Related provisions for LR 11.1.7B
241 - 260 of 1123 items.
The characteristics that a reasonable investor can be expected to have will inform the use of judgment required by the 'expectation test' and the 'satisfaction test'. These tests relate to the investor's ability to realise an investment within a reasonable period and to do so on the basis of the net value of its assets. In the FCA's view, the characteristics of the reasonable investor include:(1) sound judgment based on good sense;(2) some knowledge of, and possibly experience
The reasonable investor is a hypothetical investor. The implications of this are that the test does not relate to actual investment by a particular person at a particular time or in relation to a particular issue of any class of shares or securities. In the FCA's view, what underlies the test is what a reasonable investor would think he was getting into if he were contemplating investment in a particular body corporate. In addition, because the investor is hypothetical, the investment
After an initial assessment, however, the FCA's view is that subsequent applications of the investment condition could produce a different result, but only if there is a change to the constitution or practice of the body corporate which is significant and sustained. For example, this may happen if there is a change in the body corporate's published intentions or regular practices. As the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said in parliamentary debate when commenting on the definition,
Section 236(3) uses the words "the investor would, if he were to participate in the scheme". This is consistent with the fact that the reasonable investor is hypothetical. But applying the test at this early stage makes it clear that there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could base the expectation in section 236(3)(a). And on which he could be satisfied on the matters in section 236(3)(b). In the FCA's view, this requires, for example,
36Unless a contrary intention appears, to the extent that a provision made by the FCA15 ('the referring provision') contains a cross-reference to another provision that is not made by the FCA including a provision formerly made by the PRA which the PRA has now deleted15 ('the referred provision'), the referred provision as amended from time to time (excepting deletion in its entirety)15 is to be treated as having15 been made by the FCA15 to the extent necessary to make the referring
A general rule (that is a rule made by the FCA18 the general rule making powers36) is to be interpreted as:3636(1) applying to a firm with respect to the carrying on of all regulated activities, except to the extent that a contrary intention appears; and(2) not applying to a firm with respect to the carrying on of unregulated activities, unless and then only to the extent that a contrary intention appears.
(1) This rule applies to Handbook provisions20 where the PRA have made commensurate provisions in the PRA Rulebook. It may affect their application by the FCA to PRA-authorised persons and PRA approved persons20.3616151615(2) Where a Handbook provision (or part of one) goes beyond the FCA's20 powers or regulatory responsibilities, it is to be interpreted as applied20 to the extent of the FCA’s20 powers and regulatory responsibilities only.(3) The extent of a Handbook provision
An example of a rule20 being interpreted as cut back by GEN 2.2.23R is SYSC 6.1.1R, which requires a firm to maintain adequate policies and procedures to ensure compliance with its obligations under the regulatory system; SYSC 6.1.1R should be interpreted as applied by the FCA in respect of a PRA-authorised person’s compliance with regulatory obligations that are the responsibility of the FCA (for example, in respect of a bank maintaining policies and procedures to ensure compliance
(1) 1The FCA may suspend, with effect from such time as it may determine, the listing of any securities if the smooth operation of the market is, or may be, temporarily jeopardised or it is necessary to protect investors. [Note: article 18(1) CARD](2) An issuer that has the listing of any of its securities suspended must continue to comply with all listing rules applicable to it.(3) If the FCA suspends the listing of any securities, it may impose such conditions on the procedure
Examples of when the FCA may suspend the listing of securities include (but are not limited to) situations where it appears to the FCA that:(1) the issuer has failed to meet its continuing obligations for listing; or(2) the issuer has failed to publish financial information in accordance with the listing rules; or(3) the issuer is unable to assess accurately its financial position and inform the market accordingly; or(4) there is insufficient information in the market about a
1The FCA has investigation and sanctioning powers in relation to both criminal and civil breaches of the Payment Services Regulations. The Payment Services Regulations impose requirements including, amongst other things, obligations on payment service providers to provide users with a range of information and various provisions regulating the rights and obligations of payment service users and providers.
