Related provisions for IFPRU 4.12.19

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IFPRU 2.2.31RRP
(1) As part of its obligations under the overall Pillar 2 rule, a firm must carry out an evaluation of its exposure to the interest-rate risk arising from its non-trading activities.(2) The evaluation under (1) must cover the effect of a sudden and unexpected parallel change in interest rates of 200 basis points in both directions.(3) A firm must immediately notify the FCA if any evaluation under this rule suggests that, as a result of the change in interest rates described in
IFPRU 2.2.37RRP
(1) As part of its obligation under the overall Pillar 2 rule, a firm that is a significant IFPRU firm must:(a) for the major sources of risk identified in line with IFPRU 2.2.7R(2), carry out stress tests and scenario analyses that are appropriate to the nature, scale and complexity of those major sources of risk and to the nature, scale and complexity of the firm's business; and(b) carry out the reverse stress testing under SYSC 20 (Reverse stress testing).(2) In carrying out
IFPRU 2.2.52RRP
(1) This rule relates to the assessment of the amounts, types and distribution of financial resources, own funds and internal capital (referred to in this rule as "resources") under the overall Pillar 2 rule as applied on a consolidated basis and to the assessment of diversification effects as referred to in IFPRU 2.2.14 R (3)(b) as applied on a consolidated basis.(2) A firm must be able to explain how it has aggregated the risks referred to in the overall Pillar 2 rule and the
IFPRU 2.2.53RRP
(1) A firm must allocate the total amount of financial resources, own funds and internal capital identified as necessary under the overall Pillar 2 rule (as applied on a consolidated basis) between different parts of the FCA consolidation group. IFPRU 2.2.11 R (Identifying different tiers of capital) does not apply to this allocation(2) The firm must carry out the allocation in (1) in a way that adequately reflects the nature, level and distribution of the risks to which the group
IFPRU 2.2.56GRP
The purpose of IFPRU 2.2.52 R to IFPRU 2.2.55 G is to enable the FCA to assess the extent, if any, to which a firm's assessment, calculated on a consolidated basis, is lower than it would be if each separate legal entity were to assess the amount of capital it would require to mitigate its risks (to the same level of confidence) were it not part of a group subject to consolidated supervision under Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of the EUCRR (Prudential consolidation). The reason
IFPRU 2.2.59RRP
Where a firm is a member of a FCA consolidation group or a non-EEA sub-group, the firm must ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at those levels comply with the obligations set out in the risk control rules on a consolidated basis (or a sub-consolidated basis).[Note: article 109(2) of CRD]
IFPRU 2.2.63RRP
When the overall financial adequacy rule applies on a consolidated basis or sub-consolidated basis, the firm must ensure that at all times its FCA consolidation group maintains overall financial resources and internal capital, including own funds and liquidity resources, which are adequate, both as to amount and quality, to ensure that there is no significant risk that the liabilities of any members of its FCA consolidation group cannot be met as they fall due.
IFPRU 2.2.73GRP
(1) In identifying an appropriate range of adverse circumstances and events in accordance with IFPRU 2.2.37 R (2):(a) a firm will need to consider the cycles it is most exposed to and whether these are general economic cycles or specific to particular markets, sectors or industries;(b) for the purposes of IFPRU 2.2.37 R (2)(a), the amplitude and duration of the relevant cycle should include a severe downturn scenario based on forward-looking hypothetical events, calibrated against
IFPRU 2.2.87GRP
A firm should satisfy itself that the systems (including IT) of the FCA consolidation group or the non-EEA sub-group of which it is a member are sufficiently sound to support the effective management and, where applicable, the quantification of the risks that could affect the FCA consolidation group or the non-EEA sub-group, as the case may be.
IFPRU 4.12.6GRP
For IFPRU 4.12.3 G (3) (option 3), the1FCA intends to grant permission for an originator to make its own assessment of significant risk transfer only where it is satisfied that:1(1) in every relevant case, the reduction in own funds requirements achieved would be justified by a commensurate transfer of risk to third parties;(2) the firm has appropriately risk-sensitive policies and methodologies in place to assess the transfer of risk; and(3) such transfer of risk to third parties
IFPRU 4.12.8GRP
A firm seeking to achieve capital relief by deducting or applying a 1250% risk weight where permitted under articles 243 or 244 of the EU CRR does not need to make the notification in IFPRU 4.12.1 R.1 However, in such cases, a firm should consider whether the characteristics of the transaction are such that the FCA would reasonably expect prior notice of it.1
IFPRU 4.12.16GRP
To assess a firm's ability to use its own policies and methodologies for assessing significant risk transfer, the FCA's permission reviews will focus on:(1) the firm's understanding of the risk of any potential transactions within permission scope, including for potential underlying assets, securitisation structures and other relevant factors that affect the economic substance of risk transfer;(2) the governance around significant risk transfer assessment (including sign-off procedures)
IFPRU 4.12.17GRP
