Related provisions for CREDS 3A.5.9

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DTR 2.5.2GRP
(1) Delaying disclosure of inside information will not always mislead the public, although a developing situation should be monitored so that if circumstances change an immediate disclosure can be made.(2) Investors understand that some information must be kept confidential until developments are at a stage when an announcement can be made without prejudicing the legitimate interests of the issuer.
DISP App 1.3.9GRP
12A firm may arrange the sale of the endowment policy on the traded endowment market, provided the full implications of such a course of action are explained to the complainant and his express consent is obtained for the firm to arrange the sale. This includes informing the investor that he will continue to be the life assured under the policy. The complainant should be informed that such an arrangement may reduce or eliminate the amount of redress actually borne by the firm,
LR 8.4.3RRP
A sponsor must:(1) submit a completed Sponsor's Declaration on an Application for Listing to the FCA either:2(a) on the day the FCA is to consider the application for approval of the prospectus and prior to the time the prospectus is approved; or(b) at a time agreed with the FCA, if the FCA is not approving the prospectus13;1(2) submit a completed Shareholder Statement or Pricing Statement, as applicable, to the FCA by 9 a.m. on the day the FCA is to consider the application;(3)
LR 4.4.3RRP
1If final terms of the offer are not included in the listing particulars:(1) the final terms must be provided to investors and filed with the FCA, and made available to the public, as if the relevant requirements in PRR 3.2, article 21 of the Prospectus Regulation, the PR Regulation and the Prospectus RTS Regulation4 applied to them; and(2) the listing particulars must disclose the criteria and/or the conditions in accordance with which the above elements will be determined or,
EG 7.2.1RP
4The FCA also has measures available to it where it considers it is appropriate to take protective or remedial action. These include: (1) where a firm's continuing ability to meet the threshold conditions or where an approved person's or other individual’s1 fitness and propriety1 are called into question: (a) varying and/or cancelling of permission and the withdrawal of a firm’s authorisation (see chapter 8); and (b) the withdrawal of an individual’s status as an approved person
GEN 2.2.25GRP
An example of a rule20 being interpreted as cut back by GEN 2.2.23R is SYSC 6.1.1R, which requires a firm to maintain adequate policies and procedures to ensure compliance with its obligations under the regulatory system; SYSC 6.1.1R should be interpreted as applied by the FCA in respect of a PRA-authorised person’s compliance with regulatory obligations that are the responsibility of the FCA (for example, in respect of a bank maintaining policies and procedures to ensure compliance
EG 6.2.6RP
3The FCA will take the following initial steps in considering whether it is appropriate to exercise this power: (1) It will consider whether it is appropriate to publish details of the warning notice in order to enable consumers, firms and market users to understand the nature of the FCA’s concerns. The FCA will consider the circumstances of each case but expects normally to consider it appropriate to publish these details. (2) Where the FCA considers it is appropriate to publish
PERG 9.11.1GRP

Table There are some frequently asked questions about the application of the definition of an open-ended investment company in the following table. This table belongs to PERG 9.2.4 G (Introduction).

Question

Answer

1

Can a body corporate be both open-ended and closed-ended at the same time?

In the FCA's view, the answer to this question is 'no'. The fact that the investment condition is applied to BC (rather than to particular shares in, or securities of, BC) means that a body corporate is either an open-ended investment company as defined in section 236 of the Act or it is not. Where BC is an open-ended investment company, all of its securities would be treated as units of a collective investment scheme for the purpose of the Act. A body corporate formed in another jurisdiction may, however, be regarded as open-ended under the laws of that jurisdiction but not come within the definition of an open-ended investment company in section 236 (and vice versa).

2

Can an open-ended investment company become closed-ended (or a closed-ended body become open-ended)?

In the FCA's view, the answer to this question is 'yes'. A body corporate may change from open-ended to closed-ended (and vice versa) if, taking an overall view, circumstances change so that a hypothetical reasonable investor would consider that the investment condition is no longer met (or vice versa). This might happen where, for example, an open-ended investment company stops its policy of redeeming shares or securities at regular intervals (so removing the expectation that a reasonable investor would be able to realise his investment within a period appearing to him to be reasonable). See also PERG 9.7.5 G.

