Related provisions for BIPRU 4.3.31
41 - 60 of 112 items.
1An important consideration before an enforcement investigation and/or enforcement action is taken forward is the nature of a firm’s overall relationship with the FCA and whether, against that background, the use of enforcement tools is likely to further the FCA's aims and objectives. So, for any similar set of facts, using enforcement tools will be less likely if a firm has built up over time a strong track record of taking its senior management responsibilities seriously and
(1) The RDC is separate from the FCA's2 executive management structure. Apart from its Chairman, none of the members of the RDC is an FCA2employee.22(2) All members of the RDC are appointed for fixed periods by the FCA2 Board. The FCA2 Board may remove a member of the RDC, but only in the event of that member's misconduct or incapacity.22
The purpose of SUP 10C is: (1) to specify, under section 59 of the Act, descriptions of the FCA-designated senior management functions for SMCR firms2, which are listed in SUP 10C.4.3R; and2(2) to specify the manner in which a firm must apply for the FCA's approval under section 59 of the Act and other procedures for FCA-approved SMF managers; 2
[Editor’s note: The text of this provision has been moved to SYSC 25 Annex 1G]4
1The FCA's normal practice is to follow a "minded-to" procedure before deciding whether to give a private warning. This means that it will notify in writing the intended recipient of the warning that it has concerns about their conduct and inform them that the FCA proposes to give a private warning. The recipient will then have an opportunity to comment on our understanding of the circumstances giving rise to the FCA's concerns and whether a private warning is appropriate. The
5A firm should ensure that the systems and controls include:(1) appropriate training for its employees in relation to money laundering;(2) appropriate provision of information to its governing body and senior management, including a report at least annually by that firm'smoney laundering reporting officer (MLRO) on the operation and effectiveness of those systems and controls;(3) appropriate documentation of its risk management policies and risk profile in relation to money laundering,
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
3A firm must disclose the following information, including regular, at least annual, updates, regarding its remuneration policy and practices for those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile:(1) information concerning the decision-making process used for determining the remuneration policy, including if applicable, information about the composition and the mandate of a remuneration committee, the external consultant whose services
(1) 3A firm that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and the complexity of its activities must also disclose the quantitative information referred to in BIPRU 11.5.18 R at the level of senior personnel.(2) Firms must comply with the requirements set out in BIPRU 11.5.18 R in a manner that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities and without prejudice to the UK or other
(1) UCITS Remuneration Code staff comprise those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of: (a) the management company; or(b) the UCITS that the management company manages.(2) UCITS Remuneration Code staff must comprise: (a) senior management;(b) risk takers;(c) staff engaged in control functions; and(d) any employees receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk
A management company must ensure the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by: (1) the remuneration committee; or(2) if such a committee has not been established, the management body in its supervisory function.[Note: article 14b(1)(f) of the UCITS Directive]
(1) A firm should have a conceptually sound risk management system which is implemented with integrity and should meet the minimum standards set out in this paragraph.(2) A firm should have a risk control unit that is independent of business trading units and reports directly to senior management. The unit should be responsible for designing and implementing the firm's risk management system. It should produce and analyse daily reports on the risks run by the business and on the
An actuary appointed to perform the actuarial function must, in respect of those classes of the firm's long-term insurance business which are covered by his appointment1:1(1) advise the firm's management, at the level of seniority that is reasonably appropriate, on1 the risks the firm runs in1 so far as they may have a material impact on the firm's ability to meet liabilities to policyholders in respect of long-term insurance contracts as they fall due and on the capital needed
1An actuary appointed to perform the with-profits actuary function must:(1) advise the firm's management, at the level of seniority that is reasonably appropriate, on key aspects of the discretion to be exercised affecting those classes of the with-profits business of the firm in respect of which he has been appointed;(2) [deleted]88(2A) where the firm is a Solvency II firm, advise the firm'sgoverning body as to whether the assumptions used to calculate the future discretionary
A firm should carry out assessments of the sort described in the overall Pillar 2 rule and GENPRU 1.2.39 R at least annually, or more frequently if changes in the business, strategy, nature or scale of its activities or operational environment suggest that the current level of financial resources is no longer adequate. The appropriateness of the internal process, and the degree of involvement of senior management in the process, will be taken into account by the FCA15 when reviewing
(1) 6In identifying an appropriate range of adverse circumstances and events in accordance with GENPRU 1.2.42R (2):(a) a firm will need to consider the cycles it is most exposed to and whether these are general economic cycles or specific to particular markets, sectors or industries;(b) for the purposes of GENPRU 1.2.42R (2)(a), the amplitude and duration of the relevant cycle should include a severe downturn scenario based on forward looking hypothetical events, calibrated against
