Related provisions for PERG 6.5.2

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EG 19.20.1RP
1The FCA has investigation and sanctioning powers in relation to both criminal and civil breaches of the Payment Services Regulations. The Payment Services Regulations impose requirements including, amongst other things, obligations on payment service providers to provide users with a range of information and various provisions regulating the rights and obligations of payment service users and providers.
EG 19.20.2RP
1The FCA's approach to enforcing the Payment Services Regulations will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
EG 19.20.3RP
1The regulatory powers which the Payment Services Regulations provide to the FCA include: the power to require information;powers of entry and inspection;power of public censure;the power to impose financial penalties;the power to prosecute or fine unauthorised providers; andthe power to vary an authorisation on its own initiative.
EG 19.20.4RP
[deleted]312
EG 19.20.5RP
1The Payment Services Regulations, for the most part, mirror the FCA's investigative, sanctioning and regulatory powers under the Act. The FCA has decided to adopt procedures and policies in relation to the use of those powers akin to those it has under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
EG 9.6.1RP
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances of a case. These may include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct or other unfitness that resulted in the order; (2) the amount of time since the original order was made; (3) any steps taken subsequently by the individual to remedy the misconduct or other unfitness; (4) any evidence which, had it been
EG 9.6.2RP
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will take into account any indication given by the FCA in the final notice that it is minded to revoke or vary the prohibition order on application after a certain number of years (see paragraph 9.2.4).
EG 9.6.3RP
2If the individual applying for a revocation or variation of a prohibition order proposes to take up an offer of employment to perform a controlled function, the FCA will take this into account when considering whether to grant or refuse the application1.
EG 9.6.4RP
2The FCA will not generally grant an application to vary or revoke a prohibition order unless it is satisfied that: the proposed variation will not result in a reoccurrence of the risk to consumers or confidence in the financial system that resulted in the order being made; and the individual is fit to perform functions in relation to regulated activities generally, or to those specific regulated activities in relation to which the individual has been prohibited. The FCA will
EG 9.6.5RP
2The FCA will consult the PRA before varying or revoking a prohibition order if, as a result of the variation or revocation, an individual will either be prohibited from, or no longer be prohibited from, a function of interest to the PRA as defined at section 56(7B) of the Act.
EG 4.13.1RP
1In cases where the FCA proposes to submit an investigation report to the RDC with a recommendation for regulatory action, the FCA's usual practice is to send a preliminary findings letter to the subject of an investigation before the matter is referred to the RDC. The letter will normally annex the investigators' preliminary investigation report. Comment will be invited on the contents of the preliminary findings letter and the preliminary investigation report.
EG 4.13.2RP
1The FCA recognises that preliminary findings letters serve a very useful purpose in focussing decision making on the contentious issues in the case. This in turn makes for better quality and more efficient decision making. However, there are exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may decide it is not appropriate to send out a preliminary findings letter. This includes: (1) where the subject consents to not receiving a preliminary findings letter; or (2) where it is not practicable
EG 4.13.3RP
1In cases where it is sent, the preliminary findings letter will set out the facts which the investigators consider relevant to the matters under investigation (normally, as indicated above, by means of an annexed preliminary investigation report). And it will invite the person concerned to confirm that those facts are complete and accurate, or to provide further comment. FCA staff will allow a reasonable period (normally 28 days) for a response to this letter, and will take into
EG 4.13.4RP
1Where the FCA has sent a preliminary findings letter and it then decides not to take any further action, the FCA will communicate this decision promptly to the person concerned.
SUP 16.8.2GRP
1The purpose of this section is to enable information on the persistency of life policies and data on stakeholder pensions to be prepared and provided to the FCA11 in a standard format. This information is used in the monitoring of firms both individually and collectively.11
SUP 16.8.3RRP
(1) An insurer with a permission to effect or carry out life policies must submit to the FCA a persistency report in respect of life policies by 30 April each year in accordance with this section.11111118(2) A firm with permission to establish, operate or wind up a stakeholder pension scheme must submit to the FCA11:11(a) a data report on stakeholder pensions by 30 April each year using the form specified in SUP 16 Annex 6R.99(b) [deleted]99
SUP 16.8.3ARRP
(1) 9A firm may submit persistency and a data report for a 12 month period ending within 4 months of its accounting reference date if:(a) it has notified the FCA of this intention by email using the email address specified in SUP 16.3.10 G (3) no later than the firm'saccounting reference date; and(b) it either:(i) has an accounting reference date other than 31 December; or(ii) undertakes industrial assurance policy business.
SUP 16.8.3BRRP
9Firms required to submit reports as set out in SUP 16.8.3 R (1) and SUP 16.8.3 R (2) must do so online through the appropriate systems accessible from the FCA's website.
SUP 16.8.4RRP
1In this section, and in SUP 16 Annex 6R:9(1) '12 month report' means the part of a persistency report or data report reporting on life policies or stakeholder pensions effected in Y-2, '24 month report' means the part of a persistency report or data report reporting on life policies or stakeholder pensions effected in Y-3, and so on;(2) 'CC' means the number of life policies or stakeholder pensions which: (a) were effected during the period to which the calculation relates; and(b)
SUP 16.8.23RRP
1A firm must make and retain such records as will enable it to:(1) monitor regularly the persistency of life policies and stakeholder pensions effected through each of its representatives; and (2) make persistency reports or data reports to the FCA11 in accordance with SUP 16.8.3R10. 11
EG 6.1.1RP
