Related provisions for PERG 9.3.4

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To access the FCA Handbook Archive choose a date between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2004 (From field only).

PERG 9.8.2GRP
In the FCA's view, the 'realisation' of an investment means converting an asset into cash or money. The FCA does not consider that 'in specie' redemptions (in the sense of exchanging shares or securities of BC with other shares or securities) will generally count as realisation. Section 236(3)(a) refers to the realisation of an investment, the investment being represented by the 'value' of shares or securities held in BC. In the FCA's view, there is no realisation of value where
PERG 9.8.3GRP
The most typical means of realising BC's shares or securities will be by their being redeemed or repurchased, whether by BC or otherwise. There are, of course, other ways in which a realisation may occur. However, the FCA considers that these will often not satisfy all the elements of the definition of an open-ended investment company considered together. For example, the mere fact that shares or securities may be realised on a market will not meet the requirements of the 'satisfaction
PERG 9.8.4GRP
An investor in a body corporate may be able to realise part, but not all, of his investment. The FCA considers that the fact that partial realisations may take place at different times does not prevent the body corporate coming within the definition of an open-ended investment company. But, in any particular case, the 'expectation test' will only be met if the overall period for realising the whole of the investment can be considered to be reasonable. Apart from this, the simple
PERG 9.8.5GRP
The use of an expectation test ensures that the definition of an open-ended investment company is not limited to a situation where a holder of shares in, or securities of, a body corporate has an entitlement or an option to realise his investment. It is enough if, on the facts of any particular case, the reasonable investor would expect that he would be able to realise the investment. The following are examples of circumstances in which the FCA considers that a reasonable investor
PERG 9.8.7GRP
In the FCA's view, the fact that a person may invest in the period shortly before a redemption date would not cause a body corporate, that would not otherwise be regarded as such, to be open-ended. This is because the investment condition must be applied in relation to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general).
PERG 9.8.9GRP
As indicated in PERG 9.3.5 G (The definition), the potential for variation in the form and operation of a body corporate is considerable. So, it is only possible in general guidance to give examples of the factors that the FCA considers may affect any particular judgment. These should be read bearing in mind any specific points considered elsewhere in the guidance. Such factors include:(1) the terms of the body corporate's constitution;(2) the applicable law;(3) any public representations
SUP 10A.6.10GRP
A director can be a body corporate and may accordingly require approval as an FCA-approved person in the same way as a natural person may require approval.
SUP 10A.6.21GRP
Note that a body corporate may be a chief executive. If so, it will need to be approved (if the firm in question is an FCA-authorised person) to perform the chief executive function.
PERG 9.9.2GRP
In the FCA view, this means that the reasonable investor must be satisfied that what he will get when he realises his investment is his proportionate share in the value of BC's underlying assets, less any dealing costs. In other words, that he is satisfied he will get net asset value. The investment condition focuses on the way the body corporate operates over time, and not by reference to particular issues of shares or securities (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section
PERG 9.9.3GRP
For the 'satisfaction test' to be met, there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could form a view. He must be satisfied that the value of BC's property will be the basis of a calculation used for the whole, or substantially the whole, of his investment. The FCA considers that the circumstances, or combination of circumstances, in which a reasonable investor would be in a position to form this view include:(1) where the basis of net asset valuation
PERG 9.9.4GRP
PERG 9.9.3 G (2)and PERG 9.9.3 G (3) refer to circumstances where the reasonable investor may be satisfied that he can realise his investment at net asset value because of arrangements made to ensure that the shares or securities trade at net asset value on a market. There may, for example, be cases of market dealing where the price of shares or securities will not depend on the market. An example is where BC or a third party undertakes to ensure that the market value reflects
PERG 9.9.5GRP
However, where there is a market, the FCA does not consider that the test in section 236(3)(b) would be met if the price the investor receives for his investment is wholly dependent on the market rather than specifically on net asset value. In the FCA's view, typical market pricing mechanisms introduce too many uncertainties to be able to form a basis for calculating the value of an investment (linked to net asset value) of the kind contemplated by the satisfaction test. As a
PERG 9.9.6GRP
The fact that the definition must be applied to BC as a whole (see PERG 9.6.3 G (The investment condition (section 236(3) of the Act): general)) is also relevant here. So, for example, in a take-over situation the fact that a bidder may be willing to provide an exit route for an investment at net asset value will be irrelevant within the context of the definition. This is so even if an investor invests in particular shares or securities in the knowledge or expectation or in anticipation
PERG 9.3.2GRP
Each of these aspects of the definition is considered in greater detail in PERG 9.4 (Collective investment scheme (section 235 of the Act)) to PERG 9.9 (The investment condition: the 'satisfaction test' (section 236(3)(b) of the Act)). Although the definition has a number of elements, the FCA considers that it requires an overall view to be taken of the body corporate. This is of particular importance in relation to the investment condition (see PERG 9.6.3 G and PERG 9.6.4 G (The
PERG 9.3.5GRP
The FCA understands that the aim of the definition in section 236 of the Act is to include any body corporate which, looked at as a whole, functions as an open-ended investment vehicle. The definition operates against a background that there is a wide range of different circumstances in which any particular body corporate can be established and operated. For example, the definition applies to bodies corporate wherever they are formed. So, in the application of the definition to
PERG 9.3.6GRP
