Related provisions for SUP 9.2.4

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IFPRU 4.5.1GRP
The FCA expects that if a firm ordinarily assigns exposures in the corporate, institution or central government and central bank exposure classes to a member of a group, substantially on the basis of membership of that group and a common group rating, and the firm does so in the case of a particular obligor group, the firm should consider whether members of that group should be treated as a single obligor for the purpose of the definition of default in article 178(1) of the EU
IFPRU 4.5.2GRP
The FCA would not expect a firm to treat an obligor as part of a single obligor under IFPRU 4.5.1 G if the firm rates its exposures on a standalone basis or if its rating is notched. (For these purposes, a rating is notched if it takes into account individual risk factors or otherwise reflects risk factors that are not applied on a common group basis.) Accordingly, if a group has two members which are separately rated, the FCA will not expect that the default of one will necessarily
IFPRU 4.5.3GRP
Under article 178(1)(b)1 of the EU CRR, the FCA is empowered to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential or SME commercial real estate in the retail exposure class, as well as exposures to public sector entities (PSEs).1
IFPRU 4.5.4GRP
The FCA would expect to replace 90 days with 180 days in the days past due component of the definition of default for exposures secured by residential real estate in the retail exposure class, and/or for exposures to PSEs,1 where this was requested by the firm. Where this occurred, it would be specified in the firm's IRB permission.
IFPRU 4.5.5GRP
The FCA expects that a credit obligation be considered as a distressed restructuring if an independent third party, with expertise in the relevant area, would not be prepared to provide financing on substantially the same terms and conditions (see article 178(2)(d) of the EU CRR).
IFPRU 4.5.6GRP
To be satisfied that a firm complies with the documentation requirements in article 175(3) of the EU CRR, the FCA expects a firm should have a clear and documented policy for determining whether an exposure that has been in default should subsequently be returned to performing status (see article 175(3) of the EU CRR).
PERG 8.10.3GRP
In the FCA's view, the matters identified in PERG 8.10.2 G mean that:(1) for a communication to be real time it must be made in course of an interactive dialogue; but that(2) if the interactive dialogue takes place by means of the exchange of letters or e-mails or in a publication, the communication will be deemed to be non-real time. In this case, publications include newspapers, journals, magazines or other periodical publications, websites or similar systems for the electronic
PERG 8.10.4GRP
The words ‘personal visit, telephone conversation or other interactive dialogue’ clearly imply that the first two are types of the third. In the FCA's view, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which a personal visit or telephone conversation would not be interactive. The very fact of a conversation taking place would mean two or more persons were interacting with each other. A telephone call is not the same thing as a conversation. It may be made to, or even by, an intelligent
PERG 8.10.5GRP
In the FCA's view, the fact that scope for interaction is essential if a financial promotion is to be real time leads to the following conclusions.(1) Most communications made in written or pictorial form will not offer scope for interaction. The most likely exception to this is where persons are expected to respond immediately. This situation may arise, for example, where the equivalent of a telephone conversation is conducted by e-mail. This is the basis of the exemption in
PERG 8.10.7GRP
In the FCA's view, a communication which may exist in enduring form will be a non-real time communication. Examples of this include videos, audio cassettes, bulletin boards, websites and recorded telephone messages. Messages placed on Internet chat-rooms will also be non-real time. Radio or television programmes or teletext services may contain communications that involve an interactive dialogue. For example, a communication made by the broadcaster and addressed to an interviewee
PERG 8.10.11GRP
PERG 8.6.9 G explains that article 6 of the Financial Promotion Order has the broad effect that a communication is made to another person where it is addressed to a particular person or persons. It also states that a ‘recipient’ of a communication is the person or persons to who it is made (that is to whom it is addressed). This takes on importance where certain exemptions which apply to real time financial promotions made to a person are concerned. It appears to the FCA that,
PERG 8.10.12GRP
In the FCA's view, persons who may be engaging in investment activity or engaging in claims management activity1 jointly include:(1) a married couple;(2) two or more persons, who will invest jointly in a product (for example, a cohabiting couple who are not married or members of a family);(3) the directors of a company or partners in a firm;(4) members of a group of companies;(5) the participants in a joint commercial enterprise;(6) the members of an investment club; and(7) the
PERG 8.10.14GRP
In the FCA's view, the mere fact of a person accepting an invitation to attend a meeting does not automatically mean that he has initiated any dialogue which may take place during the meeting and which may amount to a financial promotion. This will depend on the facts of each case and such matters as the manner in which the invitations are made, the arrangements for acceptance and how the meeting is conducted. For example, the fact that investments or investment services will
SYSC 19C.3.3RRP
(1) This section applies to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, except as set out in (3).(2) When establishing and applying the total remuneration policies for BIPRU Remuneration Code staff, a firm must comply with this section in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities (the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule).(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to the requirement for significant
SYSC 19C.3.6GRP
  1. (1)

