Related provisions for LR 11.1.1D

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PERG 8.10.3GRP
In the FCA's view, the matters identified in PERG 8.10.2 G mean that:(1) for a communication to be real time it must be made in course of an interactive dialogue; but that(2) if the interactive dialogue takes place by means of the exchange of letters or e-mails or in a publication, the communication will be deemed to be non-real time. In this case, publications include newspapers, journals, magazines or other periodical publications, websites or similar systems for the electronic
PERG 8.10.4GRP
The words ‘personal visit, telephone conversation or other interactive dialogue’ clearly imply that the first two are types of the third. In the FCA's view, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which a personal visit or telephone conversation would not be interactive. The very fact of a conversation taking place would mean two or more persons were interacting with each other. A telephone call is not the same thing as a conversation. It may be made to, or even by, an intelligent
PERG 8.10.5GRP
In the FCA's view, the fact that scope for interaction is essential if a financial promotion is to be real time leads to the following conclusions.(1) Most communications made in written or pictorial form will not offer scope for interaction. The most likely exception to this is where persons are expected to respond immediately. This situation may arise, for example, where the equivalent of a telephone conversation is conducted by e-mail. This is the basis of the exemption in
PERG 8.10.7GRP
In the FCA's view, a communication which may exist in enduring form will be a non-real time communication. Examples of this include videos, audio cassettes, bulletin boards, websites and recorded telephone messages. Messages placed on Internet chat-rooms will also be non-real time. Radio or television programmes or teletext services may contain communications that involve an interactive dialogue. For example, a communication made by the broadcaster and addressed to an interviewee
PERG 8.10.11GRP
PERG 8.6.9 G explains that article 6 of the Financial Promotion Order has the broad effect that a communication is made to another person where it is addressed to a particular person or persons. It also states that a ‘recipient’ of a communication is the person or persons to who it is made (that is to whom it is addressed). This takes on importance where certain exemptions which apply to real time financial promotions made to a person are concerned. It appears to the FCA that,
PERG 8.10.12GRP
In the FCA's view, persons who may be engaging in investment activity or engaging in claims management activity1 jointly include:(1) a married couple;(2) two or more persons, who will invest jointly in a product (for example, a cohabiting couple who are not married or members of a family);(3) the directors of a company or partners in a firm;(4) members of a group of companies;(5) the participants in a joint commercial enterprise;(6) the members of an investment club; and(7) the
PERG 8.10.14GRP
In the FCA's view, the mere fact of a person accepting an invitation to attend a meeting does not automatically mean that he has initiated any dialogue which may take place during the meeting and which may amount to a financial promotion. This will depend on the facts of each case and such matters as the manner in which the invitations are made, the arrangements for acceptance and how the meeting is conducted. For example, the fact that investments or investment services will
SYSC 19C.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
SYSC 19C.3.6GRP
  1. (1)

    In the FCA's view:

    1. (a)

      a firm's staff includes its employees;

    2. (b)

      a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;

    3. (c)

      the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;

    4. (d)

      firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;

      1
    5. (e)

      firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and

    6. (f)

      a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.

    [Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/remuneration

    .]

  2. (2)

    High-level category

    Suggested business lines

    Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Fixed income

    Foreign exchange

    Commodities

    Securitisation

    Sales areas

    Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)

    Commercial banking

    Equities

    Structured finance

    Lending quality

    Trading areas

    Research

    Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Credit/market/operational risk

