Related provisions for GENPRU 3.1.31
1 - 6 of 6 items.
A lead supervisor (called the coordinator) is appointed for each financial conglomerate. The definition of coordinator in the Financial Groups Directive Regulations10 describes the criteria for deciding which competent authority is appointed as coordinator. 10[Note: Article 10 and 11 of the Financial Groups Directive]10
Once a financial conglomerate has become a financial conglomerate and subject to supervision in accordance with this chapter10, the figures in the financial conglomerate definition decision tree are altered as follows:(1) the figure of 40% in the box titled Threshold Test 1 is replaced by 35%;(2) the figure of 10% in the box titled Threshold Test 2 is replaced by 8%; and(3) the figure of six billion Euro in the box titled Threshold Test 3 is replaced by five billion Euro.
Regulation 16 to 20, 21 and 24 of the financial groups directive regulations10 allow competent authorities, on a case by case basis, to:(1) change the definition of financial conglomerate and the obligations applying with respect to a financial conglomerate (which would include, where the appropriate regulator would be the coordinator under GENPRU 3.1.3G (6), permitting firms to apply, on an annual basis and subject to publication and notification to the competent authority10,
4GENPRU 3.1.29 R4 to GENPRU 3.1.31 R and GENPRU 3 Annex 1 apply10 the detailed capital adequacy requirements that correspond with10 the Financial Groups Directive. They only deal with a financial conglomerate for which the FCA8 is the coordinator. If another competent authority is coordinator of a financial conglomerate, those rules do not apply with respect to that financial conglomerate and instead that coordinator will be responsible for implementing those detailed requir
Annex I of the Financial Groups Directive laid10 down three5 methods for calculating capital adequacy at the level of a financial conglomerate. Those three5 methods are implemented as follows:55(1) Method 1 calculates capital adequacy using accounting consolidation. It is implemented by GENPRU 3.1.29 R to GENPRU 3.1.31 R and Part 1 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1.(2) Method 2 calculates capital adequacy using a deduction and aggregation approach. It is implemented by GENPRU 3.1.29 R to GENPRU
Paragraph 5.7 of GENPRU 3 Annex 1 (Capital adequacy calculations for financial conglomerates) deals with a case in which there are no capital ties between entities in a financial conglomerate. In particular, the FCA8 , after consultation with the other competent authority10 and in accordance with this chapter10, will determine which proportional share of a solvency deficit in such an entity will have to be taken into account, bearing in mind the liability to which the existing
(1) A firm that is a member of a financial conglomerate must at all times have capital resources of such an amount and type that results in the capital resources of the financial conglomerate taken as a whole being adequate.(2) This rule does not apply with respect to any financial conglomerate until notification has been made that it has been identified as a financial conglomerate as contemplated by regulation 2 of the Financial Groups Directive Regulations.10
GENPRU 3.1.35 R implements requirements that correspond to10 Article 7(4) and Article 8(4) of the Financial Groups Directive10 that where a financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company, the sectoral rules regarding risk concentration and intra-group transactions of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate, if any, shall apply to that sector as a whole, including the mixed financial holding company.
(1) 10This rule deals with the inclusion of an asset management company or an alternative investment fund manager5 that is a member of a financial conglomerate in the scope of regulation of financial conglomerates.[Note: Articles 30 and 30a of the Financial Groups Directive]1055555(2) An asset management company or an alternative investment fund manager5 is in the overall financial sector and is a regulated entity for the purpose of:(a) 5GENPRU 3.1.29 R5 to GENPRU 3.1.36 R;(b)
If the Part 4A permission of a firm contains a requirement obliging it to comply with this rule with respect to a third-country banking and investment group of which it is a member, it must comply, with respect to that third-country banking and investment group, with the rules in Part 2 of GENPRU 3 Annex 2, as adjusted by Part 3 of that annex.
Where this section applies with respect to a financial conglomerate, the risk management processes referred to in SYSC 12.1.8R (2) or, for a Solvency II firm, the risk management system referred to in the PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business, rule 3,12 must include:(1) sound governance and management processes, which must include the approval and periodic review by the appropriate managing bodies within the financial conglomerate of the strategies and
A firm does not have to give notice to the FCA2 under SUP 15.9.1 R if it or another member of the consolidation group has already given notice of the relevant fact to:55(1) the FCA2 or55(2) (if another competent authority is co-ordinator of the financial conglomerate ) that competent authority; or(3) (in the case of a financial conglomerate that does not yet have a co-ordinator ) the competent authority who would be co-ordinator under Regulation 1(2) of the Financial Groups
2These Regulations implemented3 in part the Financial Conglomerates Directive,25 which imposed3 certain procedural requirements on the FCA as a competent authority under the Directive. These Regulations also made3 specific provision about the exercise of certain supervisory powers in relation to financial conglomerates. 25 Directive 2002/87/EC
In considering whether to grant (or consent to, as the case may be)27 a firm's application to vary its Part 4A permission or impose or vary a requirement, the regulator concerned will also have regard, under section 55R(1)27 of the Act (Persons connected with an applicant), to any person6 appearing to be, or likely to be, in a relationship with the firm which is relevant. The Financial Groups Directive Regulations make special consultation provisions where the regulator is exercising