Related provisions for LR 11.1.1B
701 - 720 of 1115 items.
The FCA may modify LR 14.2.2 R to accept a percentage lower than 25% if it considers that the market will operate properly with a lower percentage in view of the large number of shares of the same class and the extent of their distribution to the public. For that purpose, the FCA may take into account shares of the same class that are held (even though they are not listed) in states that are not EEA States.1[Note: Article 48 CARD]
The FCA will not admit shares of a company incorporated in a non-EEA State that are not listed either in its country of incorporation or in the country in which a majority of its shares are held, unless the FCA is satisfied that the absence of the listing is not due to the need to protect investors. [Note: Article 51 CARD]
In relation to each document in a CASS debt management firm'sCASS 11 resolution pack a firm must:(1) put in place adequate arrangements to ensure that an administrator, receiver, trustee, liquidator or analogous officer appointed in respect of it or any material part of its property is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable and, in any event, within 48 hours of that officer’s appointment; and(2) ensure that it is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable
(1) The FCA1 considers it reasonable for a firm's policy to exclude cover for:(a) specific business lines if that type of business has not been carried out by the firm in the past and will not be carried out by the firm during the life of the policy; or (b) specific claims that have been previously notified to the firm'sinsurer and claimed for under another policy.
(2) The FCA1 does not consider it reasonable for a firm's policy to treat legal defence
A firm must notify the FCA1 immediately if it becomes aware, or has information which reasonably suggests, that any of the following matters in relation to its professional indemnity insurance has occurred, may have occurred or may occur in the foreseeable future:
(1) professional indemnity insurance cannot be obtained within 28 days of the inception or renewal date; (2) professional indemnity insurance is cancelled; (3) the amount of aggregate cover is exhausted;
(1) 1For the purposes of the provisions relating to professional indemnity
insurance, “additional capital resources” means readily realisable own
funds or capital resources under IPRU-INV 13.15.3R, depending on
the type of firm1.(2) 1The FCA1 expects items included in own funds or capital
resources under IPRU-INV 13.15.3R, depending on the type of firm,1
to be regarded as “readily realisable” only if they can be realised, at
any given time, within 90 days.
1This
manual (DEPP) is relevant to firms, approved
persons and other persons,
whether or not they are regulated by the FCA.5 It sets out:5(1) the FCA's5 decision-making procedure for giving statutory
notices. These are warning
notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5);5(1A) the FCA's decision-making
procedure in cases where the PRA is
required to seek the FCA's consent
before approving an application (a) for Part
4A permission; (b) for the variation
(1) (a) If a depositary performs part of its functions through a branch in another EEA State, this is not a delegation by the depositary of its functions to a third party.(b) This is because ‘third party’ in COLL 6.6B.22R means any party that is not part of the same legal entity as the depositary.(2) Paragraph (1) also applies where the depositary is the UKbranch of an EEA firm and it performs part of its functions:(a) through a branch in another EEA State; or(b) from the EEA
The requirements of SUP 2 (Information gathering by the FCA or PRA2 on its own initiative) apply to the depositary, under which it must enable the FCA to obtain, on request, all information that the depositary has obtained while discharging its duties and that the FCA considers necessary.[Note: article 26a first paragraph of the UCITS Directive]
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only to certain categories of employee. However, the FCA expects firms, in complying with the BIPRU Remuneration Codegeneral requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FCA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19C.3.40 R to SYSC 19C.3.43 G. (3) The FCA also
Section 87B(1) of the Act sets out when the FCA may authorise the omission of information from a prospectus:
(1) |
The [FCA] may authorise the omission from a prospectus of any information, the inclusion of which would otherwise be required, on the ground – |
|
(a) |
that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest; |
|
(b) |
that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the issuer, provided that the omission would be unlikely to mislead the public with regard to any facts or circumstances which are essential for an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2); or |
|
(c) |
that the information is only of minor importance for a specific offer to the public or admission to trading on a regulated market and unlikely to influence an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2). |
|
2Article 2(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/301 sets out requirements regarding the submission of requests to omit information from a prospectus. The FCA considers that a reasoned request for this purpose would: (1) be in writing from the applicant;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for its omission; and(3) state why in the applicant's opinion one or more of the grounds in section 87B(1) of the Act applies.2[Note: Extracts