3

Does the liquidation of a body corporate affect the assessment of whether or not the body is an open-ended investment company?

The FCA considers that the possibility that a body corporate that would otherwise be regarded as closed-ended may be wound up has no effect at all on the nature of the body corporate before the winding up. The fact that, on a winding up, the shares or securities of any investor in the body corporate may be converted into cash or money on the winding up (and so 'realised') would not, in the FCA's view, affect the outcome of applying the expectation test to the body corporate when looked at as a whole. The answer to Question 4 explains that investment in a closed-ended fixed term company shortly before its winding up does not, in the FCA view, change the closed-ended nature of the company. For companies with no fixed term, the theoretical possibility of a winding up at some uncertain future point is not, in the FCA's view, a matter that would generally carry weight with a reasonable investor in assessing whether he could expect to be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period.

4

Does a fixed term closed-ended investment company become an open-ended investment company simply because the fixed term will expire?

In the FCA's view, the answer to this is 'no'. The termination of the body corporate is an event that has always been contemplated (and it will appear in the company's constitution). Even as the date of the expiry of the fixed term approaches, there is nothing about the body corporate itself that changes so as to cause a fundamental reassessment of its nature as something other than closed-ended. Addressing this very point in parliamentary debate, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury stated that the "aim and effect [of the definition] is to cover companies that look, to a reasonable investor, like open-ended investment companies". The Minister added that "A reasonable investor's overall expectations of potential investment in a company when its status with respect to the definition is being judged will determine whether it meets the definition. The matter is therefore, definitional rather than one of proximity to liquidation". (Hansard HC, 5 June 2000 col 124).

5

In what circumstances will a body corporate that issues a mixture of redeemable and non-redeemable shares or securities be an open-ended investment company?

In the FCA's view, the existence of non-redeemable shares or securities will not, of itself, rule out the possibility of a body corporate falling within the definition of an open-ended investment company. All the relevant circumstances will need to be considered (see PERG 9.6.4 G, PERG 9.2.8.8G and PERG 9.8.9 G). So the following points need to be taken into account.

  • The precise terms of the issue of all the shares or securities will be relevant to the question whether the investment condition is met, as will any arrangements that may exist to allow the investor to realise his investment by other means.
  • The proportions of the different share classes will be relevant to the impression the reasonable investor forms of the body corporate. A body corporate that issues only a minimal amount of redeemable shares or securities will not, in theFCA's view, be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that issues a minimal amount of non-redeemable shares or securities will be likely to be an open-ended investment company. A body corporate that falls within the definition of an open-ended investment company is likely to have (and to be marketed as having) mainly redeemable shares or securities. However, whether or not the body corporate does fall within the definition in any particular case will be subject to any contrary indications there may be in its constitutional documents or otherwise.
  • Where shares or securities are only redeemable after the end of a stated period, this factor will make it more likely that the body corporate is open-ended than if the shares or securities are never redeemable.

6

Does "realised on a basis calculated wholly or mainly by reference to..." in section 236(3)(b) apply to an investor buying investment trust company shares traded on a recognised investment exchange because of usual market practice that the shares trade at a discount to asset value?

In the FCA's view, the answer is 'no' (for the reasons set out in PERG 9.9.4 G to PERG 9.9.6 G).

7

Does the practice of UK investment trust companies buying back shares result in them becoming open-ended investment companies?

In the FCA's view, it does not, because its actions will comply with company law: see section 236(4) of the Act and PERG 9.6.5 G.

8

Would a body corporate holding out redemption or repurchase of its shares or securities every six months be an open-ended investment company?

