Related provisions for PERG 6.5.2
261 - 280 of 1115 items.
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances of a case. These may include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct or other unfitness that resulted in the order; (2) the amount of time since the original order was made; (3) any steps taken subsequently by the individual to remedy the misconduct or other unfitness; (4) any evidence which, had it been
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will take into account any indication given by the FCA in the final notice that it is minded to revoke or vary the prohibition order on application after a certain number of years (see paragraph 9.2.4).
2The FCA will not generally grant an application to vary or revoke a prohibition order unless it is satisfied that: the proposed variation will not result in a reoccurrence of the risk to consumers or confidence in the financial system that resulted in the order being made; and the individual is fit to perform functions in relation to regulated activities generally, or to those specific regulated activities in relation to which the individual has been prohibited. The FCA will
5A firm must:(1) appoint an individual as MLRO, with responsibility for oversight of its compliance with the FCA'srules on systems and controls against money laundering; and(2) ensure that its MLRO has a level of authority and independence within the firm and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
A firm, other than a Solvency II firm,15 should have in place appropriate arrangements, having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of its business, to ensure that it can continue to function and meet its regulatory obligations in the event of unforeseen interruption. These arrangements should be regularly updated and tested to ensure their effectiveness. Solvency II firms are subject to the business continuity requirements in PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions
1In cases where the FCA proposes to submit an investigation report to the RDC with a recommendation for regulatory action, the FCA's usual practice is to send a preliminary findings letter to the subject of an investigation before the matter is referred to the RDC. The letter will normally annex the investigators' preliminary investigation report. Comment will be invited on the contents of the preliminary findings letter and the preliminary investigation report.
1The FCA recognises that preliminary findings letters serve a very useful purpose in focussing decision making on the contentious issues in the case. This in turn makes for better quality and more efficient decision making. However, there are exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may decide it is not appropriate to send out a preliminary findings letter. This includes: (1) where the subject consents to not receiving a preliminary findings letter; or (2) where it is not practicable
1In cases where it is sent, the preliminary findings letter will set out the facts which the investigators consider relevant to the matters under investigation (normally, as indicated above, by means of an annexed preliminary investigation report). And it will invite the person concerned to confirm that those facts are complete and accurate, or to provide further comment. FCA staff will allow a reasonable period (normally 28 days) for a response to this letter, and will take into
In assessing compliance with, or a breach of, a rule in COCON, the FCA will have regard to the context in which a course of conduct was undertaken, including: (1) the precise circumstances of the individual case; (2) the characteristics of the particular function performed by the individual in question; and (3) the behaviour expected in that function.
In determining whether or not the particular conduct of a person complies with the rules in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include: (1) whether that conduct relates to activities that are subject to other provisions of the Handbook; (2) whether that conduct is consistent with the requirements and standards of the regulatory system relevant to the person'sfirm.
In determining whether or not the conduct of a senior conduct rules staff member complies with rules SC1 to SC4 in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include:(1) whether they exercised reasonable care when considering the information available to them;(2) whether they reached a reasonable conclusion upon which to act;(3) the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business;(4) their role and responsibility as determined by reference to the relevant statement
UK domestic firms listed on the London Stock Exchange are subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code, whose internal control provisions are explained in the publication entitled ‘Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (October 2005)’ issued by the Financial Reporting Council. Therefore, firms in this category will be subject to that code, as well as to the rules in COCON. In forming an opinion as to whether a senior conduct rules staff member has
(1) An insurer with a permission to effect or carry out life policies must submit to the FCA a persistency report in respect of life policies by 30 April each year in accordance with this section.11111118(2) A firm with permission to establish, operate or wind up a stakeholder pension scheme must submit to the FCA11:11(a) a data report on stakeholder pensions by 30 April each year using the form specified in SUP 16 Annex 6R.99(b) [deleted]99
(1) 9A firm may submit persistency and a data report for a 12 month period ending within 4 months of its accounting reference date if:(a) it has notified the FCA of this intention by email using the email address specified in SUP 16.3.10 G (3) no later than the firm'saccounting reference date; and(b) it either:(i) has an accounting reference date other than 31 December; or(ii) undertakes industrial assurance policy business.