The information the FCA expects a firm to provide in a permission application includes the following:(1) details of the firm's governance processes for significant risk transfer, including details of any relevant committees and the seniority and expertise of key persons involved in sign-off;(2) a copy of the firm's significant risk transfer policy, including details of the significant risk transfer calculation policies, methodologies and any models used to assess risk transfer
IFPRU 4.12.26GRP
As part of a firm's ongoing consideration of risk transfer, the FCA expects it to consider the support it has provided to securitisation transactions.
IFPRU 4.12.33GRP
The FCA considers the following to be examples of features which generally indicate a positive incentive to call or, at least, to constitute grounds for discussion with the FCA prior to the conclusion of the transaction:(1) the transaction contains terms, such as payments at maturity or payments upon early termination or significant premiums, which may reduce risk transfer;(2) the transaction includes a requirement for the protection buyer to incur additional costs or obligations
IFPRU 4.12.34GRP
Significant risk transfer is an ongoing requirement. Accordingly, the FCA expects firms to ensure that any reduction in own funds requirements achieved through securitisation continues to be matched by a commensurate transfer of risk throughout the life of the transaction. The FCA expects firms to take a substance over form approach to assessing significant risk transfer. Firms should be able to demonstrate that the capital relief post-transaction adequately captures the economic
IFPRU 4.12.35GRP
When risk transfer transactions are structured as a group of linked transactions rather than a single transaction, the FCA expects the aggregate effect of linked transactions to comply with the EU CRR. The FCA expects firms to ensure that analysis of risk transfer incorporates all linked transactions, particularly if certain transactions within a group of linked transactions are undertaken at off-market rates.
IFPRU 4.12.38GRP
The FCA expects relevant senior management of a firm to be appropriately engaged in the execution of securitisation transactions that lead to a reduction in RWEA where the firm is providing or purchasing structured trades.
IFPRU 4.12.39GRP
The FCA does not operate a pre-approval process for transactions. The FCA expects a firm to discuss with its supervisor at any early stage securitisation transactions that are material or have complex features. Where a firm claims a regulatory capital reduction from securitisation transactions in its disclosures to the market, the FCA expects such disclosures to include caveats making clear the risk of full or partial re-characterisation where this risk is material in the light
IFPRU 4.12.41GRP
The FCA will seek to ensure that the securitisation framework is not used to undermine or arbitrage other parts of the prudential framework. For other similar credit protection arrangements (eg, those subject credit risk mitigation or trading book requirements), the impact of certain features (such as significant premiums or call options) may cast doubt on the extent of risk transferred and the resulting capital assessment. Features which result in inadequate own funds requirements
IFPRU 4.12.42GRP
Where a firm achieves significant risk transfer for a particular transaction, the FCA expects it to continue to monitor risks related to the transaction to which it may still be exposed. The firm should consider capital planning implications of securitised assets returning to its balance sheet. The EU CRR requires a firm to conduct regular stress testing of its securitisation activities and off-balance sheet exposures. The stress tests should consider the firm-wide impact of stressed
IFPRU 2.3.8GRP
The SREP is a process under which the FCA: (1) reviews the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by a firm to comply with IFPRU, SYSC and with requirements imposed by or under the EUCRR and wider regulatory system and evaluates the risks to which the firm is, or might be, exposed;(2) determines whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the firm and the capital held by the firm ensures a sound management and coverage
IFPRU 2.3.36GRP
(1) This paragraph applies to a proportional ICAAP in the case of a firm that is a significant IFPRU firm (see IFPRU 1.2.3 R) whose activities are complex.(2) A proportional approach to that firm'sICAAP should cover the matters identified in IFPRU 2.3.34 G and IFPRU 2.3.35 G, but is likely also to involve the use of models, most of which will be integrated into its day-to-day management and operation.(3) Models of the kind referred to in (2) may be linked to generate an overall
IFPRU 2.3.60GRP
As an asset manager's mandates become more complex, the risk of it failing to comply fully with the terms of its contracts increases. In the event of such failure, a firm can be exposed to substantial losses resulting from customers' claims and legal actions. Although the FCA would expect an asset manager to have adequate controls in place to mitigate that risk, it may also like to consider the potential cost to it if customers claim that it has not adhered to mandates. Past claims
SYSC 19D.3.2GRP
SYSC 12.1.13R(2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member, comply with the obligations in this section on a consolidated basis (or sub-consolidated basis). In the FCA’s view, the application of this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels in SYSC 19D.3.1R(1) is in line with article 109(2) of the CRD
SYSC 19D.3.24GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance within that process of applying judgment and common sense. The FCA expects that a firm will apply qualitative judgements and common sense in the final decision about the performance-related components of variable remuneration pools. (2) [deleted]1(3) We consider good practice in this area to be represented by those firms who provide a quantitative reference or
