Related provisions for IFPRU 7.1.7
381 - 400 of 1123 items.
2These guidelines concern the following bodies (the agencies): the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA);the Serious Fraud Office (the SFO);the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS);the Crown Prosecution Service (the CPS);the Association of Chief Police Officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO);the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS);the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (the PPS);the Association of Chief Police Officers
2The guidelines are intended to assist the agencies when considering cases concerning financial crime and/or regulatory misconduct that are, or may be, of mutual interest to the FCA and one or more of the other agencies. Their implementation and wider points arising from them will be kept under review by the agencies who will liaise regularly.
2The following are indicators of whether action by the FCA or one of the other agencies is more appropriate. They are not listed in any particular order or ranked according to priority. No single feature of the case should be considered in isolation, but rather the whole case should be considered in the round.(a) 2 Tending towards action by the FCAWhere the suspected conduct in question gives rise to concerns regarding market confidence or protection of consumers of services regulated
2The agencies will consider, as necessary, and keep under review whether an investigation has reached the point where it is appropriate to commence proceedings. Where agencies are deciding whether to institute criminal proceedings, they will have regard to the usual codes or guidance relevant to that decision. For example, agencies other than the PPS or COPFS will have regard to the Code for Crown Prosecutors (Note: Different guidance applies to the PPS and COPFS. All criminal
So-called 'mortgage clubs' or 'wholesalers' essentially act as a distribution function for lenders, providing information to intermediaries about current deals available from a range of lenders. They provide information (often through an electronic sourcing system) in a way that helps intermediaries search the market effectively and, as such, do not deal directly with individual borrowers. If only engaged in these activities and without direct contact with individual borrowers,
So-called 'mortgage packaging companies' may undertake certain parts of the mortgage process for lenders on an outsourced basis, ensuring that a complete set of documentation is collated and sent to the lender. This might include receiving application forms from intermediaries, undertaking credit reference checks and instructing a valuer. Other activities might include a product placement service for other intermediaries who provide product advice or recommendations to their clients.
The term 'broker packagers' is typically used to describe intermediaries who either market their services directly to borrowers or who offer other intermediaries a complete mortgage outsourcing service. They are often involved in the sales and advice process, including helping the borrower complete application forms. In the FCA's view, broker packagers carrying on these types of activity in direct contact with the borrower are likely to be carrying on the regulated activities
For the purpose of article 282(6) of the EU CRR (Hedging sets), a firm must apply the CCR Mark-to-market method as set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6, Section 3 (Mark-to-market method) of the EU CRR to:(1) transactions with non-linear risk profile; or(2) payment legs and transactions with debt instruments as underlying;for which it cannot determine the delta or the modified duration, as the case may be, using an internal model approved by the FCA under Part Three Title
(1) This guidance sets out the FCA's expectations for granting permission to a firm to use its own one-sided credit valuation adjustment internal models (an "internal CVA model") for the purpose of estimating the maturity factor "M", as proposed under article 162(2)(h) of the EU CRR (Maturity).(2) In the context of counterparty credit risk, the maturity factor "M" is intended to increase the own funds requirements to reflect potential higher risks associated with medium and long-term
(1) This guidance sets out the FCA's expectations for permitting a firm with the permission to use the Internal Model Method set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6, Section 6 (Internal model method) and the permission to use an internal VaR model for specific risk set out in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 (Use of internal models) associated with traded debt instruments to set to 1 the maturity factor "M" defined in article 162 of the EU CRR.(2) In the context of counterparty
13The FCA performs part of its supervision work by reviewing and analysing information about firms' records of compliance with the requirements and standards under the regulatory system. The type of report the FCA requires will vary, depending on the type of business a firm undertakes. This information helps the FCA to determine whether a firm is complying with the requirements applicable to its business, and what procedures it is operating to ensure its compliance.
(1) [deleted]101313(1A) The breach report from a depositary of an authorised fund to the FCA must include, for each authorised fund for which it is a depositary:10(a) details of all breaches of COLL or FUND, which came to the depositary’s attention or which were reported to the depositary by the authorised fund manager, during the previous month;10(b) details of any changes to the reported details of an existing breach, whether reported under SUP 16.6.8R(1A) or otherwise;10(c)
(1) 10A depositary must submit its breach report under SUP 16.6.8R(1A) using the form REP011 in SUP 16 Annex 12AR.(2) A depositary must submit its oversight report under SUP 16.6.8R(1B) using the form REP012 in SUP 16 Annex 12AR.(3) A depositary must submit the forms in SUP 16 Annex 12AR:(a) online through the appropriate systems accessible from the FCA’s website; or (b) if the appropriate systems are unavailable, via email to fundsupervision@fca.org.uk.