In the FCA's view a period of six months would generally be too long to be a reasonable period for a liquid securities fund. A shorter period affording more scope for an investor to take advantage of any profits caused by fluctuations in the market would be more likely to be a reasonable period for the purpose of the realisation of the investment (in the context of the 'expectation' test, see PERG 9.8 and, in particular, PERG 9.8.9 G which sets out the kind of factors that may need to be considered in applying the test).

9

Would an initial period during which it is not possible to realise investment in a body corporate mean that the body corporate could not satisfy the investment condition?

In the FCA's view, the answer to that question is 'no'. In applying the investment condition, the body corporate must be considered as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G). At the time that the shares or securities in a body corporate are issued, a reasonable investor may expect that he will be able to realise his investment within a reasonable period notwithstanding that there will first be a short-term delay before he can do so. Whether or not the 'expectation test' is satisfied will depend on all the circumstances (see PERG 9.8.9 G).
LR 5.1.1RRP
(1) 1The FCA may suspend, with effect from such time as it may determine, the listing of any securities if the smooth operation of the market is, or may be, temporarily jeopardised or it is necessary to protect investors. [Note: article 18(1) CARD](2) An issuer that has the listing of any of its securities suspended must continue to comply with all listing rules applicable to it.(3) If the FCA suspends the listing of any securities, it may impose such conditions on the procedure
CASS 7.16.36RRP
A firm with a Part 30 exemption order which also operates an LME bond arrangement for the benefit of US-resident investors must exclude the client equity balances for transactions undertaken on the LME on behalf of those US-resident investors from the calculation of the margined transaction requirement, to the extent those transactions are provided for by an LME bond arrangement (see CASS 12.2.3 G).1
SUP 13.3.6GRP
(1) Save where (1A) applies, if19 the appropriate UK regulator20 gives a consent notice, it will inform the UK firm in writing that it has done so.20(1A) If the UK firm’sEEA right derives from the IDD, where the appropriate UK regulator has given a consent notice and the Host State regulator has acknowledged receipt of that notice, the appropriate UK regulator must give written notice to the UK firm concerned that the Host State regulator has received the consent notice.19(2)
DISP App 1.4.14GRP

12Example 8

Example 8

Term extends beyond retirement age and policy reconstruction

Background

45 year old male non-smoker, having taken out a £50,000 loan in 1998 for a term of 25 years. Unsuitable sale identified on the grounds of affordability and complaint raised on 12th policy anniversary.

It has always been the intention of the complainant to retire at State retirement age 65.

Term from date of sale to retirement is 20 years and the maturity date of the mortgage is 5 years after retirement.

Established facts

Established premium paid by investor on policy of original term (25 years):

£81.20

Premium that would have been payable on policy with term from sale to retirement (20 years):

£111.20

Actual policy value at time complaint assessed:

£12,500

Value of an equivalent 20-year policy at time complaint assessed:

£21,300

Difference in policy values at time complaint assessed:

£8,800

Difference in outgoings (20 year policy - 25 year policy):

£4,320

Basis of compensation

The policy is reconstructed as if it had been set up originally on a term to mature at retirement age, in this example, a term of 20 years. The difference in the current value of the policy actually sold to the complainant and the current value of the reconstructed policy, as if the premium on the reconstructed policy had been paid from outset, is calculated. The complainant has gained from lower outgoings (lower premiums) of the actual endowment policy to date. In calculating the redress, the gain may be offset against the loss unless the complainant's particular circumstances are such that it would be unreasonable to take account of the gain.

Redress generally if it is not unreasonable to take account of the whole of the gain from lower outgoings

Loss from current value of reconstructed policy less current value of actual policy:

(£8,800)

Gain from total lower outgoings under actual policy:

£4,320

Net loss:

(£4,480)

Therefore total redress is:

£4,480

Redress if it is unreasonable to take account of gain from lower outgoings

Loss from current value of reconstructed policy less current value of actual policy:

(£8,800)

Gain from total lower outgoings under actual policy:

Ignored

Therefore total redress is:

£8,800

Additional Information

If the policy is capable of reconstruction, the complainant must now fund the higher premiums himself for the remainder of the term of the shortened policy until maturity. In this example the higher premium could be £111.20. However the firm should provide the complainant with a reprojection letter based on the reconstructed policy such that the actual monthly payment required to achieve the target sum could be even higher, say £130. The reprojection letter should set out the range of options facing the complainant to deal with the projected shortfall, if any.