    In the FCA's view:

    1. (a)

      a firm's staff includes its employees;

    2. (b)

      a person who performs a significant influence function for, or is a senior manager of, a firm would normally be expected to be part of the firm'sBIPRU Remuneration Code staff;

    3. (c)

      the table in (2) provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of key positions that should, subject to (d), be within a firm's definition of staff who are risk takers;

    4. (d)

      firms should consider how the examples in the table in (2) apply to their own organisational structure;

      1
    5. (e)

      firms may find it useful to set their own metrics to identify their risk takers based, for example, on trading limits; and

    6. (f)

      a firm should treat a person as being BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in relation to remuneration in respect of a given performance year if they were BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for any part of that year.

    [Note: The FCA has published guidance on the application of particular rules on remuneration structures in relation to individuals who are BIPRU Remuneration Code staff for only part of a given performance year. This guidance is available at www.fca.org.uk/firms/remuneration

    .]

  2. (2)

    High-level category

    Suggested business lines

    Heads of significant business lines (including regional heads) and any individuals or groups within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Fixed income

    Foreign exchange

    Commodities

    Securitisation

    Sales areas

    Investment banking (including mergers and acquisitions advisory)

    Commercial banking

    Equities

    Structured finance

    Lending quality

    Trading areas

    Research

    Heads of support and control functions and other individuals within their control who have a material impact on the firm's risk profile