1The FCA's approach to enforcing the Payment Services Regulations will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
1The regulatory powers which the Payment Services Regulations provide to the FCA include: the power to require information;powers of entry and inspection;power of public censure;the power to impose financial penalties;the power to prosecute or fine unauthorised providers; andthe power to vary an authorisation on its own initiative.
1The Payment Services Regulations, for the most part, mirror the FCA's investigative, sanctioning and regulatory powers under the Act. The FCA has decided to adopt procedures and policies in relation to the use of those powers akin to those it has under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
1In deciding whether to make a prohibition order and/or, in the case of an approved person, to withdraw its approval, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances including whether other enforcement action should be taken or has been taken already against that individual by the FCA. As is noted below, in some cases the FCA may take other enforcement action against the individual in addition to seeking a prohibition order and/or withdrawing its approval. The FCA will also
1The FCA has the power to make a range of prohibition orders depending on the circumstances of each case and the range of regulated activities to which the individual's lack of fitness and propriety is relevant. Depending on the circumstances of each case, the FCA may seek to prohibit individuals from performing any class of function in relation to any class of regulated activity, or it may limit the prohibition order to specific functions in relation to specific regulated activities.
1Where the FCA issues a prohibition order, it may indicate in the decision notice or final notice that it would be minded to revoke the order on the application of the individual in the future, in the absence of new evidence that the individual is not fit and proper. If the FCA gives such an indication, it will specify the number of years after which it would be minded to revoke or vary the prohibition on an application. However, the FCA will only adopt this approach in cases
1Paragraphs 9.3.1 to 9.3.7 set out additional guidance on the FCA's approach to making prohibition orders against approved persons and/or withdrawing such persons’ approvals. Paragraphs 9.5.1 to 9.5.2 set out additional guidance on the FCA's approach to making prohibition orders against other individuals.
2In some cases there will be instances of market misconduct that may arguably involve a breach of the criminal law as well as market abuse1. When the FCA decides whether to commence criminal proceedings rather than impose a sanction for market abuse in relation to that misconduct, it will apply the basic principles set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. When deciding whether to prosecute market misconduct which also falls within the definition of market abuse, application
2The factors which the FCA may consider when deciding whether to commence a criminal prosecution for market misconduct rather than impose a sanction for market abuse include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct: if the misconduct is serious and prosecution is likely to result in a significant sentence, criminal prosecution may be more likely to be appropriate; (2) whether there are victims who have suffered loss as a result of the misconduct:
2It is the FCA's
policy not to impose a sanction for market abuse where a person is being prosecuted for market misconduct or has been finally convicted or acquitted of market misconduct (following the exhaustion of all appeal processes) in a criminal prosecution arising from substantially the same allegations. Similarly, it is the FCA's
policy not to commence a prosecution for market misconduct where the FCA has brought or is seeking to bring
The FCA expects a firm to have a validation process that includes the following:(1) standards of objectivity, accuracy, stability and conservatism that it designs its ratings systems to meet and processes that establish whether its rating systems meet those standards;(2) standards of accuracy of calibration (ie, whether outcomes are consistent with estimates) and discriminative power (ie, the ability to rank-order risk) that it designs its rating systems to meet and processes
The FCA expects a firm to be able to explain the performance of its rating systems against its chosen measure (or measures) of discriminative power. In making this comparison, a firm should rely primarily on actual historic default experience where this is available. In particular, the FCA expects a firm to be able to explain the extent of any potential inaccuracy in these measures, caused, in particular, by small sample size and the potential for divergence in the future, whether
In the case of a portfolio for which there is insufficient default experience to provide any confidence in statistical measures of discriminative power, the FCA expects a firm to use other methods. For example, analysis of whether the firm's rating systems and an external measurement approach (eg, external ratings) rank common obligors in broadly similar ways. Where such an approach is used, the FCA would expect a firm to ensure it does not systematically adjust its individual
Under section 60(3) of the CCA, if, on an application made to the FCA by a firm carrying on a consumer credit business or a consumer hire business, it appears to the FCA impracticable for the firm to comply with any requirement of the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553) or the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations (SI 2010/1014) in a particular case, it may direct that the requirement be waived or varied in relation to the regulated agreement and subject
The requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers a notice of their rights to cancel a cancellable agreement within the seven days following the making of that agreement does not apply in the case of the agreements described in SUP 8A.2.5 G, if: (1) on application by a firm to the FCA, the FCA has determined, having regard to:(a) the manner in which antecedent negotiations for the relevant agreements with the firm are conducted; and(b) the information
If on an application made to the FCA by a firm carrying on a consumer hire business, it appears to the FCA that it would be in the interests of hirers to do so, the FCA may direct that subject to such conditions (if any) as it may specify, section 101 of the CCA shall not apply to consumer hire agreements made by that firm.