1The FCA will not normally make public the fact that it is or is not investigating a particular matter, or any of the findings or conclusions of an investigation except as described in other sections of this chapter. The following paragraphs deal with the exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may make a public announcement that it is or is not investigating a particular matter.
EG 6.1.2RP
1Where the matter in question has occurred in the context of a takeover bid, and the following circumstances apply, the FCA may make a public announcement that it is not investigating, and does not propose to investigate, the matter. Those circumstances are where the FCA:(1) has not appointed, and does not propose to appoint, investigators; and (2) considers (following discussion with the Takeover Panel) that such an announcement is appropriate in the interests of preventing or
EG 6.1.3RP
1Where it is investigating any matter, the FCA will, in exceptional circumstances, make a public announcement that it is doing so if it considers such an announcement is desirable to: (1) maintain public confidence in the financial system or the market; or (2) protect consumers or investors; or (3) prevent widespread malpractice; or (4) help the investigation itself, for example by bringing forward witnesses; or (5) maintain the smooth operation of the market. In deciding whether
EG 6.1.4RP
1The exceptional circumstances referred to above may arise where the matters under investigation have become the subject of public concern, speculation or rumour. In this case it may be desirable for the FCA to make public the fact of its investigation in order to allay concern, or contain the speculation or rumour. Where the matter in question relates to a takeover bid, the FCA will discuss any announcement beforehand with the Takeover Panel. Any announcement will be subject
EG 6.1.6RP
1The FCA will not normally publish details of the information found or conclusions reached during its investigations. In many cases, statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained by the FCA in the course of exercising its functions are likely to prevent publication (see section 348 of the Act). In exceptional circumstances, and where it is not prevented from doing so, the FCA may publish details. Circumstances in which it may do so include those where the fact
EG 8.5.1RP
1The FCA will consider cancelling a firm'sPart 4A permission using its own-initiative powers contained in sections 55J and 55Q respectively of the Act in two main circumstances: (1) where the FCA has very serious concerns about a firm, or the way its business is or has been conducted; (2) where the firm'sregulated activities have come to an end and it has not applied for cancellation of its Part 4A permission.
EG 8.5.2RP
1The grounds on which the FCA may exercise its power to cancel an authorised person's permission under section 55J of the Act are the same as the grounds for variation and for imposition of requirements. They are set out in section 55J(1) and section 55L(2) and described in EG 8.1.1. Examples of the types of circumstances in which the FCA may cancel a firm'sPart 4A permission include: (1) non-compliance with a Financial Ombudsman Service award against the
EG 8.5.3RP
1Depending on the circumstances, the FCA may need to consider whether it should first use its own-initiative powers to impose requirements on a firm or to vary a firm'sPart 4A permission before going on to cancel it. Amongst other circumstances, the FCA may use this power where it considers it needs to take immediate action against a firm because of the urgency and seriousness of the situation.
EG 8.5.4RP
1Where the situation appears so urgent and serious that the firm should immediately cease to carry on all regulated activities, the FCA may first vary the firm'sPart 4A permission so that there is no longer any regulated activity for which the firm has a Part 4A permission. If it does this, the FCA will then have a duty to cancel the firm'sPart 4A permission - once it is satisfied that it is no longer necessary to keep the Part 4A permission in force.
EG 8.5.5RP
1However, where the FCA has cancelled a firm'sPart 4A permission, it is required by section 33 of the Act to go on to give a direction withdrawing the firm'sauthorisation. Accordingly, the FCA may decide to keep a firm'sPart 4A permission in force to maintain the firm's status as an authorised person and enable it (the FCA) to monitor the firm's activities. An example is where the FCA needs to supervise an orderly winding down of the firm's regulated business (see SUP 6.4.22 (When
SUP 12.8.1RRP
If either the firm or the appointed representative notifies the other that it proposes to terminate the contract of appointment or to amend it so that it no longer meets the requirements contained or referred to in SUP 12.5 (Contracts: required terms), the firm must:2(1) complete and submit to the FCA the form in SUP 12 Annex 5 R (Appointed representative termination form) in accordance with the instructions on the form and no more than ten business days after the date of the
SUP 12.8.1ARRP
(1) 4Subject to (2A), a5firm other than a credit union must submit any notification under SUP 12.8.1 R (1) in the form set out in SUP 12 Annex 5 R, online at www.fca.org.uk5 using the FCA'sonline notification and application system8.5566(2) A credit union must submit any notification under SUP 12.8.1 R (1) in the form set out in SUP 12 Annex 5 R and in the way set out in SUP 15.7.4 R to SUP 15.7.9 G (Form and method of notification).(2A) A firm must submit any notification under
SUP 12.8.1BGRP
4If the FCA's information technology systems fail and online submission is unavailable for 24 hours or more, the FCA will endeavour to publish a notice on its website confirming that online submission is unavailable and that the alternative methods of submission set out in SUP 12.8.1AR(3) and SUP 15.7.4 R to SUP 15.7.9 G (Form and method of notification) should be used.
SUP 12.8.2GRP
In assessing whether to terminate a relationship with an appointed representative, a firm should be aware that the notification rules in SUP 15 require notification to be made immediately to the FCA if certain events occur. Examples include a matter having a serious regulatory impact or involving an offence or a breach of any requirement imposed by the Act or by regulations or orders made under the Act by the Treasury.
SUP 12.8.4GRP
The firm is responsible for notifying the FCA of any approved person who no longer performs a controlled function under an arrangement entered into by a firm or its appointed representative (see SUP 10A.3 and SUP 10C.3)7.
SUP 12.8.5GRP
2The FCA has the power to remove from the Financial Services Register an appointed representative, whose scope of appointment covers insurance distribution activities9 (see SUP 12.4.9 G and SUP 12.4.10 G).
REC 2.4.1UKRP

Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, Paragraph 2

2(1) The [UK RIE] must be a fit and properpersonto perform the [ relevant functions ] of a [ UK RIE ].

(2) In considering whether this requirement is satisfied, the [FCA]4 may (without prejudice to the generality of regulation 6(1)) take into account all the circumstances, including the [UK RIE's] connection with any person.

4

2(3) The members of the management body5 must be of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skill and experience to perform their duties5.

2(4) The persons who are in a position to exercise significant influence over the management of the [UK RIE], whether directly or indirectly must be suitable.

REC 2.4.3GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to any relevant factor including, but not limited to:4(1) the commitment shown by the UK recognised body'smanagement body5 to satisfying the recognition requirements and to complying with other obligations in or under the Act;(2) its arrangements, policies and resources for fulfilling its obligations under the Act in relation to its activities as a UK recognised body;(3) the extent
REC 2.4.4GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to its connections with:4(1) any undertaking in the same group;(2) any owner or part-owner of the UK recognised body;(3) any person who has the right to appoint or remove members of the management body5;(4) any person who is able in practice to appoint or remove members of the management body5;(5) any person in accordance with whose instructions the management body5 is accustomed to
REC 2.4.5GRP
In assessing whether its connection with any person could affect whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to:4(1) the reputation and standing of that other person, including his standing with any relevant UK or overseas regulator;(2) breaches of any law or regulation by that other person; (3) the roles of any of the UK recognised body's key individuals who have a position within organisations under the control or influence of that other
REC 2.4.6GRP
2In assessing whether the persons who effectively direct the business and operations of the UK RIE are of sufficiently good repute and sufficiently experienced to ensure the sound and prudent management and operation of the financial markets operated by 3it, the FCA4 may have regard to the repute and experience of the UK RIE'skey individuals.4
EG 2.1.1RP
1The FCA's effective and proportionate use of its enforcement powers plays an important role in the pursuit of its statutory objectives, including its operational objectives of securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system, and promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers. For example, using enforcement helps to contribute to the protection of consumers and to deter future contraventions
EG 2.1.2RP
1There are a number of principles underlying the FCA's approach to the exercise of its enforcement powers: (1) The effectiveness of the regulatory regime depends to a significant extent on maintaining an open and co-operative relationship between the FCA and those it regulates.(2) The FCA will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies.(3) The FCA will seek to
EG 2.1.3RP
1Enforcement is only one of a number of regulatory tools available to the FCA. As a risk based regulator with limited resources, throughout its work the FCA prioritises its resources in the areas which pose the biggest threat to its statutory objectives. This applies as much to the enforcement tool as it does to any other tool available to it. The next section of this chapter summarises how in practice the FCA takes a risk based approach towards its use of the enforcement tool,
EG 2.1.4RP
1Where a firm or other person has failed to comply with the requirements of the Act, the rules, or other relevant legislation, it may be appropriate to deal with this without the need for formal disciplinary or other enforcement action. The proactive supervision and monitoring of firms, and an open and cooperative relationship between firms and their supervisors, will, in some cases where a contravention has taken place, lead the FCA to decide against taking formal disciplinary
DEPP 2.3.1GRP
If a decision maker is asked to decide whether to give a decision notice or second supervisory notice, it will:(1) review the material before it;(2) consider any representations made (whether written, oral or both) and any comments by FCA1 staff or others in respect of those representations;1(3) decide whether to give the notice and the terms of any notice given.
DEPP 2.3.2GRP
If the FCA1 receives no response or representations within the period specified in a warning notice, the decision maker may regard as undisputed the allegations or matters in that notice and a decision notice will be given accordingly. A person who has received a decision notice and has not previously made any response or representations to the FCA1, may nevertheless refer the FCA's1 decision to the Tribunal.111
DEPP 2.3.3GRP
If the FCA1 receives no response or representations within the period specified in a first supervisory notice, the FCA1 will not give a second supervisory notice. The outcome depends on when the relevant action took or takes effect (as stated in the notice). If the action:11(1) took effect immediately, or on a specified date which has already passed, it continues to have effect (subject to any decision on a referral to the Tribunal); or(2) was to take effect on a specified date
DEPP 2.3.5GRP
