Related provisions for SUP 1A.4.7
581 - 600 of 1113 items.
(1) 7In addition to the notification requirements in the Remuneration Code7 general circumstances in which the FCA7 expects to be notified by firms of matters relating to their compliance with requirements under the regulatory system are set out in SUP 15.3 (General notification requirements). (2) In particular, in relation to remuneration matters such circumstances should take into account unregulated activities as well as regulated activities and the activities of other members
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should in particular note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices to be
7The purpose of this chapter is to give guidance on the FCA’s4 use of the power in section 166 (Reports by skilled persons) and section 166A (Appointment of skilled person to collect and update information) of the Act. The purpose is also to make rules requiring a firm to give assistance to a skilled person and, where a firm is required to appoint a skilled person, to include certain provisions in its contract with a skilled person. These rules are designed to ensure that the
The restrictions mentioned in PERG 9.10.3 G are subject to a number of exemptions. For example, the controls in sections 238 and 240 do not apply to financial promotions about certain kinds of collective investment scheme. These are:(1) open-ended investment companies formed in Great Britain and authorised by the FCA under the Open-ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001;(2) authorised unit trust schemes;6(2A) authorised contractual schemes; and6(3) collective investment schemes
The FCA has also made rules under section 238(5) which allow authorised persons to communicate or approve a financial promotion for an open-ended investment company that is an unregulated collective investment scheme (that is, one that does not fall within PERG 9.10.4 G). The circumstances in which such a communication or approval is allowed are explained in COBS 4.12.4 R535
7(1) A person carrying on the regulated activity of establishing, operating or winding up a collective investment scheme that is constituted as an open-ended investment company will need permission for those activities. In line with section 237(2) of the Act (Other definitions), the operator of a collective investment scheme that is an open-ended investment company is the company itself and therefore the starting point for an open-ended investment company that is incorporated
21The FCA22, (for FCA and PRA22periodic fees, FOS and FSCS levies, CFEB levies, SFGB levies and a DA levy20), expects11 to issue invoices at least 30 days before the date on which the relevant amounts fall due. Accordingly it will generally be the case that a person will have at least 30 days from the issue of the invoice before an administrative fee becomes payable.22186723117232
(1) Paragraph15 23(8) of Schedule 1ZA of the Act permits the FCA to recover fees (including fees relating to payment services, the issuance of electronic money, 17CBTL firms, data reporting services providers,17designated credit reference agencies, designated finance platforms16 and, where relevant, FOS levies, 21SFGB levies, and a DA levy20).1418(2) Section 213(6) of the Act permits the FSCS to recover shares of the FSCS levy payable, as a debt owed to the FCA and FSCS respectively.
21In addition, the FCA13may be entitled to take regulatory action in relation to the non-payment of fees,6FOS levies, CFEB levies, SFGB levies and a DA levy20. The FCA136 may also take regulatory action in relation to the non-payment of FOS case fees or 723 a723 share of the FSCS levy, after reference of the matter to the6FCA13 by the6FSCS. What action (if any) that is taken by the FCA13will be decided upon in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.66186723723
16TC Appendix 5G sets out:(1) the criteria which the FCA may take into account when assessing a qualification provider; and(2) the information the FCA will expect the qualification provider to provide if it asks the FCA to add a qualification to the list of appropriate qualifications in TC Appendix 4E.
The Glossary definition of accredited body contains a list of bodies recognised by the FCA for the purpose of providing the independent verification required under TC 2.1.27 R. Information on accredited bodies, including guidance on the process for including a body in the list is set out inTC Appendix 6G and the obligation to pay the application fee is set out in FEES 3.2.1717
17A firm must notify the FCA as soon as reasonably practicable after it becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests, that any of the following events has occurred or may have occurred in relation to any of its retail investment advisers, and the event is significant:(1) a retail investment adviser, who has been assessed as competent for the purposes of TC 2.1.1 R, is no longer considered competent for those purposes; (2) a retail investment adviser has failed to
A firm must:(1) have written agreements with all investment firms pursuing a market making strategy on trading venues operated by it (market making agreements);(2) have schemes, appropriate to the nature and scale of a trading venue, to ensure that a sufficient number of investment firms enter into market making agreements which require them to post firm quotes at competitive prices with the result of providing liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis;(3) monitor
The 'assumption of risk' by the provider is an important descriptive feature of all contracts of insurance. The 'assumption of risk' has the meaning in (1) and (3), derived from the case law in (2) and (4) below. The application of the 'assumption of risk' concept is illustrated in PERG 6.7.2 G (Example 2: disaster recovery business).(1) Case law establishes that the provider's obligation under a contract of insurance is an enforceable obligation to respond (usually, by providing
Contracts, under which the amount and timing of the payments made by the recipient make it reasonable to conclude that there is a genuine pre-payment for services to be rendered in response to a future contingency, are unlikely to be regarded as insurance. In general, the FCA expects that this requirement will be satisfied where there is a commercially reasonable and objectively justifiable relationship between the amount of the payment and the cost of providing the contract
Under most commercial contracts with a customer, a provider will assume more than one obligation. Some of these may be insurance obligations, others may not. The FCA will apply the principles in PERG 6.5.4 G, in the way described in (1) to (3) to determine whether the contract is a contract of insurance.(1) If a provider undertakes an identifiable and distinct obligation that is, in substance an insurance obligation as described in PERG 6.5.4 G, then, other things being equal,
