Related provisions for LR 10.2.6
221 - 240 of 398 items.
1The FCA recognises the importance of consistency in its decision-making and that it must consider the approach previously taken to, say, the application of a particular rule or Principle in a given context. This applies equally to consideration by the RDC or by the settlement decision makers when they look at action taken by the FCA in earlier, similar, cases. This is not to say that the FCA cannot take a different view to that taken in the earlier case: the facts of two enforcement
1When it decides whether a suspension order under section 267 is appropriate, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances. General factors that the FCA may consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the breach of financial promotionrules by the operator (the matters listed at paragraph 14.1.1 (a) to (f) may be relevant in this context); and (2) the conduct of the operator after the breach was discovered including whether the operator has compensated
Where the FCA1 considers that it is unlikely to make a recognition order, it will discuss its concerns with the applicant with a view to enabling the applicant to make changes to its rules or guidance, or other parts of the application. If the FCA1 decides to refuse to make a recognition order, it will follow the procedure set out in section 298 of the Act (Directions and revocation: procedure) (which applies in consequence of section 290(5) of the Act (Recognition orders)) which
1On its web site, the FCA gives2 anonymous examples of where it has decided not to investigate or take enforcement action in relation to a possible rule
breach because of the way in which the firm has conducted itself when putting the matter right. This is part of an article entitled ‘The benefits to firms and individuals of co-operating with the FCA2’. However, in those cases where enforcement action is not taken and/or a formal investigation is not commenced,
1A firm2 must:(1) report to the FCA any2: (a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions;2(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; and2(d) system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument;2(2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and2(3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the
1A disapplication order in relation to exempt regulated activities made against a member will be relevant should that member subsequently apply for authorisation under the Act. Whether or not such an application for authorisation is successful will depend on many factors, including the FCA's grounds for making the disapplication order. For example, if the order for disapplication of the exemption was made on the grounds of a breach of rules made under section 332(1) of the Act,
The FCA has made rules providing that compensation costs and specific costs attributable to the classes (other than the deposit acceptors’ contribution class),14 and which exceed the classlevy limits, may be allocated to the retail pool. Levies allocated to the retail pool are then allocated amongst the other such classes, together with the deposit acceptors’ contribution class.14 The deposit acceptors’ contribution class14 may contribute to compensation costs levies or specific
SYSC 10.2.2 R is made under section 137P6 of the Act (Control of information rules). It has the following effect:6(1) acting in conformity with SYSC 10.2.2 R (1) provides a defence against proceedings brought under sections89(2), 90(1) and 91(1) 4of the Financial Services Act 2012 (Misleading statements, Misleading impressions and Misleading statements etc. in relation to benchmarks) - see sections 89(3)(b), 90(9)(c) and 91(3)(b); and5444(2) [deleted]5(3) acting in conformity
(1) 2Full-scope UK AIFMs are advised that ESMA published Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under the AIFMD on 3 July 2013, which full-scope UK AIFMs should comply with in applying the rules in this section. The Guidelines can be found at: http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-232_aifmd_guidelines_on_remuneration_-_en.pdf(2) The FCA has provided additional guidance on the application of principles of proportionality to remuneration policies of AIFM. The guidance also
(1) 2Taking account of the remuneration principles proportionality rule in SYSC 19B.1.4 R, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules referred to in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both of the following conditions are satisfied:(a) Condition 1 is that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) Condition 2 is that X’s total remuneration is no more than £500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) are
The following rules in FEES apply to VJ participants as part of the standard terms, but substituting 'VJ participant' for 'firm':(1) FEES 2.2.1 R (late payment) but substituting 'FOS Ltd' for 'the FCA';2121(2) FEES 2.3.1 R and 2.3.2 R (remission of fees);(3) [deleted]24(4) FEES 5.3.6 R (general levy) but substituting:(a) 'Voluntary Jurisdiction' for 'Compulsory Jurisdiction' ; and(b) 'FOS Ltd' for 'the FCA';2121(5) FEES 5.3.8 R (calculation of general levy) but substituting:24(a)
Section 21 precludes the promotion by unauthorised persons of unregulated collective investment schemes unless the financial promotion is approved by an authorised person or is exempt. Section 238 then precludes the promotion of an unregulated collective investment scheme by authorised persons except where:(1) there is an exemption in an order made by the Treasury under section 238(6); or(2) the financial promotion is permitted under rules made by the FCA under section 238(5)
The FCA has made rules under section 238(5) which allow authorisedfirms to communicate or approve a financial promotion for an unregulated collective investment scheme in certain specified circumstances. These circumstances are set out in COBS 4.12.4 R3 To date, the Treasury has not made an order exempting single property schemes under section 239.23
(1) Subject to (3), a4firm must submit a completed CMAR to the FCA10 within 15 business days of the end of each month.410(2) In this rule month means a calendar month and SUP 16.3.13 R (4) does not apply.(3) 4A firm which changes its 'CASS firm type' and notifies the FCA10 that it is a CASS medium firm or a CASS large firm in accordance with CASS 1A.2.9 R is not required to submit a CMAR in respect of the month in which the change to its 'CASS firm type' takes effect in accordance
This guidance is issued under section 139A of the Act (Guidance). It is designed to throw light on particular aspects of regulatory requirements, not to be an exhaustive description of a person's obligations. If a person acts in line with the guidance in the circumstances it contemplates, the FCA will proceed on the footing that the person has complied with aspects of the requirement to which the guidance relates. Rights conferred on third parties cannot be affected by guidance
The only kind of body corporate of an open-ended kind that may currently be formed under the law of the United Kingdom is one that is authorised by the FCA. A person intending to form an open-ended body corporate that has its head office in Great Britain should refer to the Open-ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1228). Bodies corporate formed under these Regulations are referred to in the Handbook as investment companies with variable capital (or ' ICVCs ').
A firm must:(1) have written agreements with all investment firms pursuing a market making strategy on trading venues operated by it (market making agreements);(2) have schemes, appropriate to the nature and scale of a trading venue, to ensure that a sufficient number of investment firms enter into market making agreements which require them to post firm quotes at competitive prices with the result of providing liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis;(3) monitor
A firm must:(1) have written agreements with all investment firms pursuing a market making strategy on trading venues operated by it (market making agreements);(2) have schemes, appropriate to the nature and scale of a trading venue, to ensure that a sufficient number of investment firms enter into market making agreements which require them to post firm quotes at competitive prices with the result of providing liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis; (3) monitor