4The FCA may authorise the omission of information required by LR 13.3 to LR 13.6, LR 13.8 and LR 13 Annex 1, if it considers that disclosure of that information would be contrary to the public interest or seriously detrimental to the listed company, provided that that omission would not be likely to mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances, knowledge of which is essential for the assessment of the matter covered by the circular.
4A request to the FCA to authorise the omission of specific information in a particular case must:(1) be made in writing by the listed company;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for the omission; and(3) state why in the listed company's opinion one or more grounds in LR 13.1.7 G apply.
(1) CASS 11.3.4R describes the FCA controlled function known as the CASS operational oversight function (CF10a) in relation to CASS large debt management firms, including not-for-profit debt advice bodies.1(2) As a consequence of CASS 11.3.4R (in conjunction with SUP 10A.4.1R and SUP 10A.7.10R), in a CASS large debt management firm (including a not-for-profit debt advice body fitting into that category) the function described in CASS 11.3.4R is required to be discharged by a director
A CASS large debt management firm must allocate to a director or senior manager the function of: (1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that CASS debt management firm's systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS 11; (2) reporting to the CASS debt management firm'sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CCR005 return to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.12.29C R.
If, at the time a CASS debt management firm that is not an SMCR firm3 becomes a CASS large debt management firm in accordance with CASS 11.2.8 R, the firm is not able to comply with CASS 11.3.4 R because it has no director or senior manager who is an approved person in respect of the CASS operational oversight function, the firm must:1(1) take the necessary steps to ensure that it complies with CASS 11.3.4 R as soon as practicable, which must at least include submitting an application
(1) 1CASS 11.3.5R provides a grace period for a firm that is not an SMCR firm3 to apply for someone to be approved to perform the CASS operational oversight function. (2) There is no equivalent to CASS 11.3.5R for an SMCR firm3, because a person does not need specific FCA approval before carrying out the function. This is explained in (3) to (5), below.(3) As explained in CASS 11.3.3G, the function in CASS 11.3.5R is not, by itself, a controlled function.(4) Therefore, if an approved
(1) A firm must monitor the transactions made by clients using the service to identify:
(a) infringements of the rules of the trading venue; or
(b) disorderly trading conditions; or
(c) conduct which may involve market abuse and which is to be reported to the FCA.(2) A firm must have a binding written agreement with each client which:
(a) details the essential rights and obligations of both parties arising from the provision of the service; and
(b) states that the firm is responsible
A firm must immediately notify the following if it is providing DEA services:
(1) the FCA; and
(2) the competent authority of any trading venue in the EEA to which the firm provides DEA services.
[Note: article 17(5) of MiFID and MiFID RTS 6 specifying the organisational requirements of investment firms providing direct electronic access]
A firm must provide the following, at the FCA’s request, within 14 days from receipt of the request:
(1) a description of the systems mentioned in MAR 7A.4.2R(1);
(2) evidence that those systems have been applied; and
(3) information stored in accordance with MAR 7A.4.6R.[Note: article 17(5) of MiFID]
(1) 1The FCA2will seek to deprive a firm of the financial benefit derived directly from the breach (which may include the profit made or loss avoided) where it is practicable to quantify this. The FCA2 will ordinarily also charge interest on the benefit.22(2) Where the success of a firm’s entire business model is dependent on breachingFCArules2 or other requirements of the regulatory system and the breach is at the core of the firm’s regulated activities, the FCA2 will seek to
(1) The FCA2 will determine a figure that reflects the seriousness of the breach. In many cases, the amount of revenue generated by a firm from a particular product line or business area is indicative of the harm or potential harm that its breach may cause, and in such cases the FCA2 will determine a figure which will be based on a percentage of the firm’s revenue from the relevant products or business areas. The FCA2 also believes that the amount of revenue generated by a firm
(1) The FCA2 may increase or decrease the amount of the financial penalty arrived at after Step 2, but not including any amount to be disgorged as set out in Step 1, to take into account factors which aggravate or mitigate the breach. Any such adjustments will be made by way of a percentage adjustment to the figure determined at Step 2.2(2) The following list of factors may have the effect of aggravating or mitigating the breach:(a) the conduct of the firm in bringing (or failing
(1) If the FCA2 considers the figure arrived at after Step 3 is insufficient to deter the firm who committed the breach, or others, from committing further or similar breaches then the FCA2 may increase the penalty. Circumstances where the FCA2 may do this include:222(a) where the FCA2 considers the absolute value of the penalty too small in relation to the breach to meet its objective of credible deterrence;2(b) where previous FCA2 action in respect of similar breaches has failed
The FCA2 and the firm on whom a penalty is to be imposed may seek to agree the amount of any financial penalty and other terms. In recognition of the benefits of such agreements, DEPP 6.7 provides that the amount of the financial penalty which might otherwise have been payable will be reduced to reflect the stage at which the FCA2 and the firm concerned reached an agreement. The settlement discount does not apply to the disgorgement of any benefit calculated at Step 1.22
COND gives guidance on the threshold conditions. The FCA3threshold conditions represent the minimum conditions for which the FCA is responsible,3 which a firm is required to satisfy, and continue to satisfy, in order to be given and to retainPart 4A permission. A PRA-authorised person or, as appropriate, a firm seeking to become a PRA-authorised person must also satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the threshold conditions for which the PRA is responsible in order to be given and