1In this section, and in SUP 16 Annex 6R:9(1) '12 month report' means the part of a persistency report or data report reporting on life policies or stakeholder pensions effected in Y-2, '24 month report' means the part of a persistency report or data report reporting on life policies or stakeholder pensions effected in Y-3, and so on;(2) 'CC' means the number of life policies or stakeholder pensions which: (a) were effected during the period to which the calculation relates; and(b)
1(1) 1SYSC 22 (Regulatory references) says that if1 a firm (A):1(a) is considering appointing a person (P)1 to perform any1controlled function or certain other functions1; (b) requests a reference from a firm (B) that is P’s1 current or former employer1; and(c) indicates to B the purpose of the request;B should1, as soon as reasonably practicable, give a reference1 to A1(2) This applies even if A is a firm to which SUP 10A (FCA Approved Persons) applies rather than this chapt
(1) The obligations to supply information to:(a) the FCA under this chapter;(b) [deleted]1apply notwithstanding any:(c) agreement (for example a 'COT 3' Agreement settled by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS)); or(d) any other arrangements entered into by a firm and an employee upon termination of the employee’s employment.(2) A firm should not enter into any such arrangements or agreements that could conflict with its obligations under this chapter.
(1) The5 exclusion for groups and joint enterprises in article 69 of the Regulated Activities Order (Groups and joint enterprises) does not apply to transactions relating to contracts of insurance. This will affect5 a company providing services for:(a) other members of its group; or(b) other participants in a joint enterprise of which it is a participant.(2) Such companies might typically provide risk or treasury management or administration services which may include regulated
Article 67 excludes from the activities of dealing as agent, arranging (bringing about) deals in investments, making arrangements with a view to transactions in investments, assisting in the administration and performance of a contract of insurance and advising on investments, any activity which:(1) is carried on in the course of carrying on any profession or business which does not otherwise consist of the carrying on of regulated activities in the United Kingdom; and(2) may
Article 67 may also apply to activities relating to assignments of insurance policies, as, in the FCA'sview, article 2.1(1) of the IDD5 applies essentially to the creation of new contracts of insurance and not the assignment of rights under existing policies. As such, where a solicitor or licensed conveyancer arranges an assignment of a contract of insurance, the exclusion in article 67 remains of potential application. For similar reasons, trustees advising on or arranging assignments
Article 72B (see also PERG 5.3.7 G (Connected contracts of insurance)) may be of relevance to persons who supply non-motor goods or services5 or provide services related to travel in the course of carrying on a profession or business which does not otherwise consist of carrying on regulated activities. In the FCA's view, the fact that a person may carry on regulated activities in the course of the carrying on of a profession or business does not, of itself, mean that the profession
In the FCA's view, the liability risks referred to in PERG 5.11.13G (5) cover risks in relation to liabilities that the policyholder might have to others (that is, third party claims). Many policies will provide this sort of cover and so fall outside the scope of the exclusion. For example, a policy that covers the cost of unauthorised calls made when a mobile telephone is stolen includes 'liability risks' and would not be a 'connected contract of insurance'. By contrast, travel
1Section 365(6) of the Act makes it clear that the FCA may petition for the compulsory winding up of a company even if it is already in voluntary winding up. This power is already available to creditors and contributories of companies in voluntary winding up. For example, the court can be asked to direct the liquidator to investigate a transaction which the company undertook before the winding up. In some circumstances, this power may be used in respect of partnerships (section
1Given the powers available to creditors (or contributories), the FCA anticipates that there will only be a limited number of cases where it will exercise the right under section 365(6) to petition for the compulsory winding up of a company already in voluntary winding up. The FCA will only be able to exercise this right where one or both of the grounds on which it can seek compulsory winding up are met.
1Factors which the FCA will consider when it decides whether to use this power (in addition to the factors identified in paragraphs 13.5.1 to 13.6.3 in relation to the FCA's decisions to seek compulsory winding up) include: (1) whether the FCA's concerns can properly and effectively be met by seeking a specific direction under section 365(2) of the Act;
(2) whether the affairs of the company require independent investigation of the kind which follows a compulsory
1The FCA will not normally make public the fact that it is or is not investigating a particular matter, or any of the findings or conclusions of an investigation except as described in other sections of this chapter. The following paragraphs deal with the exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may make a public announcement that it is or is not investigating a particular matter.