SYSC 19A.3.2GRP
SYSC 12.1.13 R (2)(dA) requires the firm to ensure that the risk management processes and internal control mechanisms at the level of any UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group of which a firm is a member comply with the obligations set out in this section on a consolidated (or sub-consolidated) basis. In the FCA’s6 view, the application of6 this section at group, parent undertaking and subsidiary undertaking levels in SYSC 19A.3.1R(1) is in line with6 article 109(2) of
SYSC 19A.3.23GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance within that process of applying judgement6 and common sense. The FCA expects a6firm to apply qualitative judgements and common sense in6 the final decision about the performance-related components6 of variable remuneration pools6. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those most appropriate to its circumstances.
REC 2.3.3GRP
In determining whether a UK recognised body has financial resources sufficient for the proper performance of its relevant functions, the FCA5 may have regard to:5(1) the operational and other risks to which the UK recognised body is exposed;(2) if the UK recognised body guarantees the performance of transactions in specified investments, the counterparty and market risks to which it is exposed in that capacity; 5(3) the amount and composition of the UK recognised body's capital;(4)
REC 2.3.6GRP
In assessing whether a UK recognised body has sufficient financial resources in relation to operational and other risks, the FCA5 may have regard to the extent to which, after allowing for the financial resources necessary to cover counterparty and market risks, the UK recognised body's financial resources are sufficient and sufficiently liquid:5(1) to enable the UK recognised body to continue carrying on properly the regulated activities that it expects to carry on; and(2) to
REC 2.3.7GRP
In considering whether a UK recognised body has sufficient financial resources in relation to operational and other risks, the FCA5 will normally have regard to two components: eligible financial resources and net capital.454
REC 2.3.9GRP
4(1) 4The FCA5 considers that a UK RIE which at any time holds:5(a) eligible financial resources not less than the greater of:(i) the amount calculated under the standard approach; and (ii) the amount calculated under the risk-based approach; and (b) net capital not less than the amount of eligible financial resources determined under (1)(a);will, at that time, have sufficient financial resources to meet the recognition requirement in respect of operational and other risks unless
REC 2.3.10GRP
4The FCA5 would expect to provide a UK recognised body with individual guidance, issued with a frequency determined in accordance with the usual prudential cycle for such bodies, communicated from time to time,6 on the amount of eligible financial resources which it considers would be sufficient for the UK recognised body to hold in respect of operational and other risks6 to satisfy the recognition requirements. In formulating its individual guidance, the FCA5 will ordinarily
REC 2.3.17GRP
4The financial risk assessment should be based on a methodology which provides a reasonable estimate of the potential business losses which a UK RIE might incur in stressed but plausible market conditions. The FCA5 would expect a UK RIE to carry out a financial risk assessment at least once in every twelve-month period, or more frequently if there are material changes in the nature, scale or complexity of the UK RIE's operations or its business plans that suggest such financial
SYSC 19C.3.17GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle is designed to manage the conflicts of interest which might arise if other business areas had undue influence over the remuneration of employees within control functions. Conflicts of interest can easily arise when employees are involved in the determination of remuneration for their own business area. Where these do arise they need to be managed by having in place independent roles for control functions (including, notably, risk management and
SYSC 19C.3.23GRP
(1) This Remuneration Principle stresses the importance of risk adjustment in measuring performance, and the importance of applying judgment and common sense. A firm should ask the risk management function to validate and assess risk-adjustment techniques and to attend a meeting of the governing body or remuneration committee for this purpose. (2) A number of risk-adjustment techniques and measures are available, and a firm should choose those that are most appropriate to its
RCB 2.3.6GRP
The FCA will:(1) expect the issuer to demonstrate that it has in place appropriate systems, controls, procedures and policies, including in relation to risk management, underwriting, arrears and valuation; (2) expect the issuer to demonstrate that the cash-flows generated by the assets would be sufficient to meet the payments due in a timely manner including under conditions of economic stress and in the event of the failure of the issuer;(3) take account of any over collateralisation
RCB 2.3.7GRP
The risk factors which the FCA will take into account in assessing the issuer's and owner's compliance with Regulations 17(2)(d) (general requirements on issuer in relation to the asset pool) and 23(2) (requirements on owner relating to the asset pool) will include credit risk of the assets, concentration risk, market risk and counterparty risk.
RCB 2.3.9GRP
