Related provisions for BIPRU 11.5.21
281 - 300 of 385 items.
Principles 3, 4 and (in so far as it relates to disclosing to the FCA5) 11 (and this chapter) also:(1) apply with respect to the carrying on of unregulated activities (for Principle 3 this is only in a prudential context); and(2) take into account any activity of other members of a group of which the firm is a member.
(1) Where a firm gives advice to a customer not to make a contractual repayment or to cancel any means of making such a repayment before any debt solution is agreed or entered into, the firm must be able to demonstrate the advice is in the customer's best interests.(2) Where a firm gives advice of the type in (1), the firm must advise the customer (C) that if C adopts the advice C should notify C's lenders without delay and explain that C is following the firm's advice to this
The requirement under section 64(1)(b) of the CCA to send debtors or hirers a notice of their rights to cancel a cancellable agreement within the seven days following the making of that agreement does not apply in the case of the agreements described in SUP 8A.2.5 G, if: (1) on application by a firm to the FCA, the FCA has determined, having regard to:(a) the manner in which antecedent negotiations for the relevant agreements with the firm are conducted; and(b) the information
Where consideration of the root causes of complaints suggests recurring or systemic problems in the firm's sales practices for payment protection contracts, the firm should, in assessing an individual complaint, consider whether the problems were likely to have contributed (at step 1) 1to a breach or failing or (at step 2) to a failure to disclose commission 1in the individual case, even if those problems were not referred to specifically by the complainant.
(1) This guidance applies to policies bought as secondary products to revolving credit agreements (such as store cards or credit cards).(2) Price information should be given in a way calculated to enable a typical customer to understand the typical cumulative cost of taking out the policy. This does not require oral disclosure where there is a sales dialogue with a customer. However, consistent with Principle 7, a firm should ensure that this element of price information is not
(1) 1In order to take reasonable care to ascertain the price which is the best available, a firm:(a) should disregard any charges and commission made by it or its agents that are disclosed to the customer under COBS 6.1.9 R (Information about costs and associated charges);(b) need not have access to competing exchanges, or to all, or a minimum number of, available price sources; but if a firm can access prices displayed by different exchanges and trading platforms and make a direct
3If a groupundertaking proposes to establish a debt securities program for the issue of capital instruments which the firm intends to include within its capital resources or the consolidated capital resources of its UK consolidation group or non-EEA sub-group, it must:(1) notify the appropriate regulator of the establishment of the program; and(2) provide the information required by BIPRU 8.6.1BR (1) to (4); as soon as it becomes aware of the proposed establishment. The appropriate
For an EEA insurer:(1) 4(a) the rules and guidance on the with-profits fund (COBS 20.1A), on treating with-profits policyholders fairly (COBS 20.2.1 G to COBS 20.2.41 G and COBS 20.2.53 R to COBS 20.2.60 G), and the governance provisions in COBS 20.5. apply only in so far as responsibility for the matter in question has not been reserved to the firm'sHome State regulator by an EU instrument;4notwithstanding the above: (b) COBS 20.2.26A R (financial penalties and the with-profits
Subject to MCOB 14.1.5R and MCOB 14.1.7R: (1) MCD article 3(1)(b) creditors and MCD article 3(1)(b) credit intermediaries must comply with the following provisions in MCOB. These provisions apply with such changes as are necessary to apply them to MCD article 3(1)(b) credit agreements and activity undertaken in relation to those agreements (see MCOB 14.1.4G):(a) MCOB 1.2.19G (identifying MCD credit agreements);(b) MCOB 2.3 (inducements);(c) MCOB 2.5A (the customer’s best interests);(d)
(1) If a policy is bought by a consumer in connection with other goods or services a firm must, before conclusion of the contract, disclose its premium separately from any other prices and whether buying the policy is compulsory.(2) In the case of a distance contract, disclosure of whether buying the policy is compulsory may be made in accordance with the timing requirements under the distance communication rules (see ICOBS 3.1.8 R, ICOBS 3.1.14 R and ICOBS 3.1.15 R).(3) 2This
A firm which agrees an adviser charge with a consumer and provides an associated pure protection service to that consumer must:(1) in good time before the provision of its services, take reasonable steps to ensure that the consumer understands:(a) how the firm is remunerated for its pure protection service; and(b) if applicable, that the firm will receive commission in relation to its pure protection service in addition to the firm'sadviser charge;(2) as close as practicable
An affected person is not liable to account to another affected person or to the unitholders of the scheme for any profits or benefits it makes or receives that are made or derived from or in connection with:(1) dealings in the units of a scheme; or(2) any transaction in scheme property; or(3) the supply of services to the scheme;where disclosure of the non-accountability has been made in the prospectus of the scheme.
The byelaws referred to in INSPRU 8.4.3 R should:(1) ensure that adequate and effective arrangements are in place to enable members and persons applying to be admitted as members to enter into transactions to transfer syndicate capacity and settle these transactions in a timely manner;(2) give clear and comprehensive guidance about the dissemination of information that is, or may be, relevant to the price of syndicate capacity and the transparency of the capacity transfer market;
In considering whether commercial interests would be prejudiced to an unreasonable degree (see SUP 8.6.2 G (2)), the appropriate regulator4 will weigh the prejudice to firms' commercial interests against the interests of consumers, markets and other third parties in disclosure. In doing so the appropriate regulator4 will consider factors such as the extent to which publication of the waiver would involve the premature release of proprietary information to commercial rivals, for
1Statements of Principle issued under section 64A(1)(a) of the Act
Statement of Principle 1 An approved person must act with integrity in carrying out his accountable functions. |
Statement of Principle 2 An approved person must act with due skill, care and diligence in carrying out his accountable functions. |
Statement of Principle 3 An approved person must observe proper standards of market conduct in carrying out his accountable functions. |
Statement of Principle 4 An approved person must deal with the FCA, the PRA and other regulators in an open and cooperative way and must disclose appropriately any information of which the FCA or the PRA would reasonably expect notice. |
Statement of Principle 5 An approved person performing an accountable higher management function1 must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which they are 1responsible in their 1accountable function is organised so that it can be controlled effectively. |
Statement of Principle 6 An approved person performing an accountable higher management function1 must exercise due skill, care and diligence in managing the business of the firm for which they are1 responsible in their 1accountable function. |
Statement of Principle 7 An approved person performing an accountable higher management function1 must take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of the firm for which they are 1responsible in their 1accountable function complies with the relevant requirements and standards of the regulatory system. |
1The FCA recognises that preliminary findings letters serve a very useful purpose in focussing decision making on the contentious issues in the case. This in turn makes for better quality and more efficient decision making. However, there are exceptional circumstances in which the FCA may decide it is not appropriate to send out a preliminary findings letter. This includes: (1) where the subject consents to not receiving a preliminary findings letter; or (2) where it is not practicable