Related provisions for FEES 13.2.10
301 - 320 of 590 items.
The purpose of this chapter is
to implement article 27(3)1of MiFID,
which deals with the requirements on systematic
internalisersto make available to the public data relating to the quality of execution of transactions1. It also provides a
rule (MAR 6.4.1R)1requiring investment firms to notify the
FCA
when they become, or cease to
be, a systematic internaliser,
and which gives effect to articles 15(1) and 18(4)1 of MiFIR. Finally, MAR 6.4A.1R
1A firm must make appropriate records to demonstrate compliance with the rules in this sourcebook and keep them for the following periods after an employee stops carrying on the activity:(1) at least 5 years for MiFID business;(2) 3 years for non-MiFID business; and(3) indefinitely for a pension transfer specialist.[Note: article 9(4) of the MCD]2
1The FCA may be alerted to possible contraventions or breaches by complaints from the public or firms, by referrals from other authorities or through its own enquiries and supervisory activities. Firms may also bring their own contraventions to the FCA's attention, as they are obliged to do under Principle 11 of the Principles for Businesses and rules in the FCA's Supervision manual.
The Listing Principles and, if applicable, the Premium Listing Principles5 are designed to assist listed companies in identifying their obligations and responsibilities under the listing rules, disclosure requirements6, transparency rules and corporate governance rules.5 The Listing Principles and Premium Listing Principles5 should be interpreted together with relevant rules and guidance which underpin the Listing Principles and the Premium Listing Principles.55
1On its web site, the FCA gives2 anonymous examples of where it has decided not to investigate or take enforcement action in relation to a possible rule
breach because of the way in which the firm has conducted itself when putting the matter right. This is part of an article entitled ‘The benefits to firms and individuals of co-operating with the FCA2’. However, in those cases where enforcement action is not taken and/or a formal investigation is not commenced,
1When it decides whether to exercise its power to disqualify an auditor or actuary under section 345(1), and what the scope of any disqualification will be, the FCA will take into account all the circumstances of the case. These may include, but are not limited to, the following factors: (1) the nature and seriousness of any breach of rules and the effect of that breach: the rules are set out in SUP 3 (Auditors) and SUP 4 (Actuaries), and in the case of firms which are ICVCs,
(1) 1This rule applies if the mineral company applies for the admission of its equity shares to premium listing and cannot comply with LR 6.6.1R (control of business) because the mineral company does not hold controlling interests in a majority (by value) of the properties, fields, mines or other assets in which it has invested.(2) The mineral company must demonstrate that it has a reasonable spread of direct interests in mineral resources and has rights to participate actively
(1) This chapter sets out rules governing the amounts payable by
FOS Ltd to the FCA to
fund the FCA’s functions under the ADR
Regulations.(2) These rules are made
using the rule-making power in paragraph 23 (Fees) Schedule 1ZA of the Act, as
applied with modifications by Regulation 15A of the ADR
Regulations.
1When deciding whether or not to disqualify an auditor under section 249(1) or section 261K(1) of the Act (concerning the power to disqualify an auditor for breach of trust scheme
rules or contractual scheme rules), and in setting the disqualification, the FCA will take into account all the circumstances of the case. These may include, but are not limited to, the following circumstances: (1) the effect of the auditor's breach of a duty imposed by trust scheme
The rules in this chapter adopt various concepts from the restriction on financial promotions by unauthorised persons in section 21(1) of the Act (Restrictions on financial promotion). Guidance on that restriction and the communications which are exempt from it is contained in PERG 8 (Financial promotion and related activities) and that guidance will be relevant to interpreting these rules. In particular, guidance on the meaning of:(1) 'communicate' is in PERG 8.6 (Communicate);
1A firm2 must:(1) report to the FCA any2: (a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions;2(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; and2(d) system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument;2(2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and2(3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the
(1) The commission disclosure rule is additional to the general law on the fiduciary obligations of an agent in that it applies whether or not the insurance intermediary is an agent of the commercial customer.(2) In relation to contracts of insurance, the essence of these fiduciary obligations is generally a duty to account to the agent’s principal. But where a customer employs an insurance intermediary by way of business and does not remunerate him, and where it is usual for