For a body corporate formed outside the United Kingdom, there is an additional issue as to how the applicable corporate law and the definition of open-ended investment company in the Act relate to one another. The FCA understands this to operate as follows. The term 'body corporate' is defined in section 417(1) of the Act (Interpretation) as including 'a body corporate constituted under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom'. So, whether or not any particular
PERG 9.7.2GRP
The characteristics that a reasonable investor can be expected to have will inform the use of judgment required by the 'expectation test' and the 'satisfaction test'. These tests relate to the investor's ability to realise an investment within a reasonable period and to do so on the basis of the net value of its assets. In the FCA's view, the characteristics of the reasonable investor include:(1) sound judgment based on good sense;(2) some knowledge of, and possibly experience
PERG 9.7.3GRP
The reasonable investor is a hypothetical investor. The implications of this are that the test does not relate to actual investment by a particular person at a particular time or in relation to a particular issue of any class of shares or securities. In the FCA's view, what underlies the test is what a reasonable investor would think he was getting into if he were contemplating investment in a particular body corporate. In addition, because the investor is hypothetical, the investment
PERG 9.7.5GRP
After an initial assessment, however, the FCA's view is that subsequent applications of the investment condition could produce a different result, but only if there is a change to the constitution or practice of the body corporate which is significant and sustained. For example, this may happen if there is a change in the body corporate's published intentions or regular practices. As the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said in parliamentary debate when commenting on the definition,
PERG 9.7.6GRP
Section 236(3) uses the words "the investor would, if he were to participate in the scheme". This is consistent with the fact that the reasonable investor is hypothetical. But applying the test at this early stage makes it clear that there must be objectively justifiable grounds on which the reasonable investor could base the expectation in section 236(3)(a). And on which he could be satisfied on the matters in section 236(3)(b). In the FCA's view, this requires, for example,
PERG 8.14.37GRP
In the FCA's view, a main aim of the exemption (see PERG 8.14.35G (1)) is to remove from the scope of section 21 a financial promotion concerning the sale of a corporate business by a person who, either alone or with others, controls the business to another person who, either alone or with others, proposes to control the business.
PERG 8.14.41GRP
Several exemptions, including article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order (Members and creditors of certain bodies corporate), apply only in relation to relevant investments being shares or debentures or alternative debentures7 in the body corporate or a member of its group, or warrants or certificates representing certain securities relating to such shares or debentures or alternative debentures.7 In the FCA's view, an exchangeable debt security which is partly a debenture or
PERG 9.10.10GRP
7(1) A person carrying on the regulated activity of establishing, operating or winding up a collective investment scheme that is constituted as an open-ended investment company will need permission for those activities. In line with section 237(2) of the Act (Other definitions), the operator of a collective investment scheme that is an open-ended investment company is the company itself and therefore the starting point for an open-ended investment company that is incorporated
PERG 9.5.5GRP
In the FCA's view, the question of whether funds are invested by BC with the aim of spreading investment risk is not affected by the levels of risk involved in particular investments. What matters for these purposes is that the aim is to spread the risk, whatever it may be. For example, the value of each of BC's investments, if taken separately, might be subject to a high level of risk. However, this would not itself result in BC failing to satisfy the property condition as long
PERG 9.6.3GRP
Section 236(3) of the Act states clearly that the investment condition must be met 'in relation to BC'. In the FCA's view, this means that the investment condition should not be applied rigidly in relation to specific events such as particular issues of shares or securities or in relation to particular points in time. The requirements of the investment condition must be satisfied in relation to the overall impression of the body corporate itself, having regard to all the circ
PERG 9.6.4GRP
In the FCA's view, and within limits, the investment condition allows for the possibility that a body corporate that is an open-ended investment company may issue shares or securities with different characteristics. Some shares or securities may clearly satisfy the condition whereas others may not. The FCA considers that a reasonable investor contemplating investment in such a body corporate may still take the view, looking at the body corporate overall, that the investment condition
PERG 9.4.3GRP
In the FCA's view, it is the very existence of the body corporate that is the collective investment scheme. There are a number of statutory references that support this view. For example, it is clear that paragraph 21 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Collective Investment Schemes) Order 2001 (SI 2001/1062) (Arrangements not amounting to a collective investment scheme) is drafted on the basis that it is the body corporate itself that is (or would
PERG 9.4.4GRP
Analysing a typical corporate structure in terms of the definition of a collective investment scheme, money will be paid to the body corporate in exchange for shares or securities issued by it. The body corporate becomes the beneficial owner of that money in exchange for rights against the legal entity that is the body corporate. The body corporate then has its own duties and rights that are distinct from those of the holders of its shares or securities. Such arrangements will,
PERG 9.4.6GRP
In the FCA's view, the question of what constitutes a single scheme in line with section 235(4) of the Act does not arise in relation to a body corporate. This is simply because the body corporate is itself a collective investment scheme (and so is a single scheme). Section 235(4) contemplates a 'separate' pooling of parts of the property that is subject to the arrangements referred to in section 235(1). But to analyse a body corporate in this way requires looking through its
SYSC 4.8.9RRP

Table: FCA-prescribed senior management responsibilities for third-country relevant authorised persons.

FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility in relation to the branch

Explanation

Equivalent PRA-prescribed UK branch senior management responsibility

(1) Responsibility for the firm’s performance of its obligations under the senior management regime

The senior management regime means the requirements of the regulatory system applying to relevant authorised persons insofar as they relate to SMF managers performing designated senior management functions, including SUP 10C (FCA senior management regime for approved persons in relevant authorised persons).

This responsibility includes:

(1) compliance with conditions and time limits on approval;

(2) compliance with the requirements about the statements of responsibilities (but not the allocation of responsibilities recorded in them);3

(3) compliance by the firm with its obligations under section 60A of the Act (Vetting of candidates by relevant authorised persons); and3

3(4) compliance by the firm with the requirements in SYSC 22 (Regulatory references) so far as they relate to the senior management regime, including the giving of references to another firm about an SMF manager or former SMF manager.

PRA-prescribed UK branch senior management responsibility 6.2(1)

(2) Responsibility for the firm’s performance of its obligations under the employee certification regime

The employee certification regime means the requirements of sections 63E and 63F of the Act (Certification of employees) and all other requirements of the regulatory system about the matters dealt with in those sections, including:3

3(1) SYSC 5.2 (Certification Regime);

3(2) the requirements in SYSC 22 (Regulatory references) so far as they relate to the employee certification regime, including the giving of references to another firm about a certification employee or former certification employee; and

3(3) the corresponding PRA requirements.

PRA-prescribed UK branch senior management responsibility 6.2(2)

(3) Responsibility for compliance with the requirements of the regulatory system about the management responsibilities map

This responsibility does not include allocating responsibilities recorded in it.

PRA-prescribed UK branch senior management responsibility 6.2(3)

(4) Responsibility for management of the firm’s risk management processes in the UK

PRA-prescribed UK branch senior management responsibility 6.2(4)

(5) Responsibility for the firm’s compliance with the UKregulatory system applicable to the firm

PRA-prescribed UK branch senior management responsibility 6.2(5)

(6) Responsibility for the escalation of correspondence from the PRA, FCA and other regulators4 in respect of the firm to the governing body and/or the management body of the firm or, where appropriate, of the parent undertaking or holding company of the firm’sgroup

This includes taking steps to ensure that the senior management of the firm and, where applicable, the group, are made aware of any views expressed by the regulatory bodies and any steps taken by them in relation to the branch, firm or group.

PRA-prescribed UK branch senior management responsibility 6.2(6)

(7) Local responsibility for the firm’s policies and procedures for countering the risk that the firm might be used to further financial crime

(A) This includes the function in SYSC 6.3.8R (a firm must allocate overall responsibility to a director or senior manager within the firm for the establishment and maintenance of effective anti-money laundering systems and controls), if that rule applies to the firm.

(B) The firm may allocate this FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility to the MLRO but does not have to.

(C) If the firm does not allocate this FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility to the MLRO, this FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility includes responsibility for supervision of the MLRO.

(D) Local responsibility is defined in SYSC 4.8.10R (Local responsibility for a branch’s activities, business areas and management functions).

None

(8) Local responsibility for the firm’s compliance with CASS

(A) This responsibility only applies to a firm to which CASS applies.

(B) A firm may include in this FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility whichever of the following functions apply to the firm:

(1) CASS 1A.3.1R (certain CASS compliance functions for a CASS small firm);

(2) CASS 1A.3.1AR (certain CASS compliance functions for a CASS medium firm or a CASS large firm);

(3) CASS 11.3.1R (certain CASS compliance functions for certain CASS small debt management firms); or

(4) CASS 11.3.4R (certain CASS compliance functions for a CASS large debt management firm); but it does not have to.

(C) If the firm does not include the functions in (B) in this FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility, this FCA-prescribed senior management responsibility includes responsibility for supervision of the person performing the functions in (B) that apply to the firm.

(D) Local responsibility is defined in SYSC 4.8.10R (Local responsibility for a branch’s activities, business areas and management functions).

None
FEES 4.4.9DRP
3To the extent that a firm4 has provided the information required by FEES 4.4.7 D to the FCA as part of its compliance with another provision of the Handbook, it is deemed to have complied with the provisions of that direction.444
SUP 15.5.1RRP
A firm must give the FCA4 reasonable advance notice of a change in:1010(1) the firm's name (which is the registered name if the firm is a body corporate); (2) any business name under which the firm carries on a regulated activity or ancillary activity either from an establishment in the United Kingdom or with or for clients in the United Kingdom.
PERG 9.1.4GRP
The only kind of body corporate of an open-ended kind that may currently be formed under the law of the United Kingdom is one that is authorised by the FCA. A person intending to form an open-ended body corporate that has its head office in Great Britain should refer to the Open-ended Investment Companies Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1228). Bodies corporate formed under these Regulations are referred to in the Handbook as investment companies with variable capital (or ' ICVCs ').