Concentration risk is the risk of loss from exposures being limited in number or variety. The relevant factors the FCA may consider include:(1) the level of granularity of the asset pool (i.e. what is the number and size distribution of assets in the pool); (2) whether the borrowers or collateral is unduly concentrated in a particular industry, sector, or geographical region.
COLL 6.12.2GRP
In the FCA's view the requirements relating to risk management policy and risk measurement set out in this section are the regulatory responsibility of the management company'sHome State regulator but to the extent that they constitute fund application rules, are also the responsibility of the UCITS'Home State regulator. As such, these responsibilities may overlap between the competent authorities of the Home and Host States. EEA UCITS management companies providing collective
COLL 6.12.3RRP
(1) 3(a) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must use a risk management process enabling it to monitor and measure at any time the risk of the scheme's positions and their contribution to the overall risk profile of the scheme.3(b) In particular, an authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must not solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings issued by
COLL 6.12.7RRP
(1) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must assess, monitor and periodically review:(a) the adequacy and effectiveness of the risk management policy and of the arrangements, processes and techniques referred to in COLL 6.12.5 R;(b) the level of compliance by the authorised fund manager or the UK UCITS management company with the risk management policy and with those arrangements, processes and techniques referred
SYSC 3.2.6KGRP
14The FCA provides guidance on steps that a firm can take to reduce the risk that it might be used to further financial crime in FC (Financial crime: a guide for firms).
SYSC 3.2.10GRP
(1) Depending on the nature, scale and complexity of its business, it may be appropriate for a firm to have a separate risk assessment function responsible for assessing the risks that the firm faces and advising the governing body and senior managers on them.(2) The organisation and responsibilities of a risk assessment function should be documented. The function should be adequately resourced and staffed by an appropriate number of competent staff who are sufficiently independent
IFPRU 4.4.8GRP
To be satisfied that the requirements in article 179(1) of the EU CRR are met, the FCA expects a firm to collect data on what it considers to be the main drivers of the risk parameters of probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), conversion factors (CFs) and expected loss (EL) for each group of obligors or facilities, to document the identification of the main drivers of risk parameters, and be able to demonstrate that the process of identification is reasonable and
IFPRU 4.4.9GRP
In its processes for identifying the main drivers of risk parameters, the FCA expects that a firm should set out its reasons for concluding that the data sources chosen provide in themselves sufficient discriminative power and accuracy and why additional potential data sources do not provide relevant and reliable information that would be expected materially to improve the discriminative power and accuracy of its estimates of the risk parameter in question. This process need not
IFPRU 4.4.17GRP
To demonstrate that a rating system provides for a meaningful differentiation of risk and accurate and consistent quantitative estimates of risk, the FCA expects a firm would have regard to the sensitivity of the rating to movements in fundamental risk drivers, in assigning exposures to grades or pools within a rating system (see article 171 of the EU CRR).
IFPRU 4.6.11GRP
The FCA considers that one variable scalar approach, potentially compliant with the four principles in IFPRU 4.6.5 G, could involve:(1) segmenting a portfolio by its underlying drivers of default risk; and(2) estimating separate long-run default rates for each of these segmented pools.
IFPRU 4.6.33GRP
The FCA expects a firm to assign exposures to the risk weight category for specialised lending exposures based on the criteria set out in the tables in IFPRU 4 Annex 1G(Slotting criteria).
GENPRU 1.2.40GRP
A firm should carry out assessments of the sort described in the overall Pillar 2 rule and GENPRU 1.2.39 R at least annually, or more frequently if changes in the business, strategy, nature or scale of its activities or operational environment suggest that the current level of financial resources is no longer adequate. The appropriateness of the internal process, and the degree of involvement of senior management in the process, will be taken into account by the FCA15 when reviewing
SYSC 12.1.18GRP
Assessment of the adequacy of a group's systems and controls required by this section will form part of the FCA’s14 risk management process.
IFPRU 4.11.6GRP
The FCA expects that an IPRE rating system will only be compliant if a firm is able to demonstrate the following in respect of its treatment of interest-rate risk (IRR):(1) IRR is included as a relevant risk driver (unless the portfolio is exclusively hedged);(2) the way in which IRR is included in the deal rating is intuitive with respect to model philosophy. For example, a 'point in time' rating should consider the current interest rate and likely change over a one-year time
IFPRU 4.11.18GRP
The FCA also expects that a firm will be compliant with the validation requirements only where1it can demonstrate that:11(1) appropriate stability metrics should be considered across a range of economic environments (ie, longest period possible including most recent data);(2) the tolerances for the degree of divergence, and associated actions for what should happen when they are not met, is pre-defined; and(3) subsections of portfolios by characteristics affecting risk profile,
REC 2.5.1UKRP

Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations, paragraphs 3 – 3H4

Paragraph 3 – Systems and controls4

(1)

The [UK RIE] must ensure that the systems and controls, including procedures and arrangements,4 used in the performance of its functions and the functions of the trading venues it operates are adequate, effective4 and appropriate for the scale and nature of its business.

(2)

Sub-paragraph (1) applies in particular to systems and controls concerning -

(a)

the transmission of information;

(b)

the assessment, mitigation and management of risks to the performance of the [UK RIE'srelevant functions];

(c)

the effecting and monitoring of transactions on the [UK RIE];

(ca)

the technical operation of the [UK RIE], including contingency arrangements for disruption to its facilities;

(d)

the operation of the arrangements mentioned in paragraph 4(2)(d); and

(e)

(where relevant) the safeguarding and administration of assets belonging to users of the [UK RIE's] facilities.

4(f)

the resilience of its trading systems;

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on the resilience of trading systems operated by trading venues that enable algorithmic trading]

4(g)

the ability to have sufficient capacity to deal with peak order and message volumes;

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on the adequacy of capacity of trading systems operated by trading venues that enable algorithmic trading]

4(h)

the ability to ensure orderly trading under conditions of severe market stress;

4(i)

the effectiveness of business continuity arrangements to ensure the continuity of the [UK RIE’s] services if there is any failure of its trading systems including the testing of the [UK RIE’s] systems and controls;

4(j)

the ability to reject orders that exceed predetermined volume or price thresholds or which are clearly erroneous;

4(k)

the ability to ensure algorithmic trading systems cannot create or contribute to disorderly trading conditions on trading venues operated by the [UK RIE];

4(l)

the ability to ensure disorderly trading conditions which arise from the use of algorithmic trading systems, including systems to limit the ratio of unexecuted orders to transactions that may be entered into the [UK RIE’s] trading system by a member or participant are capable of being managed;

[Note:MiFID RTS 9 contains requirements on the ratio of unexecuted orders to transactions to be taken into account by a trading venue that operates electronic continuous auction order book, quote-driven or hybrid trading systems]

4(m)

the ability to ensure the flow of orders is able to be slowed down if there is a risk of system capacity being reached;

4(n)

the ability to limit and enforce the minimum tick size which may be executed on its trading venues; and

4(o)

the requirement for members and participants to carry out appropriate testing of algorithms.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on the appropriate testing of algorithms to ensure that trading systems, when they enable algorithmic trading, cannot create or contribute to disorderly trading conditions]

4(3)

For the purposes of sub-paragraph 2(c), the [UK RIE] must -

4(a)

establish and maintain effective arrangements and procedures including the necessary resource for the regular monitoring of the compliance by members or participants with its rules; and

4(b)

monitor orders sent including cancellations and the transactions undertaken by its members or participants under its systems in order to identify infringements of those rules, disorderly trading conditions or conduct that may indicate behavior that is prohibited under the market abuse regulation or system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument.

