Related provisions for MAR 1.1.7
1 - 20 of 52 items.
Behaviour3conforming with any of the rules of the Takeover Codeabout the timing, dissemination or availability, content and standard of care applicable to a disclosure, announcement, communication or release of information, is unlikely to3, of itself, amount to market abuse, if:1(1) the rule is one of those specified in the table in
MAR 1.10.5G3;(2) the behaviour3is expressly required or expressly permitted by the rule in question (the notes for the time being associated
Table: Provisions of the Takeover Code conformity with which will be unlikely to3, of itself, amount to market abuse (This table belongs to MAR 1.10.4G3):
11Takeover Code provisions: |
|
Disclosure of information which is not generally available |
1(a) 2.1 , 52.7, 52.11, 8 20.1 521.3, 21.4 528.1 530.1, 30.5 555555 |
Standards of care |
2.8 first sentence and note 4 519.1, 19.7 520.6 second sentence 523.1 plus notes 28.1 55 |
Timing of announcements, documentation and dealings |
52.2, 2.6 5.4 6.2(b) 7.1 11.1 note 6 only 17.1 521.2 note 4 only 524.1(a) 525.1(a) 531.6(d), 31.9 533 (in so far as it refers to 31.6(d) and 31.9 only) 555555 |
Content of announcements |
2.4 (a) and (b) 19.31 |
Behaviour3conforming with Rule 4.2 of the Takeover Code (in relation to restrictions on dealings by offerors and concert parties) will be unlikely to3, of itself, amount to market abuse, if:(1) the behaviour is expressly required or expressly permitted by that rule (the notes for the time being associated with the rules identified in the Takeover Code are treated as part of the rule for these purposes); and(2) it conforms to any General Principle set out at Section B of the Takeover
This chapter provides
guidance on the Market Abuse Regulation5. It is therefore likely to be helpful to persons who:545(1) want to avoid engaging in market abuse5; or(2) want to determine whether they are required by article 16 of the Market Abuse Regulation5 to report a transaction
5or order to the
FCA
as a suspicious one.
This chapter5 does not exhaustively describe all types of behaviour5 that may indicate5market abuse. In particular, the descriptions of behaviour5 should be read in the light of: 55(1) the elements specified by the Market Abuse Regulation5 as making up the relevant type of market abuse; and(2) any relevant descriptions of behaviour specified by the Market Abuse Regulation5 which do not amount to market abuse; and5(3) any provisions in the MAR Level 2 Regulations6, and
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FCA's3 view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.33(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the market abuse. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the market abuse:(a) the conduct of the individual in
(1) If the FCA3 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the individual who committed the market abuse, or others, from committing further or similar abuse then the FCA3 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA3 may do this include:333(a) where the FCA3 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the market abuse to meet its objective of credible deterrence;3(b) where previous FCA3 action in respect of similar
2In some cases there will be instances of market misconduct that may arguably involve a breach of the criminal law as well as market abuse1. When the FCA decides whether to commence criminal proceedings rather than impose a sanction for market abuse in relation to that misconduct, it will apply the basic principles set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. When deciding whether to prosecute market misconduct which also falls within the definition of market abuse, application
2The factors which the FCA may consider when deciding whether to commence a criminal prosecution for market misconduct rather than impose a sanction for market abuse include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct: if the misconduct is serious and prosecution is likely to result in a significant sentence, criminal prosecution may be more likely to be appropriate; (2) whether there are victims who have suffered loss as a result of the misconduct:
2It is the FCA's
policy not to impose a sanction for market abuse where a person is being prosecuted for market misconduct or has been finally convicted or acquitted of market misconduct (following the exhaustion of all appeal processes) in a criminal prosecution arising from substantially the same allegations. Similarly, it is the FCA's
policy not to commence a prosecution for market misconduct where the FCA has brought or is seeking to bring
1The FCA has a range of powers it can use to take remedial, protective and disciplinary action against a person who has contravened a relevant requirement or engaged in market abuse, as well as its powers to seek injunctions under sections 380 and 381 of the Act and under the courts' inherent jurisdiction. Where appropriate, the FCA may exercise these other powers before, at the same time as, or after it applies for an injunction against a person.
