Related provisions for SUP 9.2.4
481 - 500 of 1080 items.
1This chapter describes many of the powers that the FCA has to enforce requirements imposed under legislation other than the Act. The chapter is ordered chronologically, ending with the most recent legislation. Where powers under different pieces of legislation are broadly the same, or apply to the same class of person, we have set out the relevant statements of policy in one section to avoid duplication.
1Where conduct may amount to a breach of more than one enactment, the FCA may need to consider which enforcement powers to use and whether to use powers from one or more of the Acts. Which power or powers are appropriate will vary according to the circumstances of the case. However, where appropriate, we have tried to adopt procedures in respect of our use of powers under legislation other than the Act which are akin to those used under the Act. We expect, for example, to provide
1The Act does not always require the FCA to give written notice of the appointment of investigators, for example, where investigators are appointed as a result of section 168(1) or (4) of the Act and the FCA believes that the provision of notice would be likely to result in the investigation being frustrated, or where investigators are appointed as a result of section 168(2) of the Act.
1Although the FCA is not required to give written notice of the appointment of investigators appointed as a result of section 168(2), when it becomes clear who the person under investigation is, the FCA will, nevertheless, normally notify them that they are under investigation when it exercises its statutory powers to require information from them, providing such notification will not, in the FCA's view, prejudice the FCA's ability to conduct the investigation effectively.
1Auditors and actuaries fulfil a vital role in the management and conduct of firms,
AUTs and ACSs. Provisions of the Act,
rules made under the Act and the OEIC Regulations 2000 impose various duties on auditors and actuaries. These duties and the FCA's power to disqualify auditors and actuaries if they breach them assist the FCA in pursuing its statutory objectives. The FCA's power to disqualify auditors in breach of duties imposed by trust
1The FCA also has the power under section 345 to impose a financial penalty and a public censure on an auditor or actuary in respect of a failure to comply with a duty imposed on the auditor or actuary by rules made by the FCA, or a failure to comply with a duty imposed under the Act to communicate information to the FCA. The FCA has the power under section 249 to impose a financial penalty and a public censure on an auditor in respect of a failure to comply with a duty imposed
If the appropriate regulator1 gives a firm a waiver, then the relevant rule no longer applies to the firm. But:1(1) if a waiver directs that a rule is to apply to a firm with modifications, then contravention of the modified rule could lead to appropriate regulator1 enforcement action and (if applicable) a right of action under section 138D1 of the Act (Actions for damages); and11(2) if a waiver is given subject to a condition, it will not apply to activities conducted in breach
Substantive changes to the rules (this would not include simple editorial changes) in the Handbook may affect existing waivers, changing their practical effect and creating a need for a change to the original waiver. The appropriate regulator1 will consult on proposed rule changes. A firm should note proposed rule changes and discuss the impact on a waiver with its appropriate1 supervisory contact.111
2The FCA has various powers under sections 97, 122A, 122B, 122C,1 131E, 131FA, 165 to 169 and 284 of the Act and Schedule 5 to the CRA to gather information and appoint investigators, and to require the production of a report by a skilled person. In any particular case, the FCA will decide which powers, or combination of powers, are most appropriate to use having regard to all the circumstances. Further comments on the use of these powers are set out below.
2Information may also be provided to the FCA voluntarily. For example, firms may at times commission an internal investigation or a report from an external law firm or other professional adviser and decide to pass a copy of this report to the FCA. Such reports can be very helpful for the FCA in circumstances where enforcement action is anticipated or underway. The FCA's approach to using firm-commissioned reports in an enforcement context is set out at the end of this chapter.
1As delays in the provision of information and/or documents can have a significant impact on the efficient progression of an investigation, the FCA expects persons to respond to information and document requests in a timely manner to appropriate deadlines. When an investigation is complex (and the timetable allows), the FCA may decide to issue an information or document
requirement in draft, allowing a specified period (of usually no more than three working
As set out in DEPP 5, special decision-making arrangements apply in relation to settlement. The person concerned may agree all relevant issues with the FCA (in which case the settlement decision makers will give all relevant statutory notices). Alternatively, a focused resolution agreement may be agreed (in which case the settlement decision makers are responsible for giving the warning notice and the RDC for giving any decision notice).2 The FCA would expect to hold any settlement
1If the settlement negotiations result in a proposed settlement of the dispute, FCA staff will put the terms of the proposed settlement in writing and agree them with the person concerned. The settlement decision makers (and, as the case may be, the RDC)2 will then consider the matter2 under the procedures set out in DEPP 5. A settlement is2 likely to result in the giving of statutory notices (see EG 2.15.1 to EG 2.15.32).