    Credit/market/operational risk

    Legal

    Treasury controls

    Human resources

    Compliance

    Internal audit

SYSC 19C.3.17GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
SYSC 19C.3.21GRP
The FCA would normally expect it to be appropriate for the ban on paying variable remuneration to senior personnel of a firm that benefits from exceptional government intervention to apply only in relation to senior personnel who were in office at the time that the intervention was required.
SYSC 19C.3.23GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
SYSC 19C.3.28GRP
Where a firm makes a loss, the FCA generally expects no variable remuneration to be awarded. Variable remuneration may nevertheless be justified, for example to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages.
SYSC 19C.3.34GRP
(1) Taking account of the BIPRU remuneration principles proportionality rule, the FCA does not generally consider it necessary for a firm to apply the rules in (2) where, in relation to an individual ("X"), both the following conditions are satisfied: (a) condition 1 requires that X’s variable remuneration is no more than 33% of total remuneration; and(b) condition 2 requires that X’s total remuneration is no more than 500,000.(2) The rules referred to in (1) relate to: (a) guaranteed
SYSC 19C.3.43GRP
Variable remuneration can be awarded to BIPRU Remuneration Code staff in the form of retention awards where it is compatible with the BIPRU Remuneration Code general requirement to do so. The FCA considers this is likely to be the case only where a firm is undergoing a major restructuring and a good case can be made for retention of particular key staff members on prudential grounds. Proposals to give retention awards should form part of any notice of the restructuring proposals
SYSC 19C.3.50GRP
(1) Deferred remuneration paid in shares or share-linked instruments should be made under a scheme which meets appropriate criteria, including risk adjustment of the performance measure used to determine the initial allocation of shares. Deferred remuneration paid in cash should also be subject to performance criteria.(2) The FCA generally expects a firm to have a firm-wide policy (and group-wide policy, where appropriate) on deferral. The proportion deferred should generally
SYSC 19C.3.53GRP
(1) Variable remuneration may be justified, for example, to incentivise employees involved in new business ventures which could be loss-making in their early stages. (2) The governing body (or, where appropriate, the remuneration committee) should approve performance adjustment policies, including the triggers under which adjustment would take place. The FCA may ask firms to provide a copy of their policies and expects firms to make adequate records of material decisions to operate
PERG 4.6.2GRP
In the FCA's view, the circumstances in which a person is giving advice on the borrower varying the terms of a regulated mortgage contract so as to vary his obligations under the contract include (but are not limited to) where the advice is about:(1) the borrower obtaining a further advance secured on the same land as the original loan; or(2) a rate switch or a product switch (that is, where the borrower does not change lender but changes the terms for repayment from, say, a variable
PERG 4.6.9GRP
[deleted]7
PERG 4.6.13GRP
In the FCA's view, advice requires an element of opinion on the part of the adviser7. In effect, it is a recommendation as to a course of action. Information on the other hand, involves objective statements of facts and figures.
PERG 4.6.16GRP
In the FCA's opinion, however, such information may7 take on the nature of advice if the circumstances in which it is provided give it the force of a recommendation. For example:7(1) a person may provide information on a selected, rather than balanced7, basis that would tend to influence the decision of the borrower; and7(2) a person, as a result of going through the sales process, may discuss7 the merits of one regulated mortgage contract over another, resulting in advice to
PERG 4.6.22GRP
(1) There are two aspects of the definition of advising on regulated mortgage contracts that are particularly relevant to whether pre-sale questioning involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts:7(a) the fact that advice must relate to a particular regulated mortgage contract (see PERG 4.6.5G); and (b) the distinction between information and advice (see PERG 4.6.13G). (2) Whether or not pre-sale7 questioning in any particular case is advising on regulated mortgage contracts
PERG 4.6.23GRP
7The first type involves identifying regulated mortgage contracts based on7 factual matters. For example, the purpose may be to identify7 whether a borrower wishes to pay a fixed or variable rate of interest or the size of deposit available.7 There are various possible scenarios, including the following:(1) the questioner may go on to identify several particular7regulated mortgage contracts which match features identified by the pre-sale7 questioning; provided these are presented
PERG 4.6.25GRP
When the scripted pre-sale questioning identifies particular regulated mortgage contracts (see7PERG 4.6.23G(3) and PERG 4.6.24G(2)), the FCA considers that it is necessary to look at the process and outcome of the pre-sale questioning as a whole7 in deciding whether the process involves advising on regulated mortgage contracts. Factors that may be relevant7 include:1111(1) any representations made by the questioner at the start of the questioning relating to the service they are7
PERG 4.6.34GRP

2Further examples of what is and is not regulated advice

This table belongs to PERG 4.6.33 G.

Example of what the firm3 says and does

3

Regulated or not?

(1) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, including fixed and variable rates. Here are some leaflets which set out the main features.”

No. Leaflets that just explain the terms and conditions of a lender’s products are not advice (see PERG 4.6.15G (1)).

Even if the leaflet contains promotional material, merely handing over the leaflet does not mean that the firm is giving advice.

(2) The firm says “We have a wide range of mortgages, our best rates are two-year fixed rates, you might want to look at those.”

Yes. The firm has identified specific products that it offers and is drawing the customer’s attention7 to those products. Identifying which products have the lowest rates is not advice on its own, only facts. However, “best” involves a value judgement7, particularly when a comparison is made with other products that have different periods for which interest is fixed or that have variable interest rates.

(3) The firm says “In order to provide you with an illustration, I need to know how much you want to borrow, the term and the property value. Which product or products would you like an illustration for?”

No. The firm is collecting factual information to provide the customer with an illustration of costs.