Under section 388(3) of the Act, following the giving of a decision notice but before the FCA1 takes action to which the decision notice relates, the FCA1 may give the person concerned a further decision notice relating to different action concerning the same matter. Under section 388(4) of the Act, the FCA1 can only do this if the person receiving the further decision notice gives its consent. In these circumstances the following procedure will apply:111(1) FCA1staff will recommend
DEPP 2.3.6GRP
For the purpose of establishing whether the person receiving the further decision notice gives its consent, the FCA1 will normally require consent in writing.1
SYSC 19C.1.1AGRP
1The AIFM Remuneration Code (SYSC 19B) also applies to a BIPRU firm which is a full-scope UK AIFM (ie, a full-scope UK AIFM that is an AIFM investment firm subject to BIPRU). Such a full-scope UK AIFM that complies with SYSC 19B will also comply with SYSC 19C. In such cases, the FCA will not require the full-scope UK AIFM to demonstrate compliance with SYSC 19C.
SYSC 19C.1.1BGRP
(1) 2The UCITS Remuneration Code (SYSC 19E) also applies to a BIPRU firm that is a UK UCITS management company (that is, a UK UCITS management company that is a UCITS investment firm subject to BIPRU).(2) A BIPRU firm that is a UK UCITS management company will meet its obligations under SYSC 19C and SYSC 19E by complying with SYSC 19E. (3) Under (1) and (2), the FCA will not require the UK UCITS management company to demonstrate compliance with SYSC 19C.
SYSC 19C.1.4GRP
Subject to the requirements of SYSC 19C.1.5 R, in the FCA's view SYSC 19C.1.3 R does not require a firm to breach requirements of applicable contract or employment law.
SYSC 19C.1.7GRP
(1) The BIPRU Remuneration Code does not contain specific notification requirements. However, general circumstances in which the FCA expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters, such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities
SYSC 19C.1.8GRP
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should particularly note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure, the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the BIPRU Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices
PERG 9.9.2GRP
In the FCA view, this means that the reasonable investor must be satisfied that what he will get when he realises his investment is his proportionate share in the value of BC's underlying assets, less any dealing costs. In other words, that he is satisfied he will get net asset value. The investment condition focuses on the way the body corporate operates over time, and not by reference to particular issues of shares or securities (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section
PERG 9.9.3GRP
For the 'satisfaction test' to be met, there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could form a view. He must be satisfied that the value of BC's property will be the basis of a calculation used for the whole, or substantially the whole, of his investment. The FCA considers that the circumstances, or combination of circumstances, in which a reasonable investor would be in a position to form this view include:(1) where the basis of net asset valuation
PERG 9.9.4GRP
PERG 9.9.3 G (2)and PERG 9.9.3 G (3) refer to circumstances where the reasonable investor may be satisfied that he can realise his investment at net asset value because of arrangements made to ensure that the shares or securities trade at net asset value on a market. There may, for example, be cases of market dealing where the price of shares or securities will not depend on the market. An example is where BC or a third party undertakes to ensure that the market value reflects
PERG 9.9.5GRP
However, where there is a market, the FCA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FCA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
PERG 9.9.6GRP
The fact that the definition must be applied to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general)) is also relevant here. So, for example, in a take-over situation the fact that a bidder may be willing to provide an exit route for an investment at net asset value will be irrelevant within the context of the definition. This is so even if an investor invests in particular shares or securities in the knowledge or expectation or in anticipation
DTR 1C.2.1RRP
(1) The FCA may dispense with, or modify, a requirement in DTR 8 in such cases and by reference to such circumstances as it considers appropriate (subject to the Act).(2) A dispensation or modification may be either unconditional or subject to specified conditions.(3) If a primary information provider or a person that is applying for approval as a primary information provider has applied for, or been granted, a dispensation or modification, it must notify the FCA immediately it
DTR 1C.2.2RRP
(1) An application to the FCA to dispense with or modify a requirement in DTR 8 must be in writing.(2) The application must:(a) contain a clear explanation of why the dispensation or modification is requested;(b) include details of any special requirements, for example, the date by which the dispensation or modification is required;(c) contain all relevant information that should reasonably be brought to the FCA's attention;(d) contain any statement or information that is required
DTR 1C.2.4RRP
A primary information provider or a person applying for approval as a primary information provider must consult with the FCA at the earliest possible stage if they:(1) are in doubt about how a requirement in DTR 8 applies in a particular situation; or(2) consider that it may be necessary for the FCA to dispense with or modify a requirement in DTR 8.
DTR 1C.2.5RRP