1The FCA's power under section 56 of the Act to prohibit individuals who are not fit and proper from carrying out functions in relation to regulated activities helps the FCA to work towards achieving its statutory objectives. The FCA may exercise this power to make a prohibition order where it considers that, to achieve any of those objectives, it is appropriate either to prevent an individual from performing any function in relation to regulated activities, or to restrict the
1The FCA's effective use of the power under section 63 of the Act to withdraw approval from an approved person will also help ensure high standards of regulatory conduct by preventing an approved person from continuing to perform the controlled function to which the approval relates if he is not a fit and proper person to perform that function. Where it considers this is appropriate, the FCA may prohibit an approved person, in addition to withdrawing their approval.
2Recognised Auction Platforms Regulations, regulation 13
(1) In considering whether [a RAP] or applicant satisfies the [RAP recognition requirements], the [FCA] may: (a) treat compliance by the [RAP] or applicant with the [recognition requirements] applying to it as a [UK RIE] as conclusive evidence that the [RAP] or applicant satisfies any equivalent [RAP recognition requirements] applying to it under these [RAP regulations], taking into account any arrangements that would be necessary to meet the [RAP recognition requirements], and (b) take into account all relevant circumstances including the constitution of the person concerned. |
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), [a RAP] or applicant may satisfy [RAP recognition requirements] by making arrangements for functions to be performed on its behalf by any other person. |
(3) Where [a RAP] or applicant makes arrangements of the kind mentioned in paragraph (2), the arrangements do not affect the responsibility imposed by these [RAP regulations] on the [RAP] or applicant to satisfy the [RAP recognition requirements], but it is in addition [a RAP recognition requirement] applying to the [RAP] or applicant that the person who performs (or is to perform) the functions is a fit and proper person who is able and willing to perform them. |
1This chapter applies to every firm which:(1) is subject to the requirements as to the form and content of regulated agreements under the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations (SI 2010/1014) made under section 60(1) of the CCA that wishes to apply for a direction from the FCA waiving or varying those requirements;(2) is subject to the requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers
This chapter explains how the regime works for obtaining: (1) a direction from the FCA waiving or varying the requirements as to the form and content of regulated agreements under the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) and the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations (SI 2010/1014) made under section 60(1) of the CCA;(2) a determination by the FCA that the requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers a notice of their rights
The principal purpose of imposing a financial penalty or issuing a public censure is to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct by deterring persons who have committed breaches from committing further breaches, helping to deter other persons from committing similar breaches, and demonstrating generally the benefits of compliant behaviour. Financial penalties and public censures are therefore tools that the FCA3 may employ to help it to achieve its statutory
1Where the FCA applies to the court under section 380(3) or sections 381(3) and (4) of the Act, the FCA may ask the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to make orders on an interim basis, restraining a person from disposing of, or otherwise dealing with, assets. To succeed in an application for such interim relief, the FCA will have to show a good arguable case for the granting of the injunction. The FCA will not have to show that a contravention has already occurred or
1The FCA may request the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases, for example, where it has evidence showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that a person will contravene a requirement of the Act and that the contravention will result in the dissipation of assets belonging to investors.
Where the FCA1 considers that it is unlikely to make a recognition order, it will discuss its concerns with the applicant with a view to enabling the applicant to make changes to its rules or guidance, or other parts of the application. If the FCA1 decides to refuse to make a recognition order, it will follow the procedure set out in section 298 of the Act (Directions and revocation: procedure) (which applies in consequence of section 290(5) of the Act (Recognition orders)) which
FCA2 staff responsible for the taking of a statutory notice decision under executive procedures may refer the matter to the RDC for the RDC to decide whether to give the statutory notice if:2(1) the RDC is already considering, or is shortly to consider, a closely related matter; and(2) the relevant FCA2 staff believe, having regard to all the circumstances, that the RDC should have responsibility for the decision. The relevant considerations might include: 2(a) the desirability
1Where a person who is a shareholder has contravened one or more relevant transparency provisions (as defined in section 89NA(11) of the Act) in respect of shares in a company admitted to trading on a regulated market and the FCA considers the breach to be serious, the FCA may apply to the Court for an order suspending that person’s voting rights as set out in section 89NA of the Act.