(4) The firm says “Based on what you’ve told me I think you would be best to look at two-year fixed rates. Here is some information about our products.”

Yes. The firm has made a judgment on what type of product is best for the customer and has identified specific products of that type that it offers.

(5) The firm says “Our fixed rates start at 4.99% for two years with a £900 fee. Our variable rates start at 4.50% with a £800 fee. Depending on how much you want to borrow and your circumstances, this may affect the rate available to you.”

No. The firm is comparing two products without recommending either, nor is the firm recommending7 one over the other.

(6) A lender with just one mortgage product advises a customer to take out that mortgage. The lender makes it clear that it does not give advice about products other than its own.

Yes. The lender may argue that this is not regulated advice because it is not recommending one product over another as it only has one product itself and does not give advice about the products of other lenders. However, in the FCA's view this is still regulated advice. For advice to be regulated it must be advice on the merits of entering into a particular regulated mortgage contract (or varying one). It is possible to give advice about the merits of a product without comparing that product with another.

Note: Unless otherwise specified, the firm might be the lender or an advisory or intermediary firm.

EG 18.1.1RP
1The FCA may cancel a sponsor's approval under section 88 of the Act if it considers that a sponsor has failed to meet the criteria for approval as a sponsor as set out in LR 8.6.5R.
EG 18.1.2RP
1When considering whether to cancel a sponsor's approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the sponsor; (2) the adequacy of the sponsor's systems and controls; (3) the sponsor's history of compliance with the listing rules; (4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected failure of the sponsor to meet (at
EG 18.1.3RP
1The FCA may also cancel a primary information provider’s approval under section 89P of the Act if it considers that a primary information provider has failed to meet the criteria for approval as a primary information provider as set out in DTR 8.3.
EG 18.1.4RP
1When considering whether to cancel a primary information provider’s approval on its own initiative, the FCA will take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the competence of the primary information provider; (2) the adequacy of the primary information provider’s systems and controls; (3) the primary information provider’s history of compliance with DTR 8; (4) the nature, seriousness and duration of the suspected
EG 14.2.1RP
1The FCA may use its powers under sections 254, 257 and 258 (in the case of AUTs) and sections 261U, 261X and 261Y (in the case of ACSs) individually, together, and as well as direct enforcement action against a depositary or authorised fund manager in their capacity as firms.
EG 14.2.2RP
1Where the FCA has a concern about an AUT or ACS that must be dealt with urgently, it will generally use its power to give directions under section 257 (in the case of an AUT) or section 261X (in the case of an ACS) in the first instance.
EG 14.2.3RP
1The following are examples of situations where the FCA may consider it appropriate to seek a court order under section 258 (in the case of an AUT) or section 261Y (in the case of an ACS) to remove the authorised fund manager or depositary: (1) Where there are grounds for concern over the behaviour of the authorised fund manager or depositary in respect of the management of the scheme or of its assets. (2) Where an authorised
EG 14.2.4RP
1The FCA recognises that participants in an AUT or ACS have a direct financial interest in the scheme property. It follows that in cases where it considers it appropriate to use its section 254 power (in the case of an AUT) or its section 261U power (in the case of an ACS) to revoke an authorisation order, the FCA will generally first require the authorised fund manager or depositary to wind up the AUT or ACS (or seek a court order for the
LR 4.3.2RRP
The FCA will approve listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars if it is satisfied that the requirements of the Act and this chapter have been complied with.
LR 4.3.3GRP
The FCA will try to notify the applicant of its decision on an application for approval of listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars within the same time limits as are specified in article 20 of the Prospectus Regulation3 for an application for approval of a prospectus or supplementary prospectus.
LR 4.3.4RRP
An issuer must ensure that listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars are not published until they have been approved by the FCA.
LR 4.3.5RRP
