Related provisions for SYSC 22.5.7
21 - 40 of 78 items.
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
The following factors may be relevant
to determining the appropriate length of the period of suspension, restriction,4 condition or disciplinary prohibition4 to be imposed on a person under
the Act:3(1) DeterrenceWhen determining
the appropriate length of the period of suspension, restriction,4 condition or disciplinary prohibition4 the FCA2 will
have regard to the principal purpose for which it imposes sanctions, namely
to promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct
The FCA2 may delay the commencement of the period of suspension,4 restriction or disciplinary prohibition4.
In deciding whether this is appropriate, the FCA2 will take into account all the circumstances of a case. Considerations
that may be relevant in respect of an authorised
person, sponsor or primary
information provider2 include:22(1) the impact of the suspension or
restriction on consumers;(2) any practical measures the authorised person, sponsor or primary information provider2
The following are examples of behaviour5 that might fall within the scope of article 14(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation5:(1) a director of a company, while in possession of inside information, instructs an employee of that company to
sell a financial instrument5 in respect of which the information is inside information;(2) a person recommends or advises a friend to engage in behaviour5 which, if he himself engaged in it, would amount to market abuse.
2The following are indicators of whether action by the FCA or one of the other agencies is more appropriate. They are not listed in any particular order or ranked according to priority. No single feature of the case should be considered in isolation, but rather the whole case should be considered in the round.(a) 2 Tending towards action by the FCAWhere the suspected conduct in question gives rise to concerns regarding market confidence or protection of consumers of services regulated
(1) The steps that an SMCR firm3 must take to ensure3 that its conduct rules staff understand how the rules in COCON apply to them include the provision of suitable training.(2) Suitable training should always ensure that those who are subject to the rules in COCON have an awareness and broad understanding of all of the rules in COCON, and that they also have a deeper understanding of the practical application of the specific rules which are relevant to their work.(3) For example:(a)
2Generally, the FCA would expect to use private warnings in the context of firms, approved persons and conduct rules staff1. However, the FCA may also issue private warnings in circumstances where the persons involved may not necessarily be authorised or approved. For example, private warnings may be issued in potential cases of market abuse; cases where the FCA has considered making a prohibition order or a disapplication order; or cases involving breaches of provisions imposed
A firm should ensure (subject to any legal requirements) that adequate and accurate information it holds about a customer in relation to a debt is made available to persons involved on its behalf in the debt recovery process. Information relating to the customer which should be made available to agents or employees includes, for example:(1) being in financial difficulties;(2) being particularly vulnerable;(3) disputing the debt;(4) a repayment plan or forbearance being in place;(5)
(1) [deleted]2(2) Selective2 disclosure cannot be made to any person simply
because they owe the issuer a
duty of confidentiality. For example, an issuer contemplating
a major transaction which requires shareholder support or which could significantly
impact its lending arrangements or credit-rating may selectively disclose
details of the proposed transaction to major shareholders , its lenders and/or
credit-rating agency as long as the recipients are bound by a duty of confidentiality.
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