Related provisions for PERG 6.1.1
241 - 260 of 640 items.
In assessing whether to terminate a relationship with an appointed representative, a firm should be aware that the notification rules in SUP 15 require notification to be made immediately to the FCA if certain events occur. Examples include a matter having a serious regulatory impact or involving an offence or a breach of any requirement imposed by the Act or by regulations or orders made under the Act by the Treasury.
If a contract with an appointed representative is terminated, or if it is amended in a way which gives rise to a requirement to notify under SUP 12.8.1R, a firm must take all reasonable steps to ensure that:(1) if the termination is by the firm, the appointed representative is notified in writing before, or if not possible, immediately on, the termination of the contract and informed that it will no longer be an exempt person for the purpose of the Act because of the contract
1The FCA's approach to enforcing the Payment Services Regulations will mirror its general approach to enforcing the Act, as set out in EG 2. It will seek to exercise its enforcement powers in a manner that is transparent, proportionate, responsive to the issue, and consistent with its publicly stated policies. It will also seek to ensure fair treatment when exercising its enforcement powers. Finally, it will aim to change the behaviour of the person who is the subject of its
1The Payment Services Regulations, for the most part, mirror the FCA's investigative, sanctioning and regulatory powers under the Act. The FCA has decided to adopt procedures and policies in relation to the use of those powers akin to those it has under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described below.
Another consequence of a breach of section 21 of the Act is that certain agreements could be unenforceable (see section 30 of the Act (Enforceability of agreements resulting from unlawful communications)). This applies to agreements entered into by a person as a customer as a consequence of a communication made in breach of section 21.
DTR 7.1 does not apply to:(1) any issuer which
is a subsidiary undertaking of
a parent undertaking where the parent undertaking is subject to:3(a) DTR 7.1, or to requirements implementing article 39 of the Audit Directive in any other EEA State; and3(b) articles 11(1), 11(2) and 16(5) of the Audit Regulation;3[Note: article 39(3)(a)3 of the Audit Directive](2) any issuer the sole
business of which is to act as the issuer of asset-backed
securities provided the entity makes a statement
1This means that there will be situations in which the FCA has powers to investigate and take action under both the Act and the Money Laundering Regulations. The FCA will consider all the circumstances of the case when deciding what action to take and, if it is appropriate to notify the subject about the investigation, will in doing so inform them about the basis upon which the investigation is being conducted and what powers it is using. The FCA will adopt the approach outlined
1However, the Money Laundering Regulations say little about the way in which investigation and sanctioning powers should be used, so the FCA has decided to adopt enforcement and decision making procedures which are broadly akin to those under the Act. Key features of the FCA's approach are described in EG 19.152.
(1) Section 283A(1) (Master-feeder structures) of the Act, in implementation of article 59(1) of the UCITS Directive, provides that the operator of a UCITS scheme may not invest a higher proportion of scheme property in units of another UCITS than is permitted by rules made by the FCA implementing article 55 of the UCITS Directive, unless the investment is approved by the FCA in accordance with that section.(2) The FCA has implemented article 55(1) of the UCITS Directive in
(1) An application for approval of an investment in a master UCITS under section 283A of the Act must be accompanied by the following documents:(a) the instrument constituting the fund1 of the feeder UCITS and of the master UCITS;1(b) the prospectus and the key investor information referred to in COLL 4.7.2 R (Key investor information) of the feeder UCITS and of the master UCITS;(c) the master-feeder agreement or the internal conduct of business rules in accordance with COLL 11.3.2R
1BIPRU 1.3.10 G sets out the appropriate regulator approach to the granting of waivers. The conditions in BIPRU 9.5.1BD are minimum requirements. Satisfaction of those does not automatically mean the appropriate regulator will grant the relevant waiver. The appropriate regulator will in addition also apply the tests in section 138A (Modification or waiver of rules) of the Act.
