Related provisions for BIPRU 3.4.103
61 - 80 of 272 items.
A firm must introduce adequate organisational arrangements to minimise the risk of the loss or diminution of client money, or of rights in connection with client money, as a result of misuse of client money, fraud, poor administration, inadequate record-keeping or negligence. [Note: article 2(1)(f)1 of the MiFID Delegated Directive1]
The risk of loss or diminution of rights in connection with client money can arise where a firm's organisational arrangements give rise to the possibility that client money held by the firm may be paid for the account of a client whose money is yet to be received by the firm. Consistent with the requirement to hold client money as trustee (see CASS 7.17.5 G), a firm should ensure its organisational arrangements are adequate to minimise such a risk. This may include, for example,
Article 363 of the EU CRR (Permission to use internal models) states that permission for an institution to use internal models to calculate own funds requirements is subject to competent authorities verifying compliance with:(1) the general requirements;(2) requirements particular to specific risk modelling; and(3) requirements for an internal model for incremental default and migration risk.
A firm should be able to demonstrate that it meets the risk management standards in article 368 of the EU CRR (Qualitative requirements) on a legal entity and business-line basis where appropriate. This is particularly important for a subsidiary in a group subject to matrix management where the business lines cut across legal entity boundaries.
(1) Where a firm is unable to comply with the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code because to do so would breach a provision of a prior contract (including a provision in a contract with a dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code staff member), it must take reasonable steps to amend or to terminate the provision in question in a way which enables it to comply with the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code at the earliest opportunity.(2) Until the provision in (1) ceases to prevent
(1) The aim of the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code is to ensure that firms have risk-focused remuneration policies, which are consistent with and promote effective risk management and do not expose them to excessive risk. It expands upon the general organisational requirements in SYSC 4.(2) The dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code implements the main provisions of the CRD which relate to remuneration. In applying the rules in the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code,
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should particularly note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure, the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures
1In deciding how they will satisfy and continue to satisfy the threshold conditions set out in paragraphs 2F and 3E of Schedule 6 to the Act, firms should consider matters including (but not limited to) the following:(1) the assumptions underlying the firm's business model and justification for it;(2) the rationale for the business the firm proposes to do or continues to do, its competitive advantage, viability and the longer-term profitability of the business;(3) the needs of
1Firms should consider scenarios which may negatively impact on the firm's business model with a view to ensuring the sustainability of the firm and, further, to consider the vulnerability of the business model to specific events and the risks and consequences that might arise. Where appropriate, this might include reverse stress-testing (see SYSC 20 ‘Reverse stress testing’). A firm should put in place a credible plan to minimise the risks that it identifies from, or in relation
1Firms should ensure that any adjustments to its business model:(1) are approved at an appropriate level in the business;(2) are considered in the light of any potential risks, impacts and consequences of the proposed changes; and(3) appropriately take into account the needs of and risks to clients and relevant consumers.
This section has rules requiring a firm to identify and assess risks to its ability to meet its liabilities as they fall due, how it intends to deal with those risks, and the amount and nature of financial resources that the firm considers necessary. IFPRU 2.2.43 R (Documentation of risk assessment) provides that a firm should document that assessment. The FCA will review that assessment as part of its own assessment of the adequacy of a firm's capital under its supervisory review
1This section has rules on the individual, sub-consolidated basis and consolidated basis application of:(1) the ICAAP rules in IFPRU 2.2.45R to IFPRU 2.2.49R (Level of application: ICAAP rules);(2) the risk control rules in IFPRU 2.2.58R to IFPRU 2.2.60R (Level of application: risk control rules); and(3) the overall financial adequacy rule in IFPRU 2.2.61R to IFPRU 2.2.63R (Level of application: overall financial adequacy rule).
The risks arising from securitisation transactions in relation to which a firm is investor,3originator or sponsor, including reputational risks,3 must be evaluated and addressed through appropriate policies and procedures, to ensure in particular that the economic substance of the transaction is fully reflected in risk assessment and management decisions.[Note:BCD Annex V point 8]3
The appropriate regulator expects an originator to continue to monitor any risks that it may be subject to when it has excluded the securitised exposures from its calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts. The originator should consider capital planning implications where risks may return and the impact that securitisation has on the quality of the remaining exposures held by the originator.
