Related provisions for SYSC 22.8.1

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SYSC 18.6.3GRP
When considering what procedures may be appropriate for the purposes of SYSC 18.6.1R(1), a UK MIFID investment firm or a third country investment firm may wish to consider the arrangements in SYSC 18.3.1R(2).
REC 2.8.3GRP
In determining whether there are satisfactory arrangements for securing the timely discharge of the rights and liabilities of the parties to transactions effected on its regulated markets4, the FCA3 may have regard to4:3(1A) (in relation to transactions in derivatives) the UK recognised body’s ability to demonstrate that such transactions are cleared by a CCP in accordance with article 29(1) of MiFIR;4(1B) (in relation to transactions in derivatives which are to be cleared pursuant
BIPRU 5.2.3RRP
(1) A firm must not recognise credit protection as eligible until it has conducted sufficient legal review confirming that the credit protection arrangements are legally effective and enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions in accordance with BIPRU 5.2.2 R.(2) A firm must re-conduct legal reviews as necessary to ensure continuing enforceability and effectiveness.
BIPRU 11.3.3RRP
(1) A firm must adopt a formal policy to comply with the disclosure requirements laid down in BIPRU 11.3.1 R and BIPRU 11.3.2 R and have policies for assessing the appropriateness of its disclosures, including their verification and frequency.2(2) A firm must also have policies for assessing whether its disclosures convey its risk profile comprehensively to market participants. Where those disclosures do not convey its risk profile comprehensively to market participants, a firm
IFPRU 4.5.6GRP
To be satisfied that a firm complies with the documentation requirements in article 175(3) of the UK CRR2, the FCA expects a firm should have a clear and documented policy for determining whether an exposure that has been in default should subsequently be returned to performing status (see article 175(3) of the UK CRR2).
MAR 10.2.3GRP
(1) 1Regulation 17 of the MiFI Regulations regulates the position limit exemption applicable to positions in a commodity derivative held by or on behalf of a non-financial entity which are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity of that non-financial entity, and which is approved by the FCA in accordance with the relevant criteria and procedures. Regulation 17(1) imposes an obligation on the FCA to disregard such positions, when calculating
REC 2.17.2UKRP

Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, Part II

2Paragraph 10 (Default rules in respect of market contracts)

(1)

The [UK RIE] must havedefault ruleswhich, in the event of amemberof the [UK RIE] being or appearing to be unable to meet his obligations in respect of one or moremarket contracts, enable action to be taken in respect of unsettledmarket contractsto which he is party.

(2)

The [default rules] may authorise the taking of the same or similar action in relation to amemberwho appears to be likely to become unable to meet his obligations in respect of one or moremarket contracts.

(3)

The [default rules] must enable action to be taken in respect of all unsettledmarket contracts, other than those entered into for the purposes of or in connection with the provision of clearing services for the [UK RIE].

3(4)

Sub-paragraph (5) applies where the exchange has arrangements for transacting business with, or in relation to common members of, a [recognised clearing house] or another [recognised investment exchange].

3(5)

A [UK RIE] must have [default rules] which in the event of the clearing house or the investment exchange being or appearing to be unable to meet its obligations in respect of one or more [market contracts], enable action to be taken in respect of unsettled [market contracts] to which that person is a party.

Paragraph 11 (Content of rules)

(1)

This paragraph applies as regards contracts falling within section 155(2)(a) of the Companies Act [1989].

(2)

The [default rules] must provide -

(a)

for all rights and liabilities between those party as principal to unsettledmarket contractsto which the defaulter is party as principal to be discharged and for there to be paid by one party to the other such sum of money (if any) as may be determined in accordance with the [default rules];

(b)

for the sums so payable in respect of different contracts between the same parties to be aggregated or set off so as to produce a net sum; and

(c)

for the certification by or on behalf of the [UK RIE] of the net sum payable or, as the case may be, of the fact that no sum is payable.

(3)

The reference in sub-paragraph (2) to rights and liabilities between those party as principal to unsettledmarket contractsdoes not include rights and liabilities -

(a)

in respect of margin; or

(b)

arising out of a failure to perform amarket contract.

(4)

The [default rules] may make the same or similar provision, in relation to [designated non-members] designated in accordance with the procedures mentioned in sub-paragraph (5), as in relation tomembersof the [UK RIE].

(5)

If such provision is made as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (4), the [UK RIE] must have adequate procedures -

(a)

for designating thepersons, or descriptions of person, in respect of whom action may be taken;

(b)

for keeping under review the question whichpersonsor descriptions of person should be or remain so designated; and

(c)

for withdrawing such designation.