Under article 53 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No 2) Order 2013, any of the following given or made by the Office of Fair Trading which were in effect immediately before 1 April 2014 have effect as if they had been given or made by the FCA:(1) a direction given under section 60(3) of the CCA (form and content of agreements);(2) a determination made under section 64(4) of the CCA (duty to give notice of cancellation rights) and
The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that would be in breach of rule SC2.(1) Failing to take reasonable steps to implement (either personally or through a compliance department or other departments) adequate and appropriate systems of control to comply with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system for the activities of the firm.(2) Failing to take reasonable steps to monitor (either personally or through a compliance department
The FCA recognises that a senior conduct rules staff member will have to exercise their own judgement in deciding how issues are dealt with and sometimes that judgement will, with the benefit of hindsight, be shown to have been wrong. The senior conduct rules staff member will not be in breach of rule SC3 in COCON 2.2.3R unless they fail to exercise due and reasonable consideration before they delegate the resolution of an issue or authority for dealing with a part of the business
Senior conduct rules staff members will not always manage the business on a day-to-day basis themselves. The extent to which they do so will depend on a number of factors, including the nature, scale and complexity of the business and their position within it. The larger and more complex the business, the greater the need for clear and effective delegation and reporting lines, which may involve documenting the scope of that delegation and the reporting lines in writing. The FCA
In determining whether or not the conduct of a senior conduct rules staff member complies with rule SC3 in COCON 2.2.3R, the factors which the FCA would expect to take into account include:(1) the competence, knowledge or seniority of the delegate; and (2) the past performance and record of the delegate.
For the purpose of rule SC4 in COCON 2.2.4R, regulators in addition to the FCA and the PRA are those which have recognised jurisdiction in relation to activities to which COCON applies and have a power to call for information from the relevant person in connection with their function or the business for which they are responsible. This may include an exchange or an overseas regulator.
(1) If a senior conduct rules staff member comes across a piece of information that is something of3 which they think the FCA or PRA could reasonably expect notice, they should determine whether that information falls within the scope of their responsibilities.5 For an SMF manager those responsibilities will be set out in that person’sstatement of responsibilities.52(2) If it does, then they should ensure that, if it is otherwise appropriate to do so, it is disclosed to the appropriate
In determining whether or not a person's conduct complies with rule SC4 in COCON 2.2.4R, the factors which the FCA would expect to take into account include:(1) whether it would be reasonable for the individual to assume that the information would be of material significance to the regulator concerned; (2) whether the information related to the individual themselves or to their firm; and(3) whether any decision not to report the matter was taken after reasonable enquiry and analysis
1The OEIC Regulations set out requirements relating to the way in which collective investment may be carried on by open-ended investment companies. Under the OEIC Regulations, the FCA has the power, amongst other things, to: revoke an open-ended investment company’s authorisation in several situations, including where the firm breaches relevant requirements or provides us with false or misleading information (regulation 23);give, vary and revoke certain directions, including that
1Factors that the FCA may take into account when it decides whether to use one or more of these powers include, but are not limited to, factors which are broadly similar to those in EG 14.1.1 in the context of AUTs or ACSs. However, the relevant conduct will be that of the ICVC, the director or directors of the ICVC and its depositary. Another difference is that the FCA is also able to take disciplinary action against the ICVC itself since the ICVC will be an authorised person.