1A firm must establish, implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures sufficient to ensure compliance of the firm including its managers, employees and appointed representatives (or where applicable, tied agents)3 with its obligations under the regulatory system and for countering the risk that the firm might be used to further financial crime.2[Note: article 1616(2) of MiFID and article 12(1)(a) of the UCITS Directive]8242
A 16management company8 must, taking into4account the nature, scale and complexity of its business, and the nature and range of financial services and activities8 undertaken in the course of that business, establish, implement and maintain adequate policies and procedures designed to detect any risk of failure by the firm to comply with its obligations under the regulatory system, as well as associated risks, and put in place adequate measures and procedures designed to minimise
The management report required by DTR 4.1.8 R must also give an indication of:(1) any important events that have occurred since the end of the financial year unless those events are:4(a) 4reflected in the issuer’s profit and loss account or balance sheet; or(b) 4disclosed in the notes to the issuer’s audited financial statements;(2) the issuer's likely future development;(3) activities in the field of research and development;(4) the information concerning acquisitions of own
(1) Responsibility statements must be made by the persons responsible within the issuer.(2) The name and function of any person who makes a responsibility statement must be clearly indicated in the responsibility statement.(3) For each person making a responsibility statement, the statement must set out that to the best of his or her knowledge:(a) the financial statements, prepared in accordance with the applicable set of accounting standards, give a true and fair view of the
(1) An authorised fund manager of a UCITS scheme or a UK UCITS management company of an EEA UCITS scheme must establish and maintain a permanent risk management function.(2) The function referred to in (1) must be hierarchically and functionally independent from operating units, except where such independence would not be appropriate and proportionate in view of the nature, scale and complexity of the authorised fund manager’s or UK UCITS management company’s business and of
Where the risk management function required under COLL 6.11.2 R (1) is not hierarchically and functionally independent, the authorised fund manager or UK UCITS management company should nevertheless be able to demonstrate that its risk management process satisfies the requirements of COLL 6.12.3 R (Risk management process) and that, in particular, the appropriate safeguards have been adopted.[Note: article 12(2) third paragraph and recital (12) of the UCITS implementing Dire
(1) The permanent risk management function must:(a) implement the risk management policy and procedures;(b) ensure compliance with the risk limit system, including statutory limits concerning global exposure and counterparty risk, as required by COLL 5.2 (General investment powers and limits for UCITS schemes) and COLL 5.3 (Derivative exposure) or, where appropriate, the relevant UCITS Home State measures implementing articles 41, 42 and 43 of the UCITS implementing Directive;(c)
IT systems include the computer systems and infrastructure required for the automation of processes, such as application and operating system software; network infrastructure; and desktop, server, and mainframe hardware. Automation may reduce a firm's exposure to some 'people risks' (including by reducing human errors or controlling access rights to enable segregation of duties), but will increase its dependency on the reliability of its IT systems.
A firm should establish and maintain appropriate systems and controls for the management of its IT system risks, having regard to:(1) its organisation and reporting structure for technology operations (including the adequacy of senior management oversight);(2) the extent to which technology requirements are addressed in its business strategy;(3) the appropriateness of its systems acquisition, development and maintenance activities (including the allocation of responsibilities
Operating processes and systems at separate geographic locations may alter a firm's operational risk profile (including by allowing alternative sites for the continuity of operations). A firm should understand the effect of any differences in processes and systems at each of its locations, particularly if they are in different countries, having regard to:(1) the business operating environment of each country (for example, the likelihood and impact of political disruptions or
For the corporate exposure class there is a separate sub-class of specialised lending exposure. A firm may calculate risk weights for these exposures, where it is able to do so, in the same way as it does for the rest of its corporate exposure class, i.e. using the foundation IRB approach or the advanced IRB approach. Where a firm is not able to use this approach it may calculate risk weights for specialised lending exposures by slotting them into predetermined risk weights.