4(4)

For the purpose of sub-paragraph (2)(o) the [UK RIE] must provide environments to facilitate such testing.

4(5)

The [UK RIE] must be adequately equipped to manage the risks to which it is exposed, to implement appropriate arrangements and systems to identify all significant risks to its operation, and to put in place effective measures to mitigate those risks.

4Paragraph 3A – Market making arrangements

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must -

4(a)

have written agreements with all investment firms pursuing a market making strategy on trading venues operated by it (“market making agreements”);

4(b)

have schemes, appropriate to the nature and scale of a trading venue, to ensure that a sufficient number of investment firms enter into such agreements which require them to post firm quotes at competitive prices with the result of providing liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis;

4(c)

monitor and enforce compliance with the market making agreements;

4(d)

inform the FCA of the content of its market making agreements; and

4(e)

provide the FCA with any information it requests which is necessary for the FCA to satisfy itself that the market making agreements comply with paragraphs (c) and (d) of this sub-paragraph and sub-paragraph 2.

4(2)

A market making agreement must specify-

4(a)

the obligations of the investment firm in relation to the provision of liquidity;

4(b)

where applicable, any obligations arising from the participation in a scheme mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b);

4(c)

any incentives in terms of rebates or otherwise offered by the [UK RIE] to the investment firm in order for it to provide liquidity to the market on a regular and predictable basis; and

4(d)

where applicable, any other rights accruing to the investment firm as a result of participation in the scheme referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(b).

4(3)

For the purposes of this paragraph, an investment firm pursues a market making strategy if -

4(a)

the firm is a member or participant of one or more trading venues;

4(b)

the firm’s strategy, when dealing on own account, involves posting firm, simultaneous two-way quotes of comparable size at competitive prices relating to one or more financial instruments on a single trading venue, across different trading venues; and

4(c)

the result is providing liquidity on a regular and frequent basis to the overall market.

4Paragraph 3B – Halting trading

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must be able to -

4(a)

temporarily halt or constrain trading on any trading venue operated by it if there is a significant price movement in a financial instrument on such a trading venue or a related trading venue during a short period; and

4(b)

in exceptional cases be able to cancel, vary, or correct any transaction.

4(2)

For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), the [UK RIE] must ensure that the parameters for halting trading are appropriately calibrated in a way which takes into account -

4(a)

the liquidity of different asset classes and subclasses;

4(b)

the nature of the trading venue market model; and

4(c)

the types of users,

4to ensure the parameters are sufficient to avoid significant disruptions to the orderliness of trading.

4(3)

The [UK RIE] must report the parameters mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) and any material changes to those parameters to the FCA in a format to be specified by the FCA.

4(4)

If a trading venue operated by the [UK RIE] is material in terms of liquidity of the trading of a financial instrument and it halts trading in an EEA State in that instrument it must have systems and procedures in place to ensure that it notifies the FCA.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 12 contains requirements for when a regulated market is material in terms of liquidity in a financial instrument for purposes of trading halt notifications]

4Paragraph 3C – Direct electronic access

4Where the [UK RIE] permits direct electronic access to a trading venue it operates, it must -

4(1)

(a)

ensure that a member of, or participant in that trading venue is only permitted to provide direct electronic access to the venue if the member or participant -

4(i)

is an investment firm, as defined by Article 4.1.1 of the markets in financial instruments directive (definitions), authorised in accordance with the directive;

4(ii)

is a credit institution authrised in accordance with the capital requirements directive;

4(iii)

comes within Article 2.1(a), (e), (i), or (j) of the markets in financial instruments directive (exemptions) and has a Part 4A permission relating to investment services and activities;

4(iv)

is a third country firm providing the direct electronic access in the course of exercising rights under Article 46.1 (general provisions) or 47.3 (equivalence decision) of the markets in financial instruments regulation;

4(v)

is a third country firm and the provision of the direct electronic access by that firm is subject to the exclusion in Article 72 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001; or

4(vi)

is a third country firm which does not come within paragraph (iv) or (v) and is otherwise permitted to provide the direct electronic access under the Act;