An issuer must ensure that after listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars are approved by the FCA, the listing particulars or supplementary listing particulars are filed and published as if the relevant requirements in PR 3.2, 1the PD Regulation and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/301 1applied to them.
EG 20.3.1RP
1The RDC is the FCA's decision maker for decisions which require the giving of warning or decision notices under the CCA Order, as set out in DEPP 2 Annex 1G. The RDC will make its decisions following the procedure set out in DEPP 3.2 or, where appropriate, DEPP 3.3.
EG 20.3.2RP
1The CCA Order does not require the FCA to publish procedures about its approach towards the commencement of criminal prosecutions. However, the FCA will normally follow its equivalent decision-making procedures for similar decisions under the Act as set out in EG 12.
EG 20.3.3RP
1The CCA Order does not require the FCA to publish procedures about its approach towards applications to the court for an injunction or restitution order. However, the FCA will normally follow its equivalent decision-making procedures for similar decisions under the Act as set out in EG 10 and EG 11.
EG 20.3.4RP
1The CCA Order requires the FCA to give third party rights as set out in section 393 of the Act and to give access to material, as set out in section 394 of the Act, in relation to warning notices and decision notices given under the CCA Order.
SUP 21.1.1GRP
1SUP 21 Annex 1 sets out a form of waiver that the FCA will be minded to give to energy market participants in the exercise of its statutory discretion under sections 138A and 138B of the Act to grant a waiver of its2rules.2
SUP 21.1.2GRP
Energy market participants should bear in mind that3sections 138A and 138B of the Act requires that in order to give a waiver of particular rules, the FCA4 must be satisfied that:4344(1) compliance with the rules, or with the rules as unmodified, would be unduly burdensome or would not achieve the purpose for which the rules were made; and(2) the waiver would not adversely affect the advancement of any of the FCA's operational objectives.44
SUP 21.1.3GRP
Accordingly, the FCA must be satisfied that the statutory criteria will be met in each case where an energy market participant applies for a waiver in the form in SUP 21 Annex 1.
SUP 21.1.4GRP
In particular, clause 4 of the form of waiver in SUP 21 Annex 1 will not ordinarily be inserted in waivers for energy market participants that will not, at the time the waiver will take effect, clearly satisfy the conditions set out in that clause. For these purposes the FCA will take into account the relative proportions of the energy market participant's assets and revenues that are referable to the various parts of its business, as well as to any other factor that the FCA considers
EG 20.4.1RP
1When determining whether to take action to impose a penalty or to issue a public censure in relation to the contraventions of a CCA Requirement, the FCA's policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6.2 and DEPP 6.4. When determining the level of financial penalty, the FCA's policy includes having regard to relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5B, DEPP 6.5D and DEPP 6.7.
EG 20.4.2RP
1As with cases under the Act, the FCA may settle or mediate appropriate cases involving civil contraventions of CCA Requirements to assist it to exercise its functions. DEPP 5, DEPP 6.7 and EG 5 set out information on the FCA's settlement process and the settlement discount scheme.
EG 20.4.3RP
1When determining whether to take action to impose a suspension or restriction in relation to the contraventions of CCA Requirements, the FCA's policy includes having regard to the relevant factors in DEPP 6A.2 and DEPP 6A.4. When determining the length of the period of suspension or restriction, the FCA's policy includes having regard to relevant principles and factors in DEPP 6A.3.
EG 20.4.4RP
1The FCA will apply the approach to publicity that is outlined in EG 6.
EG 14.4.1RP
1The FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances of each case. The general factors which the FCA may consider include, but are not limited to, those set out in paragraph 14.1.1 (1) to (9) (the conduct of the operator of the scheme and of the trustee or depositary will also, of course, be taken into account in relation to each of these factors).
EG 14.4.2RP
1As well as or instead of using these powers, the FCA may ask the relevant regulatory body of the country or territory in which the scheme is authorised to take such action in respect of the scheme and/or its operator, trustee or depositary as will resolve the FCA's concerns.
EG 14.4.3RP
