practice, FCA speeches, and generic letters written by the FCA to Chief Executives in particular sectors) published to support the rules and guidance in the Handbook. Rather, such materials are intended to illustrate ways (but not the only ways) in which a person can comply with the relevant rules.
EG 2.9.4RP
1Guidance and supporting materials are, however, potentially relevant to an enforcement case and a decision maker may take them into account in considering the matter. Examples of the ways in which the FCA may seek to use guidance and supporting materials in an enforcement context include: (1) To help assess whether it could reasonably have been understood or predicted at the time that the conduct in question fell below the standards required by the Principles.(2) To explain the
DEPP 6A.2.3GRP
The FCA1 will consider it appropriate to impose a suspension, restriction, condition,3 limitation3 or disciplinary prohibition3 where it believes that such action will be a more effective and persuasive deterrent than the imposition of a financial penalty alone. This is likely to be the case where the FCA1 considers that direct and visible action in relation to a particular breach is necessary. Examples of circumstances where the FCA1 may consider it appropriate to take such
DEPP 6A.2.4GRP
The FCA1 expects usually to impose a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation in relation to4 activities directly linked to the breach. However, in certain circumstances the FCA1 may also impose a suspension, restriction, condition or limitation in relation to4 activities that are not directly linked to the breach, for example, where an authorised person's relevant business area no longer exists or has been restructured.11
EG 8.5.2RP
1The grounds on which the FCA may exercise its power to cancel an authorised person's permission under section 55J of the Act are the same as the grounds for variation and for imposition of requirements. They are set out in section 55J(1) and section 55L(2) and described in EG 8.1.1. Examples of the types of circumstances in which the FCA may cancel a firm'sPart 4A permission include: (1) non-compliance with a Financial Ombudsman Service award against the
EG 8.5.5RP
1However, where the FCA has cancelled a firm'sPart 4A permission, it is required by section 33 of the Act to go on to give a direction withdrawing the firm'sauthorisation. Accordingly, the FCA may decide to keep a firm'sPart 4A permission in force to maintain the firm's status as an authorised person and enable it (the FCA) to monitor the firm's activities. An example is where the FCA needs to supervise an orderly winding down of the firm's regulated business (see SUP 6.4.22 (When
EG 8.4.2RP
1Examples of the limitations that the FCA may impose when exercising its own-initiative variation power in support of its enforcement function include limitations on: the number, or category, of customers that a firm can deal with; the number of specified investments that a firm can deal in; and the activities of the firm so that they fall within specific regulatory regimes (for example, so that oil market participants,2corporate finance advisory firms and service
EG 8.4.4RP
1Examples of requirements that the FCA may consider imposing when exercising its own-initiative power in support of its enforcement function are: a requirement not to take on new business; a requirement not to hold or control client money; a requirement not to trade in certain categories of specified investment; a requirement that prohibits the disposal of, or other dealing with, any of the firm’s assets (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) or restricts
GEN 2.2.25GRP
An example of a rule20 being interpreted as cut back by GEN 2.2.23R is SYSC 6.1.1R, which requires a firm to maintain adequate policies and procedures to ensure compliance with its obligations under the regulatory system; SYSC 6.1.1R should be interpreted as applied by the FCA in respect of a PRA-authorised person’s compliance with regulatory obligations that are the responsibility of the FCA (for example, in respect of a bank maintaining policies and procedures to ensure compliance
ICOBS 8.4.5GRP
(1) For the purposes of ICOBS 8.4.4R (2)(c) and ICOBS 8.4.4R (2)(d), a firm may put in place appropriate screening on its employers’ liability register to monitor:(a) requests for information and searches to ensure that they are being made for a legitimate purpose by persons falling into one of the categories in ICOBS 8.4.4R (2)(c); and(b) requests from tracing offices to ensure that the information is necessary, and will only be used by the tracing office, for the purposes of
SUP 5.5.3GRP
If the FCA3 is considering asking for the information specified in SUP 5.5.2 G it will take into consideration the cost of the skilled person complying with the request, and the benefit that the FCA3 may derive from the information. For example, in most cases, the FCA3 will not need to request a skilled person to give it source data, documents and working papers. However, the FCA3 may do so when it reasonably believes that this information will be relevant to any investigation