(1) Under section 55B(3) of the Act3, in giving or varying a Part 4A permission,3 imposing or varying any requirement or giving consent3, the FCA3 must ensure that the firm concerned will satisfy, and continue to satisfy, the FCA3threshold conditions in relation to all of the regulated activities for which it has or will have permission.(2) If, however, the applicant for permission is an incoming firm seeking top-up permission, or variation of top-up permission, under Part 4A3
(1) If, among other things, a firm is failing to satisfy any of the FCA3threshold conditions, or is likely to fail to do so, the FCA3 may exercise its own-initiative powers under either section 55J (Variation or cancellation on initiative of regulator) or section 55L (Imposition of requirements by FCA) of the Act3. Use of the FCA's own-initiative powers3 is explained in SUP 7 (Individual requirements), and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation of permission on the FCA's3 own initiative
(1) Under section 185 of the Act (Assessment: general) the FCA may, subject to consultation with the PRA where the conditions in section 187B of the Act are satisfied, object to an acquisition of an FCA-authorised person if there are reasonable grounds to do so on the basis of the matters set out in section 186 of the Act (Assessment: criteria) or if the information provided by the section 178 notice giver is incomplete. Section 186(d) of the Act (Assessment: criteria) specifies
(1) The purpose of REC 3.13 is to enable the FCA2to monitor any significant instances where UK recognised bodies outsource their functions to other persons (as permitted 1under Regulation 6 of the Recognition Requirements Regulations or, in relation to an RAP, under regulation 13 of the RAP regulations1. See REC 2.2 and REC 2A.2).121(2) The FCA2does not need to be notified of every instance of outsourcing by a UK recognised body, but only where an activity or activities which
Where a UK recognised body makes an offer or agrees to delegate any of its relevant functions to another person, it must immediately give the FCA2notice of that event, and:2(1) inform the FCA2of the reasons for that delegation or proposed delegation;2(2) inform the FCA2of the reasons why it is satisfied that it will continue to meet the recognition requirements or (for an RAP) RAPrecognition requirements1 following that delegation;2(3) where it makes such an offer by issuing a
1An administration order can be made only in relation to companies and partnerships and only where the court believes that making such an order will achieve one or more of the four purposes set out in section 8 of the 1986 Act. The FCA will apply for an administration order only where it considers that doing so will meet or is likely to meet one or more of these purposes.
1In addition, the FCA will consider, where relevant, factors including: (1) the extent to which the financial difficulties are, or are likely to be attributable to the management of the company or partnership, or to external factors, for example, market forces; (2) the extent to which it appears to the FCA that the company or partnership may, through an administrator, be able to trade its way out of its financial difficulties; (3) the extent to which the company or partnership
This chapter sets out the FCA's3 approach to the supervision of recognised bodies and contains guidance on: 3(1) the arrangements for investigating complaints about recognised bodies made under section 299 of the Act (Complaints about recognised bodies) (REC 4.4); (2) the FCA's3approach to the exercise of its powers under:3(a) (for RIEs)2section 296 of the Act (Appropriate regulator's3 power to give directions) or (for RAPs) regulation 3 of the RAP regulations2 to give directions
The FCA's3 general approach to supervision is intended to ensure that:3(1) the FCA3 has sufficient assurance that recognised bodies continue at all times to satisfy the recognised body requirements; and2132(2) the FCA's3 supervisory resources are allocated, and supervisory effort is applied, in ways which reflect the actual risks to the regulatory objectives. 3
1The FCA will exercise its rights under sections 362, 371 and 374 of the Act to be heard on a third party's petition or in subsequent hearings only where it believes it has information that it considers relevant to the court's consideration of the petition or application. These circumstances may include: (1) where the FCA has relevant information which it believes may not otherwise be drawn to the court's attention; especially where the FCA has been asked to attend for a particular
1The making of an insolvency order operates to stay any proceedings already in place against the company,
partnership or individual, and prevents proceedings being commenced while the insolvency order is in place. Proceedings can continue or be commenced against those persons only with the court's permission. This may impact on the effectiveness of the FCA's use of its powers to seek injunctions and restitution orders from the court. The FCA will draw the court's
1The FCA is given power to receive the same information as creditors are entitled to receive in the winding up, administration, receivership or voluntary arrangement of an authorised person, of appointed representatives and of persons who have carried out a regulated activity while unauthorised. The FCA is also entitled to attend and make representation at any creditors' meeting or (where relevant) creditors' committee meeting taking place in those regimes. When it decides whether
Sections 250 and 261L11 of the Act and regulation 7 of the OEIC Regulations allow the FCA12 to waive the application of certain rules in COLL to:111210(1) a person, as respects a particular AUT, ACS11 or ICVC, on the application or with the consent of that person; and(2) an AUT, ACS11 or ICVC on the application or with the consent of the manager and trustee (in the case of an AUT), the authorised contractual scheme manager and depositary (in the case of an ACS)11 or the ICVC and
1The FCA may impose a variation of permission or a requirement so that it takes effect immediately or on a specified date if it reasonably considers it necessary for the variation or requirement to take effect immediately (or on the date specified), having regard to the ground on which it is exercising its own-initiative powers.
