Related provisions for SUP 15.3.20
41 - 60 of 110 items.
(1) 6SYSC 14.1.29G(6) does not apply to a Solvency II firm.(2) SYSC 14.1.29G(7) does not apply to a Solvency II firm, but only in relation to references to the internal audit function. It does apply to a Solvency II firm in relation to references to the internal audit committee.(3) For Solvency II firms, the PRA has made rules implementing the governance provisions of the Solvency II Directive relating to internal controls (article 46), see PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Conditions
(1) The FCA expects an application for registration as an SME growth market to be accompanied by:(a) a copy of the rules, systems and procedures supporting the applicant’s compliance with the requirements specified in MAR 5.10.2R; and(b) such other information as the FCA may reasonably require to determine the application in accordance with MAR 5.10.2R and MAR 5.10.3R.(2) A firm intending to apply for registration as an SME growth market may wish to contact the Infrastructure
3(1) A firm must have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, and internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures and effective control and safeguard arrangements for information processing systems.8(2) [deleted]1313[Note: article 74
(1) 8If the UK firm'sEEA right derives from the CRD12 or10MiFID8,10 the appropriate UK regulator20 will give the Host State regulator a consent notice within three months unless it has reason to doubt the adequacy of a UK firm's resources or its administrative structure.8 The Host State regulator then has a further two months to notify the applicable provisions (if any) and prepare for the supervision, as appropriate, of the UK firm, or in the case of a MiFID investment firm,
Except for operational risk, a firm that is permitted to use internal approaches for the calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts or own fund requirements must report annually to the FCA: (1) the results of the calculations of its internal approaches for its exposures or positions that are included in the benchmark portfolios; and(2) an explanation of the methodologies used to produce those calculations in (1).[Note: article 78(1) of CRD]
If the RRD group includes an IFPRU 730k firm that is not a significant IFPRU firm (and does not include an IFPRU 730k firm that is a significant IFPRU firm) the group recovery plan must include:(1) a summary of the key elements of the group recovery plan;(2) information on the governance of the group, including: (a) how the group recovery plan is integrated into the corporate governance of the group; and (b) the group's overall risk management framework;(3) a description of the
The high level requirement for appropriate systems and controls at SYSC 3.1.1 R applies at all times, including when a business continuity plan is invoked. However, the FCA1 recognises that, in an emergency, a firm may be unable to comply with a particular rule and the conditions for relief are outlined in GEN 1.3 (Emergency).
(1) The FCA3 will determine a figure dependent on the seriousness of the market abuse and whether or not it was referable to the individual’s employment. This reflects the FCA's3 view that where an individual has been put into a position where he can commit market abuse because of his employment the fine imposed should reflect this by reference to the gross amount of all benefits derived from that employment.33(2) In cases where the market abuse was referable to the individual’s
Business and internal control risks vary from firm to firm, according to the nature and complexity of the business. The FCA's assessment of these risks is reflected in how its rules apply to different categories of firm as well as in the use of its other regulatory tools. One of the tools the FCA has available is to give a firm individual guidance on the application of the requirements or standards under the regulatory system in the firm's particular circumstances.
(1) A firm must establish, implement and maintain appropriate and effective arrangements for the disclosure of reportable concerns by whistleblowers.(2) The arrangements in (1) must at least:(a) be able effectively to handle disclosures of reportable concerns including: (i) where the whistleblower has requested confidentiality or has chosen not to reveal their identity; and(ii) allowing for disclosures to be made through a range of communication methods; (b) ensure the effective
1A CASS medium firm and a CASS large firm must allocate to a single6director or senior manager of sufficient skill and authority6 the function of:(1) oversight of the operational effectiveness of that firm’s systems and controls that are designed to achieve compliance with CASS;(2) reporting to the firm’sgoverning body in respect of that oversight; and(3) completing and submitting a CMAR to the FCA in accordance with SUP 16.14.[Note: article 7, first paragraph of the MiFID Delegated
2The FCA is committed to ensuring that senior managers of firms fulfil their responsibilities. The FCA expects senior management to take responsibility for ensuring firms identify risks, develop appropriate systems and controls to manage those risks, and ensure that the systems and controls are effective in practice.1 Where senior managers have failed to meet our standards1, the FCA will, where appropriate, bring cases against individuals as well as, or instead of,1firms. The
Under Principle 11 and SUP 15.3.1 R, a firm must notify the FCA1 immediately of any operational risk matter of which the FCA1 would reasonably expect notice. SUP 15.3.8 G provides guidance on the occurrences that this requirement covers, which include a significant failure in systems and controls and a significant operational loss.
1An important consideration before an enforcement investigation and/or enforcement action is taken forward is the nature of a firm’s overall relationship with the FCA and whether, against that background, the use of enforcement tools is likely to further the FCA's aims and objectives. So, for any similar set of facts, using enforcement tools will be less likely if a firm has built up over time a strong track record of taking its senior management responsibilities seriously and
1A firm2 must:(1) report to the FCA any2: (a) significant breaches of the firm's rules;(b) disorderly trading conditions;2(c) conduct that may involve market abuse; and2(d) system disruptions in relation to a financial instrument;2(2) supply the information required under this rule without delay to the FCA and any other authority competent for the investigation and prosecution of market abuse; and2(3) provide full assistance to the FCA, and any other authority competent for the