1Paragraph 7BA – Position management |
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(1) |
A [UK RIE] operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives must apply position management controls on that venue, which must at least enable the [UK RIE] to - |
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(a) |
monitor the open interest positions of persons; |
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(b) |
access information, including all relevant documentation, from persons about- |
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(i) |
the size and purpose of a position or exposure entered into; |
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(ii) |
any beneficial or underlying owners; |
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(iii) |
any concert arrangements; and |
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(iv) |
any related assets or liabilities in the underlying market; |
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(c) |
require a person to terminate or reduce a position on a temporary or permanent basis as the specific case may require and to unilaterally take appropriate action to ensure the termination or reduction if the person does not comply; and |
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(d) |
where appropriate, require a person to provide liquidity back into the market at an agreed price and volume on a temporary basis with the express intent of mitigating the effects of a large or dominant position. |
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(2) |
The position management controls must take account of the nature and composition of market participants and of the use they make of the contracts submitted to trading and must- |
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(a) |
be transparent; |
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(b) |
be non-discriminatory; and |
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(c) |
specify how they apply to persons. |
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(3) |
A [UK RIE] must inform the FCA of the details of the position management controls in relation to each trading venue it operates. |
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Paragraph 7BB – Position reporting |
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(1) |
This paragraph applies to a [UK RIE] operating a trading venue which trades commodity derivatives, emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives. |
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(2) |
The [UK RIE] must - |
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(a) |
where it meets the minimum threshold, as specified in a delegated act adopted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 58.6 of the markets in financial instruments directive, make public a weekly report with the aggregate positions held by the different categories of persons for the different commodity derivatives, emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives traded on the trading venue specifying - |
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(i) |
the number of long and short positions by such categories; |
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(ii) |
changes of those positions since the previous report; |
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(iii) |
the percentage of the total open interest represented by each category; and |
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(iv) |
the number of persons holding a position in each category; and |
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(b) |
provide the FCA with a complete breakdown of the positions held by all persons, including the members and participants and their clients, on the trading venue on a daily basis, or more frequently if that is required by the FCA. |
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(3) |
For the weekly report mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(a) the [UK RIE] must - |
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(a) |
categorise persons in accordance with the classifications required under sub-paragraph (4); and |
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(b) |
differentiate between positions identified as- |
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(i) |
positions which in an objectively measurable way reduce risks directly relating to commercial activities; or |
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(ii) |
other positions. |
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(4) |
The [UK RIE] must classify persons holding positions in commodity derivatives, emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives according to the nature of their main business, taking account of any applicable authorisation or registration, as - |
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(a) |
an investment firm or credit institution; |
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(b) |
an investment fund, either as an undertaking for collective investments in transferrable securities as defined in the UCITS Directive, or an alternative investment fund or alternative investment fund manager as defined in the alternative investment fund managers directive; |
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(c) |
another financial institution, including an insurance undertaking and reinsurance undertaking as defined in the Solvency 2 Directive and an institution for occupational retirement provision as defined in Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement; |
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(d) |
a commercial undertaking; or |
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(e) |
in the case of emission allowances, or emission allowance derivatives, an operator with compliance obligations under Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. |
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(5) |
The [UK RIE] must communicate the weekly report mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(a) to the FCA and ESMA. |
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Related provisions for SUP 16.18.10
41 - 60 of 138 items.
The recognition requirements in respect of position management and position reporting set out in REC 2.7A.1UK apply to a UK RIE operating a trading venue. An investment firm operating a trading venue which trades:(1) commodity derivatives must apply position management controls on that venue in accordance with MAR 10.3.(2) commodity derivatives or emission allowances must provide position reports in accordance with MAR 10.4.