Where a requirement in DTR 8 refers to consultation with the FCA, submissions must be made in writing other than in circumstances of exceptional urgency.Address for correspondenceNote: The FCA's address for correspondence in relation to DTR 8 is:Primary Market Monitoring Enforcement and Market Oversight Division The Financial Conduct Authority 12 Endeavour Square London, E20 1JN Primary Market MonitoringMarkets DivisionThe Financial Conduct Authority12 Endeavour Square1LondonE20
SYSC 3.2.6EGRP
5The FCA, when considering whether a breach of its rules on systems and controls against money laundering has occurred, will have regard to whether a firm has followed relevant provisions in the guidance for the UK financial sector issued by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group.
SYSC 3.2.6IRRP
5A firm must:(1) appoint an individual as MLRO, with responsibility for oversight of its compliance with the FCA'srules on systems and controls against money laundering; and(2) ensure that its MLRO has a level of authority and independence within the firm and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
SYSC 3.2.6JGRP
5The job of the MLRO within a firm is to act as the focal point for all activity within the firm relating to anti-money laundering. The FCA expects that a firm'sMLRO will be based in the United Kingdom.
SYSC 3.2.6KGRP
14The FCA provides guidance on steps that a firm can take to reduce the risk that it might be used to further financial crime in FCG (Financial Crime Guide: A firm’s guide to countering financial crime risks) and FCTR (Financial Crime Thematic Reviews)21.
SYSC 3.2.10GRP
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
SYSC 3.2.16GRP
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
SYSC 3.2.19GRP
A firm, other than a Solvency II firm,15 should have in place appropriate arrangements, having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of its business, to ensure that it can continue to function and meet its regulatory obligations in the event of unforeseen interruption. These arrangements should be regularly updated and tested to ensure their effectiveness. Solvency II firms are subject to the business continuity requirements in PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions
PRIN 1.1.2GRP
The Principles are a general statement of the fundamental obligations of firms and the other persons to whom they apply14 under the regulatory system. 13 They derive their authority from the FCA’s11 rule-making powers as set out in the Act, including as applied by the Payment Services Regulations and the Electronic Money Regulations,14 and reflect the statutory objectives.35
PRIN 1.1.5GRP
Principles 3 (Management and control), 4 (Financial prudence) and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FCA11 ) 11 (Relations with regulators) take into account the activities of members of a firm's group. Compliance by another person to whom the Principles apply with Principles 3, 4 and 11 can also be affected by the activities of other persons who are members of their group.14 This does not mean that, for example, inadequacy of a group member's risk management systems
PRIN 1.1.6GRP
As set out in PRIN 3.3 (Where?), Principles 1 (Integrity), 2 (Skill, care and diligence) and 3 (Management and control) apply to world-wide activities in a prudential context. Principle 5 (Market conduct) applies to world-wide activities which might have a negative effect on confidence in the UK financial system8. In considering whether to take regulatory action under these Principles in relation to activities carried on outside the United Kingdom, the FCA11 will take into account
PRIN 1.1.7GRP
Breaching a Principle makes a firm or other person to whom the Principles apply14 liable to disciplinary sanctions. In determining whether a Principle has been breached it is necessary to look to the standard of conduct required by the Principle in question. Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the FCA11 to show that a firm or other person14 has been at fault in some way. What constitutes "fault" varies between different Principles. Under Principle 1 (Integrity),
PRIN 1.1.8GRP
The Principles are also relevant to the FCA's15 powers of information-gathering, to vary a firm'sPart 4A permission or authorisation or registration under the Payment Services Regulations or Electronic Money Regulations14, and of investigation and intervention, and provide a basis on which the FCA15 may apply to a court for an injunction or restitution order or require a firm or other person14 to make restitution. However, the Principles do not give rise to actions for damages
DEPP 6.7.1GRP
Persons subject to enforcement action may be prepared to agree the amount of any financial penalty, or the length of any period of suspension, restriction, condition,5 limitation or disciplinary prohibition5 (see DEPP 6A)4, and other conditions which the FCA seeks to impose by way of such action. These4 conditions might include, for example, the amount or mechanism for the payment of compensation to consumers. The FCA recognises the benefits of such agreements, as4 they offer
DEPP 6.7.2GRP
In appropriate cases the FCA's3 approach will be to negotiate with the person concerned to agree in principle the amount of a financial penalty having regard to the FCA's3statement of policy as set out in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5D and DEPP 6.6.1 (This starting figure will take no account of the existence of the settlement discount scheme described in this section.) Such amount ("A") will then be reduced by a percentage of A according to the scheme set out in DEPP 6.7.3G to DEPP 6.7.3CG6.
DEPP 6.7.3GRP

