[Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25 Annex 1G]4
Related provisions for SUP 10C.3.15
41 - 60 of 109 items.
A common platform firm4 that has a nomination committee must ensure that the nomination committee:(1) engages 4a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body and for that purpose puts in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body; (2) identifies and recommends for approval, by the management body or by general meeting, candidates to fill management body vacancies, having evaluated the balance of knowledge, skills, diversity
A common platform firm4 that does not have a nomination committee must engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body. For that purpose a common platform firm4 that does not have a nomination committee must put in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body.[Note: article 91(10) of CRD and article 9(1) of MiFID4]
The FCA expects the issuer to demonstrate that there are provisions in the covered bond or programme that adequately deal with:(1) the identification and rectification of any breach of Regulations 17(2) (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 24 (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) of the RCB Regulations;(2) the appointment of replacements for parties, for example servicers, cash managers or paying agents; and(3) the orderly winding-up
(1) The FCA expects legal advice to deal adequately with at least the following matters in relation to the actual or proposed arrangements:(a) whether the transfer of the assets to the owner would be upheld in the event of liquidation or administration, or similar collective insolvency proceedings, of the issuer or the transferor (if different from the issuer);(b) the risk of the transfer of an asset to the owner being re-characterised as the creation of a security interest;(c)
5A firm must:(1) appoint an individual as MLRO, with responsibility for oversight of its compliance with the FCA'srules on systems and controls against money laundering; and(2) ensure that its MLRO has a level of authority and independence within the firm and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
(1) SYSC 3.2.13 G includes assessing an individual's honesty, and competence. This assessment should normally be made at the point of recruitment. An individual's honesty need not normally be revisited unless something happens to make a fresh look appropriate.(2) Any assessment of an individual's suitability should take into account the level of responsibility that the individual will assume within the firm. The nature of this assessment will generally differ depending upon whether
(1) The quorum required to conduct business at a meeting of unitholders is two unitholders, present in person or by proxy.(2) If after a reasonable time from the time for the start of the meeting, a quorum is not present, the meeting:(a) if convened on the requisition of unitholders, must be dissolved; and(b) in any other case, must stand adjourned to:(i) a day and time which is seven or more days after the day and time of the meeting; and(ii) in the case of a physical meeting
(1) A unitholder may appoint another person to attend a general meeting and vote in his place.(2) Unless the
instrument constituting the fund4
provides otherwise, a unitholder may appoint more than one proxy to attend on the same occasion but a proxy may vote only on a poll.4(3) Every notice calling a meeting of a scheme must contain a reasonably prominent statement that a unitholder entitled to attend and vote may appoint a proxy.(4) For the appointment to be effective, any
1A firm must, in relation to each with-profits fund it operates:(1) appoint:(a) a with-profits committee; or(b) a with-profits advisory arrangement (referred to in this section as an ‘advisory arrangement’), but only if appropriate, in the opinion of the firm'sgoverning body, having regard to the size, nature and complexity of the fund in question;(2) ensure that the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement operates in accordance with its terms of reference; and(3) make
(1) Ultimate responsibility for managing a with-profits fund rests with the firm through its governing body. The role of the with-profits committee or advisory arrangement is, in part, to act in an advisory capacity to inform the decision-making of a firm'sgoverning body. The with-profits committee or advisory arrangement also acts as a means by which the interests of with-profits policyholders are appropriately considered within a firm's governance structures. The with-profits
A firm's systems and controls should enable it to satisfy itself of the suitability of anyone who acts for it. This includes assessing an individual's honesty and competence. This assessment should normally be made at the point of recruitment. An individual's honesty need not normally be revisited unless something happens to make a fresh look appropriate.
Any assessment of an individual's suitability should take into account the level of responsibility that the individual will assume within the firm. The nature of this assessment will generally differ depending upon whether it takes place at the start of the individual's recruitment, at the end of the probationary period (if there is one) or subsequently.