1The FCA will give a company a warning notice if it proposes to revoke the company’s authorisation and a decision notice if the decision to revoke the company’s authorisation is subsequently taken. The decisions to give a warning notice or a decision notice will be taken by the RDC following the procedures set out in DEPP 3.2 or, where appropriate, DEPP 3.3. A person who receives a decision notice under the OEIC Regulations may refer the matter to the Tribunal.
2The FCA's standard practice is generally to use statutory powers to require the production of documents, the provision of information or the answering of questions in interview. This is for reasons of fairness, transparency and efficiency. It will sometimes be appropriate to depart from this standard practice, for example: (1) For suspects or possible suspects in criminal or market abuse investigations, the FCA may prefer to question that person on a voluntary basis, possibly
Firms, approved persons and conduct rules staff1 have an obligation to be open and co-operative with the FCA (as a result of Principle 11 for Businesses,1 Statement of Principle 4 for Approved Persons and Rule 3 of COCON 2.11). The FCA will make it clear to the person concerned whether it requires them to produce information or answer questions under the Act or whether the provision of answers is purely voluntary. The fact that the person concerned may be a regulated person does
2The FCA will not bring disciplinary proceedings against a person for failing to be open and co-operative with the FCA1 simply because, during an investigation, they choose not to attend or answer questions at a purely voluntary interview. However, there may be circumstances in which an adverse inference may be drawn from the reluctance of a person (whether or not they are a firm or individual1) to participate in a voluntary interview. If a person provides the FCA with misleading
Under section 61(1) of the Act (Determination of applications), the FCA7 may grant an application for approval made under section 60 (Applications for approval) of the Act14 only if it is satisfied that the candidate is fit and proper to perform the controlled function to which the application relates.7
7Under sections 60A and 63F 7of the Act, in assessing whether a person is a fit and proper person to perform an FCA designated senior management function or an FCA certification function14, 7an SMCR firm14 must have particular regard to whether that person:77(1) has obtained a qualification; or(2) has undergone, or is undergoing, training; or(3) possesses a level of competence; or(4) has the personal characteristics;required by general rules made by the FCA.
The Act does not prescribe the matters which the FCA7 should take into account when determining fitness and propriety. However, section 61(2) states that the FCA7 may have regard (among other things) to whether the candidate or approved person:777(1) has obtained a qualification; or(2) has undergone, or is undergoing, training; or(3) possesses a level of competence; or(4) has the personal characteristics;required by general rules made by the FCA.7
6 Where the application relates to a function within a Solvency II firm and is for an FCA controlled function which is also a Solvency II Directive ‘key function’ as defined in the PRA Rulebook: Glossary, then the FCA will also have regard to the assessment made by the firm as required in article 273 of the Solvency II Regulation (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014; Rules 2.1 and 2.2 of the PRA Rulebook: Solvency II Firms: Insurance - Fitness and Propriety, and other factors, as set
1Under
section 312B of the Act, the FCA5 may
prohibit an EEA market operator from
making or, as the case may be, continuing arrangements in the United Kingdom, to facilitate access to,
or use of, a regulated market,6multilateral trading facility or organised trading facility6 operated by the operator if:5(1) the FCA5 has clear and demonstrable grounds for believing that the operator
has contravened a relevant requirement;6 and5(2) the FCA5 has first complied with sections 312B(3)
The operator's right to make
arrangements in the United Kingdom,
to facilitate access to, or use of, a regulated
market,6multilateral trading
facility or organised trading facility6, operated by the operator may be reinstated (together
with its exempt person status)
if the FCA5 is
satisfied that the contravention which led the FCA5 to exercise its prohibition power has been remedied.55
1The RCB Regulations provide a framework for issuing covered bonds in the UK.