  1. (1)

    Subject to DEPP 6.7.3G(4) a settlement discount is available only in cases where a settlement agreement (which may be a focused resolution agreement) is reached during the period from commencement of an investigation until the FCA has:6

    33
    1. (a)

      a sufficient understanding of the nature and gravity of the breach to make a reasonable assessment of the appropriate penalty; and6

      33
    2. (b)

      communicated that assessment to the person concerned and given them reasonable opportunity to reach agreement as to the amount of the penalty ("stage 1").6

  2. (2)

    The communication of the FCA's3 assessment of the appropriate penalty for the purposes of DEPP 6.7.3G(1)(b)6 need not be in a prescribed form but will include an indication of the breaches alleged by the FCA3. It may include the provision of a draft warning notice.

    33
  3. (3)

    Subject to DEPP 6.7.3.G(4), in relation to any settlement agreement other than a focused resolution agreement the reduction in penalty will be as follows:6

    1. (a)

      30% if the agreement is concluded during stage 1; and6

    2. (b)

      0% in any other case.6

  4. (4)

    Where stage 1 has been started but no settlement agreement has been agreed before 1 March 2017:6

    1. (a)

      if any agreement is reached to settle the case between the period from the end of stage 1 until the expiry of the period for making representations, or, if sooner, the date on which the representations are sent in response to the giving of a warning notice, there will be a reduction of 20% in the penalty; and6

    2. (b)

      if any agreement is reached to settle the case between the expiry of the period of making representations, or, if sooner, the date on which representations are sent in response to the giving of a warning notice and the giving of a decision notice, there will be a reduction of 10% in the penalty.6