A firm must:(1) have written agreements with all investment firms pursuing a market making strategy on trading venues operated by it (market making agreements);(2) have schemes, appropriate to the nature and scale of a trading venue, to ensure that a sufficient number of investment firms enter into market making agreements which require them to post firm quotes at competitive prices with the result of providing liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis; (3) monitor
(1) 1A firm must, as soon as a customer expresses an interest in becoming a SRB agreement seller, ensure that the 2disclosures and warnings set out in (1A) are 2made to the customer2, both orally and confirmed in writing, and he is given an adequate opportunity to consider them. The firm must not demand or accept any fees, charges or other sums from the customer, or undertake any action that commits the customer in any way to entering into a specific agreement, until:2222(a) 2the
(1) A SRB intermediary2must ensure that, on first making contact with a prospective SRB agreement seller, whether or not he is the firm'scustomer, who is proposing to enter into a regulated sale and rent back agreement with an unauthorised SRB agreement provider, it provides him with the written warning in (2) before he enters into any such agreement.2(2) The warning in (1) is that:(a) the agreement provider is not authorised or regulated by the FCA, and that key protections under
A person may enter into a regulated sale and rent back agreement as agreement provider without being regulated by the FCA (or an exempt person) if the person does not do so by way of business. However, a SRB intermediary should at all times be conscious of its obligations under Principle 6 (Customers' interests). Should the firm have any reason to believe or entertain any suspicions that the SRB agreement seller may be proposing to enter into a regulated sale and rent back agreement
(1) If it appears to the FCA that there is, or there may be, a breach of the listing rules or the disclosure requirements6 and transparency rules4 by an issuer with a premium listing4, the FCA may in writing require the issuer to appoint a sponsor to advise the issuer on the application of the listing rules, the disclosure requirements6 and the transparency rules4.4(2) If required to do so under (1), an issuer must, as soon as practicable, appoint a sponsor to advise it on the
The FCA9 is concerned to ensure that every actuary appointed by a firm under PRA rules made under section 340 of the Act or for the purposes of PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business, 6,9 has the necessary skill and experience to provide the firm with appropriate actuarial advice from a conduct perspective9. SUP 4.3.9 R to SUP 4.3.10 G set out the FCA’s9 rules and guidance aimed at achieving this.11
A firm must not appoint under PRA rules made under section 340 of the Act or for the purposes of9 rule 6.1 of the PRA9 Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions Governing Business,9 an actuary who is disqualified by the FCA10 under section 345 of the Act (Disciplinary measures: FCA) or the PRA under section 345A of the Act (Disciplinary measures: PRA10) from acting as an actuary either for that firm or for a relevant class of firm. 1181010
If it appears to the FCA9 that an actuary1 has failed to comply with a duty imposed on him under the Act, it has9 the power to and10 may disqualify him under section 3459 of the Act. A list of actuaries who are disqualified may be found on the FCA10 website (http://www.fca.org.uk10).101011055110101010
The FCA may modify LR 18.2.5 R to allow partly paid securities if it is satisfied that their transferability is not restricted and investors have been provided with appropriate information to enable dealings in the securities to take place on an open and proper basis. [Note: Articles 46 and 54 CARD]
The FCA may modify LR 18.2.8 R to accept a percentage lower than 25% if it considers that the market will operate properly with a lower percentage in view of the large number of certificates of the same class and the extent of their distribution to the public. For that purpose, the FCA may take into account certificates of the same class that are held (even though they are not listed) in states that are not EEA States. 1[Note: Article 48 CARD]
(Subject to SUP 12.5.3AG) a 13firm should satisfy itself that the terms of the contract with its appointed representative (including an introducer appointed representative):13(1) are designed to enable the firm to comply properly with any limitations or requirements on its own permission;(2) require the appointed representative to cooperate with the FCA as described in SUP 2.3.4 G (Information gathering by the FCA on its own initiative: cooperation by firms) and give access to
13To the extent that the appointment of the appointed representative includes CBTL business, a firm should satisfy itself that the terms of the contract with its appointed representative:(1) are designed to enable the firm to comply properly with any direction issued or imposed under article 19 of the MCD Order; and(2) require the appointed representative to deal with the FCA in an open and co-operative manner and give access to its premises, as set out in SUP 2.3.4G and SUP 2.3.5R(2),
12A firm must ensure that, if appointing an appointed representative to carry on MCD credit intermediation activity, its written contract requires the appointed representative to provide such evidence to the FCA as to the knowledge and competence of the staff of the appointed representative, as the FCA may require from time to time. [Note: article 9(4) of the MCD]
The FCA will specify in the Financial Services Register the name of the persons to whom the responsibility for the firm'sinsurance distribution activity6 or MCD credit intermediation activity4 has been allocated8. In the case of a sole trader, the FCA will specify in the Financial Services Register the name of the sole trader as the 'contact person' in the firm.64
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule 1.(1) Misleading (or attempting to mislead) by act or omission:(a) a client; or(b) the firm for whom the person works (or its auditors); or(c) the FCA or;(d) the PRA.(2) Falsifying documents.(3) Misleading a client about:(a) the risks of an investment;(b) the charges or surrender penalties of products;(c) the likely performance of products by providing inappropriate projections of future
For the purpose of rule 3 in COCON 2.1.3R, regulators other than the FCA and the PRA are those which have recognised jurisdiction in relation to activities to which COCON applies and have a power to call for information from the firm or from individuals performing certain functions in connection with those regulated activities. This may include an exchange or an overseas regulator.
