Related provisions for SUP 9.2.4
361 - 380 of 1078 items.
The FCA5 recognises that there may be occasions when, because of a particular emergency, a person (generally a firm, but in certain circumstances, for example in relation to price stabilising rules, an unauthorised person) may be unable to comply with a particular rule in the Handbook. The purpose of GEN 1.3.2 R is to provide appropriate relief from the consequences of contravention of such a rule in those circumstances.1993
(1) If any emergency arises which:(a) makes it impracticable for a person to comply with a particular rule in the Handbook; (b) could not have been avoided by the person taking all reasonable steps; and(c) is outside the control of the person, its associates and agents (and of its and their employees);the person will not be in contravention of that rule to the extent that, in consequence of the emergency, compliance with that rule is impracticable. (2) Paragraph (1) applies only
GEN 1.3.2 R operates on the FCA's5rules. It does not affect the FCA's5 powers to take action against a firm in an emergency, based on contravention of other requirements and standards under the regulatory system. For example, the FCA5 may exercise its own-initiative power in appropriate cases to vary a firm'sPart 4A permission9 based on a failure or potential failure to satisfy the threshold conditions (see SUP 7 (Individual9 requirements) and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation
(1) A firm must monitor the transactions made by clients using the service to identify:
(a) infringements of the rules of the trading venue; or
(b) disorderly trading conditions; or
(c) conduct which may involve market abuse and which is to be reported to the FCA.(2) A firm must have a binding written agreement with each client which:
(a) details the essential rights and obligations of both parties arising from the provision of the service; and
(b) states that the firm is responsible
A firm must provide the following, at the FCA’s request, within 14 days from receipt of the request:
(1) a description of the systems mentioned in MAR 7A.4.2R(1);
(2) evidence that those systems have been applied; and
(3) information stored in accordance with MAR 7A.4.6R.[Note: article 17(5) of MiFID]
(1) The purpose of REC 3.13 is to enable the FCA2to monitor any significant instances where UK recognised bodies outsource their functions to other persons (as permitted 1under Regulation 6 of the Recognition Requirements Regulations4. See REC 2.24).2111(2) The FCA2does not need to be notified of every instance of outsourcing by a UK recognised body, but only where an activity or activities which form a significant part of a relevant function or which make a significant contribution
Where a UK recognised body makes an offer or agrees to delegate any of its relevant functions to another person, it must immediately give the FCA2notice of that event, and:2(1) inform the FCA2of the reasons for that delegation or proposed delegation;2(2) inform the FCA2of the reasons why it is satisfied that it will continue to meet the recognition requirements4following that delegation;21(3) where it makes such an offer by issuing a written invitation to tender to another body
1Where the FCA believes that a company or partnership to which sections 359(1) and 367(1) of the Act applies is, or is likely to become, unable to pay its debts, the FCA will consider whether it is appropriate to seek an administration order or a compulsory winding up order from the court. The FCA's approach will be in two stages: the first is to consider whether it is appropriate to seek any insolvency order; the second is to consider which insolvency order will meet, or is likely
1In determining whether it is appropriate to seek an insolvency order on this basis, the FCA will consider the facts of each case including, where relevant: (1) whether the company or partnership has taken or is taking steps to deal with its insolvency, including petitioning for its own administration, placing itself in voluntary winding up or proposing to enter into a company voluntary arrangement, and the effectiveness of those steps; (2) whether any consumer or other creditor
1After the FCA has determined that it is appropriate to seek an insolvency order, and there is no moratorium in place under Schedule A1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended by the Insolvency Act 2000) (hereafter referred to in this chapter as 'the 1986 Act'), it will consider whether this order should be an administration order or a compulsory winding up order.