DEPP 6.7.4GRP
(1) Any settlement agreement6 between the FCA3 and the person concerned will therefore need to include a statement as to the appropriate penalty discount in accordance with this procedure.3(2) In certain circumstances the person concerned may consider that it would have been possible to reach a settlement at an earlier stage in the action, and argue that it should be entitled to a greater percentage reduction in penalty than is suggested by the table at DEPP 6.7.3G (3). It may
DEPP 6.7.5GRP
In cases in which the settlement discount scheme is applied, the fact of settlement and the level of the discount to the financial penalty imposed by the FCA3 will be set out in the final notice.3
DEPP 6.7.6GRP
2The settlement discount scheme which applies to the amount of a financial penalty, described in DEPP 6.7.2 G to DEPP 6.7.5 G, also applies to the length of the period of a suspension, restriction,5 condition or disciplinary prohibition (other than a permanent disciplinary prohibition)5, having regard to the FCA's3 statement of policy as set out in DEPP 6A.3. No settlement discount is available with respect to a permanent disciplinary prohibition.5 The settlement discount scheme
EG 2.9.1RP
1The FCA uses guidance and other materials to supplement the Principles where it considers this would help firms to decide what action they need to take to meet the necessary standard.
EG 2.9.2RP
1Guidance is not binding on those to whom the FCA'srules apply. Nor are the variety of materials (such as case studies showing good or bad practice, FCA speeches, and generic letters written by the FCA to Chief Executives in particular sectors) published to support the rules and guidance in the Handbook. Rather, such materials are intended to illustrate ways (but not the only ways) in which a person can comply with the relevant rules.
EG 2.9.3RP
1DEPP 6.2.1G(4) explains that the FCA will not take action against someone where we consider that they have acted in accordance with what we have said. However, guidance does not set out the minimum standard of conduct needed to comply with a rule, nor is there any presumption that departing from guidance indicates a breach of a rule. If a firm has complied with the Principles and other rules, then it does not matter whether it has also complied with other material the FCA has
EG 2.9.4RP
1Guidance and supporting materials are, however, potentially relevant to an enforcement case and a decision maker may take them into account in considering the matter. Examples of the ways in which the FCA may seek to use guidance and supporting materials in an enforcement context include: (1) To help assess whether it could reasonably have been understood or predicted at the time that the conduct in question fell below the standards required by the Principles.(2) To explain the
EG 2.9.6RP
1The FCA may take action in areas in which it has not issued guidance or supporting materials.
MAR 5.7.1ADRP
4A firm that makes an application to the FCA for a waiver in accordance with articles 4 or 9 of MiFIR (in relation to pre-trade transparency for equity or non-equity instruments) must make it in the form set out in MAR 5 Annex 1D. [Note: articles 4 and 9 of MiFIR, MiFID RTS 1 and MiFID RTS 2]
MAR 5.7.1BGRP
[deleted]64
MAR 5.7.1CDRP
4A firm intending to apply to the FCA for deferral in accordance with articles 7 or 11 of MiFIR in relation to post-trade transparency for equity or non-equity instruments must apply in writing to the FCA.[Note: articles 7 and 11 of MiFIR, MiFID RTS 1 and MiFID RTS 2]
MAR 5.7.1DGRP
4A firm should have regard to the urgency and significance of a matter and, if appropriate, should also notify its usual supervisory contact at the FCA by telephone or by other prompt means of communication, before submitting a written application. Oral notifications should be given directly to the firm’s usual supervisory contact at the FCA. An oral notification left with another person or on a voicemail or other automatic messaging service is unlikely to have been given appropriately.
COLL 6.12.2GRP
[deleted]6
COLL 6.12.3RRP