1Where the matter in question has occurred in the context of a takeover bid, and the following circumstances apply, the FCA may make a public announcement that it is not investigating, and does not propose to investigate, the matter. Those circumstances are where the FCA:(1) has not appointed, and does not propose to appoint, investigators; and (2) considers (following discussion with the Takeover Panel) that such an announcement is appropriate in the interests of preventing or
1Where it is investigating any matter, the FCA will, in exceptional circumstances, make a public announcement that it is doing so if it considers such an announcement is desirable to: (1) maintain public confidence in the financial system or the market; or (2) protect consumers or investors; or (3) prevent widespread malpractice; or (4) help the investigation itself, for example by bringing forward witnesses; or (5) maintain the smooth operation of the market. In deciding whether
1The exceptional circumstances referred to above may arise where the matters under investigation have become the subject of public concern, speculation or rumour. In this case it may be desirable for the FCA to make public the fact of its investigation in order to allay concern, or contain the speculation or rumour. Where the matter in question relates to a takeover bid, the FCA will discuss any announcement beforehand with the Takeover Panel. Any announcement will be subject
1The FCA will not normally publish details of the information found or conclusions reached during its investigations. In many cases, statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained by the FCA in the course of exercising its functions are likely to prevent publication (see section 348 of the Act). In exceptional circumstances, and where it is not prevented from doing so, the FCA may publish details. Circumstances in which it may do so include those where the fact
(1) An overseas firm, which is not an incoming firm, must notify the FCA4 within 30 business days of any person taking up or ceasing to hold the following positions:88(a) the firm's worldwide chief executive (that is, the person who, alone or jointly with one or more others, is responsible under the immediate authority of the directors for the whole of its business) if the person is based outside the United Kingdom;(b) the person within the overseas firm with a purely strategic
SUP 15.4.1 R is not made under the powers conferred on the FCA4 by Part V of the Act (Performance of Regulated Activities). A person notified to the FCA4 under SUP 15.4.1 R is not subject to the Statements of Principle or Code of Practice for Approved Persons, unless he is also an approved person.8888
(1) A firm other than a credit union must submit the form in SUP 15 Ann 2 R online 8 using the FCA's4online notification and application system6. 888552(2) A credit union must submit the form in SUP 15 Ann 2 R in the way set out in SUP 15.7.4 R to SUP 15.7.9 G (Form and method of notification).2(3) Where a firm is obliged to submit an application online under (1), if the FCA's4 information technology systems fail and online submission is unavailable for 24 hours or more, until
(1) If the FCA's4 information technology systems fail and online submission is unavailable for 24 hours or more, the FCA4 will endeavour to publish a notice on its website confirming that online submission is unavailable and that the alternative methods of submission set out in SUP 15.4.3R(3) and SUP 15.7.4R to SUP 15.7.9G (Form and method of notification) should be used.28888(2) Where SUP 15.4.3R (3) applies to a firm, GEN 1.3.2 R (Emergency) does not apply.2
1The FCA will consider cancelling a firm'sPart 4A permission using its own-initiative powers contained in sections 55J and 55Q respectively of the Act in two main circumstances: (1) where the FCA has very serious concerns about a firm, or the way its business is or has been conducted; (2) where the firm'sregulated activities have come to an end and it has not applied for cancellation of its Part 4A permission.
1The grounds on which the FCA may exercise its power to cancel an authorised person's
permission under section 55J of the Act are the same as the grounds for variation and for imposition of requirements. They are set out in section 55J(1) and section 55L(2) and described in EG 8.1.1. Examples of the types of circumstances in which the FCA may cancel a firm'sPart 4A permission include: (1) non-compliance with a Financial Ombudsman Service award against the
1Depending on the circumstances, the FCA may need to consider whether it should first use its own-initiative powers to impose requirements on a firm or to vary a firm'sPart 4A permission before going on to cancel it. Amongst other circumstances, the FCA may use this power where it considers it needs to take immediate action against a firm because of the urgency and seriousness of the situation.
1Where the situation appears so urgent and serious that the firm should immediately cease to carry on all regulated activities, the FCA may first vary the firm'sPart 4A permission so that there is no longer any regulated activity for which the firm has a Part 4A permission. If it does this, the FCA will then have a duty to cancel the firm'sPart 4A permission - once it is satisfied that it is no longer necessary to keep the Part 4A permission in force.