1The FCA will consider exercising its own-initiative power as a matter of urgency where: (1) the information available to it indicates serious concerns about the firm or its business that need to be addressed immediately; and (2) circumstances indicate that it is appropriate to use statutory powers immediately to require and/or prohibit certain actions by the firm in order to ensure the firm addresses these concerns.
1It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list of the situations that will give rise to such serious concerns, but they are likely to include one or more of the following characteristics: (1) information indicating significant loss, risk of loss or other adverse effects for consumers, where action is necessary to protect their interests; (2) information indicating that a firm's conduct has put it at risk of being used for the purposes of financial crime, or of being otherwise
1The FCA will consider the full circumstances of each case when it decides whether an urgent variation of Part 4A permission or an imposition of a requirement is appropriate. The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors the FCA may consider. (1) The extent of any loss, or risk of loss, or other adverse effect on consumers. The more serious the loss or potential loss or other adverse effect, the more likely it is that the FCA’s urgent exercise of own-initiative powers will
In relation to adopting a reasonable approach to the time over which the payment shortfall4 or sale shortfall should be repaid,1the FCA takes the view that the determination of a reasonable repayment period will depend upon the individual circumstances. In appropriate cases this will mean that repayments are arranged over the remaining term. 141
Firms that propose to outsource aspects of customer relationships (including collection of debts or any other sums due1) should note that and SYSC 8,2 a firm cannot contract out its regulatory obligations and1 the FCA will continue to hold them responsible for the way in which this work is carried on.11
The FCA will determine, following consultation, the amount to be raised from each industry block. This will be based on the budgeted costs and numbers of Financial Ombudsman Service staff required to deal with the volume of complaints which the Financial Ombudsman Service expects to receive about the firms in each industry block. Modified arrangements have been made for certain types of small firms (see FEES 5.5.3 R to FEES 5.5.5 G).
(1) The purpose of this section is to set out the requirements for a firm specified in SUP 16.16.1 R to report the outcomes of its prudent valuation assessments to the FCA4 and to do so in a standard format.277(2) The purpose of collecting this data on the prudent valuation assessments made by a firm is to assist the FCA4 in assessing the capital resources of firms, to enable the FCA4 to gain a wider understanding of the nature and sources of measurement uncertainty in fair-valued
(1) 7A firm to which this section applies must submit to the FCA4 quarterly (on a calendar year basis and not from a firm'saccounting reference date), within six weeks of each quarter end, a Prudent Valuation Return in respect of its fair-value assessments in the format set out in SUP 16 Annex 31A.2(2) [deleted]47777
Where a firm to which SUP 16.16.4 R applies is a member of a FCA consolidation group, the firm must comply with SUP 16.16.4 R:(1) on a solo-consolidation basis if the firm has an individual consolidation/solo consolidation permission, or on an unconsolidated basis if the firm does not have an individual consolidation/solo consolidation permission; and(2) separately, on the basis of the consolidated financial position of the FCA consolidation group. (Firms' attention is drawn to
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the requirements on firms to pay annual fees (through a general levy invoiced and collected by the FCA on behalf of FOS Ltd) and case fees (invoiced and collected directly by FOS Ltd) in order to fund the operation of the Financial Ombudsman Service.This Chapter4 also provides for unauthorised persons to pay case fees to FOS Ltd in respect of any relevant complaints which it handles.44