(1) The appropriate regulator will only grant an IRB permission if it is satisfied that the firm's systems for the management and rating of credit risk exposures are sound and implemented with integrity and, in particular, that they meet the standards in BIPRU 4.2.2 R in accordance with the minimum IRB standards.(2) Under BIPRU 4.2.11 R, a firm applying for an IRB permission is required to demonstrate that it has been using for the IRB exposure classes in question rating systems
By modifying GENPRU 2.1.51 R to allow the firm to use the IRB approach to calculate all or part of its risk weighted exposure amounts, the appropriate regulator is treating it like an application rule. The modification means that the provisions of BIPRU relating to the IRB approach supersede the rules relating to the standardised approach for exposures coming within the scope of the IRB permission.
(1) 1A firm must satisfy the FCA that it has adequate risk management processes to control the risks to which it may be exposed as a result of carrying out credit risk mitigation.(2) These processes must include appropriate stress tests and scenario analyses relating to those risks, including residual risk and the risks relating to the intrinsic value of the credit risk mitigation.
1Under MIPRU 4.2A.9 R, MIPRU 4.2A.12 R, MIPRU 4.2A.17A R and MIPRU 4.2A.17B R, g is the risk weight to be assigned to an exposure, the exposure value (E) of which is fully protected by unfunded credit protection (GA), where: (1) g is the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider; (2) GA is the value of G* as calculated under MIPRU 4.2C.22 R further adjusted for any maturity mismatch under MIPRU 4.2C.24 R to MIPRU 4.2C.28 R; and(3) E is the exposure value according to
The FCA expects that an IPRE rating system will only be compliant if a firm is able to demonstrate the following in respect of its treatment of interest-rate risk (IRR):(1) IRR is included as a relevant risk driver (unless the portfolio is exclusively hedged);(2) the way in which IRR is included in the deal rating is intuitive with respect to model philosophy. For example, a 'point in time' rating should consider the current interest rate and likely change over a one-year time
The FCA expects that an IPRE rating system will only be compliant if a firm is able to demonstrate the following in respect of its treatment of refinance risk:(1) refinance risk is included as a relevant risk driver (unless the portfolio contains only amortising loans);(2) the model rates interest only and amortising deals differently in the final year and that the magnitude of the difference in these ratings is intuitive;(3) given the time horizon associated with IRB estimates
The FCA also expects that a firm will be compliant with the validation requirements only where1it can demonstrate that:11(1) appropriate stability metrics should be considered across a range of economic environments (ie, longest period possible including most recent data);(2) the tolerances for the degree of divergence, and associated actions for what should happen when they are not met, is pre-defined; and(3) subsections of portfolios by characteristics affecting risk profile,
An actuary appointed to perform the actuarial function must, in respect of those classes of the firm's long-term insurance business which are covered by his appointment1:1(1) advise the firm's management, at the level of seniority that is reasonably appropriate, on1 the risks the firm runs in1 so far as they may have a material impact on the firm's ability to meet liabilities to policyholders in respect of long-term insurance contracts as they fall due and on the capital needed
SUP 4.3.13 R is not intended to be exhaustive of the professional advice that a firm should take whether from an actuary appointed under this chapter or from any other actuary acting for the firm. Firms should consider what systems and controls are needed to ensure that they obtain appropriate professional advice on financial and risk analysis; for example:11(1) risk identification, quantification and monitoring;1(2) stress and scenario testing;1(3) ongoing financial conditions;1(4)
1Firms should normally obtain advice, from the actuary appointed to perform the with-profits actuary function in respect of the affected class or classes of with-profits business, whenever they are preparing to make key decisions based on the exercise of discretion affecting their with-profits business. Firms should also have risk management processes in place to ensure that all relevant matters are referred to the actuary for advice.