(6)

The procedures must be designed to secure that -

(a)

apersonis not, or does not remain, designated if failure by him to meet his obligations in respect of one or moremarket contractswould be unlikely adversely to affect the operation of the market; and

(b)

a description of persons is not, or does not remain, designated if failure by apersonof that description to meet his obligations in respect of one or moremarket contractswould be unlikely adversely to affect the operation of the market.

(7)

The [UK RIE] must have adequate arrangements -

(a)

for bringing a designation or withdrawal of designation to the attention of thepersonor description of persons concerned; and

(b)

where a description ofpersonsis designated, or the designation of a description of persons is withdrawn, for ascertaining whichpersonsfall within that description.

Paragraph 12 (Content of rules)

(1)

This paragraph applies as regards contracts falling within section 155(2)(b) or (c) of the Companies Act [1989].3

(2)

The [default rules] must provide -

(a)

for all rights and liabilities of the defaulter under or in respect of unsettledmarket contractsto be discharged and for there to be paid by or to the defaulter such sum of money (if any) as may be determined in accordance with the [default rules];

(b)

for the sums so payable by or to the defaulter in respect of different contracts entered into by the defaulter in one capacity for the purposes of section 187 of the Companies Act [1989] to be aggregated or set off so as to produce a net sum;3

3(bb)

if relevant, for that sum to be aggregated with, or set off against, any sum owed by or to the investment exchange by or to AP under an indemnity given or reimbursement or similar obligation in respect of a margin set off agreement in which the defaulter chose to participate so as to produce a net sum;

(c)

for the net sum referred to in [(2)](b) or, if relevant, the net sum referred to in [(2)](bb) -3

3

(i)

if payable by the defaulter to the exchange, to be set off against -3

3

(aa) any property provided by or on behalf of the defaulter as cover for margin (or the proceeds of realisation of such property);3

(bb) to the extent (if any) that any sum remains after set off under (aa), any default fund contribution provided by the defaulter remaining after any application of such contribution;3

(ii)

to the extent (if any) that any sum remains after set off under (i), to be paid from such other funds, including the default fund, or resources as the exchange may apply under its default rules;3

3

(iii)

if payable by the exchange to the defaulter, to be aggregated with -3

(aa) any property provided by or on behalf of the defaulter as cover for margin (or the proceeds of realisation of such property);3

(bb) any default fund contribution provided by the defaulter remaining after any application of such contribution; and3

(d)

for the certification by or on behalf of the [UK RIE] of the sum finally payable or, as the case may be, of the fact that no sum is payable.

3(2A)

In sub-paragraph (2), "margin set off agreement" means an agreement between the exchange and AP permitting any eligible position to which the Participant Member is party with the exchange and any eligible position to which the Participant Member is party with AP to be taken into account in calculating a net sum owed by or to the Participant Member to either the exchange or AP and/or margin to be provided to, either or both, the exchange and AP.

3(2B)

In sub-paragraph (2) -

"AP" means a [recognised clearing house] or another [recognised investment exchange] of whom a Participant Member is a member;

"eligible position" means any position which may be included in the set off calculation;

"Participant Member" means a person who

(a) is a member of the exchange;

(b) is a member or participant of AP; and

(c) chooses to participate, in accordance with the rules of the exchange, in such agreement.

3(2C)

The property, contribution, funds or resources referred to in (2)(c), against which the net sum is to be set off (or with which it is to be aggregated) are subject to any unsatisfied claims arising out of the default of a defaulter before the default in relation to which the calculation is being made.

(3)

The reference in sub-paragraph (2) to the rights and liabilities of a defaulter under or in respect of an unsettledmarket contractincludes (without prejudice to the generality of that provision) rights and liabilities arising in consequence of action taken under provisions of the [default rules] authorising -

(a)

the effecting by the [UK RIE] of corresponding contracts in relation to unsettledmarket contractsto which the defaulter is party;

(b)

the transfer of the defaulter's position under an unsettledmarket contractto anothermemberof the [UK RIE];

(c)

the exercise by theUK RIEof anyoptiongranted by an unsettledmarket contract.

(4)

A "corresponding contract" means a contract on the same terms (except as to price or premium) as themarket contractbut under which thepersonwho is the buyer under themarket contractagrees to sell and thepersonwho is the seller under themarket contractagrees to buy.

(5)

Sub-paragraph (4) applies with any necessary modifications in relation to amarket contractwhich is not an agreement to sell.

(6)

The reference in sub-paragraph (2) to the rights and liabilities of a defaulter under or in respect of an unsettledmarket contractdoes not include, where he acts as agent, rights or liabilities of his arising out of the relationship of principal and agent.