    Legal

    Treasury controls

    Human resources

    Compliance

    Internal audit
SYSC 19C.3.17GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
SYSC 19C.3.21GRP
The FCA would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to senior personnel of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only in relation to senior personnel who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.
SYSC 19C.3.23GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
SYSC 19C.3.28GRP
Where a firm makes a loss, the FCA generally expects no variable remuneration to be awarded. Variable remuneration may nevertheless be justified, for example to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.
SYSC 19C.3.34GRP
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
SYSC 19C.3.43GRP
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
SYSC 19C.3.50GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
SYSC 19C.3.53GRP
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
PERG 4.6.2GRP
In the FCA's view, the circumstances in which a person is giving advice on the borrower varying the terms of a regulated mortgage contract so as to vary his obligations under the contract include (but are not limited to) where the advice is about:(1) the borrower obtaining a further advance secured on the same land as the original loan; or(2) a rate switch or a product switch (that is, where the borrower does not change lender but changes the terms for repayment from, say, a variable
PERG 4.6.9GRP
[deleted]7
PERG 4.6.13GRP
In the FCA's view, advice requires an element of opinion on the part of the adviser7. In effect, it is a recommendation as to a course of action. Information on the other hand, involves objective statements of facts and figures.
PERG 4.6.16GRP
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may7 take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:7(1) a person may provide information on a selected, rather than balanced7, basis that would tend to influence the decision of the borrower; and7(2) a person, as a result of going through the sales process, may discuss7 the merits of one regulated mortgage contract over another, resulting in advice to
PERG 4.6.22GRP
(1) There are two aspects of the definition of advising on regulated mortgage contracts that are particularly relevant to whether pre-sale questioning involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts:7(a) the fact that advice must relate to a particular regulated mortgage contract (see PERG 4.6.5G); and (b) the distinction between information and advice (see PERG 4.6.13G). (2) Whether or not pre-sale7 questioning in any particular case is advising on regulated mortgage contracts
PERG 4.6.23GRP
7The first type involves identifying regulated mortgage contracts based on7 factual matters. For example, the purpose may be to identify7 whether a borrower wishes to pay a fixed or variable rate of interest or the size of deposit available.7 There are various possible scenarios, including the following:(1) the questioner may go on to identify several particular7regulated mortgage contracts which match features identified by the pre-sale7 questioning; provided these are presented
PERG 4.6.25GRP
When the scripted pre-sale questioning identifies particular regulated mortgage contracts (see7PERG 4.6.23G(3) and PERG 4.6.24G(2)), the FCA considers that it is necessary to look at the process and outcome of the pre-sale questioning as a whole7 in deciding whether the process involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts. Factors that may be relevant7 include:1111(1) any representations made by the questioner at the start of the questioning relating to the service they are7
PERG 4.6.34GRP

2Further examples of what is and is not regulated advice

This table belongs to PERG 4.6.33 G.

Example of what the firm3 says and does

3

Regulated or not?

(1) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, including fixed and variable rates. Here are some leaflets which set out the main features.”

No. Leaflets that just explain the terms and conditions of a lender’s products are not advice (see PERG 4.6.15G (1)).

Even if the leaflet contains promotional material, merely handing over the leaflet does not mean that the firm is giving advice.

(2) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, our best rates are two-year fixed rates, you might want to look at those.”

Yes. The firm has identified specific products that it offers and is drawing the customer’s attention7 to those products. Identifying which products have the lowest rates is not advice on its own, only facts. However, “best” involves a value judgement7, particularly when a comparison is made with other products that have different periods for which interest is fixed or that have variable interest rates.

(3) The firm says “In order to provide you with an illustration, I need to know how much you want to borrow, the term and the property value. Which product or products would you like an illustration for?”

No. The firm is collecting factual information to provide the customer with an illustration of costs.

(4) The firm says “Based on what you’ve told me I think you would be best to look at two-year fixed rates. Here is some information about our products.”

Yes. The firm has made a judgment on what type of product is best for the customer and has identified specific products of that type that it offers.

(5) The firm says “Our fixed rates start at 4.99% for two years with a £900 fee. Our variable rates start at 4.50% with a £800 fee. Depending on how much you want to borrow and your circumstances, this may affect the rate available to you.”

No. The firm is comparing two products without recommending either, nor is the firm recommending7 one over the other.

(6) A lender with just one mortgage product advises a customer to take out that mortgage. The lender makes it clear that it does not give advice about products other than its own.

Yes. The lender may argue that this is not regulated advice because it is not recommending one product over another as it only has one product itself and does not give advice about the products of other lenders. However, in the FCA's view this is still regulated advice. For advice to be regulated it must be advice on the merits of entering into a particular regulated mortgage contract (or varying one). It is possible to give advice about the merits of a product without comparing that product with another.

