Related provisions for SUP 1A.4.7
701 - 720 of 1118 items.
Factors that may be relevant in the assessment of a MiFID complaint under DISP 1.1A.20R(2) include the following:
(1) all the evidence available and the particular circumstances of the complaint;(2)
similarities with other complaints received by the respondent;
(3) relevant guidance published by the FCA, other relevant regulators, the Financial Ombudsman Service or former schemes; and
(4) appropriate analysis of decisions by the Financial Ombudsman Service concerning similar
When assessing a MiFID investment firm’s response to a MiFID complaint, the FCA may have regard to a number of factors, including, the quality of response, as against the above rules, as well as the speed with which it was made.
[Note: subject to a few minor changes reflecting its amended application, this provision replicates DISP 1.6.8G]
The complaints reporting rules also apply to the MiFID complaints of a firm, except that the relevant parts of the report which the firm must provide to the FCA under DISP 1.10.1R must, in relation to MiFID complaints, include information about such complaints received from retail clients, professional clients, and (where relevant) eligible counterparties rather than eligible complainants.
The FCA may modify LR 14.2.2 R to accept a percentage lower than 25% if it considers that the market will operate properly with a lower percentage in view of the large number of shares of the same class and the extent of their distribution to the public. For that purpose, the FCA may take into account shares of the same class that are held (even though they are not listed) in states that are not EEA States.1[Note: Article 48 CARD]
The FCA will not admit shares of a company incorporated in a non-EEA State that are not listed either in its country of incorporation or in the country in which a majority of its shares are held, unless the FCA is satisfied that the absence of the listing is not due to the need to protect investors. [Note: Article 51 CARD]
In relation to each document in a CASS debt management firm'sCASS 11 resolution pack a firm must:(1) put in place adequate arrangements to ensure that an administrator, receiver, trustee, liquidator or analogous officer appointed in respect of it or any material part of its property is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable and, in any event, within 48 hours of that officer’s appointment; and(2) ensure that it is able to retrieve each document as soon as practicable
Article 72B of the Regulated Activities Order (Activities carried on by a provider of relevant goods or services) excludes from FCA regulation certain regulated activities carried on by providers of non-motor goods and services related to travel in relation to contracts of insurance that satisfy a number of conditions. Details about the scope of this exclusion can be found at PERG 5.11.13 G to PERG 5.11.15 G (Activities carried on by a provider of relevant goods or services)
1This
manual (DEPP) is relevant to firms, approved
persons and other persons,
whether or not they are regulated by the FCA.5 It sets out:5(1) the FCA's5 decision-making procedure for giving statutory
notices. These are warning
notices, decision notices and supervisory notices (DEPP 1.2 to DEPP 5);5(1A) the FCA's decision-making
procedure in cases where the PRA is
required to seek the FCA's consent
before approving an application (a) for Part
4A permission; (b) for the variation
(1) (a) If a depositary performs part of its functions through a branch in another EEA State, this is not a delegation by the depositary of its functions to a third party.(b) This is because ‘third party’ in COLL 6.6B.22R means any party that is not part of the same legal entity as the depositary.(2) Paragraph (1) also applies where the depositary is the UKbranch of an EEA firm and it performs part of its functions:(a) through a branch in another EEA State; or(b) from the EEA
The requirements of SUP 2 (Information gathering by the FCA or PRA2 on its own initiative) apply to the depositary, under which it must enable the FCA to obtain, on request, all information that the depositary has obtained while discharging its duties and that the FCA considers necessary.[Note: article 26a first paragraph of the UCITS Directive]
(1) 1A Solvency II firm (including a large non-directive insurer)2 must have, and maintain, a governance map which satisfies the following conditions:(a) it complies, as applicable,2 with PRA Rulebook: Solvency II firms: Insurance – Allocation of Responsibilities, 5.1 and 5.2, or PRA Rulebook: Large Non-Solvency II firms – Allocation of Responsibilities, 5.1 and 5.2,2 as if those rules had been made by the FCA; (b) it includes details relating to all persons carrying out a significant
2A small non-directive insurer must keep an up-to-date record of the scope of responsibilities for each approved person performing a significant influence function and must:(1) retain each version of the record for six years from the date on which it was superseded by a more up-to-date record;(2) be in a position to provide any version of the record in (1) to the FCA on request;(3) ensure that the record in (1) and each updated version:(a) has the form and content, subject to
