Related provisions for LR 9.2.15A
61 - 80 of 133 items.
4In considering whether an explanation given in a circular satisfies the requirement in LR 13.7.1R (1)(g), the FCA would expect the following information to be included in the explanation:(1) the shareholdings of substantial shareholders in the listed company before and after the proposed transaction; and(2) the shareholdings of a holder of equity shares who may become a substantial shareholder in the listed company as a result of the proposed transaction.
The Treasury have made the following exemptions from the obligations under section 178 of the Act10:(1) controllers and potential controllers of non-directive friendly societiesare exempt from the obligation to notify a change in control (The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Controllers) (Exemption) Order 2009 (SI 2009/77410));10(2) controllers and potential controllers of building societies are exempt from the obligation to notify a change in control unless the change
(1) 2Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule in SYSC 19B.1.4 R, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both of the following conditions are satisfied:(a) Condition 1 is that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that X’s total remuneration is no more than £500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FCA's3 view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.33(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s
(1) 2If a listed company becomes aware of a matter described in (2) after the publication of a circular that seeks shareholder approval for a transaction expressly requiring a vote by the listing rules, but before the date of a general meeting, it must, as soon as practicable:(a) advise the FCA of the matters of which it has become aware; and(b) send a supplementary circular to holders of its listedequity shares providing an explanation of the matters referred to in (2).(2) The
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:(1) a person may offer to provide information on directors’ dealings on the basis that, in his opinion, were directors to buy or sell investors would do well to follow suit;(2) a person may offer to tell a client when certain shares reach a certain value (which would be advice if the person providing the
1Where a person who is a shareholder has contravened one or more relevant transparency provisions (as defined in section 89NA(11) of the Act) in respect of shares in a company admitted to trading on a regulated market and the FCA considers the breach to be serious, the FCA may apply to the Court for an order suspending that person’s voting rights as set out in section 89NA of the Act.
(1) Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule in SYSC 19E.2.4R, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a management company to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual (“X”), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) Condition 1 is that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and (b) Condition 2 is that X’s total remuneration is no more than £500,000. (2) The rules to which