1Decisions about whether to apply to the civil courts for collective investment scheme related orders under the Act will be made by the RDC Chairman or, in an urgent case and if the Chairman is not available, by an RDC Deputy Chairman. In an exceptionally urgent case the matter will be decided by the director of Enforcement or, in his or her absence, another member of the FCA's executive of at least director of division level.
EG 14.4.4RP
1An exceptionally urgent case in these circumstances is one where the FCA staff believe that a decision to begin proceedings (1) should be taken before it is possible to follow the procedure described in paragraph 14.4.3; and (2) it is necessary to protect the interests of consumers or potential consumers.
FEES App 1.3.1RRP
A person who submits to the FCA a proposal for the registration of a society must pay to the FCA, in full and without deduction, the fee specified for the type of application under Annex 1AR.
FEES App 1.3.2RRP
A sponsoring body wishing a set of rules to become model rules for the first time must pay to the FCA, in full and without deduction, the application fee specified in FEES App 1 Annex 1A.
FEES App 1.3.6GRP
The FCA may require the fee to be paid by the person making the application before the FCA undertakes any preliminary consideration of the proposed application or rules.
FEES App 1.3.7GRP
The FCA will not refund application fees under any circumstances.
EG 5.2.1RP
1Settlement discussions between FCA staff and the person concerned are possible at any stage of the enforcement process if both parties agree.
EG 5.2.2RP
1The FCA considers that in general, the earlier settlement discussions can take place the better this is likely to be from a public interest perspective. However, the FCA will only engage in such discussions once it has a sufficient understanding of the nature and gravity of the suspected misconduct or issue to make a reasonable assessment of the appropriate outcome. At the other end of the spectrum, the FCA expects that settlement discussions following a decision notice or second
EG 5.2.3RP
1In the interests of efficiency and effectiveness, the FCA will set clear and challenging timetables for settlement discussions to ensure that they result in a prompt outcome and do not divert resources unnecessarily from progressing a case through the formal process. To this end, the FCA will aim to organise its resources so that the preparation for the formal process continues in parallel with any settlement discussions. The FCA will expect firms and others to give it all reasonable
EG 5.2.4RP
2The FCA will engage senior management in discussions (either heads of department or directors), liaising where appropriate with the settlement decision makers, attending a without prejudice meeting during discussions or arranging for the attendance of an appropriately senior FCA representative.
DEPP 2.2.1GRP
If FCA2 staff consider that action requiring a warning notice or first supervisory notice is appropriate, they will recommend to the relevant decision maker that the notice be given.2
DEPP 2.2.2GRP
For first supervisory notices, the FCA1 staff will recommend whether the action should take effect immediately, on a specified date, or when the matter is no longer open to review (see DEPP 2.2.5 G).2
DEPP 2.2.3GRP
The decision maker will:(1) consider whether the material on which the recommendation is based is adequate to support it; the decision maker may seek additional information about or clarification of the recommendation, which may necessitate additional work by the relevant FCA2 staff;2(2) satisfy itself that the action recommended is appropriate in all the circumstances;(3) decide whether to give the notice and the terms of any notice given.
DEPP 2.2.4GRP
If the FCA2 decides to take no further action and theFCA2 had previously informed the person concerned that it intended to recommend action, the FCA2 will communicate this decision promptly to the person concerned.222
DEPP 7.1.1GRP
1DEPP 7 applies when the FCA3:3(1) has appointed an investigator at the request of an overseas regulator, under section 169(1)(b) (Assistance to overseas regulators) or of an EEA regulator under section 131FA2 of the Act; and(2) has directed, or is considering directing, the investigator, under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act, to permit a representative of the overseas regulator or of the EEA regulator2 to attend, and take part in, any interview conducted for the purposes
DEPP 7.1.2GRP
In DEPP 7, a "requested2 interview" means any interview conducted for the purposes of an investigation under section 169(1)(b) or section 131FA2 of the Act in relation to which the FCA3 has given a direction under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 of the Act.23
DEPP 7.1.3GRP