Covered bonds issued under the RCB Regulations are subject to strict quality controls and both bonds and issuers must be registered with the FCA. The RCB Regulations give the FCA powers to enforce these Regulations. Where a person has failed, or is likely to fail, to comply with any obligation under the RCB Regulations, the FCA may make a direction that the person take
1The FCA's approach to the use of its enforcement powers, and its statement of policy in relation to imposing and determining financial penalties under the RCB Regulations, are set out in RCB 4.2. The FCA's penalty policy includes having regard, where relevant, DEPP 6.5 to DEPP 6.5D and such other specific matters as the likely impact of the penalty on the interests of investors in the relevant bonds. The FCA's statement of procedure in relation to giving warning notices or decision
1The FCA may agree to settle cases in which it proposes to impose a financial penalty under the RCB Regulations if the right regulatory outcome can be achieved. The settlement discount scheme set out in DEPP 6.7 applies to penalties imposed under the RCB Regulations. See DEPP 5 and EG 5 for further information about the settlement process.
The FCA5 recognises that there may be occasions when, because of a particular emergency, a person (generally a firm, but in certain circumstances, for example in relation to price stabilising rules, an unauthorised person) may be unable to comply with a particular rule in the Handbook. The purpose of GEN 1.3.2 R is to provide appropriate relief from the consequences of contravention of such a rule in those circumstances.1993
(1) If any emergency arises which:(a) makes it impracticable for a person to comply with a particular rule in the Handbook; (b) could not have been avoided by the person taking all reasonable steps; and(c) is outside the control of the person, its associates and agents (and of its and their employees);the person will not be in contravention of that rule to the extent that, in consequence of the emergency, compliance with that rule is impracticable. (2) Paragraph (1) applies only
GEN 1.3.2 R operates on the FCA's5rules. It does not affect the FCA's5 powers to take action against a firm in an emergency, based on contravention of other requirements and standards under the regulatory system. For example, the FCA5 may exercise its own-initiative power in appropriate cases to vary a firm'sPart 4A permission9 based on a failure or potential failure to satisfy the threshold conditions (see SUP 7 (Individual9 requirements) and EG 8 (Variation and cancellation
(1) Overseas investment exchanges which are considering whether to seek authorisation or recognition should first consider whether they will be carrying on regulated activities in the United Kingdom. Overseas investment exchanges which do not carry on regulated activities in the United Kingdom need take no action.33(2) Prospective applicants should discuss authorisation and recognition with the FCA3 before deciding whether to seek authorisation or recognition.3
Applicants for authorised person status should refer to the FCA3 website “Authorisation”: www.fca.org.uk/firms/authorisation1. Applications for recognition as an overseas recognised body should be addressed to:The Financial Conduct Authority3 (Infrastructure and Trading Firms Department)412 Endeavour Square5London, E20 1JN5133
There is no standard application form for application for recognition as an ROIE2. An application should be made in accordance with any direction the FCA3 may make under section 287 (Application by an investment exchange) of the Act and should include:333(1) the information, evidence and explanatory material necessary to demonstrate to the FCA3 that the recognition requirements (set out in REC 6.3) will be met;(2) the application fee (see REC 7);(3) the address of the applicant's
The FCA3 may require further information from the applicant and may need to have discussions with the appropriate authorities in the applicant's home territory. To allow sufficient time for applications to be processed and for the necessary contacts to be made with the appropriate home territory authorities, applications should be made not later than six months before the applicant wishes the recognition order to take effect. No guarantee can be given that a decision will be reached
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will consider all the relevant circumstances of a case. These may include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of the misconduct or other unfitness that resulted in the order; (2) the amount of time since the original order was made; (3) any steps taken subsequently by the individual to remedy the misconduct or other unfitness; (4) any evidence which, had it been
2When considering whether to grant or refuse an application to revoke or vary a prohibition order, the FCA will take into account any indication given by the FCA in the final notice that it is minded to revoke or vary the prohibition order on application after a certain number of years (see paragraph 9.2.4).