Note: Unless otherwise specified, the firm might be the lender or an advisory or intermediary firm.
EG 11.1.1RP
1Decisions about whether to apply to the civil courts for restitution orders under the Act will be made by the executive2 director of Enforcement or, in his or her absence, the acting executive director of Enforcement2.
EG 11.1.2RP
1[deleted]2
EG 11.1.3RP
1The FCA has power to apply to the court for a restitution order under section 382 of the Act and (in the case of market abuse) under section 383 of the Act. It also has an administrative power to require restitution under section 384 of the Act. When deciding whether to exercise these powers, the FCA will consider whether this would be the best use of the FCA's limited resources taking into account, for example, the likely amount of any recovery and the costs of achieving and
EG 11.1.4RP
1Instances in which the FCA might consider using its powers to obtain restitution for eligible counterparties are likely to be very limited.
EG 18.1.1RP
1The FCA may cancel a sponsor's approval under section 88 of the Act if it considers that a sponsor has failed to meet the criteria for approval as a sponsor as set out in LR 8.6.5R.
EG 18.1.2RP
1When considering whether to cancel a sponsor's approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the sponsor; (2) the adequacy of the sponsor's systems and controls; (3) the sponsor's history of compliance with the listing rules; (4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected failure of the sponsor to meet (at
EG 18.1.3RP
1The FCA may also cancel a primary information provider’s approval under section 89P of the Act if it considers that a primary information provider has failed to meet the criteria for approval as a primary information provider as set out in DTR 8.3.
EG 18.1.4RP
1When considering whether to cancel a primary information provider’s approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the primary information provider; (2) the adequacy of the primary information provider’s systems and controls; (3) the primary information provider’s history of compliance with DTR 8; (4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected
EG 3.7.1RP
1The FCA's power to conduct investigations to assist overseas authorities is contained in section 169 of the Act. The section provides that at the request of an overseas regulator, the FCA may use its power under section 165 to require the production of documents or the provision of information under section 165 or to appoint a person to investigate any matter.
EG 3.7.2RP
[deleted]21
EG 3.7.3RP
1Section 169(4) and (5) set out factors that the FCA may take into account when deciding whether to use its investigative powers. 2
EG 3.7.4RP
1When it considers whether to use its investigative power, and whether section 169(4) applies, the FCA will first consider whether it is able to assist without using its formal powers, for example by obtaining the information voluntarily. Where that is not possible, the FCA may take into account all of the factors in section 169(4), but may give particular weight to the seriousness of the case and its importance to persons in the United Kingdom, and to the public interest.
EG 14.4.1RP
1The FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances of each case. The general factors which the FCA may consider include, but are not limited to, those set out in paragraph 14.1.1 (1) to (9) (the conduct of the operator of the scheme and of the trustee or depositary will also, of course, be taken into account in relation to each of these factors).
EG 14.4.2RP
1As well as or instead of using these powers, the FCA may ask the relevant regulatory body of the country or territory in which the scheme is authorised to take such action in respect of the scheme and/or its operator, trustee or depositary as will resolve the FCA's concerns.
EG 14.4.3RP
1Decisions about whether to apply to the civil courts for collective investment scheme related orders under the Act will be made by the executive2 director of Enforcement or, in his or her absence, the acting executive director of Enforcement2.
EG 14.4.4RP
1[deleted]2
DEPP 7.1.1GRP
1DEPP 7 applies when the FCA3:3(1) has appointed an investigator at the request of an overseas regulator, under section 169(1)(b) (Assistance to overseas regulators)4under section 131FA2 of the Act; and(2) has directed, or is considering directing, the investigator, under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act, to permit a representative of the overseas regulator4 to attend, and take part in, any interview conducted for the purposes of the investigation.2
DEPP 7.1.2GRP
In DEPP 7, a "requested2 interview" means any interview conducted for the purposes of an investigation under section 169(1)(b) or section 131FA2 of the Act in relation to which the FCA3 has given a direction under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act.23
DEPP 7.1.3GRP