(1) 3(a) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme 6 must use a risk management process enabling it to monitor and measure at any time the risk of the scheme's positions and their contribution to the overall risk profile of the scheme.3(b) In particular, an authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme 6 must not solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings issued by credit rating agencies, as defined in article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament
COLL 6.12.3ARRP
5An authorised fund manager 6 subject to COLL 6.12.3R(2) must notify the FCA of the information specified in points (a) and (b) of that rule:(1) annually, within 30 business days of 31 October, with information that is accurate as of 31 October of that year;(2) using the form in COLL 6 Annex 2R; and(3) by submitting it:(a) online through the appropriate systems accessible from the FCA’s website; or(b) if the appropriate systems are unavailable, via email to fundsupervision@fca.org.uk.
COLL 6.12.3BGRP
(1) 5In addition, an authorised fund manager 6 subject to COLL 6.12.3R(2) should submit a notification to the FCA if there has been a significant change to the fund’s risk profile since its last report, by sending the form in COLL 6 Annex 2R, completed as applicable, to fundsupervision@fca.org.uk.(2) A significant change to the fund’s risk profile could include, but is not limited to:(a) the first use of derivatives for investment purposes, if derivatives have previously been
COLL 6.12.7RRP
(1) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme 6 must assess, monitor and periodically review:(a) the adequacy and effectiveness of the risk management policy and of the arrangements, processes and techniques referred to in COLL 6.12.5 R;(b) the level of compliance by the authorised fund manager 6 with the risk management policy and with those arrangements, processes and techniques referred to in COLL 6.12.5 R; and(c) the adequacy and effectiveness of measures taken to address
COLL 6.12.8GRP
Authorised fund managers6 are advised that when they applied for authorisation from the FCA under the Act, their ability to comply with the requirements in COLL 6.12.7 R would have been assessed by the FCA as an aspect of their fitness and properness in determining whether the threshold conditions set out in Schedule 6 (Threshold conditions) of the Act were met. Firms are further advised that their compliance with these requirements is subject to review by the FCA on an ongoing
FEES 9.1.3GRP
Section 40(1) of FSBRA (The Payment Systems Regulator) requires the FCA to establish the PSR.
FEES 9.1.4GRP
(1) Paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 of FSBRA and the 2015 Interchange Regulations applying FSBRA in a modified form and the Payment Services Regulations applying FSBRA in a modified form6 allow3 the FCA to make rules requiring participants2 in regulated payment systems and IFR card payment systems6 to pay the FCA specified amounts or amounts calculated in a specified way to:(a) meet the relevant costs referred to in (2) below; and (b) enable the PSR to maintain adequate reserves.(1A)
FEES 9.1.6GRP
The FCA must pay to the PSR the amounts that it receives as PSR fees, apart from the following amounts (which it may keep): (1) expenses under FEES 9.1.4G (2)(b) to (d); and(2) collection costs, referred to in FEES 9.1.4G (3).
FEES 9.1.7GRP
(1) Paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 4 of FSBRA requires the PSR to adopt an annual budget which has been approved by the FCA.(2) Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 4 of FSBRA requires the PSR to prepare an annual plan which has been approved by the FCA.
FEES 9.1.8GRP
(1) PSR fees will vary from year to year, depending on the PSR’s AFR and the transaction volumes and transaction values in the relevant time period5.(2) The PSR will publish each year the PSR’s AFR along with the total transaction volumes and transaction values for the relevant time period to enable PSR fee payers to apply the methodology in FEES 9 Annex 1R if they wish.5(3) [deleted]56