(1) If a firm'sremuneration policy is not aligned with effective risk management, it is likely that employees will have incentives to act in ways that might undermine effective risk management. (2) The BIPRU Remuneration Code covers all aspects of remuneration that could have a bearing on effective risk management including salaries, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, options, hiring bonuses, severance packages and pension arrangements. In applying the BIPRU Remuneration Code,
(1) The specific remuneration requirements in this chapter may apply only to certain categories of employee. However, the FCA expects firms, in complying with the BIPRU Remuneration Codegeneral requirement, to apply certain principles on a firm-wide basis.(2) In particular, the FCA considers that firms should apply the principle relating to guaranteed variable remuneration on a firm-wide basis (Remuneration Principle 12(c); SYSC 19C.3.40 R to SYSC 19C.3.43 G. (3) The FCA also
Section 87B(1) of the Act sets out when the FCA may authorise the omission of information from a prospectus:
(1) |
The [FCA] may authorise the omission from a prospectus of any information, the inclusion of which would otherwise be required, on the ground – |
|
(a) |
that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest; |
|
(b) |
that its disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the issuer, provided that the omission would be unlikely to mislead the public with regard to any facts or circumstances which are essential for an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2); or |
|
(c) |
that the information is only of minor importance for a specific offer to the public or admission to trading on a regulated market and unlikely to influence an informed assessment of the kind mentioned in section 87A(2). |
|
2Article 2(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/301 sets out requirements regarding the submission of requests to omit information from a prospectus. The FCA considers that a reasoned request for this purpose would: (1) be in writing from the applicant;(2) identify the specific information concerned and the specific reasons for its omission; and(3) state why in the applicant's opinion one or more of the grounds in section 87B(1) of the Act applies.2[Note: Extracts
(1) The Takeover Panel publishes notices regarding compliance with the Takeover Code. It may also, from time to time, name in those notices persons as persons that, in the Takeover Panel's opinion, are not likely to comply with the Takeover Code. Any notices of this type will be available on the Takeover Panel's website (www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk).11(2) A firm should keep itself informed of Takeover Panel notices and take them into account in seeking to comply with MAR 4.3.1
(1) Where a restriction under MAR 4.3.1 R applies, an authorised professional firm is not prevented from providing professional advice or representation in any proceedings to the person where that falls within section 327(8) of the Act. This means that the person can obtain legal advice or representation in any proceedings from a law firm and accounting advice from an accounting firm: see MAR 4.4.1 R (2).(2) While the FCA recognises the duty of authorised professional firms to
The FCA2 will consider all the relevant circumstances of the case when deciding whether to impose a penalty or issue a public censure. As such, the factors set out in DEPP 6.4.2 G are not exhaustive. Not all of the factors may be relevant in a particular case and there may be other factors, not listed, that are relevant.2
The criteria for determining whether it is appropriate to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty include those factors that the FCA2 will consider in1 determining the amount of penalty set out in DEPP 6.5 A to DEPP 6.5 D.1 Some particular considerations that may be relevant when the FCA2 determines whether to issue a public censure rather than impose a financial penalty are:122(1) whether or not deterrence may be effectively achieved by issuing a public
The test for whether the contents of a particular website may or may not involve a financial promotion is no different to any other medium. If a website or part of a website, operated or maintained in the course of business, invites or induces a person to engage in investment activity, it will be a financial promotion. The FCA takes the view that the person who caused the website to be created will be a communicator. So, any software engineers that may or may not have been involved
The Internet also allows hypertext links, where two different sites in the Internet can be connected almost instantaneously by simply clicking on the link. The FCA's1 views on the position of hypertext links (which should be read with the remainder of PERG 8, especially PERG 8.4 (Invitation or inducement)) are as follows.1(1) A hypertext link may or may not be a financial promotion in itself. This will depend on the nature of the hypertext link and the context in which it is placed.