The purpose of DEPP 7 is to set out the FCA's3 statement of policy on the conduct of interviews to which a direction under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 has been given or the FCA3 is considering giving. The FCA3 is required to prepare and publish this statement of policy by section 169(9) and (11) and section 131FA2 of the Act. As required by section 169(10) and section 131FA2 of the Act, the Treasury has approved the statement of policy.333
DEPP 7.1.4GRP
The FCA3 is keen to promote co-operation with overseas regulators4. It views provision of assistance to overseas regulators4 as an essential part of discharging its general functions.3223
EG 14.2.1RP
1The FCA may use its powers under sections 254, 257 and 258 (in the case of AUTs) and sections 261U, 261X and 261Y (in the case of ACSs) individually, together, and as well as direct enforcement action against a depositary or authorised fund manager in their capacity as firms.
EG 14.2.2RP
1Where the FCA has a concern about an AUT or ACS that must be dealt with urgently, it will generally use its power to give directions under section 257 (in the case of an AUT) or section 261X (in the case of an ACS) in the first instance.
EG 14.2.3RP
1The following are examples of situations where the FCA may consider it appropriate to seek a court order under section 258 (in the case of an AUT) or section 261Y (in the case of an ACS) to remove the authorised fund manager or depositary: (1) Where there are grounds for concern over the behaviour of the authorised fund manager or depositary in respect of the management of the scheme or of its assets. (2) Where an authorised
EG 14.2.4RP
1The FCA recognises that participants in an AUT or ACS have a direct financial interest in the scheme property. It follows that in cases where it considers it appropriate to use its section 254 power (in the case of an AUT) or its section 261U power (in the case of an ACS) to revoke an authorisation order, the FCA will generally first require the authorised fund manager or depositary to wind up the AUT or ACS (or seek a court order for the
LR 4.3.2RRP
The FCA will approve listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars if it is satisfied that the requirements of the Act and this chapter have been complied with.
LR 4.3.3GRP
The FCA will try to notify the applicant of its decision on an application for approval of listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars within the same time limits as are specified in article 20 of the Prospectus Regulation3 for an application for approval of a prospectus or supplementary prospectus.
LR 4.3.4RRP
An issuer must ensure that listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars are not published until they have been approved by the FCA.
LR 4.3.5RRP
An issuer must ensure that after listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars are approved by the FCA, the listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars are filed and published as if the relevant requirements in PRR 3.2, article 21 of the Prospectus Regulation, the PR Regulation and the Prospectus RTS Regulation applied to them.4112
EG 3.8.1RP
1The FCA may use its section 131E power to require information and documents from natural or legal persons to support both its monitoring and its enforcement functions.
EG 3.8.2RP
1An officer with authorisation from the FCA may exercise the section 131E power to require information and documents from natural or legal persons. This includes an FCA employee or an agent of the FCA.
EG 3.8.3RP
1The FCA's power to conduct investigations to assist overseas regulators2 in respect of the short selling regulation is contained in section 131FA of the Act. The section provides that at the request of an overseas regulator2 or ESMA, the FCA may either use its power under section 131E to require the production of information, or appoint a person to investigate any matter.
EG 3.8.4RP
[deleted]21
EG 20.3.1RP
1The RDC is the FCA's decision maker for decisions which require the giving of warning or decision notices under the CCA Order, as set out in DEPP 2 Annex 1G. The RDC will make its decisions following the procedure set out in DEPP 3.2 or, where appropriate, DEPP 3.3.
EG 20.3.2RP
1The CCA Order does not require the FCA to publish procedures about its approach towards the commencement of criminal prosecutions. However, the FCA will normally follow its equivalent decision-making procedures for similar decisions under the Act as set out in EG 12.
EG 20.3.3RP
1The CCA Order does not require the FCA to publish procedures about its approach towards applications to the court for an injunction or restitution order. However, the FCA will normally follow its equivalent decision-making procedures for similar decisions under the Act as set out in EG 10 and EG 11.
EG 20.3.4RP
1The CCA Order requires the FCA to give third party rights as set out in section 393 of the Act and to give access to material, as set out in section 394 of the Act, in relation to warning notices and decision notices given under the CCA Order.
SUP 21.1.1GRP
1SUP 21 Annex 1 sets out a form of waiver that the FCA will be minded to give to energy market participants in the exercise of its statutory discretion under sections 138A and 138B of the Act to grant a waiver of its2rules.2