Article 72B of the Regulated Activities Order (Activities carried on by a provider of relevant goods or services) excludes from FCA regulation certain regulated activities carried on by providers of non-motor goods or services3 and services related to travel in relation to contracts of insurance that satisfy a number of conditions. Details about the scope of this exclusion can be found at PERG 5.11.13 G to PERG 5.11.14G (Activities carried on by a provider of relevant goods or
(1) The Takeover Panel publishes notices regarding compliance with the Takeover Code. It may also, from time to time, name in those notices persons as persons that, in the Takeover Panel's opinion, are not likely to comply with the Takeover Code. Any notices of this type will be available on the Takeover Panel's website (www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk).11(2) A firm should keep itself informed of Takeover Panel notices and take them into account in seeking to comply with MAR 4.3.1
(1) Where a restriction under MAR 4.3.1 R applies, an authorised professional firm is not prevented from providing professional advice or representation in any proceedings to the person where that falls within section 327(8) of the Act. This means that the person can obtain legal advice or representation in any proceedings from a law firm and accounting advice from an accounting firm: see MAR 4.4.1 R (2).(2) While the FCA recognises the duty of authorised professional firms to
The FCA2 will consider all the relevant circumstances of the case when deciding whether to impose a penalty or issue a public censure. As such, the factors set out in DEPP 6.4.2 G are not exhaustive. Not all of the factors may be relevant in a particular case and there may be other factors, not listed, that are relevant.2
The criteria for determining whether it is appropriate to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty include those factors that the FCA2 will consider in1 determining the amount of penalty set out in DEPP 6.5 A to DEPP 6.5 D.1 Some particular considerations that may be relevant when the FCA2 determines whether to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty are:122(1) whether or not deterrence may be effectively achieved by issuing a public
1Statements of Principle issued under section 64A(1)(a) of the Act
Statement of Principle 1 An approved person must act with integrity in carrying out his accountable functions. |
Statement of Principle 2 An approved person must act with due skill, care and diligence in carrying out his accountable functions. |
Statement of Principle 3 An approved person must observe proper standards of market conduct in carrying out his accountable functions. |
Statement of Principle 4 An approved person must deal with the FCA, the PRA and other regulators in an open and cooperative way and must disclose appropriately any information of which the FCA or the PRA would reasonably expect notice. |
Statement of Principle 5 An approved person performing an accountable higher management function1 must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which they are 1responsible in their 1accountable function is organised so that it can be controlled effectively. |
Statement of Principle 6 An approved person performing an accountable higher management function1 must exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm for which they are1 responsible in their 1accountable function. |
Statement of Principle 7 An approved person performing an accountable higher management function1 must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which they are 1responsible in their 1accountable function complies with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system. |
(1) Where a depositary of a master UCITS detects any irregularities with regards to the scheme which may have a negative impact on the relevant feeder UCITS, the depositary must immediately inform:(a) the FCA;(b) the feeder UCITS or, where applicable, its management company; and(c) the depositary of the feeder UCITS.(2) The irregularities referred to in (1) include, but are not limited to:(a) errors in the valuation of the scheme property performed in accordance with COLL 6.3.3
(1) When notifying the FCAof any irregularities in accordance with COLL 11.4.3R (1), the depositary of the master UCITS should also inform the depositary of the feeder UCITS how the master UCITS or its authorised fund manager has resolved or proposes to resolve the irregularity.(2) Where the depositary of a UCITS scheme that is a feeder UCITS is informed by the depositary of a master UCITS of an irregularity and is not satisfied that the resolution or proposed resolution is in
Subject to3FEES 6.3.22 R, the FSCS must calculate a participant firm's share of a base costs levy by:33(1) for recognised investment exchanges, providing for £1,000 per RIE for each financial year of the compensation scheme (other than in the financial year in which the recognised investment exchange becomes a participant firm, when its share is nil);65335(2) for other participant firms:65533(a) identifying the base costs which the FSCS has incurred, or expects to incur, in the
3A firm is not subject to consolidated supervision under BIPRU 8 where any of the following conditions are fulfilled:(1) the firm is included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by the FCA or PRA under the EUCRR; or(2) the firm is included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by a competent authority other than the FCA under the EUCRR as implemented by that competent authority.