1The FCA'sown-initiative powers do not apply to unauthorised persons. This means that an application for an injunction is the only power by which the FCA may seek directly to prevent unauthorised persons from actual or threatened breaches or market abuse. The FCA will decide whether an application against an unauthorised person is appropriate, in accordance with the approach discussed in paragraph 10.2.2. The FCA may also seek an injunction to secure assets where it intends to
6Under sections 313CA(2) and (3) of the Act, if the FCA imposes a requirement to suspend or remove a financial instrument from trading, the FCA must require any trading venue or systematic internaliser, falling under its jurisdiction as defined in section 313D of the Act, which trades the same instrument to suspend or remove the instrument if the suspension or removal was due to suspected market abuse; a take-over bid; or the non-disclosure of inside information about the issuer
6Under sections 313CB (2) and (3) of the Act, if the FCA receives notice that a person operating a trading venue has suspended or removed a financial instrument from trading on the trading venue because the instrument no longer complies with the venue’s rules, the FCA must require any other trading venue or systematic internaliser, falling under its jurisdiction as defined in section 313D of the Act, which trades the same instrument to suspend or remove the instrument if the suspension
The following are examples of behaviour5 that might fall within the scope of article 14(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation5:(1) a director of a company, while in possession of inside information, instructs an employee of that company to
sell a financial instrument5 in respect of which the information is inside information;(2) a person recommends or advises a friend to engage in behaviour5 which, if he himself engaged in it, would amount to market abuse.
2The FCA may apply to the court for an injunction if it appears that a person, whether authorised or not, is reasonably likely to breach a relevant requirement12, or engage in market abuse. It can also apply for an injunction if a person has breached one of those requirements or has engaged in market abuse and is likely to continue doing so. 12 Under section 380(6)(a) and (7)(a), a 'relevant requirement' in relation to an application by the appropriate regulator means a requirement:
2The FCA may consider taking disciplinary1 action using a range of powers1 as well as seeking restitution, if a person has breached a relevant requirement13 of the Act, the UK auctioning regulations or any4onshored regulation3, or has engaged in1market abuse. 13 Under section 204A(2), a 'relevant requirement' in relation to an application by the appropriate regulator means a requirement: which is imposed by or under the Act or by a qualifying 3provision specified, or of a description
Listing Principle 13 is intended to ensure that listed companies have adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable them to comply with their obligations under the listing rules, disclosure requirements4, transparency rules and corporate governance rules.3 In particular, the FCA considers that listed companies should place particular emphasis on ensuring that they have adequate procedures, systems and controls in relation to, where applicable:333(1) identifying whether any
Timely and accurate disclosure of information to the market is a key obligation of listed companies. For the purposes of Listing Principle 13, a listed company should have adequate systems and controls to be able to:3313(1) ensure that it can properly identify information which requires disclosure under the listing rules, disclosure requirements4, transparency rules or corporate governance rules3 in a timely manner; and3(2) ensure that any information identified under (1) is properly
4In relation to non-criminal market abuse investigations, the revised referral criteria will be similarly applied in deciding whether to open such an investigation. However, given the often limited alternatives to enforcement action available to address market abuse (with many of the subjects typically unauthorised), greater emphasis will be given to the egregiousness and deterrence value of a particular case when making such decisions.