SUP 21.1.2GRP
Energy market participants should bear in mind that3sections 138A and 138B of the Act requires that in order to give a waiver of particular rules, the FCA4 must be satisfied that:4344(1) compliance with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not adversely affect the advancement of any of the FCA's operational objectives.44
SUP 21.1.3GRP
Accordingly, the FCA must be satisfied that the statutory criteria will be met in each case where an energy market participant applies for a waiver in the form in SUP 21 Annex 1.
SUP 21.1.4GRP
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FCA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FCA considers
EG 20.4.1RP
1When determining whether to take action to impose a penalty or to issue a public censure in relation to the contraventions of a CCA Requirement, the FCA's policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6.2 and DEPP 6.4. When determining the level of financial penalty, the FCA's policy includes having regard to relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5B, DEPP 6.5D and DEPP 6.7.
EG 20.4.2RP
1As with cases under the Act, the FCA may settle or mediate appropriate cases involving civil contraventions of CCA Requirements to assist it to exercise its functions. DEPP 5, DEPP 6.7 and EG 5 set out information on the FCA's settlement process and the settlement discount scheme.
EG 20.4.3RP
1When determining whether to take action to impose a suspension or restriction in relation to the contraventions of CCA Requirements, the FCA's policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6A.2 and DEPP 6A.4. When determining the length of the period of suspension or restriction, the FCA's policy includes having regard to relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6A.3.
EG 20.4.4RP
1The FCA will apply the approach to publicity that is outlined in EG 6.
LR 2.1.2GRP
Under the Act, the FCA may not grant an application for admission unless it is satisfied that:(1) the requirements of the listing rules are complied with; and(2) any special requirement (see LR 2.1.4 R) is complied with.
LR 2.1.3GRP
Under the Act, the FCA may also refuse an application for admission if it considers that:(1) admission of the securities would be detrimental to investors' interests; or(2) for securities already listed in a third country3, the issuer has failed to comply with any obligations under that listing.
LR 2.1.4RRP
(1) The FCA may make the admission of securities subject to any special requirement that it considers appropriate to protect investors. [Note: article 12 CARD](2) The FCA must explicitly inform the issuer of any special requirement that it imposes. [Note: article 12 CARD]
LR 2.1.5GRP
2The FCA is not able to make the admission of securities conditional on any event. The FCA may, in particular cases, seek confirmation from an issuer before the admission of securities that the admission does not purport to be conditional on any matter.
FEES App 1.3.1RRP
A person who submits to the FCA a proposal for the registration of a society must pay to the FCA, in full and without deduction, the fee specified for the type of application under Annex 1AR.
FEES App 1.3.2RRP
A sponsoring body wishing a set of rules to become model rules for the first time must pay to the FCA, in full and without deduction, the application fee specified in FEES App 1 Annex 1A.
FEES App 1.3.6GRP
The FCA may require the fee to be paid by the person making the application before the FCA undertakes any preliminary consideration of the proposed application or rules.
FEES App 1.3.7GRP
The FCA will not refund application fees under any circumstances.
EG 5.2.1RP
1Settlement discussions between FCA staff and the person concerned are possible at any stage of the enforcement process if both parties agree.
EG 5.2.2RP
1The FCA considers that in general, the earlier settlement discussions can take place the better this is likely to be from a public interest perspective. However, the FCA will only engage in such discussions once it has a sufficient understanding of the nature and gravity of the suspected misconduct or issue to make a reasonable assessment of the appropriate outcome. At the other end of the spectrum, the FCA expects that settlement discussions following a decision notice or second
EG 5.2.3RP
1In the interests of efficiency and effectiveness, the FCA will set clear and challenging timetables for settlement discussions to ensure that they result in a prompt outcome and do not divert resources unnecessarily from progressing a case through the formal process. To this end, the FCA will aim to organise its resources so that the preparation for the formal process continues in parallel with any settlement discussions. The FCA will expect firms and others to give it all reasonable
EG 5.2.4RP
2The FCA will engage senior management in discussions (either heads of department or directors), liaising where appropriate with the settlement decision makers, attending a without prejudice meeting during discussions or arranging for the attendance of an appropriately senior FCA representative.