1However, where the FCA has cancelled a firm'sPart 4A permission, it is required by section 33 of the Act to go on to give a direction withdrawing the firm'sauthorisation. Accordingly, the FCA may decide to keep a firm'sPart 4A permission in force to maintain the firm's status as an authorised person and enable it (the FCA) to monitor the firm's activities. An example is where the FCA needs to supervise an orderly winding down of the firm's regulated business (see SUP 6.4.22 (When
Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, Paragraph 2
2(1) The [UK RIE] must be a fit and properpersonto perform the [ relevant functions ] of a [ UK RIE ]. |
(2) In considering whether this requirement is satisfied, the [FCA]4 may (without prejudice to the generality of regulation 6(1)) take into account all the circumstances, including the [UK RIE's] connection with any person. 4 |
2(3) The members of the management body5 must be of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skill and experience to perform their duties5. |
2(4) The persons who are in a position to exercise significant influence over the management of the [UK RIE], whether directly or indirectly must be suitable. |
In determining whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to any relevant factor including, but not limited to:4(1) the commitment shown by the UK recognised body'smanagement body5 to satisfying the recognition requirements and to complying with other obligations in or under the Act;(2) its arrangements, policies and resources for fulfilling its obligations under the Act in relation to its activities as a UK recognised body;(3) the extent
In determining whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to its connections with:4(1) any undertaking in the same group;(2) any owner or part-owner of the UK recognised body;(3) any person who has the right to appoint or remove members of the management body5;(4) any person who is able in practice to appoint or remove members of the management body5;(5) any person in accordance with whose instructions the management body5 is accustomed to
In assessing whether its connection with any person could affect whether a UK recognised body is a fit and proper person, the FCA4 may have regard to:4(1) the reputation and standing of that other person, including his standing with any relevant UK or overseas regulator;(2) breaches of any law or regulation by that other person; (3) the roles of any of the UK recognised body's key individuals who have a position within organisations under the control or influence of that other
2In assessing whether the persons who effectively direct the business and operations of the UK RIE are of sufficiently good repute and sufficiently experienced to ensure the sound and prudent management and operation of the financial markets operated by 3it, the FCA4 may have regard to the repute and experience of the UK RIE'skey individuals.4
1The FCA's effective and proportionate use of its enforcement powers plays an important role in the pursuit of its statutory objectives, including its operational objectives of securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system, and promoting effective competition in the interests of consumers. For example, using enforcement helps to contribute to the protection of consumers and to deter future contraventions
1There are a number of principles underlying the FCA's approach to the exercise of its enforcement powers: (1) The effectiveness of the regulatory regime depends to a significant extent on maintaining an open and co-operative relationship between the FCA and those it regulates.(2) The FCA will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies.(3) The FCA will seek to
1Enforcement is only one of a number of regulatory tools available to the FCA. As a risk based regulator with limited resources, throughout its work the FCA prioritises its resources in the areas which pose the biggest threat to its statutory objectives. This applies as much to the enforcement tool as it does to any other tool available to it. The next section of this chapter summarises how in practice the FCA takes a risk based approach towards its use of the enforcement tool,
1Where a firm or other person has failed to comply with the requirements of the Act, the rules, or other relevant legislation, it may be appropriate to deal with this without the need for formal disciplinary or other enforcement action. The proactive supervision and monitoring of firms, and an open and cooperative relationship between firms and their supervisors, will, in some cases where a contravention has taken place, lead the FCA to decide against taking formal disciplinary
If a decision maker is asked to decide whether to give a decision notice or second supervisory notice, it will:(1) review the material before it;(2) consider any representations made (whether written, oral or both) and any comments by FCA1 staff or others in respect of those representations;1(3) decide whether to give the notice and the terms of any notice given.