2The FCA will not generally grant an application to vary or revoke a prohibition order unless it is satisfied that: the proposed variation will not result in a reoccurrence of the risk to consumers or confidence in the financial system that resulted in the order being made; and the individual is fit to perform functions in relation to regulated activities generally, or to those specific regulated activities in relation to which the individual has been prohibited. The FCA will
5A firm must:(1) appoint an individual as MLRO, with responsibility for oversight of its compliance with the FCA'srules on systems and controls against money laundering; and(2) ensure that its MLRO has a level of authority and independence within the firm and access to resources and information sufficient to enable him to carry out that responsibility.
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
9(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to delegate much of the task of monitoring the appropriateness and effectiveness of its systems and controls to an internal audit function. An internal audit function should have clear responsibilities and reporting lines to an audit committee or appropriate senior manager, be adequately resourced and staffed by competent individuals, be independent of the day-to-day activities
A firm, other than a Solvency II firm,15 should have in place appropriate arrangements, having regard to the nature, scale and complexity of its business, to ensure that it can continue to function and meet its regulatory obligations in the event of unforeseen interruption. These arrangements should be regularly updated and tested to ensure their effectiveness. Solvency II firms are subject to the business continuity requirements in PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions
1In cases where the FCA proposes to submit an investigation report to the RDC with a recommendation for regulatory action, the FCA's usual practice is to send a preliminary findings letter to the subject of an investigation before the matter is referred to the RDC. The letter will normally annex the investigators' preliminary investigation report. Comment will be invited on the contents of the preliminary findings letter and the preliminary investigation report.
1The FCA recognises that preliminary findings letters serve a very useful purpose in focussing decision making on the contentious issues in the case. This in turn makes for better quality and more efficient decision making. However, there are exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may decide it is not appropriate to send out a preliminary findings letter. This includes: (1) where the subject consents to not receiving a preliminary findings letter; or (2) where it is not practicable
1In cases where it is sent, the preliminary findings letter will set out the facts which the investigators consider relevant to the matters under investigation (normally, as indicated above, by means of an annexed preliminary investigation report). And it will invite the person concerned to confirm that those facts are complete and accurate, or to provide further comment. FCA staff will allow a reasonable period (normally 28 days) for a response to this letter, and will take into
In assessing compliance with, or a breach of, a rule in COCON, the FCA will have regard to the context in which a course of conduct was undertaken, including: (1) the precise circumstances of the individual case; (2) the characteristics of the particular function performed by the individual in question; and (3) the behaviour expected in that function.
In determining whether or not the particular conduct of a person complies with the rules in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include: (1) whether that conduct relates to activities that are subject to other provisions of the Handbook; (2) whether that conduct is consistent with the requirements and standards of the regulatory system relevant to the person'sfirm.
In determining whether or not the conduct of a senior conduct rules staff member complies with rules SC1 to SC4 in COCON, factors the FCA would expect to take into account include:(1) whether they exercised reasonable care when considering the information available to them;(2) whether they reached a reasonable conclusion upon which to act;(3) the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business;(4) their role and responsibility as determined by reference to the relevant statement
UK domestic firms listed on the London Stock Exchange are subject to the UK Corporate Governance Code, whose internal control provisions are explained in the publication entitled ‘Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (October 2005)’ issued by the Financial Reporting Council. Therefore, firms in this category will be subject to that code, as well as to the rules in COCON. In forming an opinion as to whether a senior conduct rules staff member has