Related provisions for DISP 1.2.4
301 - 320 of 375 items.
713If a complaint relates to the sale of a payment protection contract, knowledge by the complainant that there was a problem with the sale of the payment protection contract generally (for example where there has been a rejection of a claim on the grounds of ineligibility or exclusion, or the complainant has received a customer contact letter explaining that they may have been mis-sold) would not in itself ordinarily be sufficient to establish for the purposes of the three-year
A firm need not provide an ESIS:(1) in relation to a direct deal; (2) if the consumer refuses to disclose key information (for example, in a telephone conversation, his name or a communication address) or where the consumer is not interested in pursuing the enquiry; or(3) if the firm does not wish to do business with the consumer.
(1) 7In SUP 6 the "relevant regulator" is the regulator to which a firm with a Part 4A permission has made or can make (in accordance with SUP 6) an application to vary or cancel its Part 4A permission or to have imposed on it a new requirement or to vary or cancel any existing requirement (see SUP 6.2.3A G to SUP 6.2.3E G).(2) Where the PRA can only determine an application with the consent of the FCA, the FCA may request further information as if it were the relevant regulator.(3)
1The grounds on which the FCA may exercise its power to cancel an authorised person's
permission under section 55J of the Act are the same as the grounds for variation and for imposition of requirements. They are set out in section 55J(1) and section 55L(2) and described in EG 8.1.1. Examples of the types of circumstances in which the FCA may cancel a firm'sPart 4A permission include: (1) non-compliance with a Financial Ombudsman Service award against the
If a contract with an appointed representative is terminated, or if it is amended in a way which gives rise to a requirement to notify under SUP 12.8.1R, a firm must take all reasonable steps to ensure that:(1) if the termination is by the firm, the appointed representative is notified in writing before, or if not possible, immediately on, the termination of the contract and informed that it will no longer be an exempt person for the purpose of the Act because of the contract
(1) When a firm enters into a current account agreement where:(a) there is a possibility that the account-holder may be allowed to overdraw on the current account without a pre-arranged overdraft or exceed a pre-arranged overdraft limit; and (b) if the account-holder did so, this would be a regulated credit agreement;the current account agreement must contain the information in (2) and (3).[Note: section 74A(1) of CCA](2) The information required by (1) is:(a) the rate of interest
(1) Where a financial instrument of an issuer is admitted to trading on one SME growth market, the financial instrument must not be traded on another SME growth market unless the issuer has been informed and has not objected. (2) In the case of (1), the issuer shall not be subject to any obligation relating to corporate governance or initial, ongoing or ad hoc disclosure with regard to the latter SME growth market.[Note: article 33(7) of MiFID]
(1) A firm must make available:(a) the information on the employers’ liability register either:(i) on the firm's website at the address notified to the FCA in ICOBS 8.4.6R (1); or(ii) by arranging for a tracing office which meets the conditions in ICOBS 8.4.9 R to make the information available on the tracing office’s website; and(b) the latest director's certificate prepared in accordance with SUP 16.23A.5R(1)5 and the latest report prepared by an auditor for the purposes of
The PARs impose various obligations on payment account providers, such as a duty to disclose certain information when offering a packaged account to a consumer (i.e. the costs and fees of the products or services included in the package). They also introduce an obligation to offer a switching service between payment accounts. The PARs also require credit institutions designated by Her Majesty’s Treasury to provide eligible consumers with access to basic banking services.
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FCA11 ) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. Compliance by another person to whom the Principles apply with Principles 3, 4 and 11 can also be affected by the activities of other persons who are members of their group.14 This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems
(1) 1The FCA's3 approach to determining penalties described in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5C is intended to ensure that financial penalties are proportionate to the breach. The FCA3 recognises that penalties may affect persons differently, and that the FCA3 should consider whether a reduction in the proposed penalty is appropriate if the penalty would cause the subject of enforcement action serious financial hardship.333(2) Where an individual or firm claims that payment of the penalty
(1) 1In order to take reasonable care to ascertain the price which is the best available, a firm:(a) should disregard any charges and commission made by it or its agents that are disclosed to the customer under COBS 6.1.9 R (Information about costs and associated charges);(b) need not have access to competing exchanges, or to all, or a minimum number of, available price sources; but if a firm can access prices displayed by different exchanges and trading platforms and make a direct
A firm must not act, or continue to act, for any person in connection with a transaction to which the Takeover Code applies1 (including a transaction subject to rule 8 (Disclosure of dealings during the offer period; also indemnity and other arrangements) of the Takeover Code1) if the firm has reasonable grounds for believing that the person in question, or his principal, is not complying or is not likely to comply with the Takeover Code.111
The information which the relevant regulator24 may request on the circumstances of the application for cancellation and the confirmations which the relevant regulator24 may require a firm to provide will differ according to the nature of the firm and the activities it has Part 4A permission24 to carry on.242424
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the firm should presume that the complainant would not have bought the payment protection contract he bought if the sale was substantially flawed, for example where the firm:(1) pressured the complainant into purchasing the payment protection contract; or(2) did not disclose to the complainant, in good time before the sale was concluded, and in a way that was fair, clear and not misleading, that the policy was optional; or(3) made the
It is common practice for listed companies to brief analysts, usually at the time of the company's preliminary, interim and, if applicable, quarterly results and after the information has been issued to the market as a whole. Briefings may be made personally to a small or large number of analysts in a meeting or through a conference call. It is increasingly becoming the practice for listed companies to make their briefings available live to journalists and the general public on
(1) The authorised fund manager and depositary of a charity authorised investment fund may adopt a total return approach to the allocation or distribution of income where this is provided for in:(a) the instrument constituting the fund; and (b) the prospectus.(2) Under a total return approach the authorised fund manager may make transfers between the capital account and the income account in addition to those in COLL 6.8.3R(3A)(c).(3) The authorised fund manager and depositary
In considering whether commercial interests would be prejudiced to an unreasonable degree (see SUP 8.6.2 G (2)), the appropriate regulator4 will weigh the prejudice to firms' commercial interests against the interests of consumers, markets and other third parties in disclosure. In doing so the appropriate regulator4 will consider factors such as the extent to which publication of the waiver would involve the premature release of proprietary information to commercial rivals, for