Principle 4 requires a firm to maintain adequate financial resources. GENPRU 2 sets out provisions that deal specifically with the adequacy of that part of a firm's financial resources that consists of capital resources. The adequacy of a firm'scapital resources needs to be assessed both by that firm and the appropriate regulator. Through its rules, the FCA14 sets minimum capital resources requirements for firms. It also reviews a firm's own assessment of its capital needs,
For the purposes of GENPRU 2.1.9 R, a firm should have systems in place to enable it to be certain whether it has adequate capital resources to comply with14 the main BIPRU firm Pillar 1 rules14 at all times. This does not necessarily mean that a firm needs to measure the precise amount of its capital resources and its CRR on a daily basis. A firm should, however, be able to demonstrate the adequacy of its capital resources at any particular time if asked to do so by the FCA1
1When it considers how it should deal with a concern about a firm, the FCA will have regard to its statutory objectives and the range of regulatory tools that are available to it. It will also have regard to: (1) the responsibilities of a firm's management to deal with concerns about the firm or about the way its business is being or has been run; and (2) the principle that a restriction imposed on a firm should be proportionate to the objectives the FCA is seeking to achieve.
1In the course of its supervision and monitoring of a firm or as part of an enforcement action, the FCA may make it clear that it expects the firm to take certain steps to meet regulatory requirements. In the vast majority of cases the FCA will seek to agree with a firm those steps the firm must take to address the FCA’s concerns. However, where the FCA considers it appropriate to do so, it will exercise its formal powers under sections 55J or 55L of the Act to vary a firm's
1Examples of circumstances in which the FCA will consider varying a firm'sPart 4A permission because it has serious concerns about a firm, or about the way its business is being or has been conducted include where: (1) in relation to the grounds for exercising the power under section 55J(1)(a) or section 55L(2)(a) of the Act, the firm appears to be failing, or appears likely to fail, to satisfy the threshold conditions relating to one or more, or all, of its regulated activities,
The purpose of this section is to direct CBTL firms in relation to:the information that they must provide to the FCA on their CBTL business and their compliance with requirements imposed by Schedule 2 to the MCD Order; andthe time at which, and the manner and form in which, they must provide that information.[Note: article 18(1)(c) of the MCD Order]
(1) A CBTL firm must submit a duly completed consumer buy-to-let return to the FCA.(2) The return referred to in (1) must be submitted:(a) in the format set out in SUP 16 Annex 39AD; guidance notes for the completion of the return are set out in SUP 16 Annex 39BG;(b) online through the appropriate systems accessible from the FCA’s website; and(c) within 30 business days following the end of the reporting period.(3) The reporting period is the four calendar quarters beginning on
If the RRD group includes an IFPRU 730k firm that is not a significant IFPRU firm (and does not include an IFPRU 730k firm that is a significant IFPRU firm) the group recovery plan must include:(1) a summary of the key elements of the group recovery plan;(2) information on the governance of the group, including: (a) how the group recovery plan is integrated into the corporate governance of the group; and (b) the group's overall risk management framework;(3) a description of the
(1) A firm or qualifying parent undertaking must send the group recovery plan to its 2consolidating supervisor.(2) A2firm or qualifying parent undertaking must send the group recovery plan in line with SUP 16.20 (Recovery plans and information for resolution plans).[Note: articles 6(1) and 7(1) of RRD]
1The FCA recognises that the use of its powers to disqualify auditors and actuaries will have serious consequences for the auditors or actuaries concerned and their clients; it will therefore exercise its power to impose a disqualification in a way that is proportionate to the particular breach of duty concerned. The FCA will consider the seriousness of the breach of duty when deciding whether to exercise its power to disqualify and the scope of any disqualification.
1Actuaries appointed by firms under rule 4.3.1 of the FCA's Supervision Manual are approved persons and as such will be subject to APER or COCON, as applicable2. When deciding whether to exercise its power to disqualify an actuary who is an approved person, the FCA will consider whether the particular breach of duty can be adequately addressed by the exercise of its disciplinary powers in relation to approved persons.
1In cases where the nature of the breach of duties imposed on the auditors and actuaries under the Act (and/or in the case of actuaries imposed by trust scheme
rules or contractual scheme rules) is such that the FCA has concerns about the fitness and propriety of an individual auditor or actuary, the FCA will consider whether it is appropriate to make a prohibition order instead of, or in addition to, disqualifying the individual.