3Paragraph 12A (Content of rules)

3The rules of the [UK RIE] must provide that, in the event of a default, any default fund contribution provided by the defaulter shall only be used in accordance with paragraph 12(2)(c)(i) or (ii).

Paragraph 13 (Notification to other parties affected)

The [UK RIE] must have adequate arrangements for ensuring that -

(a)

in the case of unsettledmarket contractswith a defaulter acting as principal, parties to the contract are notified as soon as reasonably practicable of the default and of any decision taken under the [default rules] in relation to contracts to which they are a party; and

(b)

in the case of unsettledmarket contractswith a defaulter acting as agent, parties to the contract and the defaulter's principals are notified as soon as reasonably practicable of the default and of the identity of the other parties to the contract.

Paragraph 14 (Cooperation with other authorities)

The [UK RIE] must be able and willing to cooperate, by the sharing of information and otherwise, with the Secretary of State, anyrelevant office-holderand any other authority or body having responsibility for any matter arising out of, or connected with, the default of amemberof the [UK RIE] or any [designated non-member] or the default of a [recognised clearing house] or another [recognised investment exchange].34
SYSC 1.4.2RRP
A contravention of a rule in SYSC 11 to 2SYSC 21,7SYSC 22.8.1R, SYSC 22.9.1R or to 9SYSC 288 does not give rise to a right of action by a private person under section 138D of the Act (and each of those rules is specified under section 138D(3) of the Act as a provision giving rise to no such right of action). 34437
APER 4.4.4GRP
1Failing to report promptly in accordance with his APER employer2 internal procedures (or if none exist direct to the regulator concerned), information which it would be reasonable to assume would be of material significance to the regulator concerned), whether in response to questions or otherwise, falls within APER 4.4.3 G. The regulator concerned is:(1) the FCA if it would be reasonable to assume that it would be of material significance to it;3(2) the PRA if it would be reasonable
COBS 2.3.8GRP
[deleted]12
REC 2.10.3GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body's measures are appropriate to reduce the extent to which its facilities can be used for a purpose connected with market abuse or financial crime, to facilitate their detection and to monitor their incidence, the FCA3 may have regard to:3(1) whether the rules of the UK recognised body enable it to disclose any information to the FCA,3 or other appropriate bodies involved in the detection, prevention or pursuit of market abuse or financial
MCOB 14.1.6GRP
(1) A firm should generally make one election under MCOB 14.1.5R for all of its MCD article (3)(1)(b) credit intermediation activity or all of its lending under MCD article 3(1)(b) credit agreements, at any given time.(2) Where a firm wishes to make different elections for different types of MCD article (3)(1)(b) credit intermediation activity or lending under MCD article 3(1)(b) credit agreements, it should maintain processes to ensure that the rules applicable to each type of
COND 2.3.11AGRP
5Paragraphs 2C(2)(e) and (f) and 3B(2)(e) and (f)6 of Schedule 6 to the Act reflect legislation initially introduced in the Post-BCCI Directive, which defines close links, in part, by reference to participation. Recital 5 of the Post-BCCI Directive gives further guidance on what is meant by ‘participation’ for the purposes of the directive. It states that the sole fact of having acquired a significant proportion of a company’s capital does not constitute participation for the
EG 20.1.3RP
1The FCA has decided to adopt procedures and policies that it currently has in place for the enforcement of the Act in exercising its powers to enforce the CCA. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
COLL 11.6.13RRP
Where the authorised fund manager of a feeder UCITS gives notice to the FCA under section 251 or section 261Q1 of the Act or regulation 21 of the OEIC Regulations that it intends to wind up the scheme, it must inform:(1) the unitholders of the feeder UCITS; and(2) where notice is given under COLL 11.6.5R (4) (Application for approval by a feeder UCITS where a master UCITS merges or divides), the authorised fund manager of the master UCITS;of its intention without undue delay.[Note:
BIPRU 9.3.11DRP
1An originator's application for a waiver of the requirements in BIPRU 9.3.7R and BIPRU 9.3.8R must demonstrate that the following conditions are satisfied:(1) it has policies and methodologies in place which ensure that the possible reduction of capital requirements which the originator achieves by the securitisation is justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties; and(2) that such transfer of credit risk to third parties is also recognised for the purposes
DEPP 6.5A.2GRP
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
SYSC 5.2.55GRP
[deleted] Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 27.8.29G]8
CONC 8.3.3GRP
The individual circumstances of the customer include, for example, the customer's financial position, the country in the UK to whose laws and procedures the customer and the lender in question are subject, and the level of understanding of the customer. [Note: paragraph 2.6c of DMG]