4(b)

ensure that appropriate criteria are set and applied for the suitability of persons to whom direct electronic access services may be provided;

4(c)

ensure that a member of, or participant in, the trading venue retains responsibility for adherence to the requirements of the markets in financial instruments directive in respect of orders and trades executed using the direct electronic access service;

4(d)

set appropriate standards regarding risk controls and thresholds on trading through direct electronic access;

4(e)

be able to distinguish and if necessary stop orders or trading on that trading venue by a person using direct electronic access separately from -

4(i)

other orders; or

4(ii)

trading by the member or participant providing the direct electronic access; and

4(f)

have arrangements in place to suspend or terminate the provision to a client of direct electronic access to that trading venue by a member of, or participant in, the trading venue in the case of non-compliance with this paragraph.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 7 contains requirements on direct electronic access permitted through a trading venue’s systems]

4Paragraph 3D – Co-location services

4(1)

The [UK RIE’s] rules on colocation services must be transparent, fair and nondiscriminatory.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 10 contains requirements to ensure co-location services are transparent, fair and non-discriminatory]

4Paragraph 3E – Fee structures

4(1)

The [UK RIE’s] fee structure, for all fees it charges including execution fees and ancillary fees and rebates it grants, must -

4(a)

be transparent, fair and non-discriminatory;

4[Note:MiFID RTS 10 contains requirements to ensure fee structures are transparent, fair and non-discriminatory]

4(b)

not create incentives to place, modify or cancel orders, or execute transactions, in a way which contributes to disorderly trading conditions or market abuse; and

4[Note:MiFID RTS 10 contains requirements concerning prohibited fee structures]

4(c)

impose market making obligations in individual shares or suitable baskets of shares for any rebates that are granted.

4(2)

Nothing in sub-paragraph (1) prevents the [UK RIE] from -

4(a)

adjusting its fees for cancelled orders according to the length of time for which the order was maintained;

4(b)

calibrating its fees to each financial instrument to which they apply;

4(c)

imposing a higher fee -

4(i)

for placing an order which is cancelled than an order which is executed;

4(ii)

on participants placing a high ratio of cancelled orders to executed orders; or

4(iii)

on a person operating a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique,

4in order to reflect the additional burden on system capacity.

4Paragraph 3F – Algorithmic trading

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must require members of and participants in trading venues operated by it to flag orders generated by algorithmic trading in order for it to be able to identify the -

4(a)

the different algorithms used for the creation of orders; and

4(b)

the persons initiating those orders.

4Paragraph 3G – Tick size regimes

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must adopt tick size regimes in respect of trading venues operated by it in -

4(a)

shares, depositary receipts, exchange-traded funds, certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on each trading venue; and

4[Note:MiFID RTS 11 contains requirements on the tick size regime for shares, depositary receipts, exchange traded funds and certificates5]

4(b)

any financial instrument for which regulatory technical standards are adopted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 49.3 or 4 of the markets in financial instruments directive which is traded on that trading venue.

[Note:MiFID RTS 11]

4 (2)

The tick size regime must -

4(a)

be calibrated to reflect the liquidity profile of the financial instrument in different markets and the average bid-ask spread taking into account desirability of enabling reasonably stable prices without unduly constraining further narrowing of spreads; and

4(b)

adapt the tick size for each financial instrument appropriately.

4(3)

The tick size regime must comply with any regulatory technical standards adopted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 49.3 or 4 of the markets in financial instruments directive.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 11]

4Paragraph 3H – Syncronisation of business clocks

4(1)

The [UK RIE] must synchronise the business clocks it uses to record the date and time of any reportable event in accordance with regulatory technical standards adopted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 50 of the markets in financial instruments directive.

4[Note:MiFID RTS 25]
REC 2.5.4GRP
REC 2.5.5G to REC 2.5.20G4 set out other matters to which the FCA3 may have regard in assessing the UK RIE’s4 systems and controls used for the transmission of information, risk management, 4the operation of settlement arrangements (the matters covered in paragraph 4(2)(d) of the Schedule to the Recognition Requirements Regulations),4 the safeguarding and administration of assets and certain other aspects of its operations4. 33
SUP 10C.12.33GRP
Where a firm is expanding or transforming its business model or its risk profile and there are identifiable upcoming milestones, the FCA may wish to link the duration of a candidate's approval to these milestones.