REC 6.3.2UKRP

Sections 292(3) and 292(4) state:

2Section 292(3)

The requirements are that-

(a)

investors are afforded protection equivalent to that which they would be afforded if the body concerned were required to comply with -4

3

4(i) recognition requirements, other than any such requirements which are expressed in regulations under section 286 not to apply for the purposes of this paragraph; and

4(ii) requirements contained in any directly applicable Community regulation made under the markets in financial instruments directive or markets in financial instruments regulation;

(b)

there are adequate procedures for dealing with a person who is unable, or likely to become unable, to meet his obligations in respect of one or more market contracts connected with the [ROIE]

3

(c)

the applicant is able and willing to co-operate with the[FCA]3by the sharing of information and in other ways; and

3

(d)

adequate arrangements exist for co-operation between the[FCA]3and those responsible for the supervision of the applicant in the country or territory in which the applicant's head office is situated.

3

Section 292(4)

In considering whether it is satisfied as to the requirements mentioned in subsections (3)(a) and (b), the[FCA]3is to have regard to-

3

(a)

the relevant law and practice of the country or territory in which the applicant's head office is situated;

(b)

the rules and practices of the applicant.
PERG 8.33.2GRP
Article 29 of the Regulated Activities Order states that certain arrangements are not covered by article 25. These are arrangements made by an unauthorised person ('A'). The arrangements must be made for or with a view to a transaction which is or is to be entered into by another person (the client) with or through an authorised person. It must also be the case that:(1) the transaction is or will be entered into on advice given to the client by an authorised person; or(2) it is
SYSC 22.5.11GRP

Table: Examples of factors to take into account when deciding whether old misconduct is sufficiently serious to disclose

Factors to take into account

Comments

(A) Whether P has committed a serious breach of individual conduct requirements.

Individual conduct requirements has the same meaning as in Part Two of SYSC 22 Annex 1R (Template for regulatory references given by SMCR firms2 and disclosure requirements).

Factors to take into account in deciding whether the breach is serious include the following.

(1) The extent to which the conduct was deliberate or reckless.

(2) The extent to which the conduct was dishonest.

(3) Whether the breaches are frequent or whether they have continued over a long period of time. The fact that breaches were frequent or repeated may increase the likelihood that they should be disclosed since the breaches may show a pattern of non-compliance.

(4) The extent of loss, or risk of loss, caused to existing, past or potential investors, depositors, policyholders or other counterparties or customers.

(5) The reasons for the breach. For example, where the breach was caused by lack of experience which has been remedied by training or further experience, it is less likely that the breach will still be relevant.

(B) Whether the conduct caused B to breach requirements of the regulatory system or P was concerned in a contravention of such a requirement by B and, in each case, whether P’s conduct was itself serious.

(1) The factors in (A) are relevant to whether P’s conduct was serious.

(2) The seriousness of the breach by B is relevant. The factors in (A) are also relevant to this.

(3) A breach by B of certain requirements is always likely to be serious under (2). Breach of the threshold conditions is an example. However that does not mean that P’s involvement will automatically be serious.

(C) Whether P’s conduct involved dishonesty (whether or not also involving a criminal act).

Dishonesty is an important factor but it is not automatically decisive in every case. For instance, a small one-off case of dishonesty many years ago may not be sufficiently serious to require disclosure.

(D) Whether the conduct would have resulted in B’s dismissing P, had P still been working for B, based on B's disciplinary policies and the requirements of the law about unfair dismissal.

(E) Whether the conduct was such that, if B was considering P for a role today and became aware of the historical conduct, B would not employ P today notwithstanding the time that has passed.

Note 1: P refers to the employee about whom the reference is being written.

Note 2: B refers to the firm giving the reference.