If the FCA1 receives no response or representations within the period specified in a warning notice, the decision maker may regard as undisputed the allegations or matters in that notice and a decision notice will be given accordingly. A person who has received a decision notice and has not previously made any response or representations to the FCA1, may nevertheless refer the FCA's1 decision to the Tribunal.111
If the FCA1 receives no response or representations within the period specified in a first supervisory notice, the FCA1 will not give a second supervisory notice. The outcome depends on when the relevant action took or takes effect (as stated in the notice). If the action:11(1) took effect immediately, or on a specified date which has already passed, it continues to have effect (subject to any decision on a referral to the Tribunal); or(2) was to take effect on a specified date
Under section 388(3) of the Act, following the giving of a decision notice but before the FCA1 takes action to which the decision notice relates, the FCA1 may give the person concerned a further decision notice relating to different action concerning the same matter. Under section 388(4) of the Act, the FCA1 can only do this if the person receiving the further decision notice gives its consent. In these circumstances the following procedure will apply:111(1) FCA1staff will recommend
(1) When deciding whether to take enforcement
action under Part 7 of the RCB Regulations,
and what form that enforcement action should take, the FCA will consider all relevant factors,
including:(a) the relevant factors on decisions to take action set out in DEPP 6.2.1 G;(b) whether any contractual or other arrangements agreed between the
parties can be used effectively to address any perceived failure under the RCB Regulations; and(c) the interests of investors in the relevant
When considering whether to impose
a financial penalty, the amount of penalty, and whether to impose the penalty
on the issuer or the owner, the FCA will have regard, where relevant,1 to:(1) the statement on determining the appropriate level of a financial
penalty set out 1in DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5D1;(2) the particular arrangements between the issuer and
the owner; (3) the likely impact of the penalty on the interests of investors
in a regulated covered bond;
and(4) the conduct
In the FCA's view the requirements relating to risk management policy and risk measurement set out in this section are the regulatory responsibility of the management company'sHome State regulator but to the extent that they constitute fund application rules, are also the responsibility of the UCITS'Home State regulator. As such, these responsibilities may overlap between the competent authorities of the Home and Host States. EEA UCITS management companies providing collective
(1) 3(a) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must use a risk management process enabling it to monitor and measure at any time the risk of the scheme's positions and their contribution to the overall risk profile of the scheme.3(b) In particular, an authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must not solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings issued by
5An authorised fund manager or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme subject to COLL 6.12.3R(2) must notify the FCA of the information specified in points (a) and (b) of that rule:(1) annually, within 30 business days of 31 October, with information that is accurate as of 31 October of that year;(2) using the form in COLL 6 Annex 2R; and(3) by submitting it:(a) online through the appropriate systems accessible from the FCA’s website; or(b) if the appropriate
(1) 5In addition, an authorised fund manager or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme subject to COLL 6.12.3R(2) should submit a notification to the FCA if there has been a significant change to the fund’s risk profile since its last report, by sending the form in COLL 6 Annex 2R, completed as applicable, to fundsupervision@fca.org.uk.(2) A significant change to the fund’s risk profile could include, but is not limited to:(a) the first use of derivatives for investment
(1) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must assess, monitor and periodically review:(a) the adequacy and effectiveness of the risk management policy and of the arrangements, processes and techniques referred to in COLL 6.12.5 R;(b) the level of compliance by the authorised fund manager or the UK UCITS management company with the risk management policy and with those arrangements, processes and techniques referred
UK UCITS management companies are advised that when they applied for authorisation from the FCA under the Act, their ability to comply with the requirements in COLL 6.12.7 R would have been assessed by the FCA as an aspect of their fitness and properness in determining whether the threshold conditions set out in Schedule 6 (Threshold conditions) of the Act were met. Firms are further advised that their compliance with these requirements is subject to review by the FCA on an ongoing
In the FCA view, this means that the reasonable investor must be satisfied that what he will get when he realises his investment is his proportionate share in the value of BC's underlying assets, less any dealing costs. In other words, that he is satisfied he will get net asset value. The investment condition focuses on the way the body corporate operates over time, and not by reference to particular issues of shares or securities (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section
For the 'satisfaction test' to be met, there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could form a view. He must be satisfied that the value of BC's property will be the basis of a calculation used for the whole, or substantially the whole, of his investment. The FCA considers that the circumstances, or combination of circumstances, in which a reasonable investor would be in a position to form this view include:(1) where the basis of net asset valuation