The purpose of DEPP 7 is to set out the FCA's3 statement of policy on the conduct of interviews to which a direction under section 169(7) or section 131FA2 has been given or the FCA3 is considering giving. The FCA3 is required to prepare and publish this statement of policy by section 169(9) and (11) and section 131FA2 of the Act. As required by section 169(10) and section 131FA2 of the Act, the Treasury has approved the statement of policy.333
DEPP 7.1.4GRP
The FCA3 is keen to promote co-operation with overseas regulators and EEA regulators2. It views provision of assistance to overseas regulators and EEA regulators2 as an essential part of discharging its general functions.33
EG 2.8.1RP
1The FCA's approach to regulation involves a combination of high-level principles and detailed rules and guidance.
EG 2.8.2RP
1The FCA will, in appropriate cases, take enforcement action on the basis of the Principles alone (see also DEPP 6.2.14 G). This will have the benefit of providing further clear examples of how the Principles work in practice.
EG 2.8.3RP
1The FCA wishes to encourage firms to exercise judgement about, and take responsibility for, what the Principles mean for them in terms of how they conduct their business. But we also recognise the importance of an environment in which firms understand what is expected of them. So we have indicated that firms must be able reasonably to predict, at the time of the action concerned, whether the conduct would breach the Principles. This has sometimes been described as the “reasonable
EG 2.8.4RP
1To determine whether there has been a failure to comply with a Principle, the standards we will apply are those required by the Principles at the time the conduct took place. The FCA will not apply later, higher standards to behaviour when deciding whether to take enforcement action for a breach of the Principles. Importantly, however, where conduct falls below expected standards the FCA considers that it is legitimate for consequences to follow, even if the conduct is widespread
EG 3.8A.1RP
1The FCA may use its section 122B power to require information and documents from natural or legal persons to support both its supervisory and its enforcement functions.
EG 3.8A.2RP
The FCA's power to require information to assist EEA regulators in respect of the Market Abuse Regulation or any directly applicable EU regulation made under the Market Abuse Regulation or the auction regulation is contained in section 122B(6) of the Act. The section provides that at the request of an EEA regulator, the FCA may use its power under section 122B to require the production of information.[Note: see Regulation 6 and Schedule 1 to the RAP Regulations in relation to
EG 3.8A.3RP
Section 122B(7) of the Act states that the FCA must, in deciding whether or not to exercise its power to require information, consider whether the exercise of that power is necessary to comply with the Market Abuse Regulation or any directly applicable EU regulation made under the Market Abuse Regulation or the auction regulation.
EG 3.8A.4RP
The FCA may give information under 122D(1) or 176(1) (Entry of premises under warrant) at the request of an EEA regulator where the regulator makes the request in the exercise of its functions under the Market Abuse Regulation. Section 122D(11) of the Act states that the FCA must, in deciding whether or not to exercise it powers of entry of premises under warrant, consider whether the exercise of that power is necessary for the purpose of the exercise by it of its obligations
EG 3.7.1RP
1The FCA's power to conduct investigations to assist overseas authorities is contained in section 169 of the Act. The section provides that at the request of an overseas regulator, the FCA may use its power under section 165 to require the production of documents or the provision of information under section 165 or to appoint a person to investigate any matter.
EG 3.7.2RP
1If the overseas regulator is a competent authority and makes a request in pursuance of any Community obligation, section 169(3) states that the FCA must, in deciding whether or not to exercise its investigative power, consider whether the exercise of that power is necessary to comply with that obligation.
EG 3.7.3RP
1Section 169(4) and (5) set out factors that the FCA may take into account when deciding whether to use its investigative powers. However, these provisions do not apply if the FCA considers that the use of its investigative powers is necessary to comply with a Community obligation.
EG 3.7.4RP
1When it considers whether to use its investigative power, and whether section 169(4) applies, the FCA will first consider whether it is able to assist without using its formal powers, for example by obtaining the information voluntarily. Where that is not possible, the FCA may take into account all of the factors in section 169(4), but may give particular weight to the seriousness of the case and its importance to persons in the United Kingdom, and to the public interest.