4As with market abuse cases, many of the non-enforcement tools are not available for use in cases involving listing regime breaches. This is because in many cases (aside from certain areas such as sponsors and primary information providers), there will be no on-going supervisory relationship with the listed companies in question, and no similar authorisation regime as there is with authorised persons, firms and individuals. As a result, the ability to use many of the early intervention
When deciding whether to take action for market abuse7, the FCA4 may consider the following additional factors:4(1) The degree of sophistication of the users of the market in question, the size and liquidity of the market, and the susceptibility of the market to market abuse.(2) The impact, having regard to the nature of the behaviour, that any financial penalty or public censure may have on the financial markets or on the interests of consumers:(a) a penalty may show that high
The FCA4 will not take action against a person over behaviour7 which does not amount to market abuse. Behaviour is less likely to amount to market abuse where it7 (a) conforms with the Takeover Code or rules of an RIE and (b) falls within the terms of MAR 1.10.4G to 1.10.6G7 which state7 that behaviour7 so conforming is unlikely to, of itself,7 amount to market abuse. The FCA4 will seek the Takeover Panel's or relevant RIE's views on whether behaviour7 complies with the Takeover
Where the behaviour7 of a person which amounts to market abuse is behaviour7 to which the Takeover Code is relevant, the use of the Takeover Panel's powers will often be sufficient to address the relevant concerns. In cases where this is not so, the FCA4 will need to consider whether it is appropriate to use any of its own powers under the market abuse regime. The principal circumstances in which the FCA4 is likely to consider such exercise are:44(1) where the behaviour7 falls
1The FCA has power to apply to the court for a restitution order under section 382 of the Act and (in the case of market abuse) under section 383 of the Act. It also has an administrative power to require restitution under section 384 of the Act. When deciding whether to exercise these powers, the FCA will consider whether this would be the best use of the FCA's limited resources taking into account, for example, the likely amount of any recovery and the costs of achieving and
1A firm must: (1) report to the FCA any:(a) significant breaches of the firm’s rules;
(b) disorderly trading conditions;
(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; and
(d) system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument;
(2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and
(3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the
(1) Notification of suspicious transactions or orders3 to the FCA requires sufficient indications (which may not be apparent until after the transaction has taken place) that the transaction or order3 might constitute market abuse. In particular a person subject to article 16 of the Market Abuse Regulation3 will need to be able to explain the basis for the3 suspicion when notifying the FCA. Certain transactions or orders3 by themselves may seem completely devoid of anything suspicious,
1In investigations into possible
insider dealing,market abuse, misleading statements and practices offences, breaches of the general prohibition, the restriction on financial promotion, or the prohibition on promoting collective investment schemes, the investigator may not know the identity of the perpetrator or may be looking into market circumstances at the outset of the investigation rather than investigating a particular person. In those circumstances,
6A firm8 must:(1) have effective arrangements and procedures, relevant to its8MTF, for the regular monitoring of the compliance by its users with its rules; and(2) monitor the transactions undertaken by its users under its systems in order to identify breaches of those rules, disorderly trading conditions, system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument,8 or conduct that may involve market abuse8. [Note: article 31(1)8 of MiFID]
1An issuer should be aware that matters that
fall within the scope of this chapter may also fall within the scope of:(1) the market abuse regime set out
in the Market Abuse Regulation2;(2) Part 7 (Offences relating to
Financial Services) of the Financial Services Act 2012 relating to misleading
statements and practices;(3) Part V of the Criminal Justice
Act 1993 relating to insider dealing; and(4) the Takeover
Code.
1A firm2 must:(1) report to the FCA any2: (a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions;2(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; and2(d) system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument;2(2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and2(3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the
1A firm must:(1)
have effective arrangements and procedures relevant to its OTF for the regular monitoring of the compliance by its users with its rules; and
(2) monitor the transactions undertaken by its users under its systems in order to identify breaches of those rules, disorderly trading conditions, system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument, or conduct that may involve market abuse.
[Note: article 31(1) of MiFID]
Where a UK recognised body has evidence tending to suggest that any person has:(1) been carrying on any regulated activity in the United Kingdom in contravention of the general prohibition; or(2) been engaged in market abuse; or(3) committed a criminal offence under the Act or subordinate legislation made under the Act; or(4) committed a criminal offence under Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Insider dealing); or(5) committed a criminal offence under the Money Laundering