A firm must include, as a minimum, the following requirements in its terms of reference for an IGC:(1) the IGC will act solely in the interests of:3(a) relevant policyholders and any other members or clients a firm asks the IGC to consider; or3(b) pathway investors;3(2) the IGC will assess the ongoing value for money for relevant policyholders delivered by a relevant scheme3 particularly, though not exclusively, through assessing:(a) whether default investment strategies within
A firm must:(1) take reasonable steps to ensure that the IGC acts and continues to act in accordance with its terms of reference;(2) take reasonable steps to provide the IGC with all information reasonably requested by the IGC in good time3 for the purposes of carrying out its role;(3) provide the IGC with sufficient resources as are reasonably necessary to allow it to carry out its role independently;(4) have arrangements to ensure that the views of relevant policyholders or
(1) A firm should consider allocating responsibility for the management of the relationship between the firm and its IGC to a person at the firm holding an FCAsignificant-influence function or designated senior management function2.(2) A firm should fund independent advice for the IGC if this is necessary and proportionate.(3) A firm should not unreasonably withhold from the IGC information that would enable the IGC to carry out its duties in the IGC’s remit of review3. (3A)
(1) A Chief Risk Officer should:(a) be accountable to the firm'sgoverning body for oversight of firm-wide risk management;(b) be fully independent of a firm's individual business units;(c) have sufficient authority, stature and resources for the effective execution of his responsibilities; (d) have unfettered access to any parts of the firm's business capable of having an impact on the firm's risk profile; (e) ensure that the data used by the firm to assess its risks are fit for
(1) The Chief Risk Officer should be accountable to a firm'sgoverning body.(2) The FCA9 recognises that in addition to the Chief Risk Officers primary accountability to the governing body, an executive reporting line will be necessary for operational purposes. Accordingly, to the extent necessary for effective operational management, the Chief Risk Officer should report into a very senior executive level in the firm. In practice, the FCA9 expects this will be to the chief executive,
Where the skilled person is appointed by the person in SUP 5.2.1 G or SUP 5.2.2 G, the FCA1 will normally require the skilled person to be appointed to report to the FCA1 through that person. In the normal course of events the FCA1 expects that the person in SUP 5.2.1 G or SUP 5.2.2 G2 will be given the opportunity to provide written comments on the report or the collection of the relevant information prior to its submission to the FCA1. 222222222
The rules in SUP 16.14 provide that CASS large firms and CASS medium firms must report to the FCA in relation to the identity of the entities with which they deposit client money and the amounts of client money deposited with those entities. The FCA will use that information to monitor compliance with the diversification rule in CASS 7.13.20 R.
(1) In addition to the requirement under CASS 7.13.57 R, before adopting the alternative approach, a firm must send a written report to the FCA prepared by an independent auditor of the firm in line with a reasonable assurance engagement, stating the matters set out in (2).(2) The written report in (1) must state whether, in the auditor's opinion:(a) the firm's systems and controls are suitably designed to enable it to comply with CASS 7.13.62 R to CASS 7.13.65 R; and(b) the firm's
A firm that uses the alternative approach must not materially change how it will calculate and maintain the alternative approach mandatory prudent segregation amount under CASS 7.13.65 R unless:(1) an auditor of the firm has prepared a report that complies with the requirements in CASS 7.13.58 R (2)(b) in respect of the firm's proposed changes; and (2) the firm provides a copy of the report prepared by the auditor under (a) to the FCA before implementing the change.
Following discussions with the firm on the items listed in IFPRU 2.3.27 G, the FCA may put in place additional reporting arrangements to monitor the firm's use of its capital planning buffer in accordance with the plan referred to in IFPRU 2.3.27 G (3). The FCA may also identify specific trigger points as the capital planning buffer is being used up by the firm, which could lead to additional supervisory actions.
A firm should carry out an ILAA at least annually, or more frequently if changes in its business or strategy or the nature, scale or complexity of its activities or the operational environment suggest that the current level of liquidity resources is no longer adequate. A firm should expect that its usual supervisory contact at the appropriate regulator will ask for the ILAA to be submitted as part of the ongoing supervisory process.
A firm should also be mindful that its retail funding profile is unlikely to be constant. In carrying out its ILAA, a firm should have regard to any changes to its retail funding profile since the previous ILAA and also to the possible impact of any future changes on its ability to maintain retail funding during periods of stress. In its ILAA submission to the appropriate regulator, a firm should include an analysis of:(1) its retail funding profile as at the date of its ILAA;(2)
A firm must, as part of its ILAA submission to the appropriate regulator, in relation to each currency in which it has significant positions:(1) identify the type of financial instruments which that firm uses to raise funding in that currency;(2) identify the main counterparties which provide funding to that firm in that currency; and(3) describe the arrangements that it has in place to fund net outflows in that currency on a timely basis.