A firm wishing to include a qualifying subordinated loan in its calculation of liquid capital must:(a) provide the FCA with a copy of the agreement not less than 10 business days before the loan is to be made; and(b) certify to the FCA that the loan agreement complies with the FCA'sprescribed subordinated loan agreement.
1An applicant applying for admission to listing by way of a block listing must submit in final form, at least two business days before the FCA is to consider the application, a completed Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List. An application in respect of multiple schemes must identify the schemes but need not set out separate block listing amounts for each scheme.1Note: The Application for Admission of Securities to the Official List form can be found on
(1) An applicant applying for admission to listing by way of a block listing must notify an RIS of the number and type of securities that are the subject of the block listing application and the circumstances of their issue.(2) The notification in paragraph (1) must be made by 9 a.m. on the day the FCA is to consider the application.
Every six months the applicant must notify a RIS of the details of the number of securities covered by the block listing which have been allotted in the previous six months, using the Block Listing Six Monthly Return.1Note: A copy of the Block Listing Six Monthly Return can be found on the UKLA section of the FCA website.
(1) 6A must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that A carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that A provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which A’s business is organised;(d) if A is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
(1) 6B must be capable of being effectively supervised by the FCA having regard to all the circumstances including-(a) the nature (including the complexity) of the regulated activities that B carries on or seeks to carry on;(b) the complexity of any products that B provides or will provide in carrying on those activities;(c) the way in which B’s business is organised;(d) if B is a member of a group, whether membership of the group is likely to prevent the FCA’s effective supervision
6The guidance in COND 2.3 should be read as applying to both paragraph 2C of Schedule 6 of the Act and, as far as relevant to the discharge by the FCA of its functions under the Act in respect of firms carrying on, or seeking to carry on, a PRA-regulated activity, paragraph 3B of Schedule 6 of the Act.
In assessing the threshold conditions set out in paragraphs 2C and 3B of Schedule 6 to the Act6, factors which the FCA6 will take into consideration include, among other things, whether: 6(1) it is likely that the FCA6 will receive adequate information from the firm, and those persons with whom the firm has close links, to enable it to determine whether the firm is complying with the requirements and standards under the regulatory system for which the FCA is responsible6 and to
3The FCA is the single statutory regulator for all financial business in the UK. Its strategic objective under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the 2000 Act) is to ensure that the relevant markets function well. The FCA's operational objectives are: securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers;protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system; andpromoting effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets.(Note: The 2000
3Under the 2000 Act the FCA has powers to investigate concerns including: • regulatory concerns about authorised firms and individuals employed by them;suspected contraventions of the Market Abuse Regulation or any supplementary market abuse legislation (as defined in Part 8 of the Act)5252• suspected misleading statements and practices under s.397 of the 2000 Act and Part 7 of the Financial Services Act 2012;• suspected insiderdealing under of Part V of the Criminal Justice
3The FCA has the power to take the following enforcement action: • discipline authorised firms under Part XIV of the 2000 Act and approved persons and other individuals1under s.66 of the 2000 Act;• impose penalties on persons that perform controlled functions4without approval under s.63A of the 2000 Act;• impose civil penalties2under s.123 of the 2000 Act;5• 2temporarily prohibit an individual from exercising management functions in MiFID investment firms or from dealing in
So-called 'mortgage clubs' or 'wholesalers' essentially act as a distribution function for lenders, providing information to intermediaries about current deals available from a range of lenders. They provide information (often through an electronic sourcing system) in a way that helps intermediaries search the market effectively and, as such, do not deal directly with individual borrowers. If only engaged in these activities and without direct contact with individual borrowers,
So-called 'mortgage packaging companies' may undertake certain parts of the mortgage process for lenders on an outsourced basis, ensuring that a complete set of documentation is collated and sent to the lender. This might include receiving application forms from intermediaries, undertaking credit reference checks and instructing a valuer. Other activities might include a product placement service for other intermediaries who provide product advice or recommendations to their clients.