(1) Where a depositary of a master UCITS detects any irregularities with regards to the scheme which may have a negative impact on the relevant feeder UCITS, the depositary must immediately inform:(a) the FCA;(b) the feeder UCITS or, where applicable, its management company; and(c) the depositary of the feeder UCITS.(2) The irregularities referred to in (1) include, but are not limited to:(a) errors in the valuation of the scheme property performed in accordance with COLL 6.3.3
(1) When notifying the FCAof any irregularities in accordance with COLL 11.4.3R (1), the depositary of the master UCITS should also inform the depositary of the feeder UCITS how the master UCITS or its authorised fund manager has resolved or proposes to resolve the irregularity.(2) Where the depositary of a UCITS scheme that is a feeder UCITS is informed by the depositary of a master UCITS of an irregularity and is not satisfied that the resolution or proposed resolution is in
The FCA considers that, to satisfy the condition in PERG 8.15.2G (2) that an activity be incidental to the provision of professional services, regulated activities cannot be a major part of the practice of the professional firm. The FCA also considers that the following further factors are relevant.(1) The scale of regulated activity in proportion to other professional services provided.(2) Whether and to what extent services that are regulated activities are held out as separate
The article 55A exemption should enable professional firms to issue brochures, websites and other non-real time financial promotions without any need for approval by an authorised person. This is provided the financial promotion does not also contain an invitation or inducement relating to regulated activities other than those covered by the Part XX exemption. In this respect, it should be noted that, unlike article 55, the article 55A exemption does not extend to activities which
3A firm is not subject to consolidated supervision under BIPRU 8 where any of the following conditions are fulfilled:(1) the firm is included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by the FCA or PRA under the EUCRR; or(2) the firm is included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member by a competent authority other than the FCA under the EUCRR as implemented by that competent authority.
3Where a group includes one or more BIPRU firms and one or more IFPRU investment firms which has permission under article 19 of the EUCRR (Exclusion from the scope of prudential consolidation) from the FCA not to be included in the supervision on a consolidated basis of the group of which it is a member, consolidated supervision under BIPRU 8 applies to those IFPRU investment firms and the BIPRU firms.
If a firm ceases to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more classes54 part way through a financial year4 of the compensation scheme:4(1) it will remain liable for any unpaid levies which the FSCS has already made on the firm; and41(2) the FSCS may make one or more levies4 upon it (which may be before or after the firm5 has ceased to be a participant firm or carry out activities within one or more classes5,4 but must be before it ceases to be an authorised
(1) A firm may arrange for records to be kept in such form as it chooses, provided the record is readily accessible for inspection by the FCA.(2) Where a firm chooses to maintain records in electronic form, it should take reasonable steps to ensure that:(a) the electronic record accurately reflects the original information; and (b) the electronic record has not been subject to unauthorised or accidental alteration.
An applicant for the admission of securitised derivatives must either:(1) have permission under the Act to carry on its activities relating to securitised derivatives and be either a bank or a securities and futures firm;(2) if the applicant is an overseas company:(a) be regulated by an overseas regulator responsible for the regulation of banks, securities firms or futures firms and which has a lead regulation agreement for financial supervision with the FCA; and(b) be carrying
Neither the UCITS Directive6, MiFID,3 the Insurance Mediation Directive, AIFMD6 nor the Act define what is meant by a firm's 'head office'. This is not necessarily the firm's place of incorporation or the place where its business is wholly or mainly carried on. Although the FCA5 will judge each application on a case-by-case basis, the key issue in identifying the head office of a firm is the location of its central management and control, that is, the location of: 16(1) the directors
The FCA's3 penalty-setting regime is based on the following principles:3(1) Disgorgement - a firm or individual should not benefit from any breach;(2) Discipline - a firm or individual should be penalised for wrongdoing; and(3) Deterrence - any penalty imposed should deter the firm or individual who committed the breach, and others, from committing further or similar breaches.
(1) The total amount payable by a person subject to enforcement action may be made up of two elements: (i) disgorgement of the benefit received as a result of the breach; and (ii) a financial penalty reflecting the seriousness of the breach. These elements are incorporated in a five-step framework, which can be summarised as follows:(a) Step 1: the removal of any financial benefit derived directly from the breach;(b) Step 2: the determination of a figure which reflects the seriousness