There may be matters relating to the scheme or the parties to the transfer that the regulators wish8 to draw to the attention of the independent expert. The regulators8 may also wish the report to address particular issues. The independent expert should therefore contact the regulators8 at an early stage to establish whether there are such matters or issues. The independent expert should form his own opinion on such issues, which may differ from the opinion of the regulators8
For a scheme involving long-term insurance business, the report should:(1) describe the effect of the scheme on the nature and value of any rights of policyholders to participate in profits;(2) if any such rights will be diluted by the scheme, how any compensation offered to policyholders as a group (such as the injection of funds, allocation of shares, or cash payments) compares with the value of that dilution, and whether the extent and method of its proposed division is equitable
8When assessing a proposed scheme under Part VII of the Act each regulator will, taking into account all relevant matters in each case, consider whether it should provide a report to the court. As it will lead the Part VII process for insurance business transfers, the PRA will usually provide such a report.
1A firm must: (1) report to the FCA any:(a) significant breaches of the firm’s rules;
(b) disorderly trading conditions;
(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; and
(d) system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument;
(2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and
(3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the
1A firm should ensure that:(1) it considers the draft client assets report provided to the firm by its auditor in accordance with SUP 3.10.8DR (1) in order to provide an explanation of: (a) the circumstances that gave rise to each of the breaches identified in the draft report; and(b) any remedial actions that it has undertaken or plans to undertake to correct those breaches; and(2) the explanation provided in accordance with (1):(a) is submitted to its auditor in a timely fashion
2Information may also be provided to the FCA voluntarily. For example, firms may at times commission an internal investigation or a report from an external law firm or other professional adviser and decide to pass a copy of this report to the FCA. Such reports can be very helpful for the FCA in circumstances where enforcement action is anticipated or underway. The FCA's approach to using firm-commissioned reports in an enforcement context is set out at the end of this chapter.
Firms are reminded that: (1)
requirements relating to the systems and controls which firms must establish and maintain for ensuring compliance with financial resources and other requirements are set out in SYSC.
(2) the financial reports that a firm is required to make to the FCA are set out in SUP 16.
The purpose of REC 3.16 is to ensure that the FCA1receives a copy of the UK recognised body's plans and arrangements for ensuring business continuity if there are major problems with its computer systems. The FCA1does not need to be notified of minor revisions to, or updating of, the documents containing a UK recognised body's business continuity plan (for example, changes to contact names or telephone numbers). [Note:MiFID RTS 7 requires that the operator of a trading venue assess
(1) Where a firm receives less than 500 complaints in a reporting period, Part A-1 of DISP 1 Annex 1 requires, for the relevant reporting period and in respect of particular categories of products:10(a) in Table 1, information about the total number of complaints received by the firm and the cause of the complaint;10(b) in Table 2, information about the number of complaints that were:10(i) closed or upheld within different periods of time; and10(ii) the total amount of redress
Part B of DISP 1 Annex 1R requires (for the relevant reporting period) information about:10618(1) the total number of complaints received by the firm;10(2) the total number of complaints closed by the firm;10(3) the total number of complaints:10(a) upheld by the firm in the reporting period; and10(b) outstanding at the beginning of the reporting period; and10(4) the total amount of redress paid in respect of complaints during the reporting period.10
For the purposes of BIPRU 12.9.17 R, a firm's liquidity remediation plan must:(1) be communicated in writing;(2) detail the firm's forward estimates of the evolution of the size of the firm's liquid assets buffer and of its funding profile;(3) in relation to any of the events identified in BIPRU 12.9.14 R that has occurred, or is expected to occur,1 detail the actions that the firm intends to take to remedy the event,1 or avoid the expected event, as the case may be,1 including
A firm that deviates from current individual liquidity guidance that it has accepted or, as the case may be, from its simplified buffer requirement, will be experiencing a firm-specific liquidity stress for the purpose of the reporting rules in SUP 16 (Reporting requirements). Those rules require the firm to report specified data items more frequently than would otherwise be the case. Additionally, a firm that is implementing a liquidity remediation plan should expect that the