3Where a group includes one or more BIPRU firms and one or more IFPRU investment firms which has permission under article 19 of the EUCRR (Exclusion from the scope of prudential consolidation) from the FCA not to be included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member, consolidated supervision under BIPRU 8 applies to those IFPRU investment firms and the BIPRU firms.
The purpose of this section is to give directions to the electronic money issuers referred to in SUP 16.1.1B D under regulation 49 (Reporting requirements) of the Electronic Money Regulations in relation to:(1) the information in respect of their issuance of electronic money and provision of payment services and their compliance with requirements imposed by or under Parts 2 to 5 of the Electronic Money Regulations that they must provide to the FCA6; and 6(2) the time at which
An electronic money issuer that is not a credit institution must submit to the FCA:66(1) the duly completed return applicable to it as set out in column (2) of the table in SUP 16.15.8 D; and(2) the return referred to in (1):(a) in the format specified as applicable in column (3) of the table in SUP 16.15.8 D; (b) at the frequency and in respect of the periods specified in column (4) of that table;(c) by the due date specified in column (5) of that table; and (d) by electronic
(1) A firm may arrange for records to be kept in such form as it chooses, provided the record is readily accessible for inspection by the FCA.(2) Where a firm chooses to maintain records in electronic form, it should take reasonable steps to ensure that:(a) the electronic record accurately reflects the original information; and (b) the electronic record has not been subject to unauthorised or accidental alteration.
An applicant for the admission of securitised derivatives must either:(1) have permission under the Act to carry on its activities relating to securitised derivatives and be either a bank or a securities and futures firm;(2) if the applicant is an overseas company:(a) be regulated by an overseas regulator responsible for the regulation of banks, securities firms or futures firms and which has a lead regulation agreement for financial supervision with the FCA; and(b) be carrying
The FCA's3 penalty-setting regime is based on the following principles:3(1) Disgorgement - a firm or individual should not benefit from any breach;(2) Discipline - a firm or individual should be penalised for wrongdoing; and(3) Deterrence - any penalty imposed should deter the firm or individual who committed the breach, and others, from committing further or similar breaches.
(1) The total amount payable by a person subject to enforcement action may be made up of two elements: (i) disgorgement of the benefit received as a result of the breach; and (ii) a financial penalty reflecting the seriousness of the breach. These elements are incorporated in a five-step framework, which can be summarised as follows:(a) Step 1: the removal of any financial benefit derived directly from the breach;(b) Step 2: the determination of a figure which reflects the seriousness
(1) [deleted]1(2) If an issuer is
faced with an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable
if it is necessary to clarify the situation. In such situations a holding
announcement should be used where an issuer believes
that there is a danger of inside information leaking
before the facts and their impact can be confirmed. The holding announcement
should:(a) detail as much of the subject matter
as possible;(b) set out the reasons why a fuller
announcement
The FCA is aware that many issuers provide unpublished information to
third parties such as analysts, employees, credit rating agencies, finance
providers and major shareholders, often in response to queries from such parties.
The fact that information is unpublished does not in itself make it inside information. However, unpublished
information which amounts to inside information is
only permitted to be disclosed in accordance with the requirements of the Market Abuse Regula