1In the event that the appropriate regulator decides that the possible reduction in risk weighted exposure amounts which the originatorcredit institution would achieve by the securitisation referred to in BIPRU 9.5.1R (6) is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, it will use its powers under section 55J (Variation etc on the Authority's own initiative) of the Act to require the firm to increase its risk weight exposure amount to an amount commensurate
1However, there may be circumstances in which the FCA will choose to use the powers under section 382 or section 383 of the Act to apply to the court for an order for restitution against a firm. Those circumstances may include, for example, where: (1) the FCA wishes to combine an application for an order for restitution with other court action against the firm, for example, where it wishes to apply to the court for an injunction to prevent the firm breaching a relevant requirement11;
1Section 365(6) of the Act makes it clear that the FCA may petition for the compulsory winding up of a company even if it is already in voluntary winding up. This power is already available to creditors and contributories of companies in voluntary winding up. For example, the court can be asked to direct the liquidator to investigate a transaction which the company undertook before the winding up. In some circumstances, this power may be used in respect of partnerships (section
1Factors which the FCA will consider when it decides whether to use this power (in addition to the factors identified in paragraphs 13.5.1 to 13.6.3 in relation to the FCA's decisions to seek compulsory winding up) include: (1) whether the FCA's concerns can properly and effectively be met by seeking a specific direction under section 365(2) of the Act;
(2) whether the affairs of the company require independent investigation of the kind which follows a compulsory
1The exceptional circumstances referred to above may arise where the matters under investigation have become the subject of public concern, speculation or rumour. In this case it may be desirable for the FCA to make public the fact of its investigation in order to allay concern, or contain the speculation or rumour. Where the matter in question relates to a takeover bid, the FCA will discuss any announcement beforehand with the Takeover Panel. Any announcement will be subject
1The FCA will not normally publish details of the information found or conclusions reached during its investigations. In many cases, statutory restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained by the FCA in the course of exercising its functions are likely to prevent publication (see section 348 of the Act). In exceptional circumstances, and where it is not prevented from doing so, the FCA may publish details. Circumstances in which it may do so include those where the fact
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the Act) is the UK legislation under which bodies corporate, partnerships, individuals and unincorporated associations are permitted by the FCA or PRA to carry on various financial activities which are subject to regulation (referred to as regulated activities).(2) The activities which are regulated activities are specified in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (the Regulated Activities
(1) The Act, and the secondary legislation made under the Act, is complex. Although PERG gives guidance about regulated activities and financial promotions, it does not aim to, nor can it, be exhaustive.(2) References have been made to relevant provisions in the Act or secondary legislation. However, since reproducing an entire statutory provision would sometimes require a lengthy quotation, or considerable further explanation, many provisions of the Act, or secondary legislation
If it appears to the appropriate regulator3 that an auditor of a firm has failed to comply with a duty imposed on him under the Act, it may have the power to and3 may disqualify him under section 345 or 345A, respectively,3 of the Act.1 A list of persons who are disqualified may be found on the FCA's3 website (www.fca.org.uk).3313333
8As a result of section 404B of the Act, if the subject matter of a complaint falls to be dealt with (or has properly been dealt with) under a consumer redress scheme, the Ombudsman will determine the complaint by reference to what, in the opinion of the Ombudsman, the redress determination under the consumer redress scheme should be or should have been, unless the complainant and the respondent agree that the complaint should not be dealt with in accordance with the consumer
The purpose of BIPRU 7.9 is to provide guidance on the appropriate regulator's policy for granting CAD 1 model waivers under section 138A of the Act (Modification or waiver of rules). The policy recognises that CAD 1 models may vary across firms but, as a minimum, the appropriate regulator will need to be satisfied:(1) about the quality of the internal controls and risk management relating to the model (see BIPRU 7.9.19G - BIPRU 7.9.23G for further details);(2) about the quality
No changes should be made to a CAD 1 model unless the change is not material. Material changes to a CAD 1 model will require a renewed waiver to be issued. Materiality is measured from the time that the waiver is granted or, if the waiver has been varied in accordance with section 138A of the Act, any later time that may be specified in the waiver for these purposes. If a firm is considering making material changes to its CAD 1 model, then it should notify the appropriate regulator
If the CAD 1 model ceases to meet the requirements of the waiver, the firm should notify the appropriate regulator at once. The appropriate regulator may then revoke the waiver unless it is varied in accordance with section 138A of the Act. If the CAD 1 model waiver contains conditions it is a condition of using the CAD 1 model approach that the firm should continue to comply with those conditions.
1The FCA will notify the subject of the investigation that it has appointed officers to carry out an investigation under the Money Laundering Regulations and the reasons for the appointment, unless notification is likely to prejudice the investigation or otherwise result in it being frustrated. The FCA expects to carry out a scoping visit early on in the enforcement process in most cases. The FCA's
policy in civil investigations is to use powers to compel information
1As with cases under the Act, the FCA may settle or mediate appropriate cases involving civil breaches of the Money Laundering Regulations or the Funds Transfer Regulation2 to assist it to exercise its functions under the Money Laundering Regulations2 in the most efficient and economic way. The settlement discount scheme set out in DEPP 6.7 applies to penalties, suspensions, restrictions and temporary prohibitions2 imposed under regulations 76, 77 and 78 of2 the Money Laundering
(1) The FCA expects that the majority of requests it will receive for the winding up of an authorised fund (under regulation 21(1) of the OEIC Regulations or under sections1 256 or 261W1 of the Act) or termination of a sub-fund will be from authorised fund managers and depositaries who consider that the AUT, ACS1, ICVC or sub-fund in question is no longer commercially viable.(2) It is in consumers' interests to minimise, as far as possible, the period between which the FCA receives
The information referred to in COLL 7.5.1 G is listed below:(1) the name of the authorised fund or sub-fund;(2) the size of the authorised fund or sub-fund;(3) the number of unitholders; (4) whether dealing in units has been suspended;(5) why the request is being made; (6) what consideration has been given to the authorised fund or sub-fund entering into a scheme of arrangement with another regulated collective investment scheme and the reasons why a scheme of arrangement is not
However, where there is a market, the FCA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FCA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
This chapter applies to an incoming firm or a UCITS qualifier only in respect of a top-up permission. An incoming firm or a UCITS qualifier should refer to SUP 14 (Variation of passport rights by incoming EEA firms and ending authorisation) for the procedures for changes to permission granted under Schedules 3, 4 or 5 of the Act.
(1) 7In SUP 6 the "relevant regulator" is the regulator to which a firm with a Part 4A permission has made or can make (in accordance with SUP 6) an application to vary or cancel its Part 4A permission or to have imposed on it a new requirement or to vary or cancel any existing requirement (see SUP 6.2.3A G to SUP 6.2.3E G).(2) Where the PRA can only determine an application with the consent of the FCA, the FCA may request further information as if it were the relevant regulator.(3)