The term 'broker packagers' is typically used to describe intermediaries who either market their services directly to borrowers or who offer other intermediaries a complete mortgage outsourcing service. They are often involved in the sales and advice process, including helping the borrower complete application forms. In the FCA's view, broker packagers carrying on these types of activity in direct contact with the borrower are likely to be carrying on the regulated activities
1The CCA Order gives the FCA the power to enforce the CCA through the application of its investigation and sanctioning powers in the Act by reference to the contravention of CCA Requirements and criminal offences under the CCA. The FCA's investigation and sanctioning powers include the following: power to censure or fine an approved person, or impose a suspension or a restriction on their approval under section 66 of the Act, for being knowingly concerned in a contravention by
1The FCA's approach to taking enforcement action under the CCA Order will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
13The FCA performs part of its supervision work by reviewing and analysing information about firms' records of compliance with the requirements and standards under the regulatory system. The type of report the FCA requires will vary, depending on the type of business a firm undertakes. This information helps the FCA to determine whether a firm is complying with the requirements applicable to its business, and what procedures it is operating to ensure its compliance.
(1) [deleted]101313(1A) The breach report from a depositary of an authorised fund to the FCA must include, for each authorised fund for which it is a depositary:10(a) details of all breaches of COLL or FUND, which came to the depositary’s attention or which were reported to the depositary by the authorised fund manager, during the previous month;10(b) details of any changes to the reported details of an existing breach, whether reported under SUP 16.6.8R(1A) or otherwise;10(c)
(1) 10A depositary must submit its breach report under SUP 16.6.8R(1A) using the form REP011 in SUP 16 Annex 12AR.(2) A depositary must submit its oversight report under SUP 16.6.8R(1B) using the form REP012 in SUP 16 Annex 12AR.(3) A depositary must submit the forms in SUP 16 Annex 12AR:(a) online through the appropriate systems accessible from the FCA’s website; or (b) if the appropriate systems are unavailable, via email to fundsupervision@fca.org.uk.
4The FCA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 13.3 to LR 13.6, LR 13.8 and LR 13 Annex 1, if it considers that disclosure of that information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that that omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the matter covered by the circular.
4A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific information in a particular case must:(1) be made in writing by the listed company;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the listed company's opinion one or more grounds in LR 13.1.7 G apply.
Section 81 of the Act (supplementary listing particulars) requires
an issuer to submit supplementary listing particulars to the FCA for approval if at any time after listing particulars have been submitted
to the FCA and before the commencement of dealings
in the securities following
their admission to the official list:(1) there is a significant change affecting
any matter contained in those particulars the inclusion of which was required
by:(a) section 80 of the Act (general
An issuer must
ensure that after supplementary listing particulars are
approved by the FCA, the supplementary
listing particulars are filed and published as if the requirements
in PRR 3.2, article 21 of the Prospectus Regulation, the PR Regulation and the Prospectus RTS Regulation applied to them.5223
1If
final terms of the offer are not included in the listing
particulars:(1) the final terms must be provided
to investors and filed with the FCA, and made available to the public,
as if the relevant requirements in PRR 3.2, article 21 of the Prospectus Regulation, the PR Regulation and the Prospectus RTS Regulation4 applied
to them; and(2) the listing
particulars must disclose the criteria and/or the conditions
in accordance with which the above elements will be determined or,
(1) 1The FCA2will seek to deprive a firm of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA2 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit.22(2) Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breachingFCArules2 or other requirements of the regulatory system and the breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA2 will seek to
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
(1) If the FCA2 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA2 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA2 may do this include:222(a) where the FCA2 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;2(b) where previous FCA2 action in respect of similar breaches has failed
The FCA2 and the firm on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA2 and the firm concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.22
1An administration order can be made only in relation to companies and partnerships and only where the court believes that making such an order will achieve one or more of the four purposes set out in section 8 of the 1986 Act. The FCA will apply for an administration order only where it considers that doing so will meet or is likely to meet one or more of these purposes.
1In addition, the FCA will consider, where relevant, factors including: (1) the extent to which the financial difficulties are, or are likely to be attributable to the management of the company or partnership, or to external factors, for example, market forces; (2) the extent to which it appears to the FCA that the company or partnership may, through an administrator, be able to trade its way out of its financial difficulties; (3) the extent to which the company or partnership