Related provisions for PERG 1.5.4
161 - 180 of 309 items.
(1) A CBTL firm must submit a duly completed consumer buy-to-let return to the FCA.(2) The return referred to in (1) must be submitted:(a) in the format set out in SUP 16 Annex 39AD; guidance notes for the completion of the return are set out in SUP 16 Annex 39BG;(b) online through the appropriate systems accessible from the FCA’s website; and(c) within 30 business days following the end of the reporting period.(3) The reporting period is the four calendar quarters beginning on
(1) This guidance sets out the FCA's expectations for granting permission to a firm to use its own one-sided credit valuation adjustment internal models (an "internal CVA model") for the purpose of estimating the maturity factor "M", as proposed under article 162(2)(h) of the EU CRR (Maturity).(2) In the context of counterparty credit risk, the maturity factor "M" is intended to increase the own funds requirements to reflect potential higher risks associated with medium and long-term
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
COND gives guidance on the threshold conditions. The FCA3threshold conditions represent the minimum conditions for which the FCA is responsible,3 which a firm is required to satisfy, and continue to satisfy, in order to be given and to retainPart 4A permission. A PRA-authorised person or, as appropriate, a firm seeking to become a PRA-authorised person must also satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the threshold conditions for which the PRA is responsible in order to be given and
This chapter sets out the FCA's3 approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: 3(1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FCA's3approach to the exercise of its powers under:3(a) (for RIEs)2section 296 of the Act (Appropriate regulator's3 power to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations2 to give directions
(1) The FCA3 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.3(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the individual in bringing (or
23One of the reasons for introducing the guidance in this appendix is to seek a reduction in the number of complaints which are referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service. If a firm writes to the complainant proposing terms for settlement which are in accordance with this appendix, the letter may include a statement that the calculation of loss and redress accords with the FCAguidance, but should not imply that this extends to the assessment of whether or not the complaint should
1In determining whether a UK RIE operating a multilateral trading facility (including an SME growth market) or organised trading facility)3 complies with this chapter3, the FCA will have regard to the compliance of the UK RIE with equivalent recognition requirements. A UK RIE operating such facilities should also have regard to the guidance set out in MAR 5 (Multilateral trading facilities (MTFs)) and MAR 5A (Organised trading facilities (OTFs))3. 22
The FCA5 expects to maintain a close working relationship with certain
types of firm and expects that
routine supervisory matters arising can be resolved during the normal course
of this relationship by, for example, issuing individual guidance where
appropriate (see SUP 9.3). However,
where the FCA deems it appropriate,
it will exercise its own-initiative powers:55(1) in
circumstances where it considers it appropriate for the firm to
be subject to a formal requirement,
breach
(1) 15A syndicated loan for the purposes of this guidance means a form of loan where a group or syndicate of parties lend money to a third party and, in return, receive interest payments during the life of the debt and a return of principal either at the end of the loan period or amortised over the life of the loan. Such loans are usually arranged through agent banks which may, among other things, maintain a record of the lenders’ interest in the loan and arrange or act as a
This guidance is issued under section 139A of the Act. It represents the FCA's views and does not bind the courts. For example, it would not bind the courts in an action for damages brought by a private person for breach of a rule (see section 138D of the Act (Actions for damages)), or in relation to the enforceability of a contract where there has been a breach of sections 19 (The general prohibition) or 21 (Restrictions on financial promotion) of the Act (see sections 26 to
(1) 15Under sections 20(1) and (1A) of the Act (Authorised persons acting without permission), if an authorised person carries on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom, or purports to do so, otherwise than in accordance with his permission, he is to be taken to have contravened a requirement imposed by the FCA (in the case of a FCA-authorised person) or the FCA and the PRA (in the case of a PRA-authorised person).(2) In addition, under section 23(1A) of the Act (Contravention
Factors that may be relevant in the assessment of a MiFID complaint under DISP 1.1A.20R(2) include the following:
(1) all the evidence available and the particular circumstances of the complaint;(2)
similarities with other complaints received by the respondent;
(3) relevant guidance published by the FCA, other relevant regulators, the Financial Ombudsman Service or former schemes; and
(4) appropriate analysis of decisions by the Financial Ombudsman Service concerning similar