(1) 3In the case of a UCITS scheme, the appointment of a new ACD of an ICVC under COLL 6.5.3 R (Appointment of an ACD) or the replacement of the authorised fund manager of an AUT or ACS5 who proposes to retire under COLL 6.5.8 R (Retirement of an authorised fund manager of an AUT or ACS)5 must, if in either case the new authorised fund manager is established in a different EEA State to the outgoing authorised fund manager, be treated as a significant change in accordance with
(1) 3In the case of a UCITS scheme, the appointment of a new authorised fund manager as a result of:(a) in the case of an ICVC, the termination of the appointment of the previous ACD under COLL 6.5.4 R (2) or COLL 6.5.4 R (3) (Termination of appointment of an ACD); or(b) in the case of an AUT or ACS5, the replacement of the
authorised fund manager5
under COLL 6.5.7 R (2) (Replacement of an authorised fund manager of an AUT or ACS);555must, if the new authorised fund manager
(1) A firm should not award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration in hiring new BIPRU Remuneration Code staff (X) unless: (a) it has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the remuneration is not more generous in its amount or terms (including any deferral or retention periods) than the variable remuneration awarded or offered by X’s previous employer; and(b) it is subject to appropriate performance adjustment requirements.(2) Contravention of (1) may be relied on as
A firm must:(1) notify the FCA of the terms on which it proposes to appoint a policyholder advocate (whether or not the candidate was nominated by the FCA); and(2) ensure that the terms of appointment for the policyholder advocate:(a) include a description of the role of the policyholder advocate as agreed with the FCA under COBS 20.2.44 G;2(aA) stress the independent nature of the policyholder advocate's appointment and function, and are consistent with it;2(b) define the relationship
Where a firm is not otherwise required to appoint an independent expert, it must:(1) appoint a reattribution expert to undertake an objective assessment of its reattribution proposals, who must be:(a) nominated or approved by the appropriate regulator before he is appointed; and(b) free from any conflicts of interest that may, or may appear to, undermine his independence or the quality of his report;(2) ensure that the reattribution expert's terms of appointment allow him to communicate
(1) 17This guidance is relevant to an SMCR banking firm20 that has
appointed a head of the risk management function.(2) Taking account of the nature, scale and complexity of its activities,
the firm should have appropriate procedures to ensure that the
removal or any other disciplinary sanctioning of the head of the risk
management function does not undermine the independence of the
risk management function.(3) It will be appropriate, in many cases, for the procedures in (2) to
include
An EEA UCITS management company that manages a UCITS scheme must comply with the rules of the FCAHandbook which relate to the constitution and functioning of the UCITS scheme (the fund application rules), as follows:(1) the setting up and authorisation of the UCITS scheme (COLL 1 (Introduction), COLL 2 (Authorised fund applications), COLL 3 (Constitution), COLL 6.5 (Appointment and replacement of the authorised fund manager and the depositary), COLL 6.6 (Powers and duties of
2In deciding whether to exercise its powers to seek or require restitution under sections 382, 383 or 384 of the Act, the FCA will consider all the circumstances of the case. The factors which the FCA will consider may include, but are not limited to, those set out below. (1) Are the profits quantifiable? The FCA will consider whether quantifiable profits have been made which are owed to identifiable persons. In certain circumstances it may be difficult to prove that the conduct
LR 9.4.1 R does not apply to the following long-term incentive schemes:(1) an arrangement where participation is offered on similar terms to all or substantially all employees of the listed company or any of its subsidiary undertakings whose employees are eligible to participate in the arrangement (provided that all or substantially all employees are not directors of the listed company); and(2) an arrangement where the only participant is a director of the listed company (or an
In relation to each document in a firm'sCASS resolution pack a firm must:(1) put in place adequate arrangements to ensure that an administrator, receiver, trustee, liquidator or analogous officer appointed in respect of it or any material part of its property is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable and in any event within 48 hours of that officer’s appointment; and(2) ensure that it is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable, and in any event within
1LR 5.2.5 R and LR 5.2.8 R do not apply to the cancellation of equity shares and certificates representing shares11 as a result of:4556(1) a takeover or restructuring of the issuer effected by a scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 20063; or 23(2) an administration or liquidation of the issuer pursuant to a court order under the Insolvency Act 1986, Building Societies Act 1986,Water Industry Act 1991, Banking Act 2009,Energy Act 2011 or the Investment Bank
(1) 20
If a MiFID investment firm or a third country investment firm appoints a person to act under its full and unconditional responsibility but only for the purpose of selling, or advising clients in relation to, structured deposits (and not any of the activities within article 4(1)(29) of MiFID), that person will not be a tied agent in respect of that activity.(2)
Unless otherwise provided, this chapter applies to a firm that appoints a structured deposit appointed representative