PERG 9.9.3 G (2)and PERG 9.9.3 G (3) refer to circumstances where the reasonable investor may be satisfied that he can realise his investment at net asset value because of arrangements made to ensure that the shares or securities trade at net asset value on a market. There may, for example, be cases of market dealing where the price of shares or securities will not depend on the market. An example is where BC or a third party undertakes to ensure that the market value reflects
However, where there is a market, the FCA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FCA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
The fact that the definition must be applied to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general)) is also relevant here. So, for example, in a take-over situation the fact that a bidder may be willing to provide an exit route for an investment at net asset value will be irrelevant within the context of the definition. This is so even if an investor invests in particular shares or securities in the knowledge or expectation or in anticipation
The relevant requirements in regulation 5(3) are that:(1) the incoming EEA firm has given a notice to the FCA12 (see SUP 14.4.1 G) and to its Home State regulator stating the details of the proposed change;12(2) if the change arises from circumstances beyond the incoming EEA firm's control, that firm has, as soon as practicable, given to the appropriate UK regulator12 and to its Home State regulator the notice in (1).112
9Where the change arises from circumstances within the control of the incoming EEA firm, the relevant requirements in regulation 7B(4) are that: (1) the incoming EEA firm has given a notice to the FCA and its Home State regulator stating the details of the proposed changes; and (2) either: (a) the FCA has informed the incoming EEA firm that it may make the change; or(b) a period of one month has elapsed beginning with the day on which the incoming EEA firm gave the notice under
(1) A firm must establish, implement and maintain appropriate and effective arrangements for the disclosure of reportable concerns by whistleblowers.(2) The arrangements in (1) must at least:(a) be able effectively to handle disclosures of reportable concerns including: (i) where the whistleblower has requested confidentiality or has chosen not to reveal their identity; and(ii) allowing for disclosures to be made through a range of communication methods; (b) ensure the effective
(1) When establishing internal arrangements in line with SYSC 18.3.1R a firm may:(a) draw upon relevant resources prepared by whistleblowing charities or other recognised standards setting organisations; and (b) consult with its UK-based employees or those representing these employees.(2) In considering if a firm has complied with SYSC 18.3.1R the FCA will take into account whether the firm has applied the measures in (1).(3) A firm may wish to clarify in its written procedures
This rule applies to an EEA SMCR banking firm3 and a third-country SMCR banking firm3.2(1) A person subject to this rule (‘P’) 2must, in the manner described in (2), communicate to its UK-based employees that they may disclose reportable concerns to the PRA or the FCA and the methods for doing so. P 2must make clear that:(a) reporting to the PRA or to the FCA is not conditional on a report first being made using P’s 2internal arrangements; (b) it is possible to report using P’s
The FCA would regard as a serious matter any evidence that a firm had acted to the detriment of a whistleblower. Such evidence could call into question the fitness and propriety of the firm or relevant members of its staff, and could therefore, if relevant, affect the firm’s continuing satisfaction of threshold condition 5 (Suitability) or, for an approved person or a certification employee, their status as such.
(1) The FCA may dispense with, or modify, a requirement in DTR 8 in such cases and by reference to such circumstances as it considers appropriate (subject to the Act).(2) A dispensation or modification may be either unconditional or subject to specified conditions.(3) If a primary information provider or a person that is applying for approval as a primary information provider has applied for, or been granted, a dispensation or modification, it must notify the FCA immediately it
(1) An application to the FCA to dispense with or modify a requirement in DTR 8 must be in writing.(2) The application must:(a) contain a clear explanation of why the dispensation or modification is requested;(b) include details of any special requirements, for example, the date by which the dispensation or modification is required;(c) contain all relevant information that should reasonably be brought to the FCA's attention;(d) contain any statement or information that is required
A primary information provider or a person applying for approval as a primary information provider must consult with the FCA at the earliest possible stage if they:(1) are in doubt about how a requirement in DTR 8 applies in a particular situation; or(2) consider that it may be necessary for the FCA to dispense with or modify a requirement in DTR 8.
Where a requirement in DTR 8 refers to consultation with the FCA, submissions must be made in writing other than in circumstances of exceptional urgency.Address for correspondenceNote: The FCA's address for correspondence in relation to DTR 8 is:Primary Market Monitoring
Enforcement and Market Oversight Division
The Financial Conduct Authority
12 Endeavour Square
London, E20 1JN
Primary Market MonitoringMarkets DivisionThe Financial Conduct Authority12 Endeavour Square1LondonE20