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only to certain categories of employee. However, the FCA expects firms, in complying with the BIPRU Remuneration Codegeneral requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FCA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19C.3.40 R to SYSC 19C.3.43 G. (3) The FCA also
To be satisfied that the requirements in article 179(1) of the EU CRR are met, the FCA expects a firm to collect data on what it considers to be the main drivers of the risk parameters of probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), conversion factors (CFs) and expected loss (EL) for each group of obligors or facilities, to document the identification of the main drivers of risk parameters, and be able to demonstrate that the process of identification is reasonable and
In its processes for identifying the main drivers of risk parameters, the FCA expects that a firm should set out its reasons for concluding that the data sources chosen provide in themselves sufficient discriminative power and accuracy and why additional potential data sources do not provide relevant and reliable information that would be expected materially to improve the discriminative power and accuracy of its estimates of the risk parameter in question. This process need not
To demonstrate that a rating system provides for a meaningful differentiation of risk and accurate and consistent quantitative estimates of risk, the FCA expects a firm would have regard to the sensitivity of the rating to movements in fundamental risk drivers, in assigning exposures to grades or pools within a rating system (see article 171 of the EU CRR).
The level of sophistication of the pricing models used to calculate own estimates of delta for use in the standardised approach for options should be proportionate to the complexity and risk of each option, and the overall risk of the firm's options trading business. In general, it is considered that the risk of sold options will be higher than the risk of the same options when bought.
A firm should ensure its risk management functions are aware of weaknesses of the model used to calculate deltas. Where weaknesses are identified, the firm should ensure that estimates of delta result in prudent own funds requirements being held. The outcome should be prudent across the whole portfolio of options and underlying positions at a given time.
For the purpose of IFPRU 6.1.15 R, the convertible should be:(1) treated as a position in the equity into which it converts; and(2) the firm's own funds requirement for the general and specific risk in its equity instruments should be adjusted by making: (a) an addition equal to the current value of any loss which the firm would make if it did convert to equity; or(b) a deduction equal to the current value of any profit which the firm would make if it did convert to equity (subject
1(1) Unless otherwise stated,8GENPRU 3.1 applies to every firm that is a member of a financial conglomerate other than:(a) an incoming EEA firm;(b) an incoming Treaty firm;(c) a UCITS qualifier;(d) an ICVC;8(e) a bank;8(f) a designated investment firm; and8(g) an insurer.8(1A) GENPRU 3.1 (except GENPRU 3.1.5R to GENPRU 3.1.13G) applies to each of the following firms that is a member of a financial conglomerate:8(a) a bank;8(b) a designated investment firm; and8(c) an insurer
GENPRU 3.1.35 R implements Article 7(4) and Article 8(4) of the Financial Groups Directive, which provide that where a financial conglomerate is headed by a mixed financial holding company, the sectoral rules regarding risk concentration and intra-group transactions of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate, if any, shall apply to that sector as a whole, including the mixed financial holding company.
Articles 7(3) (Risk concentration) and 8(3) (Intra-group transactions) and Annex II (Technical application of the provisions on intra-group transactions and risk concentration) of the Financial Groups Directive say that Member States may apply at the level of the financial conglomerate the provisions of the sectoral rules on risk concentrations and intra-group transactions. GENPRU 3.1 does not take up that option, although the FCA8 may impose such obligations on a case by case
Afirm must ensure that the sectoral rules regarding risk concentration and intra-group transactions of the most important financial sector in the financial conglomerate referred to in GENPRU 3.1.34 R are complied with with respect to that financial sector as a whole, including the mixed financial holding company. The sectoral rules for these purposes are those identified in the table in GENPRU 3.1.36 R.4
(1) This rule applies to a firm that is unable to comply with the BIPRU Remuneration Code because of an obligation it owes to a BIPRU Remuneration Code staff member under a provision of an agreement made on or before 29 July 2010. (2) A firm must take reasonable steps to amend or terminate the provision in (1) in a way that enables it to comply with the BIPRU Remuneration Code at the earliest opportunity.(3) Until the provision in (1) ceases to prevent the firm from complying
The FCA's policy on individual guidance is set out in SUP 9. Firms should particularly note the policy on what the FCA considers to be a reasonable request for guidance (see SUP 9.2.5 G). For example, where a firm is seeking guidance on a proposed remuneration structure, the FCA will expect the firm to provide a detailed analysis of how the structure complies with the BIPRU Remuneration Code, including the general requirement for remuneration policies, procedures and practices