Unless COBS 20.2.32A R applies, a5firm carrying on with-profits business must not:5(1) make a loan to a connected person using assets in a with-profits fund; or(2) give a guarantee to, or for the benefit of, a connected person, where the guarantee will be backed using assets in a with-profits fund;unless that loan or guarantee:(3) will be on commercial terms;(4) will, in the reasonable opinion of the firm's senior management, be beneficial to the with-profits policyholders in
5Loans to a connected person using assets in a with-profits fund should be considered as investments of assets within the with-profits fund. As such, a Solvency II firm will need to ensure that: (1) such loans comply with the PRA Rulebook: Solvency II Firms: Investments having regard to COBS 20.2.35B G; and(2) where there is a conflict of interests, in the reasonable opinion of the firm's senior management, they are in the best interests of the with-profits policyholders in the
1Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, paragraph 2A
(1) |
The composition of the management body of a [UK RIE] must reflect an adequately broad range of experience. |
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(2) |
The management body must possess adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience in order to understand the [UK RIE’s] activities and main risks. |
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(3) |
Members of the management body must - |
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(a) |
commit sufficient time to perform their functions on the management body; |
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(b) |
act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind; and |
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(c) |
effectively - |
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(i) |
assess and challenge, where necessary, the decisions of the senior management; and |
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(ii) |
oversee and monitor decision making. |
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(4) |
The management body must - |
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(a) |
define and oversee the implementation of governance arrangements that ensure the effective and prudent management of the [UK RIE] in a manner which promotes the integrity of the market, which at least must include the - |
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(i) |
the segregation of duties in the organisation; and |
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(ii) |
the prevention of conflicts of interest; |
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(b) |
monitor and periodically assess the effectiveness of the [UK RIE’s] governance arrangements; and |
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(c) |
take appropriate steps to address any deficiencies found as a result of the monitoring under paragraph (b). |
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(5) |
A [UK RIE] must - |
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(a) |
devote adequate human and financial resources to the induction and training of members of the management body; |
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(b) |
ensure that the management body has access to the information and documents it requires to oversee and monitor management decision-making; and |
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(c) |
notify the FCA of the identity of all the members of its management body. |
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(6) |
A [UK RIE] and, if it has a nomination committee, its nomination committee must engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting persons to the management body, and for that purpose have a policy promoting diversity on the management body. |
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(7) |
The number of directorships a member of the management body can hold at the same time must take into account individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of the [UK RIE’s] activities. |
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Positions/portfolios held with trading intent must comply with the following requirements:(1) there must be a clearly documented trading strategy for the position/instrument or portfolios, approved by senior management, which must include the expected holding horizon;(2) there must be clearly defined policies and procedures to monitor the position against the firm's trading strategy including the monitoring of turnover and stale position in the firm'strading book; and(3) there
4The financial risk assessment should be based on a methodology which provides a reasonable estimate of the potential business losses which a UK RIE might incur in stressed but plausible market conditions. The FCA5 would expect a UK RIE to carry out a financial risk assessment at least once in every twelve-month period, or more frequently if there are material changes in the nature, scale or complexity of the UK RIE's operations or its business plans that suggest such financial
Some decisions2 on settlements and statutory notices arising from them are taken by two members of the FCA's senior management, rather than by the RDC (DEPP refers to these individuals as the 'settlement decision makers'). Full details of the special decision making arrangements for settlements are set out in DEPP 5. 1
The following information is expected to be submitted quarterly:(1) analysis to support the equivalence of the firm's current approach to a VaR-maximising approach on an ongoing basis; (2) the rationale behind the selection of key major risk factors used to find the period of significant financial stress;(3) summary of ongoing internal monitoring of stressed period selection with respect to current portfolio; (4) analysis to support capital equivalence of upscaled 1-day VaR and
(1) In designing its approach to supervision,
the FCA has regard to the regulatory
principles set out in section 3B of the Act.
In particular, the FCA's regulatory
approach aims to focus and reinforce the responsibility of the senior management
of each firm (section 3B(1)(d)
of the Act) to ensure that it
takes reasonable care to organise and control the affairs of the firm responsibly and effectively, and develops
and maintains adequate risk management systems. It is the responsibility