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule 3.(1) Failing to report promptly in accordance with their firm's internal procedures (or, if none exist, direct to the regulator concerned), information in response to questions from the FCA, the PRA, or both the PRA and the FCA.(2) Failing without good reason to: (a) inform a regulator of information of which the approved person was aware in response to questions from that regulator;
(1) The FCA expects an application for registration as an SME growth market to be accompanied by:(a) a copy of the rules, systems and procedures supporting the applicant’s compliance with the requirements specified in MAR 5.10.2R; and(b) such other information as the FCA may reasonably require to determine the application in accordance with MAR 5.10.2R and MAR 5.10.3R.(2) A firm intending to apply for registration as an SME growth market may wish to contact the Infrastructure
An MTF registered as an SME growth market may be deregistered by the FCA in the following cases:(1) the firm operating the market applies for its deregistration; or(2) the requirements in MAR 5.10.2R are (subject to MAR 5.10.3G(1)) no longer complied with.[Note: article 33(5) of MiFID and article 79 of the MiFID Org Regulation]
(1) 7In SUP 6 the "relevant regulator" is the regulator to which a firm with a Part 4A permission has made or can make (in accordance with SUP 6) an application to vary or cancel its Part 4A permission or to have imposed on it a new requirement or to vary or cancel any existing requirement (see SUP 6.2.3A G to SUP 6.2.3E G).(2) Where the PRA can only determine an application with the consent of the FCA, the FCA may request further information as if it were the relevant regulator.(3)
7This chapter does not cover the FCA's use of its own-initiative variation power to vary or cancel a firm'sPart 4A permission or its own-initiative requirement power to impose, vary or cancel a requirement (see SUP 7 (Individual requirements) and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation of permission on the FCA's own initiative and intervention against incoming firms)).
The Listing Principles are as follows:
Listing3 Principle 1 |
A listed company must take reasonable steps to establish and maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable it to comply with its obligations.3 3 |
Listing3 Principle 2 |
A listed company must deal with the FCA in an open and co-operative manner.3 3 |
Principle 3 |
[deleted]3 3 |
Principle 4 |
[deleted]3 3 |
Principle 5 |
[deleted]3 3 |
Principle 6 |
[deleted]3 3 |
Listing Principle 13 is intended to ensure that listed companies have adequate procedures, systems and controls to enable them to comply with their obligations under the listing rules, disclosure requirements4, transparency rules and corporate governance rules.3 In particular, the FCA considers that listed companies should place particular emphasis on ensuring that they have adequate procedures, systems and controls in relation to, where applicable:333(1) identifying whether any
3In assessing whether the voting rights attaching to different classes of premium listedsecurities5 are proportionate for the purposes of Premium Listing Principle 4, the FCA will have regard to the following non-exhaustive list of factors:5(1) the extent to which the rights of the classes differ other than their voting rights, for example with regard to dividend rights or entitlement to any surplus capital on winding up;(2) the extent of dispersion and relative liquidity of the
(1) The directors (or director) of an ICVC must take all practicable steps to ensure the ICVC has at all times as its ACD a person who is qualified to act as ACD.(2) If the ICVC ceases to have any director, the depositary must exercise its powers, under the OEIC Regulations, to appoint a person to be an ACD of the ICVC.(3) For an ICVC that holds annual general meetings under the OEIC Regulations, the1 appointment of an ACD (other than the first ACD), under (1) or (2), must terminate
(1) The depositary of an authorised fund may not retire voluntarily except upon the appointment of a new depositary.(2) The depositary of an authorised fund must not retire voluntarily unless, before its retirement, it has ensured that the new depositary has been informed of any circumstance of which the retiring depositary has informed the FCA.(3) When the depositary of an authorised fund wishes to retire or